Spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology to estimate location-specific loss-of-coolant accident frequencies for risk-informed analysis of nuclear power plants by O'Shea, Nicholas William
  
 
 
 
SPATIO-TEMPORAL PROBABILISTIC METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE          
LOCATION-SPECIFIC LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT FREQUENCIES FOR  
RISK-INFORMED ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
NICHOLAS O’SHEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Nuclear, Plasma, and Radiological Engineering 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
Master’s Committee: 
 
Assistant Professor Zahra Mohaghegh, Chair 
Professor Rizwan Uddin    
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has promoted the use of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in nuclear regulatory activities.  Since loss-of-coolant 
accidents (LOCAs) are critical initiating events for many PRA applications, the NRC has taken 
steps towards the quantification of LOCA frequencies for use in risk-informed applications.  This 
research develops the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology to explicitly incorporate the 
underlying physics of failure mechanisms into the location-specific estimation of LOCA 
frequencies that are required for risk-informed regulatory applications such as risk-informed 
resolution of generic Safety Issue 191 (GSI-191). 
 
The essence of the risk-informed resolution of GSI-191 is that location-specific LOCA 
frequencies drive the risk.  The most recent NRC-sponsored estimations of LOCA frequencies 
were developed through an expert elicitation approach, provided in NUREG-1829.  These 
estimations provided an implicit incorporation of underlying physics, space, and time.  In support 
of the South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) risk-informed pilot project to 
resolve GSI-191, Fleming and Lydell developed a study which laid the groundwork for the 
location-specific estimations of LOCA frequencies. This research performs a critical review and a 
step-by-step quantitative verification of Fleming and Lydell’s methodology and, thus, two key 
methodological gaps are identified: (a) lack of inclusion of non-piping reactor coolant system 
components, and (b) lack of explicit incorporation of the underlying physics of failure that lead to 
the occurrence of a LOCA.  To address these gaps, first, this research qualitatively examines the 
significance of including the contributions of non-piping components into the estimations of 
LOCA frequencies by conducting industry-academia evidence seeking and screening processes. 
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Then, the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology is developed that can be used to 
quantitatively compare non-piping and piping components with respect to LOCA frequencies. The 
proposed Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology also integrates the following two types of 
modeling:  
(1) The Markov modeling technique to depict the renewal processes of components’ 
repair due to periodic maintenance after degradations;  
(2) Probabilistic Physics of failure (PPoF) models to explicitly incorporate the failure 
mechanisms, associated with the location and age of components, into the estimation 
of LOCA frequencies.  PPoF models integrate the underlying mechanisms related to 
degradation into the Markov modeling technique and, subsequently, into location-
specific LOCA frequency estimations.  
 
In most of Markov models developed in this area of research, transition rates are developed 
using solely data-driven approaches and utilizing service data. The main problems with the 
Markov models with the solely data-driven transition rates are (1) inaccuracy due to insufficient 
data and (2) the lack of explicit connections with location-specific physics of failure mechanisms 
associated with transition rates.  There is only one existing research that combines the Markov 
modeling technique with a stress-strength model of erosion corrosion for the piping components 
of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR); however due to the underlying assumptions of the 
methodology, this study does not adequately provide explicit incorporation of physical factors 
associated with locations. The Spatio-Temporal probabilistic methodology is the first research that 
combines the Markov technique with PPoF models for LOCA frequency estimations and, has four 
key tasks including:   
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➢ Task #1:  Defining Markov States of Degradation 
➢ Task #2:  Modeling and Quantification of the Transition Rates of Degradation 
o Task # 2.1: Developing and quantifying physics of failure causal models 
o Task #2.2: Propagating uncertainties in the physics of failure causal models to 
develop Probabilistic Physics of failure (PPoF) models 
o Task #2.3: Calculating transition rates of degradation based on the output of 
Probabilistic Physics of failure (PPoF) models 
o Task # 2.4: Bayesian integration of the estimated transition rate from PPoF 
models and the ones from solely data-oriented approaches  
➢ Task #3: Modeling and Quantification of the Transition Rates of Repair  
➢ Task #4: Developing the Time-dependent Distributions of State Probabilities   
 
The Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology provides the possibility for explicitly 
including the effects of location-specific causal factors, such as operating conditions (e.g., 
temperature, pressure, pH), maintenance quality, and material properties (e.g., yield strength and 
corrosion resistance) on the probability of LOCA occurrence.  This methodology is beneficial, not 
only for estimation of location-specific LOCA frequencies, but also for incorporation of spatio-
temporal physics of failure into Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA); therefore, it helps advance 
risk estimation and risk prevention.  The explicit incorporation of failure mechanisms helps more 
accurately estimate the likelihood of LOCA occurrences, dealing with limited historical data.  
Additionally, the explicit incorporation of the causal factors enables the use of sensitivity analyses, 
which allow the physical causal factors to be ranked in order of their risk significance.  Ranking 
v 
 
of causal factors helps optimize maintenance practices by indicating the most resource-efficient 
methods to reduce risks.   
 
To show the feasibility, the spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology is implemented to 
examine the effects of Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) on the rupture probability of steam 
generator tubes.  This case study demonstrates the comparative capabilities of the methodology by 
showing the variation in rupture probability based on the selection of Stainless Steel and Alloy 
690 materials for fabrication of the expansion-transition region of the steam generator tubes.  
Although the tasks in this case study are explained based on SCC, which is a dominant mechanism 
associated with LOCA in nuclear power plants, the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology 
can be applied for other failure mechanisms (e.g., wear, creep) and for any high-consequence 
industry that deals with containment of flowing liquids or gases, such as the oil and gas industry. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) promotes the use of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in nuclear regulatory activities[1].  Section 1.2 of this 
thesis consists of the background on PRA and, Section 1.3 explains its application to regulatory 
Risk-Informed Decision-Making (RIDM).  Since loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) are critical 
initiating events for many PRA applications, the NRC has taken steps towards the quantification 
of LOCA frequencies [2, 3] for use in risk-informed applications.  This research develops the 
Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology to explicitly incorporate the underlying physics of 
failure mechanisms into the location-specific estimation of LOCA frequencies that are required 
for risk-informed regulatory applications such as the risk-informed resolution of Generic Safety 
Issue 191 (GSI-191)[4].  Section 1.4.2 briefly explains the South Texas Project Nuclear 
Operating Company (STPNOC) risk-informed resolution to this issue.   
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Figure 1.1 Roadmap of the Research 
 
 
The premise of the risk-informed resolution of GSI-191 is that location-specific LOCA 
frequencies drive the risk of GSI-191 related failure. Therefore, Step #1 of the roadmap of this 
research, presented in Figure 1.1, begins with the most recent NRC-sponsored estimations of 
LOCA frequencies provided in NUREG-1829.  These estimations are only implicit functions of 
underlying physics, space, and time.  This indicates that the experts who developed the NUREG-
1829 estimations understood how the underlying physical failure mechanisms could cause the 
occurrence of a LOCA; however, they did not develop an explicit model to incorporate these 
effects.  The experts considered how LOCA frequencies changed, based on both the reactor-age 
and the location within the reactor coolant system (RCS), but they did not provide an explicit 
model incorporating these spatio-temporal effects.  The experts performing the analysis 
documented in NUREG-1829 provided “multipliers” for the distributions of LOCA frequencies.  
These multipliers allow for the estimates to be adjusted from 25 years of reactor life to 40- or 60-
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year estimates; however, these multipliers mask the mechanisms that, over time, change the LOCA 
frequencies.  In other words, the temporal effects on LOCA frequencies are only implicitly 
considered.  The NUREG-1829 estimations of LOCA frequencies are provided as a function of 
flow rates of escaping coolant, which are then converted to component break size.  These 
frequencies represent a simple summation of the contributions to LOCA frequencies from all 
locations across the RCS, but the estimations of LOCA frequencies provided in NUREG-1829 do 
not explicitly provide the contribution for each individual location to the total of LOCA frequencies 
across the RCS.  While the experts incorporated their knowledge of how contributions to LOCA 
frequencies vary by location in the RCS, this knowledge of spatial variation is only implicitly 
incorporated into the final NUREG-1829 results.  A brief history of NRC-sponsored estimations 
of LOCA frequencies is provided in Section 1.4.3. 
 
Step #2 of the roadmap of this research, presented in Figure 1.1, focuses on the critical 
review of the location-specific estimation of LOCA frequencies, developed by Fleming and 
Lydell[5] for the STPNOC risk-informed resolution of GSI-191. Fleming and Lydell’s study laid 
the groundwork for the explicit incorporation of both underlying failure mechanisms and spatial 
variation into the estimation of LOCA frequencies.  Fleming and Lydell, however, used a solely 
data-driven approach for the incorporation of the underlying failure mechanisms at each location 
across the RCS.  Fleming and Lydell developed surrogate failure rates for each of the major failure 
mechanisms that affected a PWR RCS by attributing historical operating experience to dominant 
failure mechanisms across broad categories of welds.  The temporal variation of LOCA 
frequencies in Fleming and Lydell’s work was implicitly considered because they used the same 
generic “multipliers” developed by the experts for the NUREG-1829 elicitation.  The probability 
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of an RCS component experiencing a rupture changes as components degrade and, as they degrade, 
they are more likely to rupture and make an increased contribution to the estimation of LOCA 
frequencies.  Therefore, to explicitly incorporate this temporal variation into LOCA frequencies, 
the states of degradation of the components in the RCS need to be considered.   
 
Chapter 2 summarizes a critical review on the location-specific, data-driven incorporation 
of physics of failure mechanisms into the estimation of LOCA frequencies developed by 
Fleming & Lydell. The step-by-step quantitative verification of the results, critical review of the 
methodology, and implementation are provided.   The author’s contributions to the improvement 
of the Fleming & Lydell’s report are detailed and the methodological gaps are identified and 
cover the (a) lack of incorporation of non-piping RCS components, (b) the implicit incorporation 
of reactor-age and lack of explicit incorporation of time and space, and the lack of explicit 
incorporation of the underlying physics of failure that lead to the occurrence of a LOCA.   
 
Step #3 of the roadmap of this research, presented in Figure 1.1, further analyzes the 
criticality of one of the gaps, which is the lack of incorporating non-piping RCS components. 
The results of this investigation are reported in Chapter 3 of the thesis.   Chapter 3 examines an 
evidence-seeking procedure and expert elicitation process to determine the significance of the 
contributions of non-piping reactor coolant system (RCS) components to the estimation of 
LOCA frequencies that was first presented in [6, 7].  Some estimations of LOCA frequencies 
have included contributions from non-piping RCS components[3], while other estimations have 
focused on the contributions from RCS piping components[2, 5].   
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Step #4 of the roadmap of this research, presented in Figure 1.1, focuses on other gaps in 
Fleming & Lydell’s approach by developing the spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology 
which explicitly incorporates underlying physical failure mechanisms into the estimation of 
location-specific LOCA frequencies. In this methodology, the Markov modeling technique, 
which is based on the renewal process theory, is integrated with Probabilistic Physics of Failure 
models to estimate RCS LOCA frequencies as a function of location and age and with 
considerations of periodic degradation and repair phenomena.  This idea was first presented in 
[8].  Probabilistic Physics of Failure models are used to develop a probability model directly 
from the physical failure mechanisms, building off the work presented in [9].  The underlying 
physics replace the need for statistical data[10, 11].  The methodology enables the effects of 
operating conditions, maintenance programs, and material selection to be compared with respect 
to their contributions to LOCA frequencies. This methodology will assist with the generation of 
a more efficient prevention strategy by identifying the most risk-significant causal factors.  
Improved prevention strategies will lead to more efficient maintenance programs allowing for a 
more efficient allocation of resources for improving safety and increasing system performance.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis explains the spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology. 
 
Step #5 of the roadmap of this research, presented in Figure 1.1,  focuses on a case study 
for the implementation of the spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology to examine the effects 
of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) on the rupture probability of steam generator tubes.  This case 
study demonstrates the comparative capabilities of the methodology by showing the variation in 
rupture probability based on the selection of Stainless Steel and Alloy 690 materials for the 
fabrication of the expansion-transition region of the steam generator tubes. Chapter 5 of this 
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thesis demonstrates the case study and its results.  Chapter 6 of the thesis covers the conclusions 
and makes recommendations for the direction of future work.   
 
1.2 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
The NRC relies on PRA as one of the main pillars of its risk-informed regulatory and 
oversight functions[12, 13].  PRA (summarized in WASH-1400, also known as the Reactor 
Safety Study (RSS)[14] is a systematic methodology used to quantify the risks, in terms of 
frequencies of catastrophic failures, associated with complex engineering systems that are 
sometimes referred to as a system of systems.  A nuclear power plant (NPP) is one example of a 
complex system of systems.   
 
The PRA methodology integrates design and operation aspects of an NPP in a logical 
framework that, when solved, helps provide information for analyzing plant-specific and generic 
safety issues[15].  PRA can be developed down to individual system components at different 
levels of granularity.  PRA helps disclose scenarios of events requiring analysis, as well as the 
sequences of events contributing to risk in terms of core damage frequency, large early release 
frequency, and property damage, injury, and death frequencies.  The most common definition of 
risk, the triplet definition, asks three questions [16]: 
- What can go wrong? 
- What is the likelihood? 
- What are the consequences?  
 
Based on the triplet definition of risk, risk can be calculated as a frequency by using Equation 
(1.1) [16]:  
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 ( ) ( ) ( )Risk R Frequency f Consequence C    (1.1) 
 
Kaplan and Garrick[16] caution that Equation (1.1) may be misleading.  By multiplying 
the frequency and consequence of events, a low-probability high-damage scenario is equivalent 
to a high-probability low-damage scenario quantitatively.  These cases are qualitatively quite 
different, however, since the risks calculated may contain multiple scenarios of varying 
frequencies and consequences and these scenarios would generate a distribution of risk.  
Equation (1.1) would only provide an expected or average value of the distribution.  Therefore, it 
might be beneficial to think of and describe risk as being comprised of frequencies and 
consequences, and to keep these two elements separate[16].   
 
Since the commercial nuclear power industry has a very good safety record, it does not 
have a large database of events available for the purpose of quantifying accident scenario 
frequencies for use in Equation (1.1).  Therefore, the assessment of plant design, operation, and 
safety is accomplished by identifying the sequences of potential events that dominate risk.  The 
standard approach for modeling the possible sequences of events is to use event trees (ETs).  ETs 
are inductive models that follow a chronological sequence of events that may lead to undesirable 
consequences.  In other words, ETs implicitly incorporate time into the model of events leading 
to scenarios.  The first event in an ET is known as the initiating event (IE).  Once the analyst has 
become familiarized with the plant design and method of operation, the initiating events are 
defined and grouped.  One type of initiating events is a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).  After 
the initiating event occurs, the ET models a series of “top events” to determine to which “end 
state” the system will proceed.  End states for PRAs of NPPs generally range from “no damage” 
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to “maximum core damage”[17].  The event tree is functionalized using Boolean logic, which 
means that each top event has a probability of occurrence.  The success or failure of each event 
determines which branching of the ET is to be followed and, consequently, which end state the 
system will reach.  Separate event trees are generally constructed for each initiating event. 
 
The probability for the occurrence of each top event in the ET must be quantified to 
determine the overall frequency for each of the end states.  One approach to quantify the top 
event probability is to use a statistical estimate from available data.  There is often insufficient 
data to draw a reliable statistical estimate; therefore, the system or sub-system associated with 
each top event can be modeled as a summation of its components.  The classical approach for 
modeling the components of a system is to develop fault trees (FTs).  FTs are deductive models 
that use Boolean logic gates, primarily “AND” and “OR” gates, to generate logical statements 
regarding the failure of a system.  The failure of the system will correspond to the occurrence 
(failure) or nonoccurrence (success) of a top event.  FTs are used to break-down the analysis of 
complex systems, for which there are insufficient data to develop a failure probability, into the 
components for which there are sufficient data available [18].  An example of ET and a 
corresponding FT can be found in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2 Event Tree and Connected Fault Tree Example [19] 
 
 
It is important to note that the use of ETs and FTs will provide “surrogate frequencies” 
for each end state.  Since there are insufficient data available to draw a statistical estimation of 
these end state frequencies, the surrogate frequencies are extracted from information from the 
components that build the system (or from partially relevant information utilizing Bayesian 
analysis) and are connected through a logical framework.  However, the development of the 
surrogate frequencies has an additional benefit.  By modeling the system at the component level, 
the contributions from individual components are no longer grouped under the performance of 
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the system.  This enables to the modeler to see which components make the most significant 
contributions to the end state frequencies.  
 
Fault trees must be constructed in the context of the evaluation being performed.  The 
depth of the fault tree analysis depends on the level of component or sub-system data available.  
The structure of the fault trees depends on how failure dependence between components is 
addressed in the analysis.  Identification and analysis of dependent failures are extremely 
important in PRA studies, because such dependencies can increase the frequency of multiple 
failures; therefore, dependent failures must be considered throughout the probabilistic 
analysis[15].  PRA studies, through common-cause failure (CCF) analysis[20],  are capable of 
modeling those dependent failure mechanisms that create an increase in overall risk.   
 
Past PRAs have shown the importance of the incorporation of operator error.  This error 
should be included in the system analysis to ensure that the true value of risk for an NPP is 
determined.  Incorporation of operator error is performed using human reliability analysis 
(HRA).  Error due to human action can significantly contribute to the overall risk experienced in 
a power plant[21]. 
 
The incorporation of uncertainty into PRA is integral.  There are uncertainties associated 
with every step of a PRA and some of them may be significant.  These uncertainties can stem 
from the available data at any level of analysis.  Uncertainties are also associated with every 
simplifying assumption made throughout the analysis.  These uncertainties must be propagated 
through the analysis in order to find the true uncertainty associated with the outputs of the 
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model[15].  Uncertainties are captured by distributions of risk or frequency, and can be 
categorized as either aleatory or epistemic.  Aleatory uncertainty is the portion of uncertainty 
associated with the randomness of the world, such as the roll of dice.  Epistemic uncertainty is 
due to limited data and knowledge.  For example, epistemic uncertainty may come from the 
measurement of an amount.  If ten scientists take a measurement of a length or volume, those 
scientists may arrive at ten different answers.  This uncertainty is called epistemic.  Increasing 
the knowledge of system should reduce epistemic uncertainty, but aleatory uncertainty is 
essentially uncontrollable.  Unless substantial effort is put into uncertainty quantification[22], it 
is often difficult to distinguish between these two types of uncertainties. 
 
PRA models provide a wide variety of benefits.  Primarily, they can be used to assess the 
risk significance of operational occurrences at NPPs.  These models enable the analysts to 
evaluate alternative design changes to improve safety or reduce costs.  Because these models 
incorporate both plant design and operational aspects, they can be useful in the training of plant 
operators and engineers.  Additionally, PRA helps integrate different disciplines, such as 
engineering and behavioral sciences, into the study of human reliability.  One of the most 
important aspects of PRA is that it provides decision-makers with information to make decisions 
about phenomena affecting intricate technical systems by identifying the dominant accident 
scenarios and contributing factors to risk[23]. 
 
1.3 RISK-INFORMED DECISION-MAKING 
Traditionally, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has utilized a 
deterministic approach to answer two primary questions for assessing public safety: 
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- What can go wrong? 
- What are the consequences? 
In recent years, the NRC has implemented a risk-informed performance-based approach which 
also seeks to answer two additional questions: 
- How likely is it that something will go wrong? 
- What performance is required? 
The NRC uses the triplet definition of risk, defined in Section 1.2, and the system performance 
requirements to combine the probability or likelihood of an event with the consequences of the 
event[24].   
  
In 1995, the NRC established an overall policy for consistency on the use of PRA 
methods in nuclear regulatory activities across potential applications of PRA by issuing “Use of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities; Final Policy 
Statement[1].  This policy statement concludes with four points regarding the expanded use of 
PRA in NRC activities: 
1) PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters, using state-of-the-art PRA 
methods, in a way that complements the NRC’s deterministic approach and supports 
defense-in-depth philosophy. 
2) PRA and associated analysis should be used in regulatory matters, within the state-of-the-
art, to reduce unnecessary conservatisms. 
3) PRA evaluations should be as realistic as possible and the supporting data should be 
publicly available for review. 
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4) Appropriate consideration of uncertainties should be used for making regulatory 
judgements. 
These four points are used as the basis for establishing the regulatory framework for making 
risk-informed decisions at the NRC.  This process of integrated decision-making has been widely 
incorporated into the U.S. nuclear safety systems and procedures.   
  
In 1998, the NRC published Regulatory Guide 1.174: An Approach for Using 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the 
Licensing Basis[12].  The purpose of this regulatory guide is to improve the consistency with 
which regulatory decisions are made in areas using risk analyses to justify actions, specifically 
regarding the plant licensing basis.  In this guide, an acceptable approach to risk-informed 
decision-making was established based on five principles, depicted in Figure 1.3: 
1) The proposed change meets the current regulations unless it is explicitly related to a 
requested exemption or rule change 
2) The proposed change is consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy 
3) The proposed change maintains sufficient safety margins 
4) When proposed changes result in an increase in core damage frequency or risk, the 
increases should be small and consistent with the intent of the Commission’s Safety Goal 
Policy Statement 
5) The impact of the proposed change should be monitored using performance measure 
strategies 
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Integrated decision-
making
1. Consistent with 
current regulations
2. Consistent with 
defense-in-depth 
philosophy
3. Maintain sufficient 
safety margins
4. Proposed increases 
in risk are small
5. Monitored by 
performance measure 
strategies
 
Figure 1.3 Principles of Risk-Informed Integrated Decision-Making, modified from [12] 
 
Risk-informed decision-making should not be confused with risk-based decision-making.  
In risk-informed decision-making, risk is one of the five inputs of the decision-making process.  
The risk input is associated with the fourth box in Figure 1.3.  A risk-based process would 
exclusively make decisions based on the risk analysis information[25].  However, a risk-
informed decision takes into consideration the risk analysis information in addition to the current 
regulations, defense-in-depth philosophy, sufficient safety margins, and performance measure 
strategies.   The motivation for implementing a risk-informed decision-making process is that 
with this, all the PRAs have ways to expose and reduce risk that, probably would not have been 
possible without the implementation of the PRA methodologies[26]. 
 
The risk information from PRAs is traditionally divided into three levels[15]: 
- Level 1: Determination of core damage frequency (CDF) through the assessment of 
plant failures (hardware, software, and human).   
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- Level 2: Determination of large early release frequency (LERF) and severity through 
assessment of containment response of released radiation. 
- Level 3: Development of risk curves for prompt fatalities and latent cancer fatalities 
through the assessment of off-site consequences to the public. 
 
NPP license holders each develop a plant-specific Level 1 PRA[27].  Level 1 PRAs use 
information regarding initiating events and scenario development to quantify a CDF.  Level 1 
PRAs do not distinguish between the severity of the consequences beyond core damage.   
 
Level 2 PRA expands upon a Level 1 PRA to consider containment response to an 
accident sequence.  Level 2 PRA predicts the time and mode of containment failure, as well as 
the radionuclides released to the environment[15].  While Level 1 PRA only seeks to quantify 
the frequency of a scenario (core damage), Level 2 PRA seeks to quantify both the frequency 
and consequence of a scenario (radionuclide release). 
 
Level 3 PRA uses the radionuclide information generated by the Level 2 PRA and 
assesses the transport of radionuclides through the environment.  Level 3 PRA calculates the 
final consequences to the public and, therefore, completes the calculation provided in Equation 
(1.1) [15].   
 
The source of risk information used in the NRC’s decision-making process, represented 
by Figure 1.3, is the contribution of a proposed regulatory change to CDF and LERF.  Using 
Level 1 and Level 2 PRAs, the inputs can be changed to see what the results of a regulatory 
16 
 
change would be on CDF and LERF.  There is a standard released by The American Society for 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) for Level 1 and limited Level 2 PRA for full-power operations 
proposed in 2002[28].  There are no ASME or American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards, 
beyond the calculation of LERF[29], for either Level 2 or Level 3 PRA.  According to the 2009 
ASME standards, Level 1 PRA must contain[30]: 
- Initiating event analysis 
- Accident sequence analysis 
- Success criteria analysis 
- Systems analysis 
- Human reliability analysis 
- Data analysis 
- Quantification 
 
In addition to CDF and LERF, risk information also includes contributions from 
quantitative health objectives (QHOs).  For the United States, QHOs ensure that prompt fatalities 
and cancer fatalities do not exceed 0.1% of the sum of prompt-fatality risks from other accidents 
to which the U.S. population is exposed and 0.1% of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting 
from other causes[25].  While CDF and LERF are the main measures of risk in the risk-informed 
decision-making process, this does not mean that Level 3 PRA results regarding prompt and 
latent cancer risks should be ignored.  The NRC has developed three major full-scope PRA 
studies [14, 31, 32] and another full-scope PRA project is in progress [33]. 
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1.4 RISK-INFORMED RESOLUTION OF GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 191 
One risk-informed decision-making application which requires the location-specific 
estimation of LOCA frequencies is the risk-informed resolution of Generic Safety Issue 191 
(GSI-191).  Section 1.4.1 briefly explains the history of GSI-191 and Section 1.4.2 demonstrates 
the risk-informed resolution of GSI-191, which was started under the STPNOC pilot project. 
Section 1.4.3 provides a background on the location-specific frequency estimation for the risk 
informed GSI-191 project.    
 
1.4.1 BACKGROUND ON GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 191 
The ECCS is designed to supply coolant to the reactor if a LOCA occurs.  One of the 
legal requirements of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.46, “Acceptance 
Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for Light-water Nuclear Power Reactors,” 
demands that a loss of long-term core cooling event must be mitigated with high probability[4].  
Therefore, in September 1996, the U.S. NRC issued Generic Safety Issue 191 (GSI-191), which 
is titled “Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor Sump 
Performance.”  GSI-191 was issued to help alleviate concerns regarding the performance of the 
sump after the occurrence of a LOCA.   
 
The concerns regarding PWR sump clogging due to debris date back to 1979 when the 
NRC opened Unresolved Safety Issue A-43, “Containment Emergency Sump Performance”.  In 
1985, the NRC sent a generic letter to all licensees explaining the problem, but did not require 
action[34].  However, the concerns became more urgent when on July 28, 1992, an event 
occurred at a Swedish BWR.  The event involved the clogging of two containment vessel spray 
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system suction strainers, which are synonymous with ECCS sump screens, by previously 
dislodged mineral wool.  The insulation material plugging occurred during a routine test[35].  In 
January and April of 1993, two similar events occurred at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant in 
North Perry, Ohio.  The first event resulted from fibrous debris and the second event resulted 
from latent debris in the suppression pool.  In the first event at Perry, the fibrous debris 
accumulated corrosion products more efficiently than the metal screen, resulting in a larger 
pressure drop (of flowing coolant water) through the sump screen due to the clogging at the 
screen[4].  An illustration of a typical PWR containment sump can be found in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4 Illustration of Containment Sump from [36] 
 
The NRC communicated these issues with the nuclear industry and they responded by 
modifying their strainers to minimize the potential for ECCS strainer clogging following a 
LOCA.  The strainer issue for BWRs was eventually resolved through wide-scale strainer 
replacement[37].  However, after several years of testing, the NRC decided that the same 
approach was insufficient to resolve the issue for PWRs[4].  In response to the continued 
concerns regarding the PWR sump designs, the NRC issued Generic Letter 2004-02[38] 
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requesting PWR plants to evaluate the recirculation functions of their ECCS and containment 
spray systems.   
 
This proved to be quite challenging, as the combination of fibrous debris and chemical 
precipitates were found to cause a significant head loss in post-LOCA environments[39].  The 
head loss could lead to a net positive suction head (NPSH) for ECCS and containment spray 
pumps, which could prevent them from maintaining a cool core during a LOCA.  Additionally, it 
was discovered that some of the finer debris could penetrate the strainer and inhibit coolant flow 
inside the reactor vessel.  With these discoveries, it became clear that the GSI-191 issue presents 
two major questions[40]: 
1. Would the debris that is carried with the coolant to the containment sump plug up the 
suction strainers of the ECCS pumps? 
2. Would the debris that penetrates the strainers cause blockage of the fuel channels within 
the reactor core? 
 
Despite early recognition for the need of risk quantification[41], and even after some 
thought had been given to it[42], both industry and the NRC opted for a classical deterministic 
approach for resolving GSI-191.  Due to the complexities of the issue, the classical deterministic 
approach for resolving GSI-191 proved to be insufficient.  Therefore, in 2010, the NRC 
commissioners directed the staff to consider new and innovative approaches for resolution.  One 
of the options in the staff requirement memorandum[43] was the use of a risk-informed approach 
for evaluating the impact of debris on both sump blockage and in-vessel effects.  Therefore, in 
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2011, the South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) initiated a risk-informed 
project to resolve GSI-191 by characterizing the risk significance of sump blockage[44]. 
 
1.4.2 STPNOC RISK-INFORMED PILOT PROJECT 
The STPNOC pilot project implemented an integrative risk framework (i.e., integration of 
classical PRA with simulation-based modeling) to explicitly provide failure probabilities for the 
plant-specific PRA basic events, associated with GSI-191, that were related to post-LOCA 
phenomena.  The STPNOC risk framework included a simulation module, known as CASA 
(Containment Accident Stochastic Analysis) Grande[45], to provide estimated probabilities and 
associated uncertainties to the plant-specific basic events.  These probabilities and associated 
uncertainties are quantified using the time-dependent physical models inside CASA Grande.  The 
phenomena modeled in the risk-informed GSI-191 project include the estimation of location-
specific LOCA frequencies, jet formation physics, generation and transport of debris, effects of 
chemicals on head loss in debris beds, strainer head loss, degasification, and reactor thermal-
hydraulics.  The STPNOC risk-informed methodology consists of the following steps[46]: 
1. Identify accident sequences relevant to GSI-191 
2. Identify debris-related failure modes in those accident sequences 
3. Identify the debris sources and locations 
4. Ensure accident sequences have enough detail to measure impact on failure modes 
5. Model the debris transport 
6. Perform Monte Carlo simulations to determine the conditional probability of sump and 
in-vessel failures for various LOCA sizes and plant configurations 
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7. Pass these probabilities to the plant-specific PRA module to determine the risk from 
debris and compare to acceptance guidelines. 
Figure 1.5 depicts the two elements of the integrated risk-informed GSI-191 framework at a high 
level of abstraction[44].   
 
Figure 1.5 Illustration of the Integrated Framework for Risk-Informed GSI-191 [44] 
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The top element in Figure 1.5 illustrates the plant-specific PRA (referring to classical PRA) 
that includes ET risk scenarios and their associated FTs.  The second element contains models of 
the underlying physical phenomena associated with the basic events in the top module. In other 
words, CASA Grande provides estimated probabilities, with consideration of the physical 
phenomena and the associated uncertainties, for the basic events to interface with the PRA module.  
These probabilities are based on the time-dependent physical models that have been developed for 
the basic events[44].  
 
STPNOC developed extensive models to simulate the underlying physical phenomena 
associated with GSI-191[44].  In CASA, uncertainties in the physical parameters are propagated 
from break initiation to potential core damage precursors: 
- Strainer head loss 
- Core blockage 
- Boron precipitation 
- Air ingestion 
- Mechanical collapse 
- Flashing 
- Air Intrusion 
- Net positive suction head (NPSH) 
- Boron precipitation 
- Core flow 
 
The output from these simulations was fed directly into the plant-specific PRA to calculate the 
change in CDF and LERF.  The scope of the phenomena modeled by STPNOC includes[44]: 
- Location-specific LOCA frequencies 
- Jet formation physics 
- Debris generation 
- Debris transport 
- Effects of chemicals on head loss in debris beds 
- Strainer head loss 
- Degasification 
- Downstream or in-vessel effects 
- Reactor thermal-hydraulics 
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The risk-informed approach for the resolution of GSI-191 has both advantages and 
disadvantages.  The main disadvantage for the risk-informed approach is that a significant amount 
of effort is required for determining the probability distributions for the design inputs, quantifying 
uncertainties, and developing realistic physical models.  The advantages to using the risk-informed 
approach include the following[47]: 
1. Using realistic inputs and models that consider time-dependent factors can reduce 
conservatism in the results 
2. The risk-informed approach is a holistic plant-specific assessment for GSI-191 
3. Plant modifications such as insulation replacement can easily be evaluated to select the 
most efficient method to improve safety 
4. Newly emerging issues can be quickly and easily addressed within the CASA Grande 
model 
 
As Figure 1.5 shows, the initiating element of CASA Grande relates to the development 
of location-specific LOCA frequencies.  Section 1.4.3 provides a background on LOCA 
frequency estimation and for the need to undertake the STPNOC project.    
   
1.4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF LOCATION-SPECIFIC LOCA FREQUENCIES 
The most recent NRC-sponsored estimations of LOCA frequencies were documented in 
NUREG-1829[3].  The LOCA frequencies provided in NUREG-1829 represent a summation of 
the frequencies as a function of component break size of all potential primary-side break 
locations.  However, since two equivalent-size breaks in different locations may have a 
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significantly different likelihood of occurrence and effect on GSI-191 related phenomena (e.g., 
quantity of debris generated, transport fractions, in-vessel flow paths, etc.), for the STPNOC 
risk-informed project, the total frequencies for all possible break locations had to be separated 
into the specific frequencies for each break location[44]. Section 1.4.3.1 summarizes the NRC-
sponsored estimation of LOCA. Section 1.4.3.2 briefly highlights the location-specific LOCA 
estimation for the STPNOC project that can be more adequately explained and advanced in 
Chapter 2 to 4. 
   
1.4.3.1 NRC-SPONSORED ESTIMATIONS OF LOCA FREQUENCIES 
NPPs in the United States have been designed and constructed using traditional 
engineering methods.  This means that the components in a nuclear plant were built based on 
various industry codes (e.g., the ASME code for heat exchangers).  These codes are tailored so 
that the NPPs can withstand design basis accidents with high assurance.  It does not matter how 
the design basis accident occurs, it is just assumed that the design basis accident is the initiating 
event and the NPP must be able to maintain the core cooling during such an event[48]. 
 
The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) in NPPs is designed to ensure that the 
system can successfully mitigate postulated loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs).  For this thesis, 
LOCA has the same definition utilized in NUREG-1829[3]: 
“A breach of the reactor coolant pressure boundary which results in a leak rate 
beyond the normal makeup capability of the plant.” 
 
The limiting condition, or design basis accident, considers that the largest pipe in the pressurized 
RCS suddenly ruptures, which is known as a double-ended guillotine break (DEGB).  The 
occurrence of a DEGB would cause all the primary coolant to rapidly escape from the system.  A 
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DEGB is generally accepted as an extremely unlikely event.  To establish a risk-informed 
revision of this design basis, the understanding of LOCA frequencies as a function of component 
break size is a critical consideration.  Therefore, the estimation of LOCA frequencies is 
necessary as an input for an assortment of risk-informed regulatory applications, including for 
the PRA of NPPs and for risk-informed in-service inspections (RI-ISI).  Occurrence of LOCAs is 
rare; therefore, estimation of LOCA frequencies can be challenging.  There are two main 
categories of approaches for estimating LOCA frequencies: operating experience-based 
estimations and probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses[3].   
 
In 1975, WASH-1400[14] developed the first operating experience-based study on piping 
failures for the nuclear power industry.  This study provided the first LOCA frequencies.  The 
estimations from WASH-1400 were separated into three categories based upon the size of the 
break in the component: 0.5-2.0 inches, 2.0-6.0 inches, and 6.0+ inches, which were eventually 
referred to as small break (SB), medium break (MB), and large break (LB).  At the time of 
WASH-1400, a small amount of commercial NPP service data was available.  Therefore, 
WASH-1400 used failure data from other industries, both U.S. and foreign, such as the oil and 
gas industry, to inform the estimations of LOCA frequencies.  WASH-1400 LOCA frequencies 
were conservative estimates since the materials, in-service inspections, operating conditions, and 
environments of the nuclear industry - compared to the oil and gas industry[14] - were superior.  
One of the significant findings from WASH-1400 was the significance of SB LOCAs compared 
to LB LOCAs.  Before WASH-1400, most of the nuclear safety efforts focused on LB 
LOCAs[49].  The only LOCA to occur in the U.S. commercial nuclear program was a SB 
LOCA, which occurred at Three Mile Island Unit 2, near Middletown, PA.  This was the most 
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serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant history, although the small radioactive 
releases had no detectable health effects to plant workers or to the public[50]. 
 
In 1990, the WASH-1400 estimates were used as the basis for the estimates of LOCA 
frequencies used in NUREG-1150[31].  NUREG-1150 utilized the same break size categories for 
PWRs as established in WASH-1400.  However, due to differences in engineering 
characteristics, different break size categories were developed for liquid and steam piping for 
BWRs[51].  The NUREG-1150 estimations of LOCA frequencies were updated using Bayes’ 
theory with WASH-1400 LOCA frequencies as the prior distribution.  These estimates were 
updated using the additional evidence that zero LOCAs occurred in the United States after the 
WASH-1400 estimations were published.  A detailed explanation of Bayesian theory will be 
covered in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  Ultimately, by updating the WASH-1400 estimations with 
zero occurrences of LOCAs, the LOCA frequencies were reduced, thus making the estimations 
less conservative. 
 
In 1999, NUREG/CR-5750, titled “Rates of Initiating Events at U.S. Nuclear Power 
Plants: 1987-1995”, provided the next NRC-sponsored, operating experience-based evaluation 
of pipe break LOCA frequencies[2].  Using the same break size categories from NUREG-1150, 
NUREG/CR-5750 utilized two distinct approaches for estimating LOCA frequencies.  SB LOCA 
frequencies were estimated using the additional U.S. operating experience since WASH-1400 to 
perform a simple Bayes update of the WASH-1400 SB LOCA frequency.  This approach also 
combined PWR and BWR SB LOCA data into one set, because no significant difference could 
be found in the dominant failure mechanisms between the two plant types. 
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However, the approach for estimated MB and LB LOCA frequencies consisted of 
separating LOCA frequencies into a multiplication of precursor leak frequencies and a 
conditional pipe break probability (CBP).  Precursor leak frequencies, for each BWR and PWR 
separately, are developed to incorporate information regarding leaks, or through-wall cracks, 
which had challenged piping integrity, but did not cause the occurrence of a LOCA.  
Additionally, conservative estimates were used for CBPs based upon information from fracture 
mechanics, high-energy pipe failure, and crack data.  The conservative estimate used for the 
CBPs was developed by Beliczey and Schulz as shown in Equation (1.2) [52]. 
 
2.5
CBP
DN
   (1.2) 
where: DN is the nominal diameter of a piping component in millimeters.  Using this new 
approach, the resulting MB and LB LOCA frequencies were reduced by over a factor of ten from 
the WASH-1400 and NUREG-1150 methods[2]. 
 
One of the primary advantages to separating LOCA frequencies into leak frequencies and 
CBPs is that leak frequencies can be calculated using past operating experience; thus, the 
analysts were only required to estimate the CBPs.  However, the NRC determined that the 
NUREG/CR-5750 estimates were insufficient for design basis break size selection because they 
did not address all passive-system degradation concerns, nor did they differentiate between 
component break sizes greater than 6 inches[53].   
 
The concerns regarding the NUREG/CR-5750 estimations of LOCA frequencies led to 
the most recent NRC-sponsored estimations of LOCA frequencies, documented in NUREG-
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1829[3].  Since neither PFM nor the statistical analysis of operating experience are well suited to 
estimate LOCA frequencies due to the modeling complexity and the rareness of LOCA events, 
the NUREG-1829 estimations of LOCA frequencies were developed utilizing an expert 
elicitation approach to encompass insights from both methodologies.  The expert elicitation 
approach developed separate BWR and PWR piping and non-piping passive system estimations 
of LOCA frequencies as a function of effective break size at three time periods: 
- Current-day: Fleet average of 25 operational years for U.S. NPPs 
- End-of-plant-license: Fleet average of 40 operational years for U.S. NPPs 
- End-of-plant-license-renewal: Fleet average of 60 operational years for U.S. NPPs 
The expert elicitation estimations were formed from the responses of an expert panel whose 
primary goal was to represent a group consensus while reflecting the uncertainty in each 
panelist’s estimates and the diversity among the estimates.  The NUREG-1829 estimations were 
developed for a set of 6 LOCA categories, which can be found in Table 1.1.  These categories 
alleviate previous NRC concerns regarding the lack of differentiation between component break 
sizes larger than 6 inches in NUREG/CR-5750[3]. 
Table 1.1 LOCA Break Size Category Definitions from [3] 
LOCA 
Category 
Flow 
Rate 
(gpm) 
BWR: Steam BWR: Liquid PWR: Liquid 
    
Flow 
Rate 
Flux 
(gpm/in2) 
Effective 
Break 
Size (in) 
Flow 
Rate 
Flux 
(gpm/in2) 
Effective 
Break 
Size (in) 
Flow 
Rate 
Flux 
(gpm/in2) 
Effective 
Break 
Size (in) 
1 100 355 0.5 595 0.5 687 0.5 
2 1,500 355 2.25 595 1.75 687 1.5 
3 5,000 355 4.25 595 3.25 687 3.5 
4 25,000 355 9.5 595 7.25 687 6.75 
5 100,000 355 19 375 18.5 641 14 
6 500,000 355 42.25 375 41.25 641 31.5 
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NUREG-1829 was developed to produce estimates of total LOCA frequencies at U.S. 
NPPs.  While the expert elicitation approach has provided the most recent NRC-sponsored 
generic estimations of LOCA frequencies, there are still some questions that remain regarding 
their interpretation.  These questions include whether the NUREG-1829 results provide a 
justification for using a fixed set of LOCA frequencies for all U.S. PWRs, [54]. 
 
1.4.3.2 LOCATION-SPECIFIC ESTIMATIONS OF LOCA FREQUENCIES FOR STPNOC 
PILOT PROJECT 
 
In support of the STPNOC risk-informed pilot project, Fleming and Lydell[5] developed 
a location-specific and break size-dependent estimation LOCA frequencies.  Fleming and Lydell 
implemented a model, having a similar structure to the approach implemented in NUREG/CR-
5750, that expressed LOCA frequencies as a function of precursor failure rates and conditional 
rupture probabilities (CRPs).  
 
Fleming and Lydell chose to use a “bottom-up” approach; thus, estimates of LOCA 
frequencies were found by adding the LOCA frequency contributions from individual pipe weld 
components throughout the RCS.  Fleming and Lydell aimed to build upon the risk-informed in-
service inspection methodology developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)[55] 
to develop location-specific LOCA frequencies.  The individual LOCA frequencies were found 
as a function of component break size at each weld location.  Fleming and Lydell utilized the 
expert analysis from NUREG-1829 as well as service data from the PIPExp database[56] in 
order to calculate these location-specific LOCA frequencies.  The approach used by Fleming and 
Lydell accounted for the appropriate failure mechanisms at each pipe weld by applying damage 
mechanisms uniformly across broad categories of welds due to insufficient data from the 
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NUREG-1829 report regarding the effects of the individual damage mechanisms.  Additionally, 
Fleming and Lydell made an approximate quantification of uncertainties associated with the 
LOCA frequency calculations.   
 
The model used by Fleming and Lydell calculates LOCA initiating event frequencies as a 
function of pipe failure rates and conditional rupture probabilities for a given break size.  This 
model is based on the following key assumptions.  The first assumption is that LOCAs are most 
likely to occur at or near a field weld.  LOCAs with larger break sizes generally result in more 
debris, which can potentially compromise the ECCS upon recirculation.  After analyzing the 
available data, Fleming and Lydell concluded that these LOCAs with larger break sizes are 
dominated by pipe weld failures.  Therefore, only pipe weld failures are analyzed in their report.  
The second key assumption is that any pipe failure such as a non-through wall flaw, crack, or 
leak that needs to be repaired or replaced is regarded as a precursor to more severe failures such 
as ruptures.  They also assumed that the total LOCA frequency for a given break size can be 
found by taking the linear sum of the independent LOCA frequency contributions of all pipes 
large enough to support that break size. 
 
With these three assumptions, data from NUREG-1829, and service data from the 
PIPExp database, the LOCA frequencies were calculated following three main steps: 
1. Pipe failure rates were developed from pipe failure service data 
2. CRP distributions were formed using expert unconditional LOCA frequencies found 
in NUREG-1829 and updated with service data of experienced failures and ruptures 
using Bayesian analysis 
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3. The results from the first two steps were combined to give the desired LOCA 
frequencies 
 
Chapter 2 reports on the step-by-step critical review that has been conducted in this 
research regarding the Fleming and Lydell’s methodology and concludes with the key gaps.  To 
address the gaps, this research develops a qualitative analysis (See Chapter 3) and a new spatio-
temporal probabilistic methodology (See Chapter 4) that provides more explicit incorporation of 
physical failure mechanisms associated with location and time into LOCA frequency 
estimations. 
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CHAPTER 2 : CRITICAL REVIEW AND QUANTITATIVE VERIFICATION OF THE 
EXISTING LOCATION-SPECIFIC LOCA FREQUENCY ESTIMATION 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter relates to Step #2 in the roadmap of the research presented in Figure 2.1. 
Chapter 1 introduces the STPNOC risk-informed Generic Safety Issue 191 (GSI-191)[1], which 
is an example of a risk-informed industry-regulatory project and requires estimations of location-
specific LOCA frequencies.  Fleming and Lydell [2] developed a methodology for location-
specific LOCA frequency estimation in the risk-informed GSI-191 project.  
 
Figure 2.1 Research Roadmap 
This chapter briefly explains Fleming and Lydell’s methodology. Two contributions of 
this research thesis with respect to Fleming and Lydell’s methodology are listed as follows:   
 
(1) A quantitative verification process is run on their methodology and implementation. In some 
cases, their quantitative procedure is reproduced and, in other cases, additional quantification 
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procedures are done to scientifically verify their methodology and implementation.  The 
quantitative verification process is done step-by-step (e.g., uncertainty quantification, 
Bayesian updating, failure rate estimation) and in parallel with direct communications with 
Fleming and Lydell, generating comments and resolutions sets, which are documented as 
parts of the oversight processes of the risk-informed GSI-191 project. The quantitative 
verification processes are demonstrated in Section 2.1. During the attempted recalculation of 
the results published by Fleming and Lydell, many comments and resolutions arose 
concerning various details. The communications with Karl Fleming regarding these questions 
can be found in Appendix A.  
 
(2) Key gaps in Fleming and Lydell’s methodology are highlighted in Section 2.2.  Those gaps 
set the stage for the directions of a new investigation process (demonstrated in Chapter 3) 
and a new methodology (demonstrated in Chapter 4 and applied in Chapter 5) for location-
specific LOCA frequency estimations.   
 
2.1 CRITICAL REVIEW & QUANTITATIVE VERIFICATION 
The purpose of Fleming and Lydell’s work is to develop a location- and break size-
dependent estimation of LOCA frequencies and their associated uncertainties to identify the most 
risk-significant break sizes and locations for GSI-191.  Fleming and Lydell’s work considered 
LOCAs initiating at or near the location of pipe and nozzle welds.  The evaluation is limited to 
the ASME III Class 1 piping system pressure boundary failures, which consists of all hot leg, 
cold leg, crossover leg piping, pressurizer surge, spray, auxiliary spray, relief valve, safety valve 
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and vent lines, a drain line, branch piping to the safety injection system (SIS), chemical & 
volume control system (CVCS), and residual heat removal system (RHRS).   
 
Isolable LOCAs, seismically induced LOCAs, and LOCAs due to failures of components 
other than pipes are not included.  Isolable LOCAs are not considered because they have a very 
high probability of isolation which leads to a very low risk significance level for such failures.  
Also, seismic events that are large enough to cause a LOCA would also have a high probability 
of seismic induced failure to mitigate the LOCA.  The high probability of mitigation failure was 
judged by Fleming and Lydell to dominate the debris-induced failures related to the GSI-191; 
therefore, seismic events are not considered. 
 
 Fleming and Lydell’s report estimates LOCA frequencies for each of the location-
specific categories of welds.  Additionally, the LOCA frequencies estimated by Fleming and 
Lydell are a function of the break-size of the RCS component.  Fleming and Lydell adopt the 
same 6 LOCA break size categories that are implemented in NUREG-1829.  These categories 
are discussed in Chapter 1 in Table 1.1.  The STPNOC reactors are pressurized water reactors 
(PWRs); therefore, Fleming and Lydell utilized the effective break size numbers provided in the 
last column of Table 1.1.  
 
Fleming and Lydell’s report centers around the use of the model, found in Equations (2.1)
and (2.2), which incorporates the location and break-size dependence of the LOCA frequencies,   
  x i ix
i
F LOCA m     (2.1) 
  |ix ik x ik ik
k
P R F I    (2.2) 
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where: F(LOCAx) is the LOCA frequency for a break size in category x (i.e., 1,2,3,4,5,6), per 
calendar year; mi the number of pipe welds of category i; ρix is the frequency of rupture of a 
component in category i with a break size in category x, λik is the failure rate per weld-year for 
pipe component category i due to failure mechanism k; P(Rx|Fik) is the conditional probability 
(CRP) of rupture of size x given failure of pipe component type i due to failure mechanism type 
k; and Iik is the integrity management factor for weld type i and failure mechanism k.  Equations 
(2.1) and (2.2) demonstrate that the estimation of LOCA frequencies is divided into two parts, 
the failure rate for each category of welds, λik, and the CRP, P(Rx|Fik).  The total LOCA 
frequency for each break size category is equal to the LOCA frequency for each weld category 
location multiplied by the number of welds in that location category.  The failure rate for each 
location category, i, and failure mechanism, k, can be found in Equation (2.3). 
 ik ikik
ik ik i i
n n
f N T


    (2.3) 
where: nik is the number of failures in pipe component category i from failure mechanism k; τik is 
the population of welds in category i exposed to the failure mechanism k; fik is the fraction of the 
exposed weld population of i that is susceptible to failure mechanism k; Ni s the number of pipe 
welds of category i per reactor, Ti is the total exposure in reactor-years for the component type i.   
 
The following sub-sections report on the results of critical reviews and quantitative 
verifications for the step-by-step procedure Fleming and Lydell utilized to develop the location-
specific estimation of LOCA frequencies.  Section 2.1.1 contains the critical review of the failure 
rate development for each category of all the applicable failure mechanisms.  Section 2.1.2 
includes the critical reviews on the development of the CRPs and Section 2.1.3 reviews the 
development of the location-specific LOCA frequencies. 
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2.1.1 CRITICAL REVIEW & QUANTITATIVE VERIFICATION ON FAILURE RATE 
DEVELOPMENT FOR EACH PIPING CATEGORY 
 
The section examines the approach used by Fleming and Lydell to develop failure rates 
for each weld category.  These failure rates incorporate surrogate failure data and degradation 
mechanism susceptibility information which allow the statistical analysis to be guided by the 
underlying physics.  The procedure used by Fleming and Lydell consists of the following steps: 
1. Define component/weld categories 
2. Gather component failure information 
3. Estimate component population exposure 
4. Develop failure rate prior distributions and perform Bayesian updating for each 
calculation case 
5. Calculate total failure rate for each component/weld category 
 
The first step in the development of the location-specific failure rate is to group all the 
components, which are just welds in this report, into homogenous component categories that 
have distinct failure rates and rupture distributions.  While it would be optimal to develop a 
unique failure rate for every weld location, there are approximately 775 weld locations within the 
Class 1 RCS pressure boundary at STPNOC; thus, there have not been enough failures at each 
location in the RCS to develop meaningful failure rates.  Therefore, these categories provide a 
practical simplified assumption that every weld in a category has an identical failure rate.  
Fleming and Lydell first divided the welds into eight piping system categories: 
1. RCS hot leg excluding steam generator (SG) inlet 
2. RCS cold leg 
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3. RCS hot leg SG inlet 
4. Pressurizer (PZR) surge line 
5. PZR medium bore piping 
6. Class 1 small bore piping 
7. Class 1 medium bore safety injection and recirculation system (SIR) piping 
8. Class 1 medium bore CVCS piping 
These eight piping system categories were then subdivided into 45 calculation cases which 
consider weld types, damage mechanisms, and pipe sizes.  It is assumed that the maximum break 
size of a component is equivalent to that of a double-ended guillotine break (DEGB).  
 
As a first step, Fleming and Lydell’s developed the surrogate failure rates.  They 
developed 45 calculation categories that include the 775 Class 1 piping system welds.  Fleming 
and Lydell define the term “pipe failure” to include any condition that leads to repair or 
replacement of an affected piping component.  In this thesis, surrogate failure will be used in 
place of the term pipe failure to distinguish between the surrogate event and a true pipe rupture 
event, such as the ones discussed in Chapter 4.  Databases on the piping service experience 
collect information spanning the full range of degradation conditions such as flaws that exceed 
ASME Section XI criteria for repair or replacement, cracks, leaks, and ruptures. Fleming and 
Lydell used surrogate failure information for Westinghouse, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and 
Framatome PWR plant operating experience from 1970 to 2010 from the PIPExp database[3].  
One hundred sixty-three failures were identified and each one was sorted into a failure 
mechanism category for various plant systems.  
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The next step in the development of the surrogate failure rates is to determine the 
component population exposure for each calculation case. Component exposure is the 
cumulative amount of time responsible for the identified failures for which all the components 
were operational in the service experience database.  The exposure is estimated using both the 
number of reactor-years of service experience and an estimated total of the number of 
components, or welds, per plant.  Fleming and Lydell chose to use years of operation since first 
connected to the electrical grid.  Ultimately, there were 3816.6 reactor-years of service 
experience for Westinghouse-type PWRs.  Since each of the operational plants accounting for 
the service experience have varying numbers of welds and the exact numbers are unknown to the 
public, Fleming and Lydell developed an uncertainty distribution for the component exposure.  
For this purpose, they defined a three-point discrete distribution to characterize the uncertainty in 
the total reactor year population by reviewing isometric drawings for a selected sample of PWR 
plants.  
 
Once the weld uncertainty distributions are developed for each calculation case, the 
failure mechanism-specific exposure estimations are developed.  The failure mechanism-specific 
exposure estimations represent the number of years that welds, susceptible to a specific failure 
mechanism, were exposed to that failure mechanism.  For example, if only half of the welds for a 
specific calculation case were exposed to a given failure mechanism, then the failure mechanism-
specific exposure would be equal to one half of the total exposure.  All welds are susceptible to 
design and construction flaws (D&C), so the D&C-specific exposure is equivalent to the total 
exposure.  
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The failure mechanism susceptibility fractions were developed based on Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) documents[4, 5], NUREG/CR-6923[6], SCAP-SCC Working Group[7, 
8], and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency topical report[9].  Additionally, Fleming and Lydell 
developed failure mechanism failure rate prior distributions using work based on their previous 
works regarding failure rate development[4, 10-13].  These fractions are associated with 
uncertainty.  Each failure mechanism fraction has a three-point uncertainty distribution 
representing high, medium, and low estimates. 
 
The calculation case 1C for BJ welds exposed to thermal fatigue has a three-point 
uncertainty distribution for the number of welds in the reactors and a three-point uncertainty 
distribution for the thermal fatigue susceptibility fraction.  To run a quantitative verification on 
the Fleming and Lydell’s work on this step, the uncertainty distributions are combined to 
develop a nine-point discrete uncertainty distribution for the thermal fatigue-specific exposure 
estimation.  The results of the recalculation for the reactor coolant system hot leg B-J welds for 
thermal fatigue can be found in Figure 2.2.  Each branch of the uncertainty tree developed in 
Figure 2.2 corresponds to one of the possible values from the discrete uncertainty distributions 
for weld counts and the fraction of welds susceptible to thermal fatigue.  The medium value for 
each possible result is assigned a probability of 0.5.  The high and low values for each possible 
result is assigned a probability of 0.25.  The exposure multiplier is the multiplication of the weld 
count uncertainty multiplier and the fraction of welds susceptible to the failure mechanism, in 
this case thermal fatigue.  The final discrete uncertainty distribution consists of each value in the 
exposure column with a probability of occurrence listed in the exposure case probability.  The 
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recreated results shown in Figure 2.2 are in exact agreement with the results Fleming and Lydell 
[2] published for the B-J welds susceptible to thermal fatigue. 
 Welds/Loop Number Number/Average  Welds/Loop Loops 
Rx-
years 
Weld-
years 
 Average 2.675 1  2.675 2 570 3050 
 Minimum 2 0.75  2.675 3 2053 16472 
 Maximum 3 1.12  2.675 4 1194 12775 
     Base Exposure 32297 
 Weld Count 
Uncertainty 
Fraction of B-J 
Welds Susceptible to 
Thermal Fatigue 
Exposure Case 
Probability 
Exposure 
Multiplier 
Exposure 
(weld-years) 
   
p  0.25 0.0625 0.08972 2898    
x 
Base 
 0.08       
p 0.25 0.5 0.125 0.02243 724    
x 
Base 
1.12 0.02       
p  0.25 0.0625 0.011215 362    
x 
Base 
 0.01       
p  0.25 0.125 0.08 2584    
x 
Base 
 0.08       
p 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.02 646    
x 
Base 
1.0 0.02       
p  0.25 0.125 0.01 323    
x 
Base 
 0.01       
p  0.25 0.0625 0.059813 1932    
x 
Base 
 0.08       
p 0.25 0.5 0.125 0.014953 483    
x 
Base 
0.75 0.02       
p  0.25 0.0625 0.007477 241    
x 
Base 
 0.01       
Figure 2.2 Quantitative Verification & Recalculation of Event Tree Model to Represent Uncertainty in Hot Leg 
Weld Exposures for Thermal Fatigue from 
 
It was unclear during the recalculation of Fleming and Lydell’s work why the 
probabilities of 0.25 for the low and high estimates and 0.5 for the “best” estimate values were 
chosen.  Through a set of questions sent to Karl Fleming and Bengt Lydell, it was found that 
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engineering judgement was used for this aspect of the STPNOC risk-informed project.  In 
addition, it was determined that the weld counts and failure mechanism susceptibilities 
probability distributions were based on supporting data such as the quantification of the number 
of welds at each of the U.S. PWRs. 
 
The next step in the failure rate development required a Bayesian update of prior 
distributions for the failure rates for each failure mechanism using the number of failures found 
in service experience with the exposures.  Bayesian analysis is a statistical method that combines 
prior beliefs of unknown values of interest and concrete observed information regarding the 
values to infer about their true values.  Bayes’ theorem states that for two events A and B: 
 
Pr( | ) Pr( )
Pr( | )
Pr( )
B A A
A B
B
   (2.4) 
where: Pr(A|B) is the updated posterior probability that event A occurs, considering the new 
evidence; the occurrence of event B, Pr(A) is the prior probability that event A occurs, before 
knowledge of the occurrence of event B is known; and Pr(B|A) is the likelihood that event B will 
occur, if event A occurs.  Therefore, the theorem states that one’s state of knowledge about the 
occurrence of event A is updated per Bayes’ formula upon the availability of new information 
regarding the occurrence of event B.   
 
The prior distributions were developed for the failure rate development in the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI) risk-informed in-service inspection program.  Fleming and 
Lydell provided the prior distributions for SCC, D&C, and TF from EPRI TR-111880. These 
three failure mechanisms were provided to recreate the results for the hot leg example.  
However, as part of the critical review of this work, more information was required to recreated 
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the rest of the results provided in Fleming and Lydell’s report.  To find the prior distribution for 
V-F, a few details came into question.  In Table 2-3 of the EPRI report, the D&C failure 
mechanism was listed as having a lognormal distribution with a mean of 1.24E-06 and a 
RF=100.  Fleming and Lydell’s STPNOC report listed the D&C failure mechanism with a mean 
of 2.75E-06 and a RF=100.  Following an email with Karl Fleming regarding this question, this 
answer was provided: 
“We simply made an adjustment to address insights from more than 15 years of service 
experience that was analyzed since TR 111880 was published.  STP was based on PIPExp 
data whereas TR-111880 was based on data collected in SKI 96:20 which had many data 
classification issues and was found to under-report D&C.  The large range factor (100) 
means that the results are not very sensitive to this change.  One additional thought is that 
service experience does show aging effects – every time we revisit this data we see upward 
trends.  See Chart below [Figure 2.3] from the attached summary of PIPExp data.” 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Summary of PIPExp Data Demonstrating Aging Effects of NPPs Provided by Karl Fleming[14] 
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To recreate failure rates for calculation cases 6A, 6B, and 8A-8D, a V-F prior distribution 
was required (Table 2.1).   Additionally, Fleming noted that V-F failures are unconditional 
failures and that RI-ISI evaluation does not have any criteria for deciding when V-F applies, so it 
needs to be applied wherever the weld category specifies its application.  After reviewing EPRI 
report TR-11016[13], the interpretation was that this unconditional failure means that some 
failure mechanisms such as V-F do not show a transient life.  Once a crack initiates, failures 
occur quickly.  There is no failure that can result in rupture.  There is only the probability of pipe 
rupture, so conditional rupture probability is equal to unity for the V-F failure mechanism.  Thus, 
the V-F prior distribution has units of failures per system-year.   
Table 2.1 Updated Prior Distribution Table for Weld Failure Rates 
Damage Mechanism 
Prior Distribution 
Distribution Type 
Failure Rate per Weld-Yr 
Range Factor 
Mean Median 
Stress Corrosion Cracking Lognormal 4.27E-05 8.48E-07 100 
Design and Construction Errors Lognormal 2.75E-06 5.46E-08 100 
Thermal Fatigue Lognormal 1.34E-05 2.66E-07 100 
Additional Prior Distributions 
Vibrational Fatigue Lognormal 1.00E-04 1.98E-06 100 
Small Bore (all DMs) Lognormal 1.70E-03 3.38E-05 30 
 
It is interesting to note from Table 2.1 that the small bore piping prior distribution 
includes contributions from all the failure mechanisms. Collected data shows that this prior 
mechanism includes contributions from intergranular SCC, V-F, and D&C.  Therefore, unlike 
the other calculation categories, the small bore calculation categories only deal with a combined 
failure mechanism contribution.   
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The next step in Fleming and Lydell’s quantification procedure is to perform a Bayesian 
update for each component/failure mechanism susceptibility/population-exposure estimate 
combination.  Fleming and Lydell update the lognormal prior distributions for each failure 
mechanism using a Poisson likelihood function that incorporates the number of failures for each 
failure mechanism and the failure mechanism-specific exposure time.  For the discrete 
uncertainty distributions for failure mechanism-specific exposure time, a Bayesian update of the 
prior distribution is performed for every possible exposure value.   
 
To quantitatively verify the Bayesian update step of Fleming and Lydell’s methodology, 
in this thesis, the updates were performed using R-DAT Plus version 1.5.8, a reliability data 
collection and an analysis tool developed by Prediction Technologies[15]. The recalculation of 
the data for the hot leg B-F welds susceptible to SCC can be found in Figure 2.4.  From Figure 
2.4, by entering the median and the error factor which is also known as the range factor for any 
lognormal prior distribution, R-DAT Plus generates a prior distribution represented by the red 
distribution.  Upon entering the six observed failures in 12,074 weld-years as the evidence, R-
DAT Plus updates the distribution providing both an image, the blue distribution, and a list of 
summary statistics for the posterior distribution.  The results from the R-DAT Plus Bayesian 
updates exactly match the results provided by Fleming and Lydell for the hot leg calculation 
categories.   
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Figure 2.4 Quantitative Verification and Recalculation of Bayesian Updating Results 
 
The final step in Fleming and Lydell’s development of the total failure rates requires the 
development of a mixture distribution for each of the calculation cases.  Fleming and Lydell 
develop total failure rates for each category using a Monte Carlo posterior weighting technique 
to develop a mixture distribution.  A mixture distribution combines the values from the different 
weld-count and failure mechanism susceptibility fraction uncertainty distributions.  The failure 
rate for each failure mechanism is developed by Monte Carlo sampling from a discrete 
distribution defined by probabilities and exposure cases.  The result of each sample determines 
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from which posterior distribution another Monte Carlo sample will be taken.  This process is 
repeated for 100,000 trials.  The resulting failure rate incorporates a probabilistically weighted 
contribution from each of the weld-count and failure mechanism susceptibility fraction values.   
 
In order to quantitatively verify the total failure rates, in this thesis, the mixture 
distribution is put together using a Microsoft Excel Add-in, Crystal Ball version 11.1[16], 
developed by Oracle to run a Monte Carlo simulation which samples from a discrete distribution 
defined by the probabilities developed for each case, such as the one developed in Figure 2.2. 
The resulting distributions from the Bayesian updating performed with RDAT Plus for the SCC 
and D&C mechanisms matched perfectly with the data from Fleming and Lydell.  These 
parameters were then fit to lognormal distributions.  The inputs to the SCC distribution were: 
mean = 4.32E-04 and standard deviation = 2.04E-04.  The inputs for the D&C distribution were 
mean = 1.02E-06 and standard deviation = 4.07E-05.  These distributions were then sampled 
from 100,000 times adding the samples for each damage mechanism.  This resulted in the 
parameters listed under the UIUC heading in Table 2.2   
Table 2.2 Comparison of Initial Recalculation of Fleming and Lydell's Mixture Distributions 
  Fleming UIUC % Error 
Mean 4.13E-04 4.33E-04 4.84% 
5% 1.79E-04 1.87E-04 4.47% 
50% 3.73E-04 3.91E-04 4.83% 
95% 7.82E-04 8.20E-04 4.86% 
 
To determine the differences in the calculations, Karl Fleming was consulted. He 
responded with the following explanation: 
“…. when we did the STP calculations in 2011 we used a method of fitting the Bayes’ 
updates to lognormal distributions that is different than the method used by your graduate 
student- but I think his procedure [Nick O’Shea’s] is more appropriate than the one we 
used.  The method we used was to preserve the 95%tile and to fix the 50%tile of the 
lognormal distribution at the geometric mean of the 5%tile and 95%tile of the Bayes' 
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update distribution.  This created a lognormal distribution that has a slightly different 
mean than the mean of the Bayes’ update.  The new means you get from our fitting 
procedure is 4.11E-4 for SC (smaller than the Bayes mean) and 1.86E-6 for D&C (larger 
than the Bayes’ mean).  ….. 
 
When we moved on to Vogtle, Wolf Creek, Calvert Cliffs, and Palisades we changed our 
lognormal fitting procedure to preserving the mean and the range factor of the Bayes’ 
update distribution where the range factor is calculated as the geometric mean of the 
5%tile and 95%tile of the Bayes posterior distribution.  Using this approach – which I 
believe is better than what we did for STP – the Crystal ball calculated sums from different 
damage mechanisms will generally match the mean point estimates.” 
 
The response from Fleming allowed for the recalculation of the parameters provided in 
the report by Fleming and Lydell that would not have been possible from the information 
originally provided.  Replacing the median value of the resulting posterior distributions from the 
R-DAT Plus Bayesian updates with the square root of the 95%*5% is not explained or justified 
in the report.  However, it appears that Fleming and Lydell recognized this and changed their 
methodology for the future applications of the methodology. 
 
One of the questions posed to Karl Fleming and Bengt Lydell during the review of their 
methodology regarded their selection of 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations.  Their response 
indicated that they ran an informal convergence study to make sure that 100,000 simulations was 
sufficient for the calculations in their report.  Based on this response, 100,000 Monte Carlo 
simulations was also used in the recalculation of their results.   The results from the recalculation 
using the methodology explained in Fleming’s email can be found in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3 Comparison of Mixture Distribution Recalculations for Hot Leg Calculation Cases 
Recalculation of Total Failure Rates for Hot Leg Weld Calculation Cases 
Calculation Case Weld Type DM 
Failure Rate Distribution (failures per weld-year) 
Mean 5%tile 50%tile 95%tile RF 
1A B-F SC+D&C 4.13E-04 1.78E-04 3.73E-04 7.81E-04 2.1 
1B 
B-J 
D&C 1.39E-06 5.10E-10 4.12E-08 3.25E-06 79.8 
1C TF+D&C 1.26E-05 1.81E-08 5.85E-07 2.85E-05 39.7 
Total Failure Rates for Hot Leg Weld Calculation Cases (copied from Fleming and Lydell report) 
Calculation Case Weld Type DM 
Failure Rate Distribution (failures per weld-year) 
Mean 5%tile 50%tile 95%tile RF 
1A B-F SC+D&C 4.13E-04 1.79E-04 3.73E-04 7.82E-04 2.1 
1B 
B-J 
D&C 1.44E-06 5.27E-10 4.12E-08 3.19E-06 77.8 
1C TF+D&C 1.07E-05 1.79E-08 5.79E-07 2.83E-05 39.8 
Percent Differences Between Recalculated Values and Published Results by Fleming and Lydell 
1A B-F SC+D&C -0.08 -0.67 -0.02 -0.10 -0.18 
1B 
B-J 
D&C -3.22 -3.16 0.09 1.99 2.63 
1C TF+D&C 17.57 0.89 1.10 0.60 -0.24 
 
Calculation case 1A in Table 2.3 shows results that agree with the results published by 
Fleming and Lydell.  This indicates that the methodology described by Fleming was correctly 
implemented in Crystal Ball for the recalculation of the mixture distributions.  However, for 
calculation cases 1B and 1C there is less agreement.  The most notable case is the mean value for 
calculation case 1C, which shows an over 17% difference between the value published by 
Fleming and Lydell and the value that was calculated using Crystal Ball from the approach 
described by Karl Fleming.  The variation in the mean for case 1C is particularly confusing, 
because the remaining parameters for the distribution are very close together. 
 
During the attempted recalculation of the results published by Fleming and Lydell in 
support of the STPNOC project, many questions arose concerning various details of the report.  
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The communication with Karl Fleming regarding these questions can be found in Table A.1 in 
Appendix A. Some of the issues were never closed.  Therefore, when further information is 
provided, these communications can be updated for future publications.  
 
2.1.2 CRITICAL REVIEW & QUANTITATIVE VERIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL 
RUPTURE PROBABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section discusses the recalculation and critical review of the conditional rupture 
probability (CRP) development in the location-specific estimation of LOCA frequencies 
performed by Fleming and Lydell for the STPNOC risk-informed GSI-191 project.   The 
surrogate failure rates developed by Fleming and Lydell represented the rate at which a precursor 
event occurred, such as a crack or a leak.  A precursor event does not include any type of rupture 
event that would lead to the occurrence of a LOCA.  Fleming and Lydell’s approach assumes 
that for a LOCA to occur, a precursor failure event must occur.  Once a precursor failure event 
occurs, there is a probability that the component will rupture completely.  This probability is 
called the conditional rupture probability (CRP).  The approach Fleming and Lydell used to 
develop the CRPs contains the following steps: 
1. Utilize expert reference LOCA distributions and multiplier distributions from 
NUREG-1829 
2. Determine 40-year LOCA distributions for each of the NUREG-1829 experts and 
find the geometric mean of all the experts’ distributions 
3. Calculate LOCA frequency distribution from Lydell’s base case analysis in NUREG-
1829 
4. Develop target LOCA frequency distributions 
5. Calculate CRP prior distributions for each calculation case category 
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6. Perform Bayesian updates of the CRP prior distributions with failure and rupture 
evidence from service data 
 
The expert elicitation results in NUREG-1829 capture the current state of knowledge 
among experts from two schools of thought: statistical analysis of service data and probabilistic 
fracture mechanics.  One of the NUREG-1829 experts, Bengt Lydell, co-author of the approach 
developed by Fleming and Lydell, created a “base case analysis” for informing the elicitation.  
Lydell’s base case analysis implements an approach like the approach used by Fleming and 
Lydell.  This approach develops a set of LOCA frequencies for the RCS hot leg, surge line, and 
high pressure safety injection system line.  Four independent estimates were provided for each 
applicable LOCA break size category (see Table 1.1) for each of the three component categories.  
Two of the estimates were based on statistical analysis of service experience while the other two 
estimates were based on probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis.  In addition to Lydell’s base 
case analysis, nine NUREG-1829 experts provided estimations of LOCA frequencies for a range 
of components[17].   
 
Fleming and Lydell use information from NUREG-1829 to convert the information 
provided as LOCA frequencies vs. LOCA category to CRPs vs. break size.  This step required 
establishing the target LOCA frequencies for key components and then deriving the equivalent 
CRP probability model that, when multiplied by the failure rate model, produced the same target 
LOCA frequencies.  This approach was applied to the RCS hot leg, cold leg, surge line, and high 
pressure injection line, while using the following equation: 
 ( ) ( | )j l l j
l
F LOCA m P R F   (2.5) 
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where: F(LOCAj) is the unconditional LOCA frequency for break size category j; ml is the 
number of pipe welds of type l in each component category; λl is the failure rate for component 
category l within the selected component in Lydell’s base case analysis from Appendix D of 
NUREG-1829; and P(Rj|F) is the CRP in LOCA category j given a precursor failure in the 
selected component.  Combining Equation (2.5) with the failure rates developed in Lydell’s base 
case analysis allows Fleming and Lydell to derive uncertainty distributions for the CRPs in each 
LOCA category.   
 
The failure rate development began with eight component categories which covered the 
775 weld locations in the Class 1 piping at STPNOC.  However, for the CRP estimation Fleming 
and Lydell only created four categories: the hot leg, cold leg, surge line, and high pressure 
injection system.  The four CRP categories were selected due to the information available in 
NUREG-1829 and because these four categories provide a unique model for all the large pipe 
sizes (≥12”).  These four models are used to develop prior CRP distributions.  Fleming and 
Lydell determined that the smaller pipe sizes did not require further detail.  The prior CRP 
distributions are then updated with the number of precursor failures and ruptures for each failure 
rate case.   
 
Nine NUREG-1829 experts provided LOCA frequency inputs at the component level 
including the hot leg, cold leg, surge line, and high pressure injection line components.  The first 
of the LOCA frequencies provided by the experts was for the existing fleet of nuclear power 
plants, which had an average age of 25 years at the time of the elicitation.  The experts provided 
multipliers for normalizing these LOCA frequencies to plant ages of 40 years and 60 years.  It is 
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through these multipliers that the experts in NUREG-1829 incorporated the effects of aging 
components on LOCA frequencies.  The experts implicitly incorporated the aging effects.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis explains a methodology for the explicit incorporation of temporal 
variation of LOCA frequencies.   
 
Fleming and Lydell’s study took the estimations for LOCA frequencies at 25 years and 
used the NUREG-1829 multipliers to create estimations of LOCA frequencies for 40 years. 
Creating the 40-year estimations of LOCA frequencies from the experts’ inputs was a simple 
process as both the 25-year estimations of LOCA frequencies and the 40-year multipliers were 
provided as lognormal distributions.  The product of two lognormal distributions is also a 
lognormal distribution.  Therefore, the parameters of the 40-year estimations of LOCA 
frequencies from the NUREG-1829 experts were calculated using the following formulas: 
 40 40*YLF Base YMmedian median median   (2.6) 
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where: median40YLF is the median of the lognormal distribution for the 40-year LOCA frequency, 
evaluated for each combination of expert and LOCA frequency; medianBase is the median of the 
lognormal distribution for the base LOCA frequency; median40YM is the median of the lognormal 
distribution for the 40-year multiplier provided by each expert for each LOCA category; RF40YLF 
is the range factor of the lognormal distribution for the 40-year LOCA frequency, equal to the 
square root of the 95th percentile divided by the 5th percentile of the lognormal distribution; 
σ40YLF is the logarithmic standard deviation for the lognormal distribution for the 40-year LOCA 
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frequency; RFBase is the range factor of the lognormal distribution for the base LOCA frequency 
provided by each expert for each LOCA category; and RF40YM is the range factor of the 
lognormal distribution for the 40-year multiplier provided by each expert for each LOCA 
category.  
 
In order to do the quantitative verification, using Equations (2.6)-(2.8), the 40-year 
LOCA frequency distributions for each expert and LOCA component break size category were 
recreated.  The results were an exact match to the ones published for the hot leg by Fleming and 
Lydell. Fleming and Lydell’s report for STPNOC includes the information for the 9 experts from 
NUREG-1829 for only the hot leg.  However, to recreate the 40-year LOCA Frequency 
distributions for the cold leg, surge line, and HPI line categories, the information needed to be 
pulled out of the NUREG-1829 supporting information[18].  Using the same structure as 
Fleming and Lydell used, the cold leg, surge line, and HPI line information was added to the hot 
leg information and the resulting 40-year LOCA frequency distributions can be found in 
Appendix A, Table A.2. 
 
The next step is to aggregate the expert LOCA frequency distributions into a composite 
distribution. Fleming and Lydell preserved the median value and the range factor for the experts’ 
40-year LOCA frequency distributions.  The geometric mean of the median values and the range 
factors were calculated for each LOCA break size category for the hot leg, cold leg, surge line, 
and HPI line categories.  Once the median and the range factors were calculated, the remaining 
lognormal distribution parameters were calculated.  The results of the recalculation can be found 
in Table 2.4.   
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Table 2.4 Recalculation of Aggregated NUREG-1829 Expert LOCA Frequency Distribution 
 
Component LOCA Cat. 
Break Size 
(Inches) 
Geometric Mean Distribution Parameters  
Events per Reactor-Calendar Year 
Mean 5%tile 50%tile 95%tile RF 
Hot Leg 
1 ≥ 0.5 4.08E-07 9.32E-09 1.21E-07 1.57E-06 13.0 
2 ≥ 1.5 1.28E-07 2.25E-09 3.34E-08 4.95E-07 14.8 
3 ≥ 3 6.51E-08 1.01E-09 1.59E-08 2.52E-07 15.8 
4 ≥ 6.75 2.59E-08 2.49E-10 4.96E-09 9.88E-08 19.9 
5 ≥ 14 1.50E-08 6.70E-11 1.90E-09 5.37E-08 28.3 
6 ≥ 31.5 3.16E-09 4.84E-12 2.18E-10 9.78E-09 45.0 
Cold Leg 
1 ≥ 0.5 1.47E-07 3.27E-09 4.30E-08 5.66E-07 13.2 
2 ≥ 1.5 5.20E-08 9.07E-10 1.35E-08 2.01E-07 14.9 
3 ≥ 3 2.19E-08 3.33E-10 5.31E-09 8.48E-08 16.0 
4 ≥ 6.75 7.85E-09 7.41E-11 1.49E-09 2.99E-08 20.1 
5 ≥ 14 4.53E-09 1.94E-11 5.60E-10 1.62E-08 28.9 
6 ≥ 31.5 1.10E-09 1.56E-12 7.23E-11 3.36E-09 46.4 
Surge Line 
1 ≥ 0.5 3.60E-07 1.33E-08 1.34E-07 1.35E-06 10.1 
2 ≥ 1.5 1.26E-07 3.46E-09 4.09E-08 4.83E-07 11.8 
3 ≥ 3 6.45E-08 1.29E-09 1.79E-08 2.49E-07 13.9 
4 ≥ 6.75 1.92E-08 2.47E-10 4.28E-09 7.41E-08 17.3 
5 ≥ 14 2.72E-09 4.22E-11 6.66E-10 1.05E-08 15.8 
HPI Line 
1 ≥ 0.5 1.27E-05 6.40E-07 5.45E-06 4.65E-05 8.5 
2 ≥ 1.5 4.58E-06 1.51E-07 1.62E-06 1.74E-05 10.7 
3 ≥ 3 7.21E-07 1.53E-08 2.06E-07 2.78E-06 13.5 
4 ≥ 6.75 1.29E-07 1.41E-09 2.64E-08 4.95E-07 18.8 
5 ≥ 14 1.12E-08 1.03E-09 6.20E-09 3.73E-08 6.0 
5 (KF,BL) ≥ 14 3.04E-08 3.30E-10 6.20E-09 1.16E-07 18.8 
% Difference -170.65% 68.01% 0.00% -212.59% -212.59% 
 
The recreated values match Fleming and Lydell’s published numbers exactly with the 
exception of LOCA category 5 for the HPI Line.  The result from Fleming and Lydell has been 
added to the bottom of Table 2.4 for ease of comparison.  Clearly, the recreated median value 
exactly matches the published number in Fleming and Lydell’s report.  However, the mean, 5%, 
95% and range factor values are very far apart.  Since the 5%, 95%, and mean values are 
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calculated from the median and range factor values, it appears that only the RF is varied.  To 
determine the cause of this major variation in the results, the authors asked Karl Fleming and 
Bengt Lydell for some insight, and their answer is the following: 
 
“They were adjusted to be the same as the RF for the maximum RF for the previous breaks 
sizes calculated.  The justification is to prevent the range factors determined from the 
mixture distribution to have an illogical trend in RF vs. decreasing frequency – based on 
what we believe is a reasonable engineering judgment.” 
 
While this statement from Karl Fleming does not specifically relate to Table 2.4, it is 
assumed that the range factor for Case 5 of the HPI line was increased by Fleming and Lydell to 
match the range factor calculated for Case 4 to prevent “an illogical trend” in the range factors.  
This means that as experts estimated LOCA frequencies for higher component break size 
categories, the range factor should stay the same or increase because the range factor is a 
measure of the broadness of the distribution, or the uncertainty associated with the true value.  
As the frequencies being estimated are decreasing, the uncertainty in the values should not 
decrease.  However, the range factor for Case 5 of the surge line category was not increased 
despite being smaller than the range factor calculated for Case 4 of the surge line.  Therefore, 
this research has determined that the methodology being applied by Fleming and Lydell for the 
STPNOC project should be corrected to maintain consistency in all places.  Whether it is decided 
to adjust the range factors to prevent “an illogical trend” or to keep the range factors the same as 
the expert elicitation process produced, the process should be consistent.   
 
After the experts’ LOCA frequency distributions are aggregated, the next step is to 
develop the CRP distributions from Lydell’s NUREG-1829 Appendix D base case analysis.  
Using the same files Lydell used for NUREG-1829, they fit a lognormal distribution to the 
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estimates of failure rates that Lydell derived.  A lognormal distribution for the CRP was assumed 
for each LOCA break size category.  Fleming and Lydell created CRP distributions that when 
multiplied by Lydell’s failure rate distributions closely approximated the LOCA frequency 
distributions created by Lydell for NUREG-1829.   
 
The next step in the recalculation of the conditional rupture probability distributions is to 
take the geometric mean values from the NUREG-1829 experts and to develop a mixture 
distribution between with the LOCA frequency distribution developed from Lydell’s base case 
analysis.  To run the quantitative verification, in this thesis, using the Microsoft Excel add-in, 
Crystal Ball, the mixture distributions were created.  Both the geometric mean of the NUREG-
1829 experts and Lydell’s base case LOCA frequency distributions were given an equal 0.5 
probability in the development of the mixture distribution.  Table 2.5 demonstrates the calculated 
results using 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations.   
 
Table 2.6 provides the percent differences between the calculated values and the values 
provided by Fleming and Lydell.  The differences between the calculated values are all rather 
small, which this research attributes to sampling variation.  
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Table 2.5 Recreated Values for Mixture Distribution of Geometric Mean and Lydell Base Case for LOCA 
Frequency Distributions 
 
Component 
LOCA 
Cat. 
Break Size 
(in.) 
Target LOCA Frequency Distribution Parameters Events per Reactor-Calendar 
Year 
Mean 5%tile 50%tile 95%tile RF 
Hot Leg 
1 ≥ .5 5.10E-07 5.48E-09 1.05E-07 1.85E-06 18.4 
2 ≥ 1.5 8.22E-08 4.10E-10 1.47E-08 3.28E-07 28.3 
3 ≥ 3 4.06E-08 1.62E-10 6.36E-09 1.61E-07 31.5 
4 ≥ 6.75 1.63E-08 5.74E-11 2.11E-09 6.06E-08 32.5 
5 ≥ 14 8.53E-09 2.05E-11 7.59E-10 2.90E-08 37.6 
6 ≥ 31.5 2.19E-09 5.20E-12 1.79E-10 6.55E-09 35.5 
Cold Leg 
1 ≥ .5 2.21E-07 2.42E-09 4.33E-08 7.94E-07 18.1 
2 ≥ 1.5 3.63E-08 2.03E-10 6.55E-09 1.42E-07 26.5 
3 ≥ 3 1.51E-08 8.22E-11 2.62E-09 5.98E-08 27.0 
4 ≥ 6.75 5.36E-09 2.62E-11 8.00E-10 2.08E-08 28.2 
5 ≥ 14 2.71E-09 9.07E-12 2.91E-10 9.76E-09 32.8 
6 ≥ 31.5 8.02E-10 2.04E-12 7.37E-11 2.55E-09 35.4 
Surge Line 
1 ≥ .5 2.35E-07 3.59E-09 6.58E-08 9.37E-07 16.2 
2 ≥ 1.5 6.69E-08 2.72E-10 1.03E-08 2.77E-07 31.9 
3 ≥ 3 3.46E-08 1.06E-10 4.06E-09 1.43E-07 36.8 
4 ≥ 6.75 1.04E-08 3.55E-11 1.14E-09 4.01E-08 33.6 
5 ≥ 14 1.61E-09 1.36E-11 2.87E-10 6.23E-09 21.4 
HPI Line 
1 ≥ .5 1.40E-05 3.85E-07 4.75E-06 5.21E-05 11.6 
2 ≥ 1.5 3.43E-06 5.57E-08 9.72E-07 1.35E-05 15.5 
3 ≥ 3 8.28E-07 1.41E-08 2.13E-07 3.16E-06 15.0 
4 ≥ 6.75 1.29E-07 1.41E-09 2.64E-08 4.95E-07 18.8 
5 ≥ 14 3.04E-08 3.30E-10 6.20E-09 1.16E-07 18.8 
Note: Categories 4,5 of HPI are simply the GM of the experts from NUREG-1829, as Lydell did not produce results for these categories 
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Table 2.6 Calculated Percent Differences Between Recreated Mixture Distribution Values and Fleming and Lydell's 
Published Values 
 
Component 
LOCA 
Cat. 
Break Size 
(in.) 
Target LOCA Frequency Distribution Parameters Events per Reactor-Calendar 
Year 
Mean 5%tile 50%tile 95%tile RF 
Hot Leg 
1 ≥ .5 0.67% 1.68% -0.18% 0.98% -0.20% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -0.06% -4.32% -1.51% -0.72% 1.99% 
3 ≥ 3 -1.09% -3.29% -1.77% 0.44% 1.78% 
4 ≥ 6.75 4.10% 1.52% 1.19% -0.20% -0.92% 
5 ≥ 14 -1.80% -1.98% -0.62% -1.18% 0.52% 
6 ≥ 31.5 3.75% 3.76% -0.12% -1.20% -2.48% 
Cold Leg 
1 ≥ .5 -3.17% 2.43% 0.25% -1.79% -2.06% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -2.03% -3.09% -1.16% -0.59% 1.50% 
3 ≥ 3 -1.43% 1.66% 0.18% 1.02% -0.49% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -0.31% -2.40% -1.59% 2.62% 2.62% 
5 ≥ 14 -0.23% 1.15% -0.94% 3.31% 0.93% 
6 ≥ 31.5 -0.09% -0.37% 1.35% -3.24% -1.21% 
Surge Line 
1 ≥ .5 0.23% 1.03% -0.26% 0.23% -0.22% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -1.31% -0.17% -0.81% -2.10% -1.11% 
3 ≥ 3 3.94% 0.91% 0.61% 3.92% 1.63% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -0.53% 0.78% 0.02% -1.24% -1.12% 
5 ≥ 14 -0.03% 0.98% 1.02% 0.94% -0.12% 
HPI Line 
1 ≥ .5 0.57% -0.87% 0.32% -0.89% 0.36% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -2.16% 1.20% -0.62% -1.81% -1.61% 
3 ≥ 3 2.04% -0.33% 0.98% 1.75% 0.71% 
4 ≥ 6.75 0.09% -0.33% -0.11% -0.03% -0.18% 
5 ≥ 14 0.33% -0.12% -0.05% 0.43% 0.00% 
 
The target LOCA frequencies are then developed  with Equations (2.6)-(2.8) and the 
failure rates developed from Lydell’s base case analysis from NUREG-1829 Appendix D.  The 
results from the recalculation are shown in Table 2.7.  The percent differences between the 
calculated value and the results provided by Fleming and Lydell can be found in Table 2.8.   
 
The results shown in Table 2.7 match the results provided by Fleming and Lydell for 
most calculation cases.  However, some of the calculation cases for higher LOCA categories 
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such as the 5D case for surge line are significantly different than the published results.  After 
discussing this point with Karl Fleming, it was discovered that the range factors for some 
categories were adjusted: 
 
“They were adjusted to be the same as the RF for the maximum RF for the previous breaks 
sizes calculated.  The justification is to prevent the range factors determined from the 
mixture distribution to have an illogical trend in RF vs. decreasing frequency – based on 
what we believe is a reasonable engineering judgment.” 
 
When the range factors were adjusted to match the results published by Fleming and Lydell, the 
recreated parameters are all in agreement with the values published by Fleming and Lydell.  
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Table 2.7 Recalculation of Conditional Rupture Probability Prior Distributions 
 
Component LOCA Category Break Size (in.) 
Conditional Rupture Probability Distribution Parameters 
Mean 5th Percentile Median 95th Percentile Range Factor [1] 
Hot Leg 
1 ≥ .5 1.47E-03 1.84E-04 9.13E-04 4.52E-03 5.0 
2 ≥ 1.5 3.33E-04 1.35E-05 1.30E-04 1.24E-03 9.6 
3 ≥ 3 1.66E-04 5.01E-06 5.63E-05 6.32E-04 11.2 
4 ≥ 6.75 5.78E-05 1.49E-06 1.82E-05 2.22E-04 12.2 
5 ≥ 14 2.51E-05 4.55E-07 6.64E-06 9.71E-05 14.6 
6 ≥ 31.5 5.68E-06 1.10E-07 1.56E-06 2.19E-05 14.1 
6D[2] 44.5 3.06E-06 6.13E-08 8.52E-07 1.18E-05 13.9 
Cold Leg 
1 ≥ .5 1.21E-03 1.50E-04 7.49E-04 3.74E-03 5.0 
2 ≥ 1.5 2.75E-04 1.31E-05 1.15E-04 1.01E-03 8.8 
3 ≥ 3 1.14E-04 4.89E-06 4.54E-05 4.21E-04 9.3 
4 ≥ 6.75 3.59E-05 1.49E-06 1.41E-05 1.34E-04 9.5 
5 ≥ 14 1.60E-05 4.23E-07 5.10E-06 6.14E-05 12.1 
6 ≥ 31.5 4.49E-06 9.15E-08 1.26E-06 1.74E-05 13.8 
6D[2] 44.5 2.68E-06 4.86E-08 7.11E-07 1.04E-05 14.6 
Surge Line 
1 ≥ .5 2.07E-02 2.44E-03 1.26E-02 6.48E-02 5.2 
2 ≥ 1.5 7.23E-03 1.40E-04 1.98E-03 2.80E-02 14.1 
3 ≥ 3 3.26E-03 4.70E-05 7.70E-04 1.26E-02 16.4 
4 ≥ 6.75 8.47E-04 1.44E-05 2.17E-04 3.28E-03 15.1 
5 ≥ 14 1.20E-04 6.76E-06 5.41E-05 4.33E-04 8.0 
5D[3] 19.8 4.90E-05 4.91E-06 2.80E-05 1.60E-04 5.7 
HPI Line 
1 ≥ .5 1.08E-02 5.88E-03 1.02E-02 1.76E-02 1.7 
2 ≥ 1.5 2.99E-03 5.28E-04 2.10E-03 8.38E-03 4.0 
3 ≥ 3 6.06E-04 1.30E-04 4.54E-04 1.59E-03 3.5 
4 ≥ 6.75 9.70E-05 1.03E-05 5.68E-05 3.12E-04 5.5 
5 ≥ 14 2.28E-05 2.43E-06 1.33E-05 7.32E-05 5.5 
Notes:               
[1] Range Factor = SQRT(95%tile/5%tile). 
[2] 6D corresponds to a double-ended break of a 31.5" pipe. 
[3] 5D corresponds to a double-ended break of a 14" pipe. 
[4] Range factors adjusted upwards to ensure no RF decrease with decreasing LOCA frequency. 
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Table 2.8 Calculated Percent Differences Between Recreated Conditional Rupture Probability Distributions and 
STPNOC Results Published by Fleming and Lydell 
 
Component 
LOCA 
Category 
Break Size 
(in.) 
Conditional Rupture Probability Distribution Parameters 
Mean 5th Percentile Median 
95th 
Percentile 
Range 
Factor[1] 
Hot Leg 
1 ≥ .5 0.35% 0.21% 0.33% 0.47% 1.06% 
2 ≥ 1.5 0.62% 0.11% 0.44% 0.99% -0.14% 
3 ≥ 3 0.45% 0.04% 0.29% 0.57% 0.23% 
4 ≥ 6.75 0.68% -0.09% 0.41% 0.85% 0.07% 
5 ≥ 14 0.81% 0.11% 0.35% 0.63% 0.11% 
6 ≥ 31.5 -2.81% 4.14% 0.42% -2.89% -3.42% 
6D[2] 44.5 -4.23% 5.34% 0.37% -4.47% -4.79% 
Cold Leg 
1 ≥ .5 0.70% -0.19% 0.09% 0.65% 0.02% 
2 ≥ 1.5 0.27% -0.05% -0.08% 0.84% 0.88% 
3 ≥ 3 0.56% -0.57% 0.02% 0.83% 0.89% 
4 ≥ 6.75 0.27% -0.30% -0.07% 0.49% -0.15% 
5 ≥ 14 0.70% -0.53% 0.10% 0.68% 0.44% 
6 ≥ 31.5 0.26% -0.25% 0.00% 0.32% 0.54% 
6D[2] 44.5 0.55% -0.38% 0.08% 0.84% 0.11% 
Surge Line 
1 ≥ .5 -0.68% 0.82% -0.23% -0.80% -0.91% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -0.12% 0.25% 0.05% -0.14% 0.10% 
3 ≥ 3 -0.62% 0.47% -0.06% -0.84% -0.21% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -8.28% 8.94% 0.07% -8.16% -7.93% 
5 ≥ 14 -47.71% 105.53% -0.01% -51.38% -51.22% 
5D[3] 19.8 -58.82% 188.96% 0.00% -65.30% -65.24% 
HPI Line 
1 ≥ .5 -0.42% 1.83% -0.27% -2.16% -3.82% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -0.20% 0.15% 0.15% -0.10% -0.37% 
3 ≥ 3 -5.98% 14.73% 0.17% -12.26% -12.50% 
4 ≥ 6.75 0.36% 0.36% 0.13% 0.26% -0.14% 
5 ≥ 14 0.40% -0.10% 0.25% 0.31% -0.14% 
 
  Next step of the methodology uses the target distributions of LOCA frequencies and the 
failure rate distributions developed by Lydell for the base case analysis in Appendix D of 
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NUREG-1829 to derive CRP distributions.  The target distributions, Lydell’s failure rate 
distributions, and the CRP distributions are lognormal distributions; therefore, the CRP 
distributions can be derived by dividing the lognormal target distributions of LOCA frequencies 
by the lognormal failure rate distributions using the same methodology behind Equations (2.6)-
(2.8).  The conditional rupture probabilities developed from the target distributions of LOCA 
frequencies and Lydell’s base case analysis distributions of failure rates are then used as prior 
distributions which are then updated with service experience.  The evidence for each Bayesian 
update is the number of service experience precursor failures and zero experienced LOCAs for 
each system.  Since there were no occurrences of LOCAs in the service experience, the Bayesian 
update of the prior distributions resulted in posterior CRP distributions that demonstrated a small 
decrease in rupture probabilities.   
 
To run quantitative verification on this stage of the results, using R-DAT Plus, each 
distribution was updated with zero ruptures and the number of precursor failures associated with 
each calculation case. The values recreated for this research are shown in Table 2.9.  The 
calculated percent difference for each of the parameters of the updated CRP distributions can be 
found in Table 2.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Table 2.9 Recreated Conditional Rupture Probability Posterior Distributions 
 
Component 
Bayes' 
Update 
Evidence 
LOCA 
Category 
Break Size 
(in.) 
Conditional Rupture Probability Distribution Parameters 
Mean 5%tile Median 95%tile RF[1] 
Hot Leg 
0 Ruptures/ 6 
Failures; Hot 
Leg CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 1.43E-03 1.85E-04 9.04E-04 4.39E-03 4.9 
2 ≥ 1.5 3.28E-04 1.34E-05 1.29E-04 1.23E-03 9.6 
3 ≥ 3 1.64E-04 5.01E-06 5.60E-05 6.25E-04 11.2 
4 ≥ 6.75 5.74E-05 1.48E-06 1.81E-05 2.20E-04 12.2 
5 ≥ 14 2.49E-05 4.53E-07 6.62E-06 9.66E-05 14.6 
6 ≥ 31.5 5.85E-06 1.06E-07 1.55E-06 2.26E-05 14.6 
6D[2] 44.5 3.20E-06 5.82E-08 8.49E-07 1.24E-05 14.6 
Hot Leg at SG 
Inlet 
0 Ruptures/ 
19 Failures; 
Hot Leg CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 1.39E-03 1.84E-04 8.91E-04 4.25E-03 4.8 
2 ≥ 1.5 3.22E-04 1.34E-05 1.28E-04 1.20E-03 9.5 
3 ≥ 3 1.61E-04 5.00E-06 5.58E-05 6.18E-04 11.1 
4 ≥ 6.75 5.70E-05 1.48E-06 1.81E-05 2.19E-04 12.2 
5 ≥ 14 2.48E-05 4.53E-07 6.61E-06 9.63E-05 14.6 
6 ≥ 31.5 5.84E-06 1.06E-07 1.55E-06 2.26E-05 14.6 
6D[2] 44.5 3.20E-06 5.82E-08 8.49E-07 1.24E-05 14.6 
Cold Leg 
0 Ruptures/ 3 
Failures; 
Cold Leg 
CRP Model 
1 ≥ .5 1.20E-03 1.49E-04 7.46E-04 3.71E-03 5.0 
2 ≥ 1.5 2.72E-04 1.32E-05 1.15E-04 9.97E-04 8.7 
3 ≥ 3 1.13E-04 4.93E-06 4.54E-05 4.17E-04 9.2 
4 ≥ 6.75 3.60E-05 1.48E-06 1.41E-05 1.34E-04 9.5 
5 ≥ 14 1.59E-05 4.24E-07 5.09E-06 6.11E-05 12.0 
6 ≥ 31.5 4.47E-06 9.20E-08 1.26E-06 1.73E-05 13.7 
6D[2] 44.5 2.68E-06 4.86E-08 7.10E-07 1.04E-05 14.6 
Surge Line 
0 Ruptures/ 3 
Failures; 
Surge Line 
CRP Model 
1 ≥ .5 1.89E-02 2.36E-03 1.20E-02 5.81E-02 5.0 
2 ≥ 1.5 6.09E-03 1.38E-04 1.91E-03 2.46E-02 13.3 
3 ≥ 3 2.92E-03 4.66E-05 7.56E-04 1.18E-02 15.9 
4 ≥ 6.75 8.86E-04 1.32E-05 2.16E-04 3.49E-03 16.2 
5 ≥ 14 2.27E-04 3.30E-06 5.40E-05 8.83E-04 16.4 
5D[3] 19.8 1.18E-04 1.71E-06 2.80E-05 4.58E-04 16.4 
CVCS Line 
0 Ruptures/ 
14 Failures; 
HPI CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 1.07E-02 5.59E-03 1.00E-02 1.79E-02 1.8 
2 ≥ 1.5 2.88E-03 5.17E-04 2.05E-03 7.97E-03 3.9 
3 ≥ 3 6.40E-04 1.13E-04 4.50E-04 1.79E-03 4.0 
4 ≥ 6.75 9.68E-05 1.03E-05 5.66E-05 3.11E-04 5.5 
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Table 2.9 (Cont.) 
  5 ≥ 14 2.27E-05 2.42E-06 1.33E-05 7.31E-05 5.5 
Safety Injection 
Recirculation 
(SIR) Lines 
0 Ruptures/ 
14 Failures; 
HPI CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 1.07E-02 5.59E-03 1.00E-02 1.79E-02 1.8 
2 ≥ 1.5 2.88E-03 5.17E-04 2.05E-03 7.97E-03 3.9 
3 ≥ 3 6.40E-04 1.13E-04 4.50E-04 1.79E-03 4.0 
4 ≥ 6.75 9.68E-05 1.03E-05 5.66E-05 3.11E-04 5.5 
5 ≥ 14 2.27E-05 2.42E-06 1.33E-05 7.31E-05 5.5 
Pressurizer Lines 
0 Ruptures/ 
12 Failures; 
HPI CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 1.07E-02 5.60E-03 1.00E-02 1.80E-02 1.8 
2 ≥ 1.5 2.89E-03 5.18E-04 2.05E-03 8.03E-03 3.9 
3 ≥ 3 6.41E-04 1.13E-04 4.51E-04 1.79E-03 4.0 
4 ≥ 6.75 9.68E-05 1.03E-05 5.66E-05 3.11E-04 5.5 
5 ≥ 14 2.27E-05 2.42E-06 1.33E-05 7.31E-05 5.5 
Small Bore 
0 Ruptures/ 
79 Failures; 
HPI CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 9.78E-03 5.26E-03 9.25E-03 1.61E-02 1.8 
2 ≥ 1.5 2.48E-03 4.87E-04 1.85E-03 6.59E-03 3.7 
3 ≥ 3 6.15E-04 1.11E-04 4.40E-04 1.70E-03 3.9 
Notes:                 
[1] Range Factor = SQRT(95%tile/5%tile). 
[2] 6D corresponds to a double-ended break of a 31.5" pipe. 
[3] 5D corresponds to a double-ended break of a 16" pipe. 
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Table 2.10 Calculated Percent Differences Between Updated Conditional Rupture Probability Distributions and 
STPNOC Results Published by Fleming and Lydell 
 
Component 
Bayes' 
Update 
Evidence 
LOCA 
Category 
Break Size 
(in.) 
Conditional Rupture Probability Distribution Parameters 
Mean 5%tile Median 95%tile RF[1] 
Hot Leg 
0 Ruptures/ 6 
Failures; Hot 
Leg CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 0.14% 0.00% -0.03% -0.05% -0.61% 
2 ≥ 1.5 0.12% 0.15% -0.31% -0.24% -0.40% 
3 ≥ 3 -0.12% -0.10% 0.02% 0.00% -0.23% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -0.09% 0.20% -0.06% 0.18% -0.07% 
5 ≥ 14 0.16% 0.09% -0.03% -0.05% -0.05% 
6 ≥ 31.5 -0.03% 0.19% 0.00% 0.09% -0.04% 
6D[2] 44.5 0.13% -0.09% 0.00% -0.08% -0.02% 
Hot Leg at 
SG Inlet 
0 Ruptures/ 
19 Failures; 
Hot Leg CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 0.29% -0.22% -0.06% -0.07% 0.20% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -0.16% -0.15% -0.08% 0.33% -0.15% 
3 ≥ 3 0.25% -0.04% 0.05% 0.00% 0.18% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -0.04% 0.14% -0.17% 0.18% -0.27% 
5 ≥ 14 5.70% 5.66% 5.65% 5.74% -0.15% 
6 ≥ 31.5 0.03% 0.19% 0.00% 0.04% -0.06% 
6D[2] 44.5 0.06% -0.09% -0.01% -0.08% -0.02% 
Cold Leg 
0 Ruptures/ 3 
Failures; Cold 
Leg CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 0.00% 0.27% -0.03% 0.11% -0.28% 
2 ≥ 1.5 0.04% 0.08% -0.09% 0.02% -0.13% 
3 ≥ 3 -0.35% 0.08% -0.04% 0.02% -0.06% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -0.14% 0.27% 0.00% -0.07% -0.01% 
5 ≥ 14 0.19% 0.05% 0.00% -0.07% -0.02% 
6 ≥ 31.5 -0.04% -0.03% 0.00% -0.23% -0.01% 
6D[2] 44.5 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% -0.29% 0.02% 
Surge Line 
0 Ruptures/ 3 
Failures; 
Surge Line 
CRP Model 
1 ≥ .5 0.00% -0.08% 0.00% 0.00% -0.72% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -0.08% 0.22% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 
3 ≥ 3 -0.14% -0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 0.09% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -0.06% 0.00% -0.05% -0.14% 0.30% 
5 ≥ 14 0.09% -0.09% 0.06% -0.06% -0.24% 
5D[3] 19.8 0.17% -0.18% -0.07% -0.02% -0.13% 
CVCS Line 
0 Ruptures/ 
14 Failures; 
HPI CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 0.00% -0.07% 0.00% 0.00% -0.55% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -0.17% 0.08% -0.20% -0.01% 0.63% 
3 ≥ 3 0.03% -0.09% 0.09% 0.06% -0.43% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -0.04% 0.00% 0.05% -0.03% -0.11% 
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Table 2.10 (Cont.) 
  5 ≥ 14 0.18% -0.08% 0.00% 0.00% -0.03% 
Safety 
Injection 
Recirculation 
(SIR) Lines 
0 Ruptures/ 
14 Failures; 
HPI CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 0.00% -0.07% 0.00% 0.00% -0.55% 
2 ≥ 1.5 -0.17% 0.08% -0.20% -0.01% 0.63% 
3 ≥ 3 0.03% -0.09% 0.09% 0.06% -0.43% 
4 ≥ 6.75 -0.04% 0.00% 0.05% -0.03% -0.11% 
5 ≥ 14 0.18% -0.08% 0.00% 0.00% -0.03% 
Pressurizer 
Lines 
0 Ruptures/ 
12 Failures; 
HPI CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 0.00% -0.05% 0.00% 0.00% -0.37% 
2 ≥ 1.5 0.03% 0.08% 0.20% -0.05% 0.89% 
3 ≥ 3 0.02% -0.09% -0.04% 0.22% -0.34% 
4 ≥ 6.75 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% -0.09% 
5 ≥ 14 0.18% -0.08% 0.00% 0.01% -0.02% 
Small Bore 
0 Ruptures/ 
79 Failures; 
HPI CRP 
Model 
1 ≥ .5 19.14% -52.23% 309.20% -44.67% -51.38% 
2 ≥ 1.5 48.38% -86.47% 800.98% -49.34% -54.04% 
3 ≥ 3 34.60% -89.09% 695.12% -54.27% -52.32% 
Notes:                 
[1] Range Factor = SQRT(95%tile/5%tile). 
[2] 6D corresponds to a double-ended break of a 31.5" pipe. 
[3] 5D corresponds to a double-ended break of a 16" pipe. 
 
The results in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 show that for almost all the parameters, the 
recreated values are in complete agreement with the reported values in Fleming and Lydell’s 
report.  However, there are four cases that do not show this same level of agreement.  The hot leg 
at steam generator inlet category 5 case appears to use a median value that is roughly 5% larger 
than the recreated values.  Also, it appears that the median and range factors for the small bore 
calculation cases have all been adjusted significantly.  The 5%tile values reported by Fleming 
and Lydell for the small bore cases all have values that are larger than the values reported for the 
median values.  This may have been a simple error in reporting the values in the spreadsheet; 
however, even if the 5%tile and median values were swapped, there is still a very large 
discrepancy between the reported values and the ones recreated in this research.  This issue was 
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included in the email conversations with Karl Fleming regarding the recalculation of the 
conditional rupture probability distributions.  Table A.3 in Appendix A provides an overview of 
the email communications with Karl Fleming.   
 
2.1.3 CRITICAL REVIEW & QUANTITATIVE VERIFICATION OF LOCATION- AND 
BREAK SIZE-SPECIFIC ESTIMATIONS OF LOCA FREQUENCIES 
 
The final step of the methodology to develop location- and break size-specific 
estimations of LOCA frequencies requires the multiplication of the lognormal CRP distributions 
with the lognormal failure rate distributions. To develop LOCA frequency distributions for break 
sizes that were not included in the development of the previous results, a linear interpolation or 
extrapolation technique was used on a log frequency versus log break size curve.  
 
Table 2.11 shows the resulting values from the recalculation process.  Most of the LOCA 
frequency distribution parameters could be recreated with agreement to the values provided by 
Fleming and Lydell, as can be seen in Table 2.12 which provides the percent differences between 
the values calculated in Table 2.11 and the values reported by Fleming and Lydell.  However, 
there are calculation cases that have some discrepancies that could never be reconciled.  These 
cases have been highlighted in yellow.  The most concerning discrepancies are calculation cases 
6A, 6B, 7N, and 7O in which all or most of the parameters could not be recreated using the same 
procedure that enabled the rest of the values to be recreated with agreement.  These items were 
communicated with Karl Fleming to be considered for the update and advancement of the work 
for nuclear power plants.  The discussion is shown in Table A.4 in Appendix A.  
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Table 2.11 Recalculation of the Final LOCA Frequency Distributions for the STPNOC Project 
 
Weld Case[Note 1,2] Failure Mode 
Weld Failure Rate Distribution Parameters                                                                                  
Per weld-calendar-year 
Mean 5%tile Median 95%tile RF[Note 4] 
 
Hot Leg Case 1A 
                                       
B-F Welds Subject 
to PWSCC+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR[Note 3] 4.14E-04 1.79E-04 3.74E-04 7.82E-04 2.1 
0.5 5.95E-07 5.84E-08 3.37E-07 1.95E-06 5.8 
1.5 1.37E-07 4.44E-09 4.80E-08 5.19E-07 10.8 
2.0 1.02E-07 2.97E-09 3.40E-08 3.90E-07 11.5 
3.0 6.82E-08 1.67E-09 2.09E-08 2.62E-07 12.5 
4.0 4.70E-08 1.09E-09 1.41E-08 1.81E-07 12.9 
6.0 2.79E-08 5.99E-10 8.03E-09 1.08E-07 13.4 
6.8 2.37E-08 4.97E-10 6.75E-09 9.17E-08 13.6 
14.0 1.03E-08 1.53E-10 2.47E-09 4.00E-08 16.1 
20.0 5.46E-09 8.09E-11 1.31E-09 2.11E-08 16.2 
29.0 2.81E-09 4.16E-11 6.72E-10 1.08E-08 16.1 
31.5 2.42E-09 3.59E-11 5.79E-10 9.35E-09 16.1 
41.0 1.53E-09 2.27E-11 3.66E-10 5.92E-09 16.1 
 
Hot Leg Case 1C 
                                       
B-J Welds Subject 
to TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 8.74E-06 1.79E-08 7.12E-07 2.83E-05 39.8 
0.5 1.26E-08 1.16E-11 6.41E-10 3.54E-08 55.3 
1.5 2.89E-09 1.21E-12 9.14E-11 6.89E-09 75.4 
2.0 2.16E-09 8.31E-13 6.47E-11 5.04E-09 77.9 
3.0 1.44E-09 4.86E-13 3.98E-11 3.26E-09 81.9 
4.0 9.91E-10 3.22E-13 2.68E-11 2.23E-09 83.2 
6.0 5.88E-10 1.79E-13 1.53E-11 1.30E-09 85.2 
6.8 5.01E-10 1.50E-13 1.28E-11 1.10E-09 85.8 
14.0 2.18E-10 4.94E-14 4.71E-12 4.48E-10 95.2 
20.0 1.15E-10 2.61E-14 2.49E-12 2.37E-10 95.2 
29.0 5.92E-11 1.34E-14 1.28E-12 1.22E-10 95.2 
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31.5 5.11E-11 1.16E-14 1.10E-12 1.05E-10 95.2 
41.0 3.23E-11 7.32E-15 6.97E-13 6.64E-11 95.2 
 
Hot Leg Case 1B 
                                       
B-J Welds Subject 
to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 1.36E-06 5.27E-10 4.10E-08 3.19E-06 77.8 
0.5 1.96E-09 3.59E-13 3.70E-11 3.81E-09 103.0 
1.5 4.50E-10 3.89E-14 5.26E-12 7.12E-10 135.2 
2.0 3.36E-10 2.68E-14 3.73E-12 5.19E-10 139.1 
3.0 2.24E-10 1.58E-14 2.29E-12 3.34E-10 145.4 
4.0 1.54E-10 1.05E-14 1.54E-12 2.27E-10 147.4 
6.0 9.17E-11 5.84E-15 8.80E-13 1.32E-10 150.6 
6.8 7.81E-11 4.88E-15 7.40E-13 1.12E-10 151.6 
14.0 3.40E-11 1.63E-15 2.71E-13 4.51E-11 166.2 
20.0 1.80E-11 8.61E-16 1.43E-13 2.38E-11 166.2 
29.0 9.23E-12 4.43E-16 7.36E-14 1.22E-11 166.2 
31.5 7.96E-12 3.82E-16 6.35E-14 1.05E-11 166.2 
41.0 5.04E-12 2.42E-16 4.02E-14 6.67E-12 166.2 
 
Hot Leg SG Inlet 
Case 2 
                                       
B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+D&C B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 1.42E-03 9.22E-04 1.38E-03 2.06E-03 1.5 
0.5 1.98E-06 2.41E-07 1.22E-06 6.16E-06 5.1 
1.5 4.60E-07 1.77E-08 1.75E-07 1.72E-06 9.9 
2.0 3.44E-07 1.18E-08 1.24E-07 1.30E-06 10.5 
3.0 2.30E-07 6.67E-09 7.66E-08 8.80E-07 11.5 
4.0 1.60E-07 4.34E-09 5.15E-08 6.12E-07 11.9 
6.0 9.51E-08 2.38E-09 2.95E-08 3.66E-07 12.4 
6.8 8.13E-08 1.97E-09 2.48E-08 3.13E-07 12.6 
14.0 3.35E-08 5.72E-10 8.62E-09 1.30E-07 15.1 
20.0 1.81E-08 3.10E-10 4.66E-09 7.01E-08 15.0 
29.0 9.57E-09 1.63E-10 2.46E-09 3.70E-08 15.1 
31.5 8.30E-09 1.42E-10 2.13E-09 3.21E-08 15.1 
41.0 5.28E-09 9.00E-11 1.36E-09 2.04E-08 15.1 
 
Cold Leg Cases 3A 
and 3B 
                                       
B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+D&C B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 1.17E-04 2.72E-05 8.96E-05 2.95E-04 3.3 
0.5 1.40E-07 8.98E-09 6.66E-08 4.94E-07 7.4 
1.5 3.18E-08 8.68E-10 1.03E-08 1.22E-07 11.8 
2.0 2.20E-08 5.79E-10 6.99E-09 8.44E-08 12.1 
3.0 1.31E-08 3.27E-10 4.06E-09 5.05E-08 12.4 
4.0 8.76E-09 2.14E-10 2.68E-09 3.37E-08 12.6 
6.0 4.95E-09 1.17E-10 1.49E-09 1.91E-08 12.7 
6.8 4.19E-09 9.87E-11 1.26E-09 1.61E-08 12.8 
14.0 1.86E-09 2.89E-11 4.56E-10 7.18E-09 15.8 
20.0 1.06E-09 1.49E-11 2.47E-10 4.10E-09 16.6 
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27.5 6.45E-10 8.20E-12 1.43E-10 2.49E-09 17.4 
31.5 5.22E-10 6.36E-12 1.13E-10 2.01E-09 17.8 
38.9 3.82E-10 4.32E-12 7.96E-11 1.47E-09 18.4 
44.5 3.13E-10 3.38E-12 6.37E-11 1.20E-09 18.8 
 
Cold Leg Cases 3C 
and 3D 
                                       
B-J Weld Subject to 
D&C B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 7.06E-07 5.03E-10 3.08E-08 1.89E-06 61.3 
0.5 8.47E-10 2.76E-13 2.29E-11 1.90E-09 83.0 
1.5 1.92E-10 3.38E-14 3.54E-12 3.70E-10 104.6 
2.0 1.33E-10 2.28E-14 2.41E-12 2.54E-10 105.7 
3.0 7.95E-11 1.30E-14 1.40E-12 1.50E-10 107.3 
4.0 5.30E-11 8.55E-15 9.23E-13 9.97E-11 107.9 
6.0 3.00E-11 4.73E-15 5.15E-13 5.60E-11 108.8 
6.8 2.54E-11 3.98E-15 4.34E-13 4.73E-11 109.0 
14.0 1.12E-11 1.28E-15 1.57E-13 1.92E-11 122.5 
20.0 6.43E-12 6.73E-16 8.50E-14 1.07E-11 126.3 
27.5 3.91E-12 3.78E-16 4.91E-14 6.38E-12 129.8 
31.5 3.16E-12 2.96E-16 3.89E-14 5.11E-12 131.3 
38.9 2.31E-12 2.04E-16 2.74E-14 3.68E-12 134.2 
44.5 1.89E-12 1.61E-16 2.19E-14 2.98E-12 135.9 
 
Surge Line Case 4A 
                                       
B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 5.15E-04 1.26E-04 4.02E-04 1.28E-03 3.2 
0.5 9.73E-06 6.47E-07 4.70E-06 3.42E-05 7.3 
1.5 3.27E-06 4.34E-08 7.40E-07 1.26E-05 17.0 
2.0 2.41E-06 2.77E-08 5.07E-07 9.27E-06 18.3 
3.0 1.57E-06 1.48E-08 2.98E-07 5.98E-06 20.1 
4.0 1.02E-06 9.48E-09 1.92E-07 3.88E-06 20.2 
6.0 5.55E-07 5.05E-09 1.03E-07 2.11E-06 20.4 
6.8 4.65E-07 4.21E-09 8.62E-08 1.77E-06 20.5 
14.0 1.18E-07 1.05E-09 2.17E-08 4.48E-07 20.7 
16.0 9.14E-08 8.17E-10 1.68E-08 3.47E-07 20.6 
19.8 6.12E-08 5.44E-10 1.12E-08 2.32E-07 20.7 
22.6 4.75E-08 4.24E-10 8.75E-09 1.80E-07 20.6 
 
Surge Line Case 4B 
and 4D 
                                       
B-J Weld Subject to 
TF+D&C B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 3.95E-06 1.53E-08 4.63E-07 1.40E-05 30.2 
0.5 7.50E-08 1.25E-10 5.42E-09 2.35E-07 43.4 
1.5 2.52E-08 1.18E-11 8.53E-10 6.16E-08 72.3 
2.0 1.86E-08 7.72E-12 5.84E-10 4.43E-08 75.7 
3.0 1.21E-08 4.25E-12 3.43E-10 2.77E-08 80.7 
4.0 7.86E-09 2.73E-12 2.21E-10 1.79E-08 81.1 
6.0 4.28E-09 1.46E-12 1.19E-10 9.71E-09 81.7 
6.8 3.58E-09 1.21E-12 9.93E-11 8.13E-09 81.8 
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14.0 9.09E-10 3.04E-13 2.50E-11 2.06E-09 82.3 
16.0 7.04E-10 2.36E-13 1.94E-11 1.59E-09 82.2 
19.8 4.71E-10 1.57E-13 1.30E-11 1.07E-09 82.3 
22.6 3.66E-10 1.23E-13 1.01E-11 8.28E-10 82.2 
 
Surge Line Case 4C 
                                       
BC Weld Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 6.63E-06 1.80E-08 6.35E-07 2.24E-05 35.3 
0.5 1.25E-07 1.49E-10 7.44E-09 3.71E-07 49.9 
1.5 4.21E-08 1.43E-11 1.17E-09 9.57E-08 81.8 
2.0 3.11E-08 9.37E-12 8.02E-10 6.86E-08 85.6 
3.0 2.02E-08 5.17E-12 4.71E-10 4.29E-08 91.0 
4.0 1.31E-08 3.32E-12 3.03E-10 2.77E-08 91.5 
6.0 7.15E-09 1.77E-12 1.63E-10 1.50E-08 92.1 
6.8 5.99E-09 1.48E-12 1.36E-10 1.26E-08 92.3 
14.0 1.52E-09 3.70E-13 3.43E-11 3.18E-09 92.8 
16.0 1.18E-09 2.87E-13 2.66E-11 2.47E-09 92.6 
19.8 7.88E-10 1.92E-13 1.78E-11 1.65E-09 92.8 
22.6 6.12E-10 1.49E-13 1.38E-11 1.28E-09 92.7 
 
Pressurizer Cases 
5A,5B, and 5J 
                                       
B-J Welds Subject 
to TF+D&C B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 4.32E-06 1.63E-07 1.62E-06 1.61E-05 10 
0.50 4.62E-08 1.51E-09 1.63E-08 1.75E-07 10.8 
0.75 2.77E-08 7.69E-10 9.03E-09 1.06E-07 11.7 
1.00 1.97E-08 4.68E-10 5.95E-09 7.57E-08 12.7 
1.50 1.24E-08 2.28E-10 3.30E-09 4.79E-08 14.5 
2.00 6.66E-09 1.21E-10 1.76E-09 2.58E-08 14.6 
3.00 2.77E-09 4.96E-11 7.29E-10 1.07E-08 14.7 
4.24 1.23E-09 1.91E-11 3.01E-10 4.75E-09 15.8 
5.66 6.27E-10 8.54E-12 1.44E-10 2.42E-09 16.8 
6.00 5.48E-10 7.26E-12 1.24E-10 2.11E-09 17.1 
6.75 4.18E-10 5.22E-12 9.17E-11 1.61E-09 17.5 
8.49 2.65E-10 3.32E-12 5.82E-11 1.02E-09 17.5 
 
Pressurizer Cases 
5C, 5D, 5E, and 5I 
                                       
B-J Weld Subject to 
D&C B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 1.61E-06 7.31E-08 6.58E-07 5.93E-06 9 
0.50 1.72E-08 6.80E-10 6.61E-09 6.43E-08 9.7 
0.75 1.03E-08 3.45E-10 3.67E-09 3.91E-08 10.6 
1.00 7.32E-09 2.09E-10 2.42E-09 2.80E-08 11.6 
1.50 4.61E-09 1.01E-10 1.34E-09 1.78E-08 13.3 
2.00 2.48E-09 5.37E-11 7.17E-10 9.58E-09 13.4 
3.00 1.03E-09 2.20E-11 2.96E-10 3.98E-09 13.4 
4.24 4.57E-10 8.46E-12 1.22E-10 1.77E-09 14.5 
5.66 2.34E-10 3.78E-12 5.84E-11 9.03E-10 15.5 
6.00 2.04E-10 3.21E-12 5.04E-11 7.89E-10 15.7 
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6.75 1.56E-10 2.31E-12 3.73E-11 6.01E-10 16.1 
8.49 9.86E-11 1.47E-12 2.36E-11 3.81E-10 16.1 
 
Pressurizer Case 5G 
                                       
B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 4.67E-04 2.56E-04 4.43E-04 7.68E-04 1.7 
0.50 5.00E-06 2.02E-06 4.45E-06 9.83E-06 2.2 
0.75 3.00E-06 8.89E-07 2.47E-06 6.87E-06 2.8 
1.00 2.13E-06 4.89E-07 1.63E-06 5.43E-06 3.3 
1.50 1.34E-06 2.10E-07 9.04E-07 3.90E-06 4.3 
2.00 7.21E-07 1.11E-07 4.83E-07 2.11E-06 4.4 
3.00 3.00E-07 4.52E-08 1.99E-07 8.80E-07 4.4 
4.24 1.33E-07 1.65E-08 8.24E-08 4.12E-07 5.0 
5.66 6.79E-08 7.06E-09 3.94E-08 2.19E-07 5.6 
6.00 5.93E-08 5.95E-09 3.39E-08 1.93E-07 5.7 
6.75 4.52E-08 4.21E-09 2.51E-08 1.50E-07 6.0 
8.49 2.87E-08 2.67E-09 1.59E-08 9.48E-08 6.0 
 
Pressurizer Case 5F 
                                       
B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 4.74E-04 2.59E-04 4.50E-04 7.83E-04 1.7 
0.50 5.08E-06 2.05E-06 4.52E-06 9.98E-06 2.2 
0.75 3.05E-06 9.03E-07 2.51E-06 6.98E-06 2.8 
1.00 2.16E-06 4.96E-07 1.65E-06 5.51E-06 3.3 
1.50 1.36E-06 2.13E-07 9.18E-07 3.96E-06 4.3 
2.00 7.33E-07 1.12E-07 4.90E-07 2.14E-06 4.4 
3.00 3.04E-07 4.59E-08 2.03E-07 8.94E-07 4.4 
4.24 1.35E-07 1.67E-08 8.37E-08 4.18E-07 5.0 
5.66 6.90E-08 7.17E-09 4.00E-08 2.23E-07 5.6 
6.00 6.03E-08 6.05E-09 3.44E-08 1.96E-07 5.7 
6.75 4.59E-08 4.27E-09 2.55E-08 1.52E-07 6.0 
8.49 2.91E-08 2.71E-09 1.62E-08 9.63E-08 6.0 
 
Pressurizer Case 5H 
                                       
B-F Weld Subject to 
D&C (Weld 
Overlay) B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 1.63E-06 5.29E-10 4.40E-08 3.66E-06 83.2 
0.50 1.74E-08 5.11E-12 4.42E-10 3.82E-08 86.5 
0.75 1.05E-08 2.71E-12 2.45E-10 2.22E-08 90.6 
1.00 7.43E-09 1.71E-12 1.62E-10 1.53E-08 94.8 
1.50 4.68E-09 8.79E-13 8.97E-11 9.16E-09 102.1 
2.00 2.52E-09 4.67E-13 4.79E-11 4.91E-09 102.5 
3.00 1.05E-09 1.92E-13 1.98E-11 2.04E-09 102.9 
4.24 4.64E-10 7.62E-14 8.17E-12 8.76E-10 107.2 
5.66 2.37E-10 3.51E-14 3.91E-12 4.35E-10 111.4 
6.00 2.07E-10 3.00E-14 3.37E-12 3.78E-10 112.3 
6.75 1.58E-10 2.18E-14 2.49E-12 2.85E-10 114.3 
8.49 1.00E-10 1.38E-14 1.58E-12 1.80E-10 114.2 
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Small Bore Cases 
6A and 6B 
                                       
B-J Welds Subject 
to VF+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 1.26E-04 7.03E-05 1.19E-04 2.02E-04 1.7 
0.50 1.38E-06 2.42E-07 9.66E-07 3.85E-06 4.0 
0.75 8.89E-07 1.02E-07 5.35E-07 2.81E-06 5.3 
1.00 6.65E-07 5.48E-08 3.52E-07 2.25E-06 6.4 
1.41 4.80E-07 2.61E-08 2.13E-07 1.74E-06 8.2 
1.50 4.54E-07 2.29E-08 1.95E-07 1.66E-06 8.5 
1.99 2.72E-07 1.34E-08 1.15E-07 9.94E-07 8.6 
2.00 2.69E-07 1.33E-08 1.14E-07 9.85E-07 8.6 
2.83 1.40E-06 7.05E-09 1.89E-07 5.09E-06 26.9 
 
SIR Case 7C 
                                       
B-J Welds Subject 
to SC+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 2.90E-04 3.06E-05 1.69E-04 9.37E-04 5.5 
0.5 3.09E-06 2.80E-07 1.69E-06 1.03E-05 6.1 
0.8 1.85E-06 1.39E-07 9.41E-07 6.38E-06 6.8 
1.0 1.31E-06 8.25E-08 6.20E-07 4.65E-06 7.5 
1.5 8.31E-07 3.87E-08 3.44E-07 3.06E-06 8.9 
2.0 4.46E-07 2.06E-08 1.84E-07 1.64E-06 8.9 
2.8 2.10E-07 9.64E-09 8.65E-08 7.75E-07 9.0 
4.0 9.44E-08 3.78E-09 3.65E-08 3.53E-07 9.7 
4.2 8.24E-08 3.21E-09 3.15E-08 3.09E-07 9.8 
5.7 4.21E-08 1.42E-09 1.50E-08 1.59E-07 10.6 
6.0 3.68E-08 1.20E-09 1.30E-08 1.40E-07 10.8 
6.8 2.80E-08 8.61E-10 9.58E-09 1.07E-07 11.1 
7.2 2.47E-08 7.57E-10 8.43E-09 9.39E-08 11.1 
8.5 1.78E-08 5.46E-10 6.08E-09 6.77E-08 11.1 
10.0 1.29E-08 3.94E-10 4.39E-09 4.89E-08 11.1 
11.3 1.01E-08 3.09E-10 3.44E-09 3.83E-08 11.1 
14.1 6.46E-09 1.98E-10 2.21E-09 2.46E-08 11.1 
17.0 4.50E-09 1.38E-10 1.54E-09 1.71E-08 11.1 
 
SIR Case 7A 7B 
                                       
B-J Welds Subject 
to TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 2.61E-04 2.17E-05 1.38E-04 8.81E-04 6.4 
0.5 2.78E-06 1.98E-07 1.38E-06 9.68E-06 7.0 
0.8 1.67E-06 9.88E-08 7.68E-07 5.97E-06 7.8 
1.0 1.19E-06 5.92E-08 5.06E-07 4.33E-06 8.6 
1.5 7.50E-07 2.80E-08 2.81E-07 2.82E-06 10.0 
2.0 4.02E-07 1.49E-08 1.50E-07 1.51E-06 10.1 
2.8 1.90E-07 6.99E-09 7.06E-08 7.13E-07 10.1 
4.0 8.52E-08 2.75E-09 2.98E-08 3.23E-07 10.8 
4.2 7.44E-08 2.33E-09 2.57E-08 2.83E-07 11.0 
5.7 3.80E-08 1.04E-09 1.23E-08 1.46E-07 11.9 
6.0 3.32E-08 8.78E-10 1.06E-08 1.27E-07 12.0 
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6.8 2.53E-08 6.30E-10 7.83E-09 9.72E-08 12.4 
7.2 2.23E-08 5.54E-10 6.88E-09 8.55E-08 12.4 
8.5 1.60E-08 3.99E-10 4.96E-09 6.17E-08 12.4 
10.0 1.16E-08 2.89E-10 3.59E-09 4.46E-08 12.4 
11.3 9.08E-09 2.26E-10 2.81E-09 3.49E-08 12.4 
14.1 5.83E-09 1.45E-10 1.80E-09 2.24E-08 12.4 
17.0 4.06E-09 1.01E-10 1.26E-09 1.56E-08 12.4 
 
SIR Case 7D 
ACC Case 7M 
                                       
B-J Welds Subject 
to SC+D&C B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 3.34E-05 1.24E-06 1.24E-05 1.25E-04 10.1 
0.5 3.56E-07 1.15E-08 1.25E-07 1.35E-06 10.9 
0.8 2.14E-07 5.84E-09 6.92E-08 8.19E-07 11.8 
1.0 1.52E-07 3.55E-09 4.56E-08 5.84E-07 12.8 
1.5 9.60E-08 1.72E-09 2.53E-08 3.71E-07 14.7 
2.0 5.15E-08 9.19E-10 1.35E-08 1.99E-07 14.7 
2.8 2.43E-08 4.30E-10 6.36E-09 9.39E-08 14.8 
4.0 1.09E-08 1.71E-10 2.68E-09 4.22E-08 15.7 
4.2 9.52E-09 1.45E-10 2.31E-09 3.68E-08 15.9 
5.7 4.86E-09 6.51E-11 1.11E-09 1.88E-08 17.0 
6.0 4.25E-09 5.54E-11 9.52E-10 1.64E-08 17.2 
6.8 3.24E-09 3.99E-11 7.05E-10 1.25E-08 17.7 
7.2 2.85E-09 3.51E-11 6.20E-10 1.10E-08 17.7 
8.5 2.05E-09 2.53E-11 4.47E-10 7.90E-09 17.7 
10.0 1.48E-09 1.83E-11 3.23E-10 5.71E-09 17.7 
11.3 1.16E-09 1.43E-11 2.53E-10 4.47E-09 17.7 
14.1 7.46E-10 9.18E-12 1.62E-10 2.87E-09 17.7 
17.0 5.19E-10 6.39E-12 1.13E-10 2.00E-09 17.7 
 
SIR Cases 7E-7L                       
B-J Welds Subject 
to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 1.07E-06 5.61E-08 4.67E-07 3.89E-06 8.3 
0.5 1.14E-08 5.20E-10 4.67E-09 4.20E-08 9.0 
0.8 6.83E-09 2.63E-10 2.59E-09 2.56E-08 9.9 
1.0 4.85E-09 1.59E-10 1.71E-09 1.84E-08 10.7 
1.5 3.07E-09 7.64E-11 9.49E-10 1.18E-08 12.4 
2.0 1.65E-09 4.07E-11 5.08E-10 6.32E-09 12.5 
2.8 7.76E-10 1.91E-11 2.39E-10 2.98E-09 12.5 
4.0 3.48E-10 7.54E-12 1.01E-10 1.34E-09 13.3 
4.2 3.04E-10 6.41E-12 8.68E-11 1.17E-09 13.5 
5.7 1.55E-10 2.86E-12 4.15E-11 6.01E-10 14.5 
6.0 1.36E-10 2.43E-12 3.57E-11 5.25E-10 14.7 
6.8 1.03E-10 1.75E-12 2.64E-11 4.00E-10 15.1 
7.2 9.10E-11 1.54E-12 2.33E-11 3.52E-10 15.1 
8.5 6.56E-11 1.11E-12 1.68E-11 2.54E-10 15.1 
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10.0 4.74E-11 8.01E-13 1.21E-11 1.83E-10 15.1 
11.3 3.71E-11 6.27E-13 9.49E-12 1.44E-10 15.1 
14.1 2.38E-11 4.02E-13 6.09E-12 9.22E-11 15.1 
17.0 1.66E-11 2.80E-13 4.24E-12 6.42E-11 15.1 
 
ACC Case 7N 
 B-J Welds Subject 
to TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 4.87E-06 1.42E-08 4.86E-07 1.66E-05 34.2 
0.5 5.19E-08 1.35E-10 4.86E-09 1.74E-07 35.9 
0.8 3.11E-08 7.09E-11 2.70E-09 1.03E-07 38.0 
1.0 2.21E-08 4.42E-11 1.78E-09 7.13E-08 40.2 
1.5 1.40E-08 2.23E-11 9.86E-10 4.35E-08 44.1 
2.0 7.50E-09 1.19E-11 5.28E-10 2.33E-08 44.2 
2.8 3.54E-09 5.59E-12 2.48E-10 1.10E-08 44.4 
4.0 1.59E-09 2.26E-12 1.05E-10 4.85E-09 46.3 
4.2 1.39E-09 1.93E-12 9.02E-11 4.22E-09 46.8 
5.7 7.08E-10 8.80E-13 4.31E-11 2.11E-09 49.0 
6.0 6.19E-10 7.50E-13 3.71E-11 1.84E-09 49.5 
6.8 4.71E-10 5.44E-13 2.75E-11 1.39E-09 50.5 
7.2 4.15E-10 4.79E-13 2.42E-11 1.22E-09 50.5 
8.5 2.99E-10 3.45E-13 1.74E-11 8.80E-10 50.5 
10.0 2.16E-10 2.49E-13 1.26E-11 6.36E-10 50.5 
11.3 1.69E-10 1.95E-13 9.86E-12 4.98E-10 50.5 
14.1 1.09E-10 1.25E-13 6.33E-12 3.20E-10 50.5 
17.0 7.56E-11 8.73E-14 4.41E-12 2.23E-10 50.5 
 
ACC Case 7O                            
B-J Welds Subject 
to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 5.87E-07 4.61E-10 2.72E-08 1.60E-06 59 
0.5 6.25E-09 4.42E-12 2.72E-10 1.67E-08 61.5 
0.8 3.75E-09 2.33E-12 1.51E-10 9.76E-09 64.7 
1.0 2.66E-09 1.46E-12 9.94E-11 6.74E-09 67.9 
1.5 1.68E-09 7.48E-13 5.52E-11 4.07E-09 73.7 
2.0 9.03E-10 3.99E-13 2.95E-11 2.18E-09 73.9 
2.8 4.26E-10 1.87E-13 1.39E-11 1.03E-09 74.1 
4.0 1.91E-10 7.61E-14 5.86E-12 4.51E-10 77.0 
4.2 1.67E-10 6.50E-14 5.04E-12 3.91E-10 77.6 
5.7 8.53E-11 2.98E-14 2.41E-12 1.95E-10 80.9 
6.0 7.45E-11 2.55E-14 2.08E-12 1.69E-10 81.6 
6.8 5.68E-11 1.85E-14 1.54E-12 1.28E-10 83.0 
7.2 4.99E-11 1.63E-14 1.35E-12 1.12E-10 83.0 
8.5 3.60E-11 1.17E-14 9.75E-13 8.10E-11 83.0 
10.0 2.60E-11 8.48E-15 7.04E-13 5.85E-11 83.0 
11.3 2.04E-11 6.64E-15 5.52E-13 4.58E-11 83.0 
14.1 1.31E-11 4.27E-15 3.54E-13 2.94E-11 83.0 
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  17.0 9.11E-12 2.97E-15 2.47E-13 2.05E-11 83.0 
 
CVCS Case 8A and 
8B                                       
B-J Weld Subject to 
VF+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 4.03E-06 2.43E-07 1.86E-06 1.43E-05 7.7 
0.50 4.29E-08 2.23E-09 1.86E-08 1.56E-07 8.4 
0.75 2.57E-08 1.12E-09 1.04E-08 9.53E-08 9.2 
1.00 1.82E-08 6.78E-10 6.82E-09 6.86E-08 10.1 
1.50 1.15E-08 3.24E-10 3.78E-09 4.42E-08 11.7 
2.00 6.20E-09 1.73E-10 2.02E-09 2.37E-08 11.7 
3.00 2.58E-09 7.13E-11 8.38E-10 9.86E-09 11.8 
4.00 1.31E-09 3.20E-11 4.02E-10 5.05E-09 12.6 
5.66 5.85E-10 1.21E-11 1.65E-10 2.26E-09 13.7 
 
CVCS Cases 8C, 
8D, and 8F                                       
B-J Weld Subject to 
VF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 1.75E-06 1.37E-07 9.07E-07 6.01E-06 6.6 
0.50 1.87E-08 1.26E-09 9.08E-09 6.54E-08 7.2 
0.75 1.12E-08 6.30E-10 5.04E-09 4.03E-08 8.0 
1.00 7.94E-09 3.78E-10 3.32E-09 2.92E-08 8.8 
1.50 5.03E-09 1.79E-10 1.84E-09 1.89E-08 10.3 
2.00 2.70E-09 9.55E-11 9.85E-10 1.02E-08 10.3 
3.00 1.12E-09 3.94E-11 4.08E-10 4.23E-09 10.4 
4.00 5.71E-10 1.76E-11 1.96E-10 2.17E-09 11.1 
5.66 2.55E-10 6.64E-12 8.06E-11 9.77E-10 12.1 
 
CVCS Case 8E 
                                       
BC Welds Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 7.50E-06 3.03E-07 2.91E-06 2.80E-05 9.6 
0.50 7.98E-08 2.82E-09 2.91E-08 3.01E-07 10.3 
0.75 4.79E-08 1.43E-09 1.62E-08 1.83E-07 11.3 
1.00 3.40E-08 8.70E-10 1.07E-08 1.30E-07 12.2 
1.50 2.15E-08 4.21E-10 5.91E-09 8.31E-08 14.1 
2.00 1.15E-08 2.24E-10 3.16E-09 4.46E-08 14.1 
3.00 4.80E-09 9.25E-11 1.31E-09 1.85E-08 14.2 
4.00 2.44E-09 4.17E-11 6.28E-10 9.45E-09 15.1 
5.66 1.09E-09 1.59E-11 2.59E-10 4.21E-09 16.3 
Notes:  
1. Two or more cases are listed together when they only differ by pipe size, see Tables 5-1 through 5-4 to see the different pipe sizes and DEGB 
sizes for those combined in this table. 
2. PWSCC = primary water stress corrosion cracking; SC = stress corrosion cracking; TF = thermal fatigue; D&C = design and              
    construction defects 
3. FR = total failure rate including any failure resulting in weld repair or replacement 
4. RF = range factor = SQRT(95%tile/5%tile) 
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Table 2.12 Percent differences between the LOCA frequency distributions recalculated in this thesis and the values 
reported by Fleming and Lydell 
 
Weld Case[Note 1,2] Failure Mode 
Weld Failure Rate Distribution Parameters                                                                                  
Per weld-calendar-year 
Mean 5%tile Median 95%tile RF[Note 4] 
 
Hot Leg Case 1A 
B-F Welds Subject to 
PWSCC+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR[Note 3] 0.29% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.56% -0.57% 0.05% 0.92% 1.35% 
1.5 0.63% -0.36% 0.28% 0.61% 0.08% 
2.0 0.16% -0.03% 0.09% 0.27% 0.54% 
3.0 0.52% 0.14% 0.17% 0.42% 0.15% 
4.0 0.11% 0.33% -0.26% -0.08% 0.47% 
6.0 -0.07% -0.21% -0.04% -0.36% 0.04% 
6.8 0.17% -0.17% -0.13% 0.08% -0.15% 
14.0 0.41% 0.18% 0.20% 0.16% 0.30% 
20.0 0.19% -0.13% -0.27% 0.00% 0.31% 
29.0 0.23% -0.04% -0.07% 0.42% 0.31% 
31.5 0.00% -0.11% 0.01% 0.12% 0.30% 
41.0 15.98% 15.20% 15.59% 15.55% 0.15% 
 
Hot Leg Case 1C 
 B-J Welds Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.11% 0.00% -0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.48% -0.79% -0.09% 0.41% 0.29% 
1.5 0.62% -0.66% -0.03% 0.28% 0.26% 
2.0 0.26% -0.11% 0.05% 0.05% 0.12% 
3.0 0.56% -0.14% 0.07% 0.35% 0.23% 
4.0 0.07% -0.10% -0.17% -0.22% 0.08% 
6.0 -0.13% -0.43% -0.20% 0.08% 0.12% 
6.8 -0.02% -0.26% -0.44% 0.22% 0.05% 
14.0 0.10% -0.11% -0.04% 0.07% 0.12% 
20.0 0.19% -0.38% -0.18% -0.35% 0.13% 
29.0 0.03% -0.63% -0.20% -0.29% 0.13% 
31.5 -0.08% -0.27% 0.15% -0.10% 0.12% 
41.0 0.32% -0.12% 0.01% 0.10% 0.12% 
 
Hot Leg Case 1B 
 B-J Welds Subject to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.43% -0.11% 0.14% 0.19% 0.14% 
1.5 0.27% -0.15% 0.07% 0.21% 0.13% 
2.0 0.02% 0.03% -0.02% 0.15% 0.01% 
3.0 0.10% -0.13% 0.19% 0.18% 0.07% 
4.0 -0.35% -0.42% 0.08% 0.08% -0.07% 
6.0 -0.20% -0.14% -0.15% -0.40% -0.01% 
6.8 -0.26% -0.20% -0.16% 0.14% 0.00% 
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Hot Leg Case 1B 
 B-J Welds Subject to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
14.0 0.07% 0.10% 0.09% -0.03% 0.02% 
20.0 -0.20% -0.09% 0.12% 0.01% 0.02% 
29.0 -0.08% -0.07% -0.15% 0.28% 0.02% 
31.5 -0.12% -0.06% -0.06% -0.48% 0.02% 
41.0 0.13% 0.24% 0.14% 0.07% 0.01% 
 
Hot Leg SG Inlet Case 2 
B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+D&C 
Break 
Size 
(in.) 
FR 0.05% 0.00% 0.60% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 -0.02% 0.06% -0.11% -0.01% -0.90% 
1.5 0.14% -0.33% -0.14% 0.08% 0.51% 
2.0 -0.23% 0.35% 0.09% 0.05% -0.18% 
3.0 -0.27% 0.17% 0.01% -0.15% -0.15% 
4.0 -0.21% -0.14% -0.12% -0.07% -0.29% 
6.0 -0.09% -0.10% -0.06% -0.13% -0.01% 
6.8 0.11% -0.59% -0.36% 0.24% 0.04% 
14.0 0.07% -0.11% 0.07% 0.53% 0.35% 
20.0 0.14% 0.02% 0.05% 0.01% 0.25% 
29.0 -0.01% -0.36% -0.02% 0.04% 0.34% 
31.5 0.00% -0.20% -0.32% 0.02% 0.35% 
41.0 0.70% 0.28% 0.37% 0.55% 0.42% 
 
Cold Leg Cases 3A and 3B 
 B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR -0.36% 0.00% -0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 -0.08% -0.58% -0.30% 0.01% 0.25% 
1.5 0.18% -0.41% -0.23% -0.33% 0.28% 
2.0 -0.02% -0.30% -0.14% -0.04% -0.26% 
3.0 0.25% -0.37% -0.21% -0.04% 0.23% 
4.0 -0.37% -0.64% -0.65% -0.34% 0.46% 
6.0 -0.80% -1.45% -0.99% -0.74% 0.37% 
6.8 -0.04% -0.34% 0.12% 0.18% -0.12% 
14.0 -0.15% -0.18% -0.02% 0.01% 0.32% 
20.0 0.20% -0.26% -0.06% 0.01% 0.06% 
27.5 0.22% -0.17% -0.18% 0.25% 0.10% 
31.5 0.12% -0.10% 0.01% 0.34% 0.33% 
38.9 0.36% -0.16% 0.06% 0.51% 0.13% 
44.5 -0.05% -0.17% -0.03% -0.13% 0.10% 
 
Cold Leg Cases 3C and 3D 
 B-J Weld Subject to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.08% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.08% -0.33% 0.11% 0.19% 0.04% 
1.5 0.11% 0.09% -0.08% 0.22% 0.05% 
2.0 0.10% -0.11% -0.16% 0.09% -0.04% 
3.0 0.11% 0.19% -0.14% 0.04% 0.03% 
4.0 -0.36% -0.41% -0.40% -0.34% 0.03% 
6.0 -0.79% -1.07% -0.85% -0.89% 0.11% 
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Cold Leg Cases 3C and 3D 
 B-J Weld Subject to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
6.8 -0.19% 0.10% 0.05% 0.05% -0.01% 
14.0 0.37% 0.12% -0.04% 0.09% -0.04% 
20.0 0.14% 0.14% 0.20% 0.28% 0.06% 
27.5 0.17% 0.13% 0.27% 0.29% 0.01% 
31.5 0.23% 0.08% 0.25% 0.15% 0.01% 
38.9 0.19% 0.14% 0.06% 0.25% 0.07% 
44.5 0.19% 0.18% 0.09% 0.31% 0.01% 
 
Surge Line Case 4A 
 B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR -0.62% -0.79% -0.59% -0.78% -0.40% 
0.5 -0.22% -1.21% -0.58% -0.07% 0.94% 
1.5 -0.92% -0.63% -0.81% -0.72% -0.35% 
2.0 -0.65% -0.90% -0.75% -0.54% -0.12% 
3.0 -0.62% -0.43% -0.73% -0.54% -0.14% 
4.0 -0.95% -0.71% -0.61% -0.49% 0.15% 
6.0 -0.54% -0.77% -0.77% -0.53% 0.16% 
6.8 -0.63% -0.79% -0.58% -0.77% -0.04% 
14.0 0.00% -0.98% -0.56% -0.50% 0.27% 
16.0 -0.56% -0.65% -0.41% -0.61% 0.04% 
19.8 -0.37% -0.71% -0.54% -0.37% 0.27% 
22.6 -0.39% -0.18% -0.38% -0.36% 0.09% 
 
Surge Line Case 4B and 4D 
 B-J Weld Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 0.16% 
0.5 0.75% -0.08% 0.17% 0.49% 0.44% 
1.5 -0.04% 0.00% 0.20% 0.04% -0.05% 
2.0 0.54% 0.11% 0.25% 0.36% 0.17% 
3.0 0.81% 0.32% 0.35% 0.33% -0.02% 
4.0 0.51% 0.19% 0.49% 0.18% 0.15% 
6.0 0.37% 0.43% -0.05% 0.45% 0.09% 
6.8 0.36% 0.32% 0.34% 0.36% 0.04% 
14.0 0.67% 0.21% 0.33% 0.28% 0.22% 
16.0 0.30% 0.47% 0.50% 0.23% -0.05% 
19.8 0.49% 0.26% 0.40% 0.54% 0.10% 
22.6 0.57% 0.54% 0.80% 0.66% -0.02% 
 
Surge Line Case 4C 
 BC Weld Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 2.85% 2.27% 2.42% 2.75% 0.22% 
0.5 3.61% 2.08% 2.42% 3.04% 0.59% 
1.5 2.51% 2.21% 2.63% 2.52% 0.07% 
2.0 3.01% 2.09% 2.41% 2.71% 0.31% 
3.0 2.71% 2.25% 2.58% 2.77% 0.23% 
4.0 2.71% 2.32% 2.47% 2.77% 0.31% 
6.0 3.05% 2.42% 2.63% 2.93% 0.32% 
6.8 2.97% 1.86% 2.47% 3.08% 0.30% 
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14.0 3.44% 2.07% 2.62% 2.90% 0.39% 
16.0 2.40% 2.25% 2.36% 2.71% 0.24% 
19.8 3.04% 1.90% 2.72% 3.03% 0.39% 
22.6 3.25% 2.24% 2.44% 3.34% 0.27% 
 
Pressurizer Cases 5A,5B, and 
5J 
 B-J Welds Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.36% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 0.62% -0.61% 0.40% 0.64% 0.62% 
0.75 0.39% -0.34% 0.13% 0.97% 0.33% 
1.00 0.32% -0.28% 0.17% 0.52% 0.17% 
1.50 -0.05% 0.32% 0.12% -0.14% 0.06% 
2.00 0.37% -0.22% 0.24% 0.31% 0.09% 
3.00 0.67% -0.46% -0.06% 0.08% 0.67% 
4.24 -5.55% -18.83% -12.52% -5.81% 8.05% 
5.66 0.22% -0.42% -0.13% 0.03% 0.19% 
6.00 0.22% -0.66% -0.09% 0.18% 0.36% 
6.75 0.46% -0.29% 0.09% 0.56% 0.28% 
8.49 0.35% -0.43% -0.08% 0.00% 0.23% 
 
Pressurizer Cases 5C, 5D, 5E, 
and 5I 
 B-J Weld Subject to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR -0.20% 0.00% -0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 -0.03% -0.02% 0.15% 0.11% 0.24% 
0.75 0.16% -0.01% 0.02% -0.10% 0.39% 
1.00 -0.12% 0.01% -0.08% -0.08% -0.26% 
1.50 -0.55% 0.28% 0.21% -0.55% -0.32% 
2.00 -0.34% -0.03% -0.27% -0.14% -0.33% 
3.00 0.07% -0.28% 0.04% -0.03% 0.27% 
4.24 -6.13% -18.65% -12.64% -5.96% 7.88% 
5.66 -0.17% -0.23% -0.26% -0.28% -0.28% 
6.00 -0.44% -0.23% -0.29% -0.23% -0.17% 
6.75 -0.26% -0.02% -0.10% -0.12% 0.22% 
8.49 -0.27% -0.30% -0.27% -0.22% 0.17% 
 
Pressurizer Case 5G 
 B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR -0.41% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 -0.23% 0.83% 0.04% -0.73% 0.34% 
0.75 -0.36% 0.92% 0.08% -0.82% -0.70% 
1.00 -0.08% 0.79% -0.09% -0.81% -2.01% 
1.50 -0.63% 1.38% -0.07% -1.59% -2.06% 
2.00 -0.36% 0.55% -0.03% -0.56% -0.78% 
3.00 -0.12% 0.21% -0.29% -0.47% 0.28% 
4.24 -6.41% -22.62% -12.66% -1.53% 13.58% 
5.66 -0.57% 0.49% -0.09% -0.75% -0.50% 
6.00 -0.45% 0.05% -0.26% -0.42% -0.06% 
6.75 -0.37% 0.46% -0.02% -0.25% -0.63% 
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  8.49 -0.44% 0.45% 0.11% -0.71% -0.71% 
 
Pressurizer Case 5F 
  B-F Weld Subject to 
PWSCC+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR -0.55% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 -0.26% 1.39% 0.03% -1.18% 0.34% 
0.75 -0.46% 1.23% 0.03% -1.12% -0.70% 
1.00 -0.39% 0.91% 0.24% -0.89% -2.01% 
1.50 -1.27% 1.49% -0.06% -1.79% -2.06% 
2.00 -0.46% 1.20% -0.12% -0.88% -0.78% 
3.00 -0.22% 0.44% -0.23% -0.60% 0.28% 
4.24 -6.27% -22.50% -12.68% -1.64% 13.58% 
5.66 -0.62% 0.63% -0.05% -0.99% -0.50% 
6.00 -0.56% 0.26% -0.17% -0.91% -0.06% 
6.75 -0.35% 0.59% -0.05% -0.68% -0.63% 
8.49 -0.61% 0.51% -0.21% -0.82% -0.71% 
 
Pressurizer Case 5H 
 B-F Weld Subject to D&C 
(Weld Overlay) 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 0.28% -0.06% 0.18% 0.30% 0.12% 
0.75 -0.30% -0.12% 0.13% 0.15% 0.04% 
1.00 0.12% -0.26% -0.24% 0.08% 0.06% 
1.50 -0.37% 0.22% -0.07% -0.30% -0.19% 
2.00 -0.08% -0.13% -0.17% -0.15% 0.03% 
3.00 0.57% -0.33% -0.05% -0.21% 0.17% 
4.24 -6.10% -16.32% -12.68% -8.90% 4.30% 
5.66 0.02% -0.13% -0.09% -0.16% 0.03% 
6.00 0.05% -0.48% -0.44% -0.25% 0.13% 
6.75 -0.07% -0.02% 0.02% 0.20% 0.06% 
8.49 0.09% -0.52% -0.03% -0.31% 0.03% 
Small Bore Cases 6A and 6B 
 B-J Welds Subject to 
VF+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR -0.37% 0.00% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 12.83% -52.31% -12.15% 62.65% 81.31% 
0.75 23.88% -54.35% -10.86% 74.55% 94.60% 
1.00 33.05% -55.42% -10.10% 81.73% 100.34% 
1.41 45.55% -55.95% -8.62% 89.47% 109.00% 
1.50 47.42% -56.39% -9.09% 90.14% 107.64% 
1.99 55.33% -53.32% -3.84% 98.78% 105.07% 
2.00 55.71% -53.27% -3.93% 98.57% 105.12% 
2.83 1517.77% -48.18% 223.68% 1926.71% 524.79% 
 
SIR Case 7C 
    B-J Welds Subject to 
SC+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 FR -0.44% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 -0.48% 0.58% 0.23% -0.38% -0.69% 
0.8 -0.44% 0.46% 0.06% -0.45% -0.23% 
1.0 -0.49% 0.59% 0.10% -0.55% -1.16% 
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SIR Case 7C 
    B-J Welds Subject to 
SC+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
1.5 -1.38% 0.52% 0.02% -0.37% -0.11% 
2.0 -0.46% 0.57% 0.00% -0.49% -0.84% 
2.8 13.08% 14.13% 13.46% 12.83% -0.39% 
4.0 -0.38% 0.52% 0.01% 3.71% -0.42% 
4.2 -0.21% 0.53% 0.17% -0.48% -0.93% 
5.7 -0.42% 0.54% -0.45% -0.37% 0.04% 
6.0 -0.54% 0.14% -0.38% -0.32% -0.22% 
6.8 -0.22% 0.42% -0.07% -0.25% -0.57% 
7.2 -0.53% 0.41% 0.01% -0.43% -0.57% 
8.5 -0.64% 0.33% -0.19% -0.59% -0.56% 
10.0 -0.38% 0.35% 0.05% -0.37% -0.56% 
11.3 -1.32% -0.37% -0.58% -1.00% -0.56% 
14.1 -2.40% -1.37% -1.86% -2.40% -0.55% 
17.0 -0.48% 0.74% -0.18% -0.45% -0.55% 
 
SIR Case 7A 7B 
 B-J Welds Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.15% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.12% -0.66% 0.22% 0.38% -0.05% 
0.8 0.04% -0.41% 0.00% 0.34% 0.95% 
1.0 0.43% -0.40% -0.01% 0.39% 0.61% 
1.5 0.27% -0.28% -0.02% 0.24% 0.26% 
2.0 0.33% -0.45% 0.16% 0.11% 0.62% 
2.8 13.63% 13.23% 13.50% 13.79% 0.06% 
4.0 0.24% -0.43% 0.03% 0.42% 0.44% 
4.2 0.36% -0.28% -0.06% 0.60% 0.06% 
5.7 0.27% -0.45% -0.20% 0.37% -0.11% 
6.0 0.31% -0.76% -0.24% 0.25% 0.34% 
6.8 0.38% -0.34% -0.06% 0.34% 0.20% 
7.2 0.25% -0.34% -0.08% 0.28% 0.20% 
8.5 0.28% -0.38% -0.13% 0.12% 0.20% 
10.0 -0.05% -0.47% -0.10% 0.37% 0.21% 
11.3 -0.32% -0.86% -0.75% -0.28% 0.21% 
14.1 -1.70% -1.96% -2.01% -1.73% 0.21% 
17.0 0.20% 0.01% -0.38% -0.01% 0.22% 
 
SIR Case 7D 
ACC Case 7M 
B-J Welds Subject to 
SC+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.44% 0.00% 0.40% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.62% -0.24% -1.94% 0.88% 0.51% 
0.8 0.84% -0.14% 0.22% 0.69% 0.32% 
1.0 0.43% -0.19% 0.34% 0.70% 0.16% 
1.5 0.61% 0.21% 0.38% 0.61% 0.52% 
2.0 0.56% -0.01% 0.21% 0.58% 0.15% 
2.8 14.01% 13.51% 13.72% 14.13% 0.52% 
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SIR Case 7D 
ACC Case 7M 
B-J Welds Subject to 
SC+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
4.0 0.95% -0.07% 0.15% 0.61% 0.04% 
4.2 0.70% 0.27% 0.55% 0.79% 0.04% 
5.7 0.47% -0.26% 0.48% 0.30% 0.41% 
6.0 0.44% -0.43% 0.02% 0.47% 0.58% 
6.8 0.53% -0.11% 0.23% 0.47% 0.45% 
7.2 0.63% -0.11% 0.31% 0.55% 0.45% 
8.5 0.65% -0.09% 0.21% 0.53% 0.46% 
10.0 0.93% -0.19% 0.29% 0.52% 0.46% 
11.3 0.17% -0.66% -0.43% -0.18% 0.46% 
14.1 -1.33% -2.01% -1.61% -1.35% 0.47% 
17.0 0.64% 0.03% 0.02% 0.43% 0.47% 
 
SIR Cases 7E-7L 
 B-J Welds Subject to D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR -0.11% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 -0.16% 0.48% 0.06% -0.35% -0.24% 
0.8 -0.13% 0.42% 0.19% -0.04% -0.38% 
1.0 -0.08% 0.67% -0.04% -0.16% -0.50% 
1.5 -0.10% 0.43% 0.12% -0.10% -0.65% 
2.0 -0.29% 0.34% 0.12% -0.24% -0.32% 
2.8 13.28% 14.18% 13.59% 13.03% -0.72% 
4.0 -0.17% 0.32% -0.28% -0.41% -0.38% 
4.2 0.03% 0.53% 0.20% 0.35% -0.51% 
5.7 -0.39% 0.07% -0.07% -0.34% -0.06% 
6.0 -0.17% 0.03% -0.20% -0.35% -0.01% 
6.8 -0.54% 0.41% 0.15% -0.22% -0.44% 
7.2 -0.22% 0.46% 0.26% -0.28% -0.44% 
8.5 -0.29% -0.17% -0.18% -0.47% -0.43% 
10.0 -0.19% 0.33% 0.14% -0.33% -0.43% 
11.3 -0.72% -0.31% -0.52% -0.94% -0.43% 
14.1 -2.31% -1.59% -1.90% -2.12% -0.43% 
17.0 -0.04% 0.43% 0.02% -0.17% -0.42% 
 
ACC Case 7N 
B-J Welds Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 0.12% 0.30% 0.14% 0.11% -0.09% 
0.8 0.09% 0.32% 0.25% 0.53% -0.20% 
1.0 -0.08% 0.32% 0.37% 0.06% -0.11% 
1.5 -0.18% 0.21% 0.25% 0.11% -0.13% 
2.0 0.09% 0.21% 0.11% 0.17% -0.14% 
2.8 13.33% 13.83% 13.72% 13.60% -0.10% 
4.0 -4.94% -14.10% -10.54% -6.74% 4.35% 
4.2 95.43% 119.44% 109.25% 99.85% -4.58% 
5.7 14.39% 17.13% 15.87% 14.78% -1.02% 
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ACC Case 7N 
B-J Welds Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
6.0 31.35% 38.20% 35.52% 32.18% -2.02% 
6.8 13.85% 13.87% 14.02% 13.71% -0.03% 
7.2 91.97% 92.30% 91.86% 92.20% -0.03% 
8.5 169.34% 169.70% 170.22% 169.92% -0.03% 
10.0 185.75% 186.71% 186.22% 186.41% -0.02% 
11.3 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 47.63% 
14.1 -99.79% -99.91% -99.87% -99.82% 40.64% 
17.0 -99.76% -99.88% -99.84% -99.78% 32.52% 
 
ACC Case 7O 
B-J Welds Subject to D&C 
Break 
Size 
(in.) 
FR -0.25% 0.00% -0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.5 -0.22% -0.04% -0.12% 0.03% -0.02% 
0.8 -0.03% 0.08% -0.10% -0.11% -0.01% 
1.0 -0.02% 0.31% -0.02% -0.10% -0.06% 
1.5 -0.41% 0.05% -0.03% -0.02% -0.09% 
2.0 -0.13% 0.11% 0.04% 0.01% -0.03% 
2.8 13.25% 13.50% 13.67% 13.34% -0.07% 
4.0 -5.35% -14.03% -11.95% -7.48% 3.71% 
4.2 95.18% 117.50% 108.47% 100.70% -4.11% 
5.7 14.16% 16.48% 15.92% 14.68% -0.79% 
6.0 30.94% 37.66% 34.88% 32.35% -1.85% 
6.8 13.53% 13.58% 13.86% 13.95% -0.08% 
7.2 91.34% 91.83% 91.81% 91.61% -0.08% 
8.5 168.70% 169.93% 170.07% 169.84% -0.08% 
10.0 185.28% 185.66% 185.21% 185.34% -0.08% 
11.3 -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 40.74% 
14.1 -99.79% -99.90% -99.87% -99.82% 35.02% 
17.0 -99.76% -99.87% -99.84% -99.79% 28.34% 
 
CVCS Case 8A and 8B 
  B-J Weld Subject to 
VF+TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR 0.15% 0.00% -0.32% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 0.17% -0.33% -0.28% 0.48% 0.63% 
0.75 0.10% -0.48% -0.48% 0.18% 0.04% 
1.00 0.26% -0.46% -0.19% 0.08% 0.57% 
1.50 0.41% -0.54% -0.16% 0.14% 0.61% 
2.00 2.74% -3.40% -0.28% 3.05% 3.60% 
3.00 6.45% -7.41% -0.31% 7.39% 7.89% 
4.00 4.15% -5.34% -0.28% 4.94% 5.55% 
5.66 1.44% -2.31% -0.31% 1.38% 1.95% 
 
CVCS Cases 8C, 8D, and 8F 
B-J Weld Subject to 
VF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 FR -0.44% 0.00% -0.18% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 -0.22% -0.02% -0.15% -0.46% 0.07% 
0.75 -0.03% 0.04% -0.23% -0.30% -0.07% 
1.00 -0.35% -0.08% -0.35% -0.50% -0.16% 
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CVCS Cases 8C, 8D, and 8F 
B-J Weld Subject to 
VF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
1.50 -0.28% 0.06% -0.44% -0.30% -0.16% 
2.00 2.14% -3.24% -0.26% 2.70% 3.18% 
3.00 5.78% -7.37% -0.46% 7.10% 7.99% 
4.00 4.04% -5.34% -0.19% 4.50% 4.82% 
5.66 1.09% -2.37% -0.67% 1.09% 1.97% 
 
CVCS Case 8E 
BC Welds Subject to 
TF+D&C 
B
re
ak
 S
iz
e 
(i
n
.)
 
FR -0.05% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.50 0.04% 0.34% 0.12% 0.03% 0.33% 
0.75 0.01% 0.17% -0.17% -0.21% -0.08% 
1.00 -0.07% 0.19% 0.49% 0.36% -0.42% 
1.50 0.01% 0.14% 0.04% 0.02% -0.30% 
2.00 3.00% -2.45% 0.10% 2.76% 2.91% 
3.00 6.36% -6.34% 0.00% 6.58% 6.44% 
4.00 4.43% -4.54% -0.17% 4.45% 4.54% 
5.66 0.92% -1.97% -0.55% 1.21% 1.77% 
Notes:  
1. Two or more cases are listed together when they only differ by pipe size, see Tables 5-1 through 5-4 to see the different pipe sizes and DEGB 
sizes for those combined in this table. 
2. PWSCC = primary water stress corrosion cracking; SC = stress corrosion cracking; TF = thermal fatigue; D&C = design and              
    construction defects 
3. FR = total failure rate including any failure resulting in weld repair or replacement 
4. RF = range factor = SQRT(95%tile/5%tile) 
 
2.2 KEY GAPS IDENTIFIED IN THE EXISTING LOCATION-SPECIFIC LOCA 
FREQUENCY ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
After thorough review of Fleming and Lydell’s work, this research has identified five 
outstanding gaps and , therefore, the following ways are suggested to advance the estimations of 
LOCA frequencies: 
1. Include contributions from non-piping components 
2. Develop a methodology to explicitly incorporate the underlying physics of failure 
models of the failure mechanisms 
3. Incorporate an explicit time dependence for the LOCA frequencies 
4. Develop a method that explicitly considers maintenance programs and accounts for 
changes to maintenance programs 
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5. Develop plant specific failure mechanism contributions 
 
The first advancement suggested for this research concerns the incorporation of non-
piping components.  Fleming and Lydell’s work considered LOCAs initiated at or near the 
location of pipe and nozzle welds.  This means that contributions from non-piping components 
were not considered in the estimation of LOCA frequencies.  This was identified as a key gap, 
because the most recent NRC-sponsored approach for the estimation of LOCA frequencies, 
NUREG-1829, did include non-piping component contributions.  Therefore, the significance of 
the assumption of LOCAs occurring at only pipe and nozzle welds should be further examined.  
Chapter 3 of this thesis develops a qualitative analysis to examine the significance of the 
contributions of non-piping components to the estimations of LOCA frequencies.  
 
The second advancement pursued for this research concerns the explicit incorporation of 
the underlying physics of failure models of the failure mechanisms.  An explicit incorporation of 
the failure models would enable the estimations of LOCA frequencies to be guided by scientific 
knowledge of how failure mechanisms work instead of being almost entirely data driven.  This is 
important, because data can be misleading.  Additionally, the data that is available is sparse and 
only accounts for the failure mechanisms and maintenance programs of the past.  Using past data 
to predict the future can also be misleading.   
 
Incorporation of physical failure models can be used to develop an explicit time 
dependence for LOCA frequencies.  Instead of relying on multiplier distributions to mask the 
temporal dependence of LOCA frequencies, explicitly incorporated failure models can provide a 
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more detailed insight into how the LOCA frequencies change over a reactor’s lifetime.  This can 
also enable the incorporation of maintenance program information that currently is only 
implicitly included in the past failure data.  Changes in maintenance programs can have a 
significant effect on LOCA frequencies.  Finally, plant specific information can be used as an 
input into the failure mechanism models.  This would allow for a plant’s uniqueness to be taken 
into consideration and enable the estimations of LOCA frequencies for each plant.  Chapter 4 
develops a new spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology that provides more explicit 
incorporation of physical failure mechanisms associated with location and time into estimations 
of LOCA frequencies to address the gaps 2-5. 
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CHAPTER 3 : QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NON-
PIPING COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR LOCA FREQUENCIES  
 
This chapter relates to Step #3 in the roadmap of the research presented in Figure 3.1.  It 
focuses on evidence-seeking and expert elicitation to investigate the significance of 
incorporating contributions from non-piping components in the estimations of LOCA 
frequencies for the STPNOC risk-informed GSI-191 project, which was first presented in [1].  
Chapter 1 introduced the STPNOC risk-informed Generic Safety Issue 191 project[2].  The 
STPNOC project is an example of a risk-informed regulatory project which requires estimations 
of location-specific LOCA frequencies.  In support of the STPNOC project, Fleming and 
Lydell[3] developed location-specific estimations of LOCA frequencies.  Chapter 2 provides a 
critical review of the Fleming and Lydell method and identifies the key gaps.  Step #3 in Figure 
3.1 shows that the next step in the research progression is to examine the significance of one of 
the key gaps identified, i.e., the lack of incorporation of non-piping RCS components into the 
estimation of LOCA frequencies.  Fleming and Lydell’s work assumes that LOCAs initiate at or 
near the location of pipe and nozzle welds.  This chapter reports on the results of investigating 
the significance of the non-piping RCS component contributions to LOCA frequencies for 
nuclear power plants (NPPs). 
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Figure 3.1 Roadmap of the Research 
 
3.1 NON-PIPING COMPONENT IMPACT FOR GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 191 
The primary function of the reactor coolant system (RCS) in NPPs is to transfer heat 
from the fuel to the steam generators.  The RCS consists of the reactor vessel, the steam 
generators, the reactor coolant pumps, the pressurizer, and the piping that connects each of the 
major non-piping components[4].  A depiction of an RCS for a U.S. PWR can be found in Figure 
3.2.  Breaks in the RCS can lead to the escape of large quantities of primary coolant.  If this 
coolant exceeds the capabilities of the reactor to replace the coolant, a LOCA can occur.  
Therefore, to understand the risk associated with the operation of NPPs, it is important to 
understand the probability or the frequency of such a break occurring.  NRC has, therefore, 
sponsored multiple reports that support the estimation of LOCA frequencies[5-8].  These reports 
have investigated the frequency at which RCS piping could break and the potential there is to 
produce a LOCA.   
99 
 
 
Figure 3.2 PWR Reactor Coolant System, Emergency Core Cooling System, and Sump Depiction from [4] 
 
Many risk-informed regulatory decision-making applications, such as the STPNOC risk-
informed pilot project to resolve GSI-191[9], need estimations of LOCA frequencies as a critical 
input.  As explained in Section 1.4.2 in Chapter 1, the initiating event frequencies for the risk-
informed resolution of GSI-191 need to be location-specific.  The NRC-sponsored estimations of 
LOCA frequencies provided cumulative frequencies as a function of component break size that 
included the contributions from all potential LOCA locations, but did not provide the individual 
contribution for each of the locations.  Since two breaks of equivalent size in different locations 
may have significantly different likelihoods of occurrence and effects on GSI-191 related 
phenomena (e.g., quantity of debris generated, transport fractions, in-vessel flow paths, etc.), the 
cumulative frequencies needed to be distributed to each of the potential break locations.   
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In support of the STPNOC project, Fleming and Lydell[3] utilized service data from 
4,000 reactor-years of PWR service experience to estimate location-specific LOCA frequencies.  
Fleming and Lydell’s works did not consider non-piping passive components, and mentioned 
that the most important degradation mechanisms, such as thermal fatigue (TF) and stress 
corrosion cracking (SCC) occur at or near welds.  However, the expert elicitation process 
documented in NUREG-1829 revealed that despite a dearth of precursor data available for the 
non-piping components compared with piping components, panelists believe non-piping 
components provide significant contributions for Category 1 and 2 LOCA frequencies.  
According to the experts documented in NUREG-1829, assessment of non-piping component 
failure frequencies and their impact on estimations of LOCA frequencies are more difficult than 
for piping components as there are multiple aspects to consider including the different operating 
requirements, designs, materials, and inspection considerations for each non-piping 
component[8].  Non-piping component related information has been extracted from NUREG-
1829 and can be found in Appendix B.  Despite the information regarding the potential for non-
piping components provided by the experts of NUREG-1829, Fleming and Lydell chose not to 
consider non-piping components and to consider only the pipe and nozzle welds for three main 
reasons: 
1. Apart from leaks from valves and seals, piping system failures occur almost 
exclusively at or near welds. 
2. Since primary reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary welds are distributed 
relatively evenly around the piping systems, these welds provide a representative set 
of pipe failure locations for both pipe and non-pipe failures. 
3.  The most important degradation mechanisms, such as thermal fatigue (TF) and stress 
corrosion cracking (SCC) occur at or near welds due to the localized metallurgical 
changes from elevated temperature service, including increased residual stress 
distributions across the heat-affected zones[10-13]. 
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Step #3 in the roadmap of this research, presented in Figure 3.1, focuses on investigating 
further evidence to help support or refute the necessity for including non-piping component 
contributions into the estimations of LOCA frequencies associated with GSI-191.  This chapter 
reports the results of this investigation consisting of two steps: 
1. Evidence Seeking: utilized the references developed by academia, industry, 
regulatory, and national laboratory 
2. Evidence Screening: conducted by experts in academia and industry 
 
A flowchart of the investigation procedure can be seen in Figure 3.3.  Section 3.2 
provides a description of the “evidence-seeking” process in Figure 3.2.  Section 3.3 explains the 
“evidence screening” process in Figure 3.2.  The evidence seeking and evidence screening 
processes were based on the following two criteria: 
A. LOCA Relevancy:  the potential for the failure of each component or sub-component to 
result in a LOCA 
B. Debris Generation Relevancy: the potential for the failure of a component or sub-
component to generate debris that could travel to the containment floor, and ultimately 
to the sump strainer of the emergency core cooling system 
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Figure 3.3 Investigation Procedure for Importance of Passive Non-Piping RCS Components for the Estimations of 
LOCA Frequencies Associated with GSI-191 
 
3.2 EVIDENCE-SEEKING PROCESS FOR NON-PIPING COMPONENTS 
To determine the significance of non-piping components for estimations of LOCA 
frequencies and GSI-191, evidence-seeking research was performed.  Due to the rare nature of 
LOCA phenomena, this evidence-seeking research required extensive literature review and 
included approximately 500 academic, industry, national laboratory, and regulatory 
publications.1  Due to the extensive nature of the evidence-seeking process, it was necessary to 
develop specific criteria (criteria A and B in Figure 3.3) by which to judge whether the literature 
provided relevant evidence for the research.   
 
                                                 
1 The evidence-seeking process was conducted with help from undergraduate research intern, John Simmons 
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Evidence regarding the importance of non-piping RCS components or sub-components for 
GSI-191 phenomena is classified into six groups based on the functionality of each component or 
sub-component.  The six categories include: 
- Reactor coolant pump (RCP) 
- Pressurizer 
- Steam generator 
- Reactor vessel 
- ECCS 
- Chemical volume and control system (CVCS) 
 
The collected evidence is limited to the period from 1975 to 2014 to reduce irrelevancies due to 
design changes.   
 
The following sub-sections (3.2.1 to 3.2.6) provide selected evidence to highlight the 
scope and multi-dimensional nature of evidence seeking research.  A few examples of the 
accumulated evidence are included in each sub-section to provide an understanding of the 
information within the evidence tables as well as to highlight the range of the information.  The 
complete evidence tables for this investigation are provided in Appendix B of this thesis. 
 
3.2.1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 
In the reactor coolant pump (RCP) category, 16 sub-component categories were initially 
identified as satisfying the evidence seeking criteria.  These sub-component categories are:  
- turning vane bolts/cap screws 
- pump shaft 
- pump closure 
- pump body/casing 
- flange 
- flywheel 
- framing and support 
- thermal barrier 
- seals 
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- suction deflector bolting 
- motor exterior 
- oil collection system tank2  
- motor stator coolers 
- heat exchanger components 
- motor lube oil coolers2 
- valves2  
 
These sub-component categories were developed based on similarities in function and/or location 
within a typical RCP. 
 
The RCP evidence search included 121 academic, industry, national laboratory, and 
regulatory publications related to reactor coolant pumps spanning the period from 1980-2014.  
Relevant information was brought into the evidence tables (see Appendix B) in the form of 
quotations, names of tables within the documents, or descriptive information from 51 of these 
publications, including: 
- 14 regulatory publications 
- 9 national laboratory publications 
- 26 industry publications 
- 2 news articles from Nuclear Street News and South Jersey Times 
 
For the RCP category, no information of high relevancy to the evidence-seeking criteria was 
found from the academic sector.  Examples of the collected evidence include: 
 
LOCA Relevancy: 
 
                                                 
2 Component in Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection Sub-System 
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 Industry: In 2000, the Application for Renewed Operating License of Turkey Point 
Units 3&4 from the Florida Power and Light Co. stated, “Mechanical closure bolting 
associated with the reactor coolant pump components is made of low alloy steel 
bolting material and is subject to aggressive chemical attack.”[14] 
 National Laboratory:  An Idaho National Laboratory document from 1989[15] found, 
"Visual inspection of closure studs at other PWR plants has revealed that the studs in 
all pump designs are susceptible to boric acid corrosion." The document later states, 
"Leakage of borated water across LWR primary coolant pump case-to-cover gaskets 
can cause corrosion of the pump closure studs and corrosion of carbon steel pump 
body base metal.” 
 Regulatory:  Information Notice No. 90-68 from the NRC in 1994[16] states, “On 
September 2, 1993, the licensee for Millstone Unit 3 was inspecting the reactor’s 
lower core support plate before reloading fuel. The licensee discovered pieces of a 
locking cup for the Westinghouse model 93A-1 reactor coolant pump turning vane 
cap screws. The cap screws connect the flanged interfaces of the turning vane and 
thermal barrier.” 
 News:  A 2014 news article from the South Jersey Times[17] reports, “Sheehan said 
one of the main concerns was having the bolt heads damage or stop the impeller at 
the bottom of the pump which spins and draws the water into the pump in then sends 
it into the reactor vessel. Also, Sheehan said, there could be the possibility of the 
impeller, moving at such a high rate of speed, striking and disintegrating a bolt head 
and sending tiny pieces of metal circulating throughout the cooling system and 
possibly causing damage.” 
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Debris Generation Relevancy: 
 
 Industry:  The Electric Power Research Institute, in 1988[18] reported, “The RC pump 
main flange showed the greatest capacity for producing large leak rates owing to the 
large diameter of the sealing surface and smaller number of studs per arc length.” 
 Regulatory:  Information Notice No. 90-68 from the NRC in 1994[16] states, “The 
licensee subsequently removed four turning vane cap screws for inspection. A visual 
and liquid penetrant inspection at the juncture of the head and body of the cap screws 
revealed cracks in two cap screws. One cap screw had no cracks. The head of the 
fourth cap screw was almost completely severed. The cap screws are made of alloy 
A286 stainless steel, designated by the American Society for Testing and Materials as 
A453 grade 660. The cap screw or cap screw head may deform, loosen, fracture, or 
fail the locking cup restraints. Cap screw failures could present a safety hazard 
because failed parts could enter the reactor coolant system and cause damage to vital 
components.” 
 News: A 2014 news article from the Nuclear Street News Team[19] reported, 
“Inspections during a refueling outage at unit 2 of PSEG's Salem nuclear plant 
revealed bolt fragments at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel. Quoting 
spokesmen from the plant and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the South Jersey 
Times reported that as many as 17 bolt heads have been found beneath fuel 
assemblies and at the bottom of a reactor coolant pump. The bolts came from RCP 
turning vanes and may have been affected by stress corrosion cracking.” 
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 National Laboratory:  An Idaho National Laboratory document from 1989[15] 
explained, “Failure of pump internals, for example, shafts and bearings, will not 
compromise the integrity of the pressure boundary, but the broken pieces may be 
carried over to the reactor vessel and damage the vessel internals, fuel rods, and 
other core components.” 
 
3.2.2 PRESSURIZER 
In the pressurizer category, 13 sub-component categories were identified, including: 
- thermal/heater sleeve 
- manway bolts/studs 
- instrument nozzles 
- walls/vessel shell 
- valve bonnet bolts 
- bolted relief valve 
- spray head 
- support skirt and the immediate surrounding insulation 
- seismic lugs 
- power-operated relief valve (PORV) 
- spray line nozzle 
- surge line nozzle 
- surge line 
 
These categories were developed based on similarities in function and/or location within a 
pressurizer. 
 
The pressurizer evidence search covered 82 academic, industry, national laboratory, and 
regulatory publications related to pressurizers that spanned 30 years (from 1981-2011).  Relevant 
information was brought into the evidence tables in the form of quotations, names of tables 
within the documents, or descriptive information from 30 of these publications, including: 
- 3 academic publications 
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- 8 regulatory publications 
- 7 national laboratory publications 
- 12 industry publications 
 
A complete set of collected evidence is available in Appendix B.  Examples of the collected 
evidence include: 
 
LOCA Relevancy: 
 
 Industry: In 1992, Dominion Engineering released [20], which stated, “In May 1989, 
approximately 20 of 120 heater sleeves were found to be leaking in the Calvert Cliffs 
Unit 2 pressurizer.” 
 National Laboratory:  In 2008, Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Korea 
Atomic Energy Research Institute released [21], which reports, “Since the late 1980's, 
approximately 50 Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves at Combustion Engineering-
designed (CE- designed) facilities in the United States have shown evidence of RCPB 
leakage which has been attributed to PWSCC.” 
 Regulatory:  In 2008, the NUREG-1829[8] Appendix B states, “Heater sleeves fail 
due to PWSCC, but as a result of their size, multiple failures are required in order to 
result in a LOCA.” 
 
Debris Generation Relevancy: 
 
 National Laboratory:  In 1989, Idaho National Laboratory, in [22], stated, “Failure of 
heater sleeve welds has the potential of becoming a serious problem because it is 
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possible that these sleeves could blow out and result in an unisolable small-break 
LOCA” 
 Regulatory: In 2008, NUREG-1829[10] Appendix L reported, “Again, for the 
Category 2 LOCAs, the major contributors are the CRDMs and the pressurizer 
heater sleeves.” 
 Industry: In 1981, Burns and Roe Inc. released [23], which explained, “The potential 
for large amounts of insulation debris reaching the sump from inside the shield wall 
exist.  Two partial floors exist within the shield wall at E. 605’-4” and El. 609’-1”.  
Although these floors will capture much of the insulation, some could pass through 
the gap between the two floors to reach the sump.  Any insulation below the floor at 
El. 606’-0” and El. 605’-4” will reach the basement floor.  In the region surrounding 
the sump, there exists several pipes above the sump.  The largest of these pipes is a 
10-inch residual heat removal pipe.  A pipe break could dislodge the insulation from 
these pipes and the insulation could land on the sump.” 
 Academia: In 2011, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety released [24], which stated, 
“In the US, Trojan plant reported unexpectedly large piping displacements due to 
thermal stratification, which resulted in crushed insulation.” 
 
3.2.3 STEAM GENERATOR 
In the steam generator category, 7 sub-component categories were identified, including:  
- steam generator tubes 
- primary manway cover 
- bolts 
- studs 
- nozzles 
- tubesheet 
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- support bolts 
- embedded anchor studs 
- primary divider plate 
- steam generator shell 
 
These categories were developed based on similarities in function and/or location within a steam 
generator. 
 
The steam generator evidence search examined 104 academic, industry, national 
laboratory, and regulatory publications related to steam generators and spanned the years 1975 
through 2014.  Relevant information was brought into the evidence tables in the form of 
quotations, names of tables within the documents, or descriptive information from 41 of these 
publications, including: 
- 3 academic publications 
- 15 regulatory publications 
- 7 national laboratory publications 
- 16 industry publications 
 
A complete set of collected evidence is available in Appendix B. Examples of the collected 
evidence include: 
 
LOCA Relevancy: 
 
 National Laboratory: In 1998, Idaho National Laboratory published Rates of 
Initiating Events at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants 1987-1995[7], which reported, “This 
study identified three steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) events. The SGTR 
frequency estimate based on the three SGTR events is 7.0E-3 per critical year. Based 
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on the current PWR population, this frequency correlates to about one event every 
two calendar years. The last SGTR identified in the 1987–1995 experience occurred 
at Palo Verde 2 in 1993.” 
 Regulatory: In 2013, the NRC released the Summary of Event and Plant Conditions 
(as of May 16, 2013) regarding SONGS steam generator tube degradation[25], which 
states, “SONGS unit 3 experienced a leak on Jan. 31, 2012 from tube wear at retainer 
bars, 74 tubes had indications of potential failure” 
 Academia:  In 2011, the University of Maryland published a journal paper[26], A 
Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure Approach to Prediction of Steam Generator Tube 
Rupture Frequency, which states, “…there were ten SGTR occurrences in the United 
States between 1975 and 2000. For example, on July 15, 1987, an SGTR event 
occurred at the North Anna Unit 1 PWR, shortly after the unit reached 100% power. 
The cause of the tube rupture was determined to be high cycle fatigue.” 
 
Debris Generation Relevancy: 
 
 Industry:  In Stress Corrosion Cracking of a Kori 1 Retired Steam Generator Tube, 
[27], a 2007 report from the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, it was found 
that pitting may cause penetration through a wall leading to loss of primary coolant 
water. 
 National Laboratory: In a 1996 document, Steam Generator Tube Failures[28], from 
the Idaho National Laboratory, it was reported, “Although the damaged tubes on the 
tube bundle periphery were plugged as a result of eddy-current inspection indications 
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and/or small leaks, the debris, in conjunction with the hydraulic and pressure 
loadings, continued to damage the plugged tubes and eventually caused the tubes to 
collapse and in some cases to become completely severed near the top of the 
tubesheet.” 
 Regulatory:  In 2008, NUREG-1829 Appendix H[8] stated, “From 1990 to 2002 there 
were 15 reports of steam generator tube leaks. There is a total of 929 reactor 
calendar years represented in this period, so the mean leak frequency over this period 
is 1.6x10-3 per calendar year.”, “Therefore, the frequency of steam generator tube 
Category 1 ruptures (with resultant leak rates greater than 100 gpm [380 lpm]) was 
4/1,133 calendar years, or 3.5x 103 per calendar year. NUREG/CR-5750 [4.1] 
conducted a similar assessment of SGTRs, and estimated a frequency of 7x 10-3 per 
calendar year” 
 
3.2.4 REACTOR VESSEL 
In the reactor vessel category, 20 sub-component categories were identified, including: 
- lower support structure 
- core barrel 
- upper grid 
- plenum cover 
- lower grid 
- fuel 
- flow distributor 
- vent valve 
- core support shield 
- core barrel and its support 
- shield and shroud 
- baffle and former 
- control rod guide tube 
- upper/lower internals 
- upper guide structure support barrel 
- control element assembly shroud 
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- control element drive mechanism 
- rod cluster control assembly guide tube 
- RV closure upper/lower head 
 
These categories were developed based on similarities in function and/or location within a 
reactor vessel 
 
The reactor vessel evidence search reviewed 59 academic, industry, national laboratory, 
and regulatory publications related to reactor vessels and spanned the years from 1988-2012.  
Relevant information was brought into the evidence tables in the form of quotations, names of 
tables within the documents, or descriptive information from 26 of these publications, including: 
- 1 academic publication 
- 1 regulatory publication 
- 1 national laboratory publication 
- 23 industry publications 
 
A complete set of collected evidence is available in Appendix B. Examples of the collected 
evidence include:  
 
LOCA Relevancy: 
 
 Industry: In 2002, the First Energy Nuclear Operating Company released the “Root 
Cause Analysis report: Significant Degradation of the Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Head"[29] which stated, “Circumferential cracking in CRDM nozzles were identified 
at Oconee 2 and 3, and axial cracking in the J-groove weld in CRDM nozzles were 
identified at Oconee 1 and ANO 1 (i.e., B&W plants).” 
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 National Laboratory: In 2002, a Brookhaven National Laboratory ASME conference 
paper[30] reported that said, “… identified flow-induced vibration as a cause for 
wear (i.e., thinning) of the thimble tubes ...” 
 Regulatory: In 1988, the NRC released Generic Letter No. 88-05, “Boric Acid 
Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR 
Plants”[31] which stated, “At Turkey Point Unit 4, leakage of reactor coolant from 
the lower instrument tube seal on one of the incore instrument tubes resulted in 
corrosion of various components on the reactor vessel head including three reactor 
vessel bolts.  The maximum depth of corrosion was 0.25 inches.” 
 Academia: In 2011, the Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, released, “Accident 
Management Actions in an Upper-head Small-break Loss-of-Coolant Accident with 
high-pressure Safety Injection Failed”[32] which stated, “In 2002, the discovery of 
thinning of the vessel head wall at the Davis Besse nuclear power plant reactor 
indicated the possibility of an SBLOCA in the upper head of the reactor vessel as a 
result of circumferential cracking of a control rod drive mechanism penetration 
nozzle…” 
 
Debris Generation Relevancy: 
 
 Industry: In 2007, Entergy Nuclear Operations’ License renewal for Indian Point 
nuclear generating units 2 and 3, appendix A[33] stated, “Flux thimble tubes are 
subject to loss of material at certain locations in the reactor vessel where flow-
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induced fretting causes wear at discontinuities in the path from the reactor vessel 
instrument nozzle to the fuel assembly instrument guide tube.” 
 Regulatory: In 1988, the NRC released Generic Letter No. 88-05, “Boric Acid 
Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR 
Plants”[31] which stated, “At San Onofre Unit 2, boric acid solution corroded nearly 
through the bolts holding the valve packing follow plate in the shutdown cooling 
system isolation valve.  During an attempt to operate the valve, the bolts failed and 
the valve packing follow plate became dislodged causing leakage of approximately 
18,000 gallons of reactor coolant into the containment.” 
 
3.2.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 
In the ECCS category, 22 sub-component categories were identified, including:  
- CSS heat exchanger (shell) 
- tanks 
- bolting and bearings 
- valves and valve bodies 
- tubing 
- strainers 
- suction 
- grating 
- sump 
- seals 
- nozzles 
- orifices 
- thermowell 
- filters 
- heater housing 
- oil cooler shell and channel head 
- spray system 
- flex hose 
- high pressure injection system 
- structural coating 
- pump casings 
- pumps 
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- heat exchanger (channel heads and coils) 
- heat exchanger (tubes and tube sheets/ shields) 
 
These categories were developed based on similarities in function and/or location within an 
ECCS. 
 
The ECCS evidence search covered 131 academic, industry, national laboratory, and 
regulatory publications related to ECCSs spanning the years from 1986-2010.  Relevant 
information was brought into the evidence tables in the form of quotations, names of tables 
within the documents, or descriptive information from 20 of these publications, including: 
- 10 regulatory publications  
- 10 industry publications 
 
An example is shown below to provide an understanding of the information included within the 
evidence tables.  A complete set of collected evidence is available in Appendix B.  
 
There was no LOCA-Relevancy information identified, because the ECCS does not 
operate until there is already an issue with insufficient cooling.   
 
Debris Generation Relevancy: 
 
 Regulatory: In the 1998 report, “Potential for Degradation for the Emergency Core 
Cooling System and the Containment Spray System after a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident 
because of Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in 
Containment (Generic Letter No. 98-04)” released by the NRC [34], it states that, 
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“September 18, 1992: During Technical Specification in-service inspection testing of 
the A containment spray pump the pump was declared inoperable. A foam rubber 
plug was blocking pump suction. Plug removed and pump tested satisfactorily. One 
train of Unit 2 residual heat removal, safety injection, and containment spray systems 
inoperable for entire operating cycle. Plug was part of a cleanliness barrier.” 
 
3.2.6 CHEMICAL VOLUME AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
In the CVCS category, 14 sub-component categories were identified, including:  
- valves and bodies 
- housings 
- thermowell 
- gauges and indicators 
- vessels 
- accumulators 
- reservoirs 
- pumps and cases 
- bolting and fasteners 
- filters and strainers 
- tanks 
- orifices and elements 
- piping 
- hoses 
- fittings 
- heat exchanger (channel heads and covers) 
- heat exchanger (shell) 
- heat exchanger (tubes and tubesheets) 
 
These categories were developed based on similarities in function and/or location within a 
CVCS. 
 
The CVCS evidence search reviewed 29 academic, industry, national laboratory, and 
regulatory publications related to steam generators spanning the years from 2001-2010.  
Relevant information was brought into the evidence tables in the form of quotations, names of 
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tables within the documents, or descriptive information from 10 industry license renewal 
applications.  
 
The CVCS is not directly part of the primary reactor pressure boundary and, therefore, is 
not a concern for LOCA.  However, some of the CVCS components are connected to the RCS 
pressurized systems, so they do have a potential for debris generation that could play a role in the 
GSI-191 scenario. 
 
The only information currently found regarding the CVCS relates to the potential failure 
modes of components within the CVCS.  It is theorized in this research that failures in the CVCS 
could create debris that could be transported to the RCS and thus become a contributor to a GSI-
191 issue. 
 
3.3 EXPERT SCREENING OF NON-PIPING COMPONENT INFORMATION 
After the initial evidence aggregation, the evidence tables underwent an internal 
academic review by Professor Zahra Mohaghegh and Dr. Seyed A. Reihani.  The evidence was 
evaluated with respect to the two criteria presented in Figure 3.3 (i.e., LOCA Relevancy and 
Debris Generation Relevancy).  The reviewers were sent copies of the evidence tables and asked 
to provide any relevant information they may personally have in relation to the two evidence-
seeking criteria.  The resulting qualitative feedback helped eliminate some of the sub-
components identified in Subsections 3.2.1 – 3.2.6 that did not meet the evaluation criteria.   
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Upon completion of the internal academic review, the evidence tables were sent for 
external review to three nuclear industry experts.  The nuclear industry experts were selected due 
to their many years of experience working with PRAs involving LOCA frequencies.  These 
experts provided their opinions regarding each component and sub-component based on the 
information collected from the evidence seeking process of the investigative procedure in 
addition to their professional experiences.  In the screening provided by experts, some 
contributors were identified as ‘indirect’ contributors to LOCA.  These were internal components 
such as turning vanes, thermal barrier, and suction deflector, or sub-components such as 
flywheels, framing, etc. that can add stress, for example, to pressure boundary components, but 
their failure would not directly cause the occurrence of a LOCA. 
 
Subsections 3.3.1. – 3.3.6. report the results of the expert screening for each of the six 
categories: RCP, pressurizer, steam generator, reactor vessel, ECCS, and CVCS.  In each 
category of components, two sets of examples of review comments are included in the 
subsections to demonstrate the type of information provided by the experts.  The remaining 
comments can be found in Appendix B.  The first set of examples of comments provided in each 
subsection are on the “agreement” expressed by the expert regarding the importance and the 
potential contribution of the sub-component to debris generation and the GSI-191 issue.  This 
has benefitted this research and helped identify the sub-component as a potential non-piping 
concern for GSI-191.  The second set of examples of comments relate to “disagreement” 
expressed by the experts regarding the importance and the potential contribution of the sub-
component to debris generation and the GSI-191 issue and has helped this research eliminate 
subcomponents regarding potential concerns for GSI-191 from further consideration. 
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The review comments from the academic and industry experts have assisted in the 
identification process of the potential importance of non-piping components for GSI-191.  The 
items identified in each category are not based on any ranking.  They only show items identified 
as being potential contributors to the GSI-191 project. 
 
3.3.1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 
After receiving the academic and industry reviews from the experts, the following 6 RCP 
sub-component categories were identified as having the potential to make a significant 
contribution for non-piping components: 
- Pump shaft 
- Pump closure (studs, bolts, main flange, and nuts) 
- Pump body/casing 
- Flywheel 
- Framing and support 
- Thermal barrier 
  
Examples of the review comments include: 
 Pump closure (studs, bolts, main flange, and nuts): “Potential for large LOCA here.  
Probably the most important issue for reactor coolant pump (because seal package 
failure has been experienced).”   
 Turning vane bolts and cap screws: “Not an issue for the GSI-191, because the bolt 
fragments are too heavy.  If the flow through the reactor pressure vessel isn’t strong 
enough to push the fragments out, then in the case of a LOCA, the flow on the 
containment floor will not push the fragments to help clog the sump strainer.”  
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3.3.2 PRESSURIZER 
After receiving the academic and industry reviews from the experts, the following 5 
pressurizer sub-component categories have been identified as potentially important non-piping 
components for the GSI-191 project: 
- Spray head 
- Manway bolts/studs 
- Thermal/heater sleeves 
- Power-operated relief valves (some plants) 
- Walls/vessel shell.   
 
Examples of the review comments include: 
 Spray head: “This is interesting because it is talking about the vessel walls.  We 
should look into this and find out what the exposure may be.  The pressurizer has a 
large volume of liquid in it and there would be a very large break potential (much 
bigger than a pipe).”   
 Instrument nozzles: “Instrument nozzles addressed in bottom-up approach.  PWSCC 
susceptibility exists only for B&W and CE plants.  Current fleet has implemented 
mitigation.”   
 
3.3.3 STEAM GENERATOR 
After receiving the academic and industry reviews from the experts, the following 2 
steam generator sub-component categories have been identified as potentially important non-
piping components for the GSI-191 project: 
- Primary manway cover, bolts, and studs 
- Support bolts and embedded anchor studs.   
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Examples of the review comments include: 
 Support bolts, embedded anchor studs: “Steam generator supports failures could 
result in greater load on the connected piping. So this is something to consider.”   
 Primary divider plate: “This is not a GSI-191 concern because it is internal to the 
primary system.”  
 
3.3.4 REACTOR VESSEL 
After receiving the academic and industry reviews from the experts, the following 8 
reactor vessel sub-component categories have been identified as potentially important non-piping 
components for the GSI-191 project: 
- Reactor vessel flange 
- Instrument tubes 
- Control rod drive mechanisms and housings 
- Thimble tubes 
- Thermal shield 
- Nozzle safe ends 
- Closure heads (torus, dome and cladding) 
- Nozzles.   
 
Examples of the review comments include: 
 Control rod drive mechanism housings: “CRDM housing failures, especially the drive 
shaft housing could result in debris generation.”   
 Reactor vessel internals: “Internal components would not cause debris generation.”  
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3.3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 
After receiving the academic and industry reviews from the experts, the following 3 
ECCS sub-component categories have been identified as potentially important non-piping 
components for the GSI-191 project: 
- Strainers, suction grating 
- Sump, thermowell 
- High pressure injection system.   
 
Examples of the review comments include: 
 Strainers, suction, grating, and sump: “If the ECCS suction strainers are weakened by 
corrosion or have additional buildup of corrosion prior to the need for recirculation, 
they could fail mechanically (allowing excess debris bypass to the core) or collapse 
and prevent pumping.”  
 Seals: “ECCS equipment requiring seals would not result in debris generation that 
would cause sump blockage.”  
 
3.3.6 CHEMICAL VOLUME AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
After receiving the academic and industry reviews from the experts, no CVCS sub-
component categories were identified as potentially important non-piping components for the 
GSI-191 project.  The consensus of the reviewers for the CVCS category has shown to be that  
 
“Some CVCS equipment and piping is connected to RCS pressurized systems.  
This equipment could create debris.”  However, “CVCS is another system located 
out of RCS pressure boundary between the first and second valves.  The potential 
for debris generation could be an issue, but they are isolable-LOCA.”   
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Therefore, since there was not any evidence of the potential for an unisolable-LOCA to occur 
from a subcomponent in the CVCS category, this category was eliminated from the investigative 
research. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION OF INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH 
Non-piping components are a major part of the RCS in NPPs.  Like all things, non-piping 
components have the potential to break.  The investigative research presented in this chapter 
explored the significance of the potential for non-piping component breaks to contribute to GSI-
191.  This research consisted of two steps.  The first step of the investigation required an 
extensive evidence-seeking process, which spanned over 500 academic, industry, national 
laboratory and regulatory publications, to gather as much information as possible regarding the 
potential contributions of non-piping RCS components in PWRs to GSI-191.  This initial 
evidence was then screened by academic and industry experts.  The expert-screening process 
identified many components that should be eliminated from the investigative process.  However, 
after the expert-screening, 24 subcomponent categories were identified as having potentially 
significant GSI-191 contributions.   
 
The 24 subcomponent categories identified by this investigative process indicates that 
estimations of LOCA frequencies for risk-informed decision-making applications such as GSI-
191 should not focus exclusively on the RCS piping components, because there is a potential for 
impact from the non-piping components.  However, the investigative procedure could not 
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determine “how significant” the exclusion of non-piping components could be on the results of 
risk-informed analyses. 
 
A quantitative methodology is needed to determine the “level of impact” of the 
inclusion/exclusion of non-piping components on the estimations of LOCA frequencies for risk-
informed applications.  Chapter 4 develops a quantitative methodology which could be used to 
quantitatively compare the LOCA frequencies associated with non-piping components with the 
ones for the piping components.  The spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology developed in 
Chapter 4 explicitly incorporates the underlying physical failure mechanisms into location-
specific LOCA frequency estimations through the integration of the Markov modeling technique 
with Probabilistic Physics of Failure models to develop LOCA frequencies for specific RCS 
locations and age.  In addition, a case study is provided in Chapter 5 of this thesis to implement 
the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology to compare the effects of material selection on 
the rupture probability of steam generator tubes. 
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CHAPTER 4 : SPATIO-TEMPORAL PROBABILISTIC METHODOLOGY FOR 
ESTIMATIONS OF LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) FREQUENCIES 
 
This chapter relates to Step #4 in the roadmap of the research presented in Figure 4.1. 
Chapter 1 introduces the risk-informed GSI-191 project [1] and the current state of estimations of 
LOCA frequencies. Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the location-specific, data-driven 
incorporation of physical failure mechanisms into the estimation of LOCA frequencies 
developed by Fleming and Lydell [1].  Chapter 2 also identifies key gaps in the Fleming and 
Lydell’s methodology including (a) the lack of inclusion of non-piping components in the 
estimations of LOCA frequencies and (b) the lack of explicit incorporation of physics of failure.  
Chapter 3 qualitatively examines the significance of including the contributions of non-piping 
components into the estimations of LOCA frequencies.  However, the qualitative investigative 
procedure in Chapter 3 cannot specify “how significantly” the exclusion of non-piping 
components could affect the results of risk-informed analyses.  Step #4 in Figure 4.1, which is 
the focus of this chapter, relates to the development of the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic 
methodology for LOCA frequency estimations. The Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology 
can be used to quantitatively compare non-piping and piping components with respect to LOCA 
frequencies.  
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Figure 4.1 Roadmap of the Research  
 
The Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology, which is an integration of the Markov 
modeling technique with the Probabilistic Physics of Failure (PPoF) models, provides the 
possibility for explicitly including the effects of location-specific causal factors, such as 
operating conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, pH), maintenance quality, and material 
properties (e.g., yield strength and corrosion resistance) on the probability of LOCA occurrence.  
This methodology is beneficial, not only for estimation of location-specific LOCA frequencies, 
but also for incorporation of spatio-temporal physics of failure into Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA); therefore, it helps advance risk estimation and risk prevention.  The explicit 
incorporation of failure mechanisms helps more accurately estimate the likelihood of LOCA 
occurrences, dealing with limited historical data.  Additionally, the explicit incorporation of the 
causal factors enables the use of sensitivity analyses, which allow the causal factors to be ranked 
in order of their risk significance.  Ranking of causal factors helps optimize maintenance 
practices by indicating the most resource-efficient methods to reduce risks.   
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Section 4.1 and its sub-sections explain the foundations and the logical tasks of the 
Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology. To show the feasibility of this new methodology, a 
case study is demonstrated in Chapter 5.  
 
4.1 THE FOUNDATIONS AND LOGICAL TASKS OF THE SPATIO-TEMPORAL 
PROBABILISTIC METHODOLOGY  
 
A Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) can occur when a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 
experiences a break that is large enough so that the high-pressure coolant flowing through the 
RCS can escape confinement at a rate greater than the reactor coolant makeup systems can 
replace the coolant[2].  Because NPPs are under a periodic maintenance, the underlying 
mechanisms that affect the state of degradation of a component in the RCS fall into two 
categories: (1) degradation and (2) repair.  Degradation mechanisms, also known as failure 
mechanisms, move components into a “more degraded state”.  The definition of “more degraded 
state” is application specific, and usually describes some ability of a component, such as its 
resistance to an applied load.  For RCS components, exposure to degradation mechanisms can 
result in a decrease of a component’s ability to contain high-pressure coolant.  Eventually, 
degradation of a component reaches a threshold where the component is no longer capable of 
withstanding the coolant pressure, and a LOCA may occur.  While degradation mechanisms 
move a component to more degraded states, repair mechanisms can restore a component’s 
ability, thus moving a component into a less degraded state.  NPPs have periodic maintenance 
programs to assist with prevention of LOCA occurrence.  The maintenance programs enable 
degradation of RCS components to be detected and repaired, counter-acting the effects of the 
degradation mechanisms, and bringing a component back to a less degraded state.  Therefore, it 
is important that LOCA frequency estimation models consider both degradation and repair 
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phenomena.  The proposed Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology integrates the following 
two types of modeling:  
 
(1) The Markov modeling technique (the left side of Figure 4.2) to depict the renewal 
processes of components’ repair due to periodic maintenance after degradations.  
(2) Probabilistic Physics of failure (PPoF) models (the right side of Figure 4.2) to 
explicitly incorporate the failure mechanisms, associated with the location and age of 
components, into the estimation of LOCA frequencies.  PPoF models integrate the 
underlying mechanisms related to degradation into the Markov modeling technique 
and, subsequently, into LOCA frequency estimations.   
 
To capture the back-and-forth and periodic nature of the degradation and repair 
mechanisms, the Markov modeling technique that is a technique for renewal process modeling 
[3-6] is selected.  Appendix C provides a review for renewal process modeling.  The Markov 
modeling technique uses discrete states to represent a component’s level of degradation as a 
function of both degradation and repair mechanisms. One of the underlying assumptions of the 
Markov modeling technique is “perfect repair”, i.e., the repair mechanisms would return the 
component or system to an “as good as new” state. Future research can use more advanced 
renewal process techniques (See Appendix C) to relax this assumption in the Spatio-Temporal 
Probabilistic methodology.  
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Figure 4.2 Integration of the Markov Modeling Technique with Probabilistic Physics of Failure Models in the 
Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic Methodology for Location-Specific LOCA Frequency Estimations 
 
The left side of Figure 4.2 demonstrates the Markov model and its four states for crack 
propagation failure and repair mechanisms developed in this research.  The four ovals in the 
figure represent the Markov states of degradation including: New, Flaw, Leak, and Rupture. In 
most of Markov models developed in this area of research, e.g., Fleming [7-10], the “transition 
rates” among the states (i.e., degradation transition rates:  , λ, ρ ,  in Figure 4.2 and repair 
transition rates: ω,  in Figure 4.2) are developed using solely data-driven approaches and 
utilizing service data. For example, Fleming develops a Markov model for piping system 
reliability that incorporates statistical estimates for the transition rates from Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) studies performed for thermal fatigue[11] and water hammer 
events[12].  Other multi-state physics-based models have been also developed in recent years for 
applications, such as the exploration of aging degradation of passive components[13, 14], to 
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predict long-term failure rates of passive components[15-17], passive component degradation for 
the RELAP 7 reactor simulation environment[18], and SCC of dissimilar metal in RELAP 7[19]. 
These multi-state physics-based models have implemented a data-driven approach by fitting 
uncertainty distributions to available data to quantify the probability of transitions between 
states.  While these approaches try to explicitly incorporate the progression of damage through 
the Markov model development, the transition rates themselves are developed through a solely 
data-driven approach. The main problems with the Markov models with the solely data-driven 
transition rates are (1) inaccuracy due to insufficient data and (2) the lack of “explicit” 
connections with location-specific physics of failure mechanisms associated with transition rates.   
 
The rate of change in degradation of a component varies at each location.  For example, 
some locations in the RCS may not be inspected as frequently as other locations.  Therefore, the 
probability that the maintenance program will identify the component degradation and repair the 
component is much lower for an infrequently inspected location than it would be for a more 
frequently inspected location.  Additionally, some failure mechanisms may degrade a component 
very quickly at one location due to the operating conditions such as temperature or humidity.  
However, that same failure mechanism may have a much lower rate of degradation at another 
location due to a change in operating conditions or material properties.  Some locations may not 
experience that same failure mechanism at all because of the component being made from a 
different material.  Therefore, to explicitly incorporate this spatial variation of the effects of the 
underlying failure mechanisms into LOCA frequency estimations, it is necessary to integrate the 
transition rates in the Markov modeling technique with the associated location-specific physics 
of failure mechanisms.  
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Vinod et al. [56] combine the Markov modeling technique with a stress-strength model of 
erosion corrosion (E-C) for the piping components of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors 
(PHWR), using an analytical model to estimate corrosion rates. Vinod et al. define a limit state 
function (LSF) to determine the probability that the stress applied to the piping component will 
exceed the strength of the piping component. The “failure probability” in the Vinod et al. 
methodology is the probability that the crack size in the component exceeds the maximum 
allowable crack size of the Markov state before transitioning to another Markov state. Although 
Vinod et al.’s approach utilizes a physical failure mechanism model for erosion-corrosion to 
depict the underlying physical failure mechanism of transition rates in the Markov model more 
explicitly than solely data-driven approaches, due to some unrealistic assumptions, their 
approach does not adequately provide explicit incorporation of physical factors associated with 
locations.  For example, the progression of erosion-corrosion damage propagation, like stress 
corrosion cracking, changes with the size of the crack.  As the damage progresses, the damage 
rate of the mechanism changes.  Vinod et al.’s approach lumps the failure rate into a distribution 
and treats the failure mechanism the same through each stage of crack progression.  Therefore, 
the variations in the failure probability, based on the underlying spatio-temporal physics, are 
masked by the average rate distribution.   
 
To develop more explicit connection between the Markov model and the spatio-temporal 
physical failure mechanisms, this research proposes the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic 
methodology that integrates the Markov modeling technique with Probabilistic Physic of Failure 
(PPoF) models (i.e., the causal model in the right side of Figure 4.2). The physics of failure 
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models directly incorporate the operating conditions (e.g., temperature and pressure) and 
environmental factors (e.g., load) into the estimation of “time-to-failure,” by incorporating the 
scientific knowledge of failure mechanisms (e.g., SCC).  Bayesian regression analysis is used to 
fit the physics of failure models to the available service experience information.  Probabilistic 
Physics-of-Failure (PPoF) models [20] combine scientific knowledge of failure mechanisms with 
uncertainty in the operating conditions and environmental factors to predict the time-to-failure of 
a component.  Modarres [21, 22] developed probabilistic relationships for common failure 
mechanisms using Bayesian updating to incorporate test or field data as evidence to find 
distributions for the time-to-failure parameters.  This allows for the epistemic uncertainties of 
deterministic physics-based models to be determined.  The models are turned into probabilistic 
forms and able to be used in current Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) frameworks. 
 
One of the main challenges of PPoF models relates to their quantifications. Since these 
models are based on curve-fitting to specific conditions, they are not generic and their accuracy 
and scope rely heavily on the availability of historical or experimental data.  Mohaghegh et al. 
[23] proposed combination of causal modeling techniques (e.g., Bayesian Belief Network) and 
Finite Element methods for quantification of PPoF models, more specifically, where two failure 
mechanisms interact. The scope of the research in this thesis focuses on single failure mechanism 
and future work can expand the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology to include the 
interactions of two failure mechanisms. To overcome the quantification difficulties of PPoF 
models, this research proposes the Data-Theoretic approach, first presented in [24], that is 
explained in Section 4.1.2.1 as a part of Task #2.1 in the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic 
methodology.  
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The Spatio-Temporal probabilistic methodology, developed in this research for LOCA 
frequency estimations, has four key tasks that are listed here and explained in the following sub-
sections. These tasks are also implemented in a case study explained in Chapter 5.  
➢ Task #1:  Defining Markov States of Degradation 
➢ Task #2:  Modeling and Quantification of the Transition Rates of Degradation 
o Task # 2.1: Developing and quantifying physics of failure causal models 
o Task #2.2: Propagating uncertainties in the physics of failure causal models to 
develop Probabilistic Physics of failure (PPoF) models 
o Task #2.3: Calculating transition rates of degradation based on the output of 
Probabilistic Physics of failure (PPoF) models 
o Task # 2.4: Bayesian integration of the estimated transition rate from PPoF 
models (from step 3) and the ones from solely data-oriented approaches (e.g., 
Fleming [7-10])  
➢ Task #3: Modeling and Quantification of the Transition Rates of Repair  
➢ Task #4: Developing the Time-dependent Distributions of State Probabilities   
 
 
Although the tasks are explained mainly based on the Stress Corrosion Cracking 
mechanism (SCC), which is a dominant mechanism associated with LOCA in NPPs, the Spatio-
Temporal Probabilistic methodology can be applied for any other failure mechanisms (e.g., wear, 
creep) and for other industry applications than NPPs (e.g., oil and gas).    
 
4.1.1 TASK #1: DEFINING MARKOV STATES OF DEGRADATION 
The first step in the development of the Markov model is to define a set of discrete, 
mutually exclusive, and collectively exhaustive states that completely model the possible states 
of degradation to which the component of concern can belong. The modeler has the freedom to 
select the number of states of degradation utilized in the model. An assumption utilized in the 
application of a Markov model is that the modeled component can transition from one state to 
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any other state (depending on the underlying mechanisms) independently of the components past 
states.  Therefore, the system has no memory of a component’s past existence, only the 
components current state.  For defining the states in the Markov model, the modeler should 
consider the following three criteria:  
1. The desired output information from the Markov model  
2. How state thresholds align with the underlying mechanisms 
3. The computational cost of the model 
 
The first criterion that the modeler should consider is the desired output information from 
the Markov model. For example, if the modeler would like to find the probability that a 
component will leak, then the modeler should include a “Leak” state in the model.  A component 
may be defined as belonging to a “leak” state if the component has a crack that penetrates 100% 
through the thickness of the component.  Therefore, when the model is solved for the time-
dependent probability that the component is in each state, the probability that the component will 
leak will be directly output from the solution to the model.   
 
Markov states are defined by characteristic thresholds.  The second criterion for 
development of the states in the Markov model is how the threshold criteria of each state aligns 
with the underlying PoF models. For example, some failure mechanisms only begin propagating 
after a specific threshold criterion has been met.  Aligning the threshold criterion of the failure 
mechanism with the threshold criterion of the Markov states can make quantification of the 
model much simpler.  However, if the failure mechanism threshold criterion occurs at the middle 
of a degradation state, the development of the transitions between states can become much more 
complex, especially after a layer of uncertainty is added for the input parameters.  The 
development of the “Flaw” state in the case study in Chapter 5 provides an example of the state 
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of degradation that is defined in a way to align with a failure mechanism, in this case, Stress-
Corrosion Cracking (SCC). 
 
In some cases, the choice of the characteristic threshold for defining a Markov state may 
be accompanied with uncertainty.  For example, the modeler may want to find the probability 
that a component will rupture within a given mission time.  However, the modeler may not be 
certain as to what value to use as the characteristic threshold of the “rupture” state.  In this case, 
the suggestion is to quantify the Markov model using the range of possible characteristic 
threshold values.  The resulting distribution of output values would represent the model 
uncertainty for the characteristic threshold.  Investigating the model uncertainty enables the 
modeler to see the significance of assuming a specific characteristic value. 
 
The third criterion that should be considered for degradation state development is the 
computational cost required for solving the model.  Obtaining time-dependent state probabilities 
from a Markov model requires the analyst to solve a series of coupled differential equations, 
which represent the rate of change of a component belonging to a given state at a given time.  
The complexity of such a solution depends on the number of states and the number of paths 
through which a component can transition from one state to another.  Further information 
regarding Markov model solutions is provided in Section 4.1.4.   
 
As an example, the left side of Figure 4.2 demonstrates the Markov model with four 
states: New, Flaw, Leak, and Rupture. The choice of four states in this model relates to the case 
study that is demonstrated in Chapter 5.  
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4.1.2 TASK #2: MODELING AND QUANTIFICATION OF TRANSITION RATES OF 
DEGREDATION  
 
A component can transition from one state to another at any time, depending on the 
underlying failure and repair mechanisms that are appropriate for each state.  Once a component 
transitions to another state, it has no memory of how it reached a given state.  Transition rates 
represent the paths through which a component can transition from one state to another.  The 
numerical value of a transition rate represents the rate of change in the probability that the 
modeled component occupies a given state. Transition rates of degradation represent the 
pathways that a component moves along as it transitions into a more degraded state.  In the 
Markov model in the left side of Figure 4.2, the transition rates of degradation are represented by 
, λ, ρ, and , which represent the pathways of transition from the “New” state to the “Flaw state, 
“Flaw” to “Leak”, “Leak” to “Rupture”, and “Flaw” to “Rupture”, respectively.   
 
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 4.1, in most of Markov models developed in 
this area of research, e.g., Fleming [7-10], the transition rates are developed using solely data-
driven approaches and utilizing service data. For example, to calculate the transition rate for λ 
and ρ, Fleming assumes the component to be a weld in a Combustion Engineering (CE) PWR 
RCS subject to thermal fatigue and design and construction errors.  Fleming then utilizes leak 
and rupture frequencies developed by Mikschl and Fleming[11] using NPP service data.  For the 
calculation of , Fleming assumes that the thermal fatigue damage mechanism will create 3 flaws 
in a component for every leak or rupture that is observed.  Therefore, the leak and rupture 
frequencies are added together and multiplied by a factor of 3.  In order to calculate , Fleming 
assumes that the conditional frequencies of rupture are equal to the frequency of severe water 
142 
 
hammer events, which is developed by Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation[12]. This 
data-oriented approach enables the modeler to bring historical experience into the Markov 
models, however, their main challenges are (1) inaccuracy due to insufficient data and (2) the 
lack of “explicit” connections with location-specific physics of failure mechanisms associated 
with transition rates.   
 
 In the proposed Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology, the Markov modeling 
technique is integrated with PPoF models.   The transition rates of degradation provide the 
explicit pathway for connecting the PPoF models to the Markov model.  For example, in Figure 
4.2, a SCC physics of failure causal model is shown on the right-hand side of the image.  This 
causal model can be used to develop the rate that the probability of a component being in the 
“Flaw” state decreases due to transitions into the “Leak” state from SCC.  The transition rates are 
also the explicit pathway for incorporation of spatio-temporal factors, as the physics of failure 
causal factors (e.g., coolant temperature or material composition, stress) depend on the specific 
location of the component and on the age of the component. The following sub-tasks are 
proposed to model and quantify transition rates of degradation in the Spatio-Temporal 
Probabilistic methodology:  
 
o TASK #2.1: Developing and quantifying physics of failure causal models based on the 
identified failure mechanisms to find the “transition time between two states” as a function 
of underlying physical causal factor. This research proposes a Data-Theoretic approach to 
overcome the challenges of quantification of these casual models. Section 4.1.2.1 explain 
this approach.   
o TASK #2.2: Propagating uncertainties in the physics of failure causal models to make the 
Probabilistic Physic of Failure (PPoF) models and to develop a probabilistic estimation of 
“transition time between two states”. This step is explained in Section 4.1.2.2.  
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o TASK #2.3: Calculating transition rates of degradation based on the output of PPoF 
models, i.e., the estimated probabilistic “transition time between two states”. This step is 
explained in Section 4.1.2.3.  
o TASK #2.4: Bayesian integration of the estimated transition rate from PPoF (from step 3) 
and the transition rate from solely data-oriented approaches (e.g., Fleming [7-10]) to 
combine different sources of information, i.e., information from historical data and from 
physics-based simulations. This step is out of the scope of this research and will be 
elaborated in future research.     
 
4.1.2.1 TASK #2.1: DEVELOPING AND QUANTIFYING PHYSICS OF FAILURE CAUSAL 
MODELS  
 
This section explains the development of physics of failure casual models (the right side 
of Figure 4.2). The target node of the causal model is the “transition time between two states”, 
which refers to the yellow node at the top of the casual model of Figure 4.2.  Development of 
physic of failure casual models using a theory-based approach requires quantification and 
validation of the models through experimentation and simulation.  The challenge of this 
approach is that the quantification and validation of large-scale models with many factors 
becomes expensive and time consuming.  On the other hand, the use of a solely data-oriented 
approach can create potentially misleading results due to the lack of guidance from an underlying 
theory.  It also requires extensive data, not always available, for every possible failure, e.g., 
LOCAs. To overcome the quantification challenge of these multi-level causal models, this 
research proposes the Data-Theoretic methodology which integrates theory-based and data-
oriented techniques by utilizing a comprehensive underlying theory to guide the data analysis.  
The underlying theory supports the completeness of contextual factors and the accuracy of their 
causal relationships.  It also helps avoid the potential for being misled by results from a solely 
data-informed analysis.  The proposed Data-Theoretic methodology (in the context of PoF and 
PRA research) is originally published in [24] and is under development in a parallel research 
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[25] for the context of socio-technical risk analysis, sponsored by the National Science 
Foundation.   
 
The proposed Data-Theoretic methodology (in the context of physics of failure and PRA 
research) is broken down into four steps: 
a. Determine causal factors and relationships and develop physics of failure causal 
models of underlying damage mechanisms 
b. Extract historical data and update the generic causal model  
c. Scientifically reduce physical factors in the network 
d. Quantify and validate important factors and causal paths 
 
Step a: Determine causal factors and relationships and develop physic of failure causal models 
of underlying damage mechanisms:   
 
The first step of Data-theoretic methodology is to establish the underlying theory 
associated with the physical failure mechanisms of the system.  Theory development often 
requires a thorough review of published literature from academia, industry, and regulatory 
regarding the failure mechanisms.  Causal factors, sub-factors, and pathways are determined 
based on the literature review and the knowledge of the system (i.e., expert opinion).  Each 
causal factor and sub-factor is represented by a node in the causal model.  This process is 
repeated for each underlying failure mechanism.  These causal models are then connected by 
their common factors, or common nodes. An example of a causal model is developed for stress 
corrosion cracking (SCC) presented in the right side of Figure 4.2. The first-round quantification 
of the causal model in the Data-Theoretic approach is based on generic equations and 
information available in the literature that would lead to development of DT-base causal model. 
 
Step b: Extract historical data and update the generic causal model:   
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The DT-base casual model, developed in Step 1, will would be updated by the historical 
data to quantify the missing links and/or update the generic casual model with the available 
historical data.    The data are often buried in a wide variety of documentation and a large 
volume of unstructured or excess information.  Therefore, this Data-Theoretic approach proposes 
the application of advanced data analytic techniques (i.e., text mining) to extract and interpret 
information from historical documentation such as: Root Cause Analysis (RCA) reports, 
Corrective Action Program (CAP) entries, Licensee Event Reports (LER), and LOCA databases.  
The extracted information is used to determine frequencies of occurrence for each causal node in 
the theoretical model (developed in Step a).  The frequency of each node is then converted to 
probability that enables the use of predictive modeling techniques, such as Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBNs), to develop the initial causal network. 
 
Step c: Scientifically reduce physical factors in the network:   
The cost of validating every causal link due to time and resource constraints, would make 
a theory-based approach impractical.  The Data-Theoretic method scientifically narrows the 
scope of the factors, making the modeling of large or complex systems practical without the loss 
of critical information.  To avoid this loss, sensitivity analysis is proposed to perform on the 
initial causal network to determine which factors have the most significant impact on the target 
node (e.g., time-to-failure).  The factors are ranked by their significance to failure and the factors 
requiring more detailed quantification are determined.   
 
Step d: Quantify and validate important factors and causal paths:   
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Step c scientifically narrows the scope of the factors so that time and resources are 
focused on the quantification of the most important factors.  These factors are quantified using 
available classical theory-based techniques, such as controlled experimentations and finite 
element simulations. The important factor quantification information is stored, updated, and 
operationalized in an updated physics of failure causal model.  
 
The four steps of the Data-Theoretic methodology help manage the quantification of 
multi-level causal model (e.g., the one presented on the right side of Figure 4.2.) and to reduce 
the scope of the casual network in a scientific way without missing the critical risk factors.  
However, in this thesis, the scope of the causal model is reduced (from the beginning) in a way 
that only the first level of the causal model in Figure 4.2 (i.e., the blue casual factors in Figure 
4.2) is covered. Therefore, this research mainly focuses on step “a” of the Data-theoretic 
approach explained above. Other steps are the focus of future research.  
 
The first step of the Data-Theoretic methodology is to establish a physics of failure 
theory that provides the foundation for the causal models and guides the data analytics in Step 2.  
After a review of academic, industry, and regulatory publications, the underlying failure 
mechanisms of the system need to be determined.  High-level qualitative causal models are then 
developed to depict causal pathways that lead to a failure in the system. To demonstrate the 
causal modeling development, Figure 4.3 shows a high-level causal model depicting the causal 
progression of a LOCA for a PWR RCS.  Fleming and Lydell identified four main categories of 
failure mechanisms for a PWR RCS: fatigue, flow-assisted degradation, stress corrosion cracking 
(SCC), and other corrosion mechanisms[1].  These failure mechanisms are represented as green 
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nodes in Figure 4.3.  It should be noted that, for simplicity, the repair (maintenance) paths are not 
included in this figure but it is covered in the Markov model of Figure 4.2.      
 
 
Figure 4.3 High Level Causal Model for RCS Failures Leading to a LOCA in a PWR 
 
The causal pathways are represented by the black arrows in Figure 4.3.  Each causal 
pathway is labeled with Pi (i.e., P1, P2, …, P23), which represents the degree of influence of the 
causal factor on the effect (e.g., the influence of each failure mechanism on the flaw/crack 
progression). The causal pathways in Figure 4.3. demonstrate that the failure mechanisms can 
lead to the nucleation of flaws in the components of a RCS.  These flaws, for this research, are 
undetectable by conventional non-destructive examination (NDE) methods.  Other events, such 
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as design flaws, construction deficiencies, and installation errors may also lead to the nucleation 
of flaws in RCS components. 
 
Once flaws have nucleated in a RCS component, the damage mechanisms drive the 
propagation and coalescence of these flaws, which leads to the formation of cracks large enough 
to be detected by conventional NDE methods.  External events (e.g., seismic, flood, installation 
errors) may cause physical degradation, resulting in cracking of RCS components.  Once 
developed, a crack may propagate until the piping component fails, resulting in a loss of primary 
coolant.  The reactor coolant makeup system is designed to supply the RCS with additional 
coolant to mitigate the loss of coolant.  A LOCA occurs once the loss of coolant rate exceeds the 
capabilities of the reactor coolant makeup system. 
   
Figure 4.3 shows that the failure mechanisms have a causal relationship with the system 
properties (e.g., pressure, temperature, material properties, etc.).  For example, to occur, SCC 
requires three factors: material susceptibility, corrosive environment, and a constant tensile 
stress[26].  Without all three of these factors, SCC will not occur.  Once the high-level causal 
model of the underlying failure mechanisms is established, a more detailed causal model needs 
to be developed for each of the failure mechanisms. To facilitate communication, the rest of 
casual modeling development is explained based on the Stress Corrosion Cracking mechanism 
(SCC), which is a dominant mechanism associated with LOCA in NPPs. However, the Spatio-
Temporal Probabilistic methodology and the physics of failure causal models can be applied for 
any other failure mechanisms (e.g., wear, creep).    
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A more detailed causal model for SCC is presented in the right side of Figure 4.2.  A two-
stage process SCC model proposed by Wu [3] is used for the development of SCC causal model 
in this thesis.  The SCC models, developed by Wu[27], are shown in Equations (4.1)- (4.5).  
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where: CPR- linearly combined crack propagation rate, CPRI- crack propagation rate for Stage I 
crack propagation, CPRII- crack propagation rate for Stage II crack propagation, K- stress 
intensity factor (SIF), defined by Equation (4.4) where applied – total effective stress on the 
material, and a- depth of crack, Ktrs- approximate SIF at the beginning of the Stage I to Stage II 
transition, Ktre- approximate SIF at the end of the Stage I to Stage II transition, x - transition ratio 
defined by Equation(4.5), Q- activation energy (130 kJ/mol for alloy 600[28, 29]), R- universal 
gas constant (8.314E-3 kJ/mol-K), T- operating temperature, Tref- reference temperature (588 K), 
pH- pH of the bulk environment, ys – material yield strength, Kth- threshold SIF (9MPa√m), and 
CI, CII, mI, mII, nI, nII, II are empirical model parameters used to fit the SCC propagation model 
to data.  A summary of the model parameters can be found in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Parameters of SCC Two-stage Model Developed by Wu[27] 
CPR linearly combined crack propagation rate (m/s) 
CPRI crack propagation rate for Stage I crack propagation (m/s) 
CPRII crack propagation rate for Stage II crack propagation (m/s) 
K stress intensity factor (SIF) (MPa√m) 
Ktrs approximate SIF at beginning of Stage I to Stage II transition (MPa√m) 
Ktre approximate SIF at end of Stage I to Stage II transition (MPa√m) 
x transition ratio 
Q activation energy for SCC (130 kJ/mol for alloy 600) 
R universal gas constant (8.314E-3 kJ/mol-K) 
T operating temperature (K) 
Tref reference temperature (588K) 
pH pH of the bulk environment 
σys material yield strength (MPa) 
Kth threshold SIF (9MPa√m) 
C,n,m,β empirical model parameters 
σapplied total effective stress on the component (MPa) 
a crack depth (m) 
 
As mentioned above, the target node of the SCC causal model is the “transition time 
between two states”, which refers to the yellow node at the top of the casual model of Figure 4.2.  
Therefore, for building this SCC causal model, it is required to isolate the time it takes to 
transition between Markov states via SCC. For the sake of explaining the casual model in Figure 
4.2, the propagation time for stage I SCC crack propagation is isolated.  CPRI is a time rate, so 
Equation (4.2) needs to be integrated so that the propagation time for stage I can be solved for 
explicitly.  To isolate crack length, a, Equation (4.4) is substituted into Equation (4.2).  ath is 
defined as the length of the crack the instant it initiates.  The integral will be invalid at the instant 
the crack propagation begins, since a=ath=0 at that instant, causing division by zero.  Therefore, 
the integration interval for the crack length will be from ath
+, the crack length immediately after 
propagation begins, to atrs, the critical crack length when K=Ktrs.  Similarly, the time interval of 
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integration will be from t=0+ to t=tI, where tI is the time it takes a crack to propagate from crack 
initiation (t=0+) to the threshold at which the transition between Markov states occurs. 
 
Despite attempting to separate this differential equation, it still cannot be integrated 
analytically.  This is due to the dependence of σys on the crack length, a.  The magnitude of this 
dependence is not in a quantifiable equation format; therefore, the dependence cannot be 
analytically manipulated to analytically integrate the differential equation.  A numerical method, 
such as finite difference, is, therefore, required to numerically solve the integral.  However, the 
results of the integral are represented in Equation (4.6). 
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The resulting numerator will be a function of σapplied, atrs, ath, nI.  Now that tI has been 
approximately solved, using a placeholder for the function in the numerator, it is clear to identify 
the “primary-level” causal factors (i.e., the blue factors in the casual model of Figure 4.2) that 
affect the time it takes for a crack to propagate under stage I SCC.  This helps the development 
of the causal factors for SCC stage I crack propagation time in Figure 4.2. In this casual model, 
the yellow node at the top of the model is the target node, tI, which is the unknown of interest.  
The blue nodes immediately leading to the target node are the “primary-level” causal factors, 
which have a direct effect on the target node.  The relationship between the “primary-level” 
causal factors and the target node can be explicitly seen in the result of the integration of the 
equation for CPRI, Equation (4.6).  
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The green-colored nodes in the casual model of Figure 4.2 represent the “secondary-
level” causal factors.  The “secondary-level” causal factors have a direct effect on the “primary-
level” causal factors.  The figure shows that the externally applied stress and the residual stress 
nodes have an immediate causal relationship to the total effective stress node.  This relationship 
is simply the contribution of all external stresses applied to a component in addition to all the 
internal, or residual stresses applied to each component.  Figure 4.2 also shows that the material 
composition node has a direct causal relationship to the activation energy node, the material 
strength node, and the critical crack length at the end of the stage I propagation node.  All three 
of these “primary-level” nodes are inherently dependent on the material composition, as different 
compositions have varying material properties.  Activation energy and material strength are 
inherently material properties.  The critical crack length node at the end of the SCC stage I crack 
propagation is also material dependent, because different materials are able to handle varying 
amounts of stress due to their different tensile strengths[30].  The manufacturing/ fabrication 
process node has a causal relationship to material strength and residual stress nodes.  This results 
from the microstructural changes in the material during fabrication[31]. 
 
The orange and white nodes in the casual model of Figure 4.2 represent the “root” causal 
factors.  The installation/ welding process node affects the residual stresses inside a component, 
because flaws can form in the microstructure of the material due to the heating applied during 
welding[31].  The weight of the coolant flowing through a component, as well as the weight of 
the component itself, result in a force, and ultimately stress, on the component due to gravity.  
Pipes connected to other pipes or components in the RCS also need to be supported.  Often, 
adjacent pipes will be supported by a component in the RCS, which results in additional stress on 
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the component.  Finally, the operating pressure of the coolant flowing through the component 
exerts a pressure force on the component, as the component must contain the internal 
pressure[30]. 
 
The Data-Theoretic methodology is required to quantify all levels of this causal model 
and that is the scope of future research; however, in this research the focus is only on the casual 
relationships between the primary-level factors (the blue factors in the casual model of Figure 
4.2) and the target node (the transition time estimated from equation (4.6)). Equation (4.6) cannot 
be solved analytically.  Therefore, to isolate the SCC propagation time required to transition 
between Markov states, a SCC propagation simulation technique is required to numerically 
estimate the time. The structure of this simulation combined with uncertainty propagation is 
explained in the next section (Section 4.1.2.2).  
 
4.1.2.2 TASK #2.2: PROPAGATING UNCERTAINTIES IN PHYSICS OF FAILURE CAUSAL 
MODELS  
 
After the development of the physics of failure causal models, the next step is to 
propagate the uncertainties to generate the Probabilistic Physic of Failure (PPoF) models and to 
develop a probabilistic estimation of “transition time between two states”.  This section explains 
this process in the scope of primary-level causal factors (i.e. blue factors in the causal model of 
Figure 4.2) of SCC model.  
To numerically solve equation (4.6), a simulation process is developed along with 
sampling to take care of uncertainties.   Using Monte Carlo sampling, the uncertainty in the 
model parameters can be incorporated.  Sampling from the input distributions allows for the 
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incorporation of all the possible values in each of the distributions to be incorporated into the 
results.  Therefore, the output distribution of failure or state transition times includes the total 
uncertainty in the quantity of concern.  The results of the simulations can be used in Section 
4.1.2.3 to quantify the transition rates between the Markov states. The SCC propagation 
simulation procedure has the following main steps: 
1. Sample from the SCC model parameter uncertainty distributions. 
2. Sample from the initial crack length distribution, sample from the aspect ratio 
uncertainty distribution, and calculate the initial crack depth.   
3. Check initial conditions against threshold criteria for the Flaw, Leak, and Rupture 
states.  If the sample is found to be in the New, Leak, or Rupture states, reject the 
sample and repeat the second step.  This step serves as a method of truncating the 
initial crack distribution to only allow samples that are initially in the Flaw state, as 
transitions of components that were initially in the Flaw state are the concern of the 
simulation.   
4. Iteratively integrate the crack length and crack depth until one of three possible 
outcomes occurs: transition into the Leak state, transition into the Rupture state, or 
maximum time limit is reached.  The maximum time limit for the simulation is set as 
60 years, which represents an extended lifetime for an NPP. 
5. If the sample transitions into the Rupture state, the time of transition from the Flaw to 
the Rupture state is recorded and the next sample is simulated.  If the sample 
transitions from the Flaw state to the Leak state, the time of transition is also 
recorded.  However, the simulation continues from the Leak state with a new time 
counter to simulate when the sample transitions from the Leak to the Rupture state.  
The SCC propagation model is still used along with the aspect ratio to propagate the 
crack length, but the crack depth is held constant once the Leak state has been 
reached.  Crack depth is held constant since once a SCC crack propagates 100% 
through the thickness of the component, the depth cannot continue to increase.  If the 
sample transitions from the Leak to the Rupture state, the time of the transition from 
entering the Leak state until transitioning into the Rupture state is recorded.   
 
Chapter 5 demonstrates how this process is developed in a MATLAB code to estimate the 
transitions rates of degradation in the case study.   
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4.1.2.3 TASK #2.3: CALCULATING TRANSITION RATES OF DEGRADATION BASED ON 
THE OUTPUT OF PROBABILISTIC PHYSICS OF FAILURE MODELS  
 
This section focuses on the calculation of the transition rates , λ, ρ, and , based on the 
result of probabilistic simulation from Section 4.1.2.2, which is the probabilistic estimation of 
“transition time between two states”.   Using the simulation explained in the previous section and 
sampling, the probability that a component in the Flaw state will transition to the Leak state is 
calculated by dividing the number of transitions from the Flaw state to the Leak state by the total 
number of samples.  The probability that a component in the Flaw state will transition directly to 
the Rupture state is calculated by dividing the number of transitions from the Flaw to the Rupture 
state by the total number of samples.  To have a reliable number of samples for this estimation, a 
“convergence study” is required. A discussion regarding the convergence of the results for the 
case study is provided in Chapter 5.    
 
The transition rates for a Markov model are rates of probability transition.  This means 
the rate at which the probability that a component is in each state is changing or “flowing” into 
another state. Therefore, the time it takes for each sample to transition from the Flaw state to 
either the Leak or Rupture state is stored.  The mean of the time-from-flaw-to-leak data (MTFL) 
is calculated. Then to find the rate at which probability transitions from the Flaw to the Leak 
state, the inverse of the MTFL is multiplied by the probability that a component transitions from 
the Flaw state to the Leak state, as shown in Equation (4.7).  For the same reason, to find the rate 
at which probability transitions from the Flaw to the Rupture state, the inverse of the mean of the 
time-from-flaw-to-rupture (MTFR) is multiplied by the probability that a component transitions 
from the Flaw state to the Rupture state, as shown in Equation (4.8).  
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Using the simulation explained in Section 4.1.2.2 and sampling, the probability that a 
component will transition from the Leak state to the Rupture state is calculated by dividing the 
total number of transitions from the Leak to the Rupture state by the total number of transitions 
from the Flaw to the Leak state.  For each sample that transitioned from the Flaw state to the 
Leak state, a separate time counter is implemented in the simulation process.  Therefore, for each 
sample that transitioned from the Leak to the Rupture state, a time-from-Leak-to-Rupture is 
recorded.  The mean of the time-from-Leak-to-Rupture (MTLR) is calculated. To find the rate at 
which probability transitions from the Leak state to the Rupture state, the inverse of the MTLR is 
then multiplied by the probability that a component in the Leak state transitions into the Rupture 
state, as shown in Equation (4.9). 
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The same method is used for estimation of transition rate from New to flaw that is explained in 
Chapter 5 where the New states is clarified.  Chapter 5 further explains the implementations of 
these equations in the context of the case study.  
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4.1.3 MODELING AND QUANTIFICATION OF THE TRANSITION RATES OF REPAIR 
 
Transition rates of repair represent the possible pathways by which a component can 
move to a less degraded state.  In Figure 4.2, the transition rates of repair are represented by ω 
and , which represent the pathways of transition from the “Flaw” state to the “New” state and 
the “Leak” state to the “New” state respectively.  The quantification of the transition rates of 
repair provides the explicit pathway for including the effects of the maintenance mechanisms.  
Like the causal model development for degradation mechanisms, causal models should be 
developed for the maintenance mechanisms.  These causal models could include the probability 
that a component will be inspected.  For some components in certain states of degradation, 
inspection may never occur.  For example, a component that is in the “Flaw” state may never be 
inspected.  Therefore, such a component would not be repaired from the “Flaw” state to the 
“New” state.  In other words, for the model in Figure 4.2, ω=0.  Additionally, the causal models 
could include the probability that degradation would be detected if the component was inspected.  
Probability of detection could depend on many causal factors such as the training of the 
maintenance team or the quality of the inspection tools.  These causal models of the maintenance 
mechanisms should be spatio-temporal to account for the variation that may occur in the 
probability of repair based on a component’s location or age.  Interested readers may refer to 
Mohaghegh-Ahmadabadi[32] for more information regarding the development of a maintenance 
model.  Additionally, readers may refer to Pence et al.[25] for more information regarding 
modeling of the quality of training within organizations.  In the scope of this research, solely 
data-driven approaches are used for transition rates of repair. Future research is required to use 
model-based approaches for transition rates of repair.  
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4.1.4 DEVELOPING THE TIME-DEPENDENT DISTRIBUTIONS OF STATE 
PROBABILITIES 
 
For each Markov state of degradation, a differential equation which represents the rate of 
change of the probability that a component is in each state at any given time can be set-up.  The 
resulting series of coupled differential equations can be solved to find the time-dependent 
distribution of the state probabilities.  When solving a Markov model, it is common to assume 
that the transition rates are constant values.  Using this assumption, Equations (4-10) -(4-14) are 
developed for the Markov model shown in Figure 4.2. 
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where: New(t), Flaw(t), Leak(t), and Rupture(t) represent the probability that a component is in 
each state at a given time, t, and ω, , , , λ, and ρ represent the transition rates from Figure 4.2.  
These differential equations can be written in vector form as: 
 
d
dt

X
AX   (4-15) 
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where: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
New t
Flaw t
t
Leak t
Rupture t
 
 
 
 
 
 
X   (4-16) 
 
0
( ) 0 0
0 ( ) 0
0 0
  
   
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
A   (4-17) 
 
Since the Markov states of degradation are mutually exclusive, the summation of the 
probabilities of each state at any given time must be equal to 1, as shown by the condition in 
Equation (4-14).  The diagonal elements of the matrix A represent the change in probability that 
is leaving each state.  The final diagonal element of matrix A is equal to zero, because this 
research assumes that the Rupture state cannot be repaired.  Therefore, there are no transitions 
out of the Rupture state and it becomes a probability sink.  Each column of matrix A adds to 
zero.  This is because probability is conserved.  As the probability flows out of one state 
(represented by the negative elements), it must flow into another Markov state (represented by 
the positive matrix elements).  The quantification results for the time-dependent distribution of 
state probabilities for the case study can be found in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5 : APPLICATION OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL PROBABILISTIC 
METHODOLOGY FOR STRESS CORROSION CRACKING IN PWR STEAM 
GENERATOR TUBES  
 
This chapter relates to Step #5 in the roadmap of the research presented in Figure 5.1.  It 
focuses on the implementation of the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology that is 
introduced in Chapter 4.  The case study in this chapter compares the time-dependent rupture 
probabilities, due to Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC), for the expansion-transition region of a 
steam generator tube fabricated from alloy 690 and stainless steel (SS).   
 
Figure 5.1 Roadmap of the Research  
 
 SCC was selected for the case study of this research, because it has been identified as a 
dominant failure mechanism in the RCSs of NPPs [1, 2].  Tregoning et al. determined that steam 
generator tube ruptures (with resultant leak rates greater than 100 gallons per minute) occurred at 
a frequency of 3.5E-03 per calendar year, which provides a significant contribution to the 
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estimation of LOCA frequencies, since it only takes one SGTR to result in a Category 1 
LOCA[1].  Therefore, the steam generator tubes were investigated for this case study.  
Additionally, Wu identified that the expansion transition region of every steam generator tube is 
affected by SCC[3].  This case study will compare two expansion transition steam generator 
tubes, with one fabricated from alloy 690 and the other fabricated from SS.  While the only 
difference for this case study is the selection of material, it is important to note that this 
methodology could be applied to compare any component fabricated from any material, at any 
location, experiencing any set of operating conditions, that experiences underlying degradation 
and repair mechanisms.   
The following sections demonstrates the case study, implementing the four key tasks of the Spatio-
Temporal Probabilistic methodology, listed as follows:  
 
➢ Task #1:  Defining Markov States of Degradation 
➢ Task #2:  Modeling and Quantification of the Transition Rates of Degradation 
➢ Task #3: Modeling and Quantification of the Transition Rates of Repair  
➢ Task #4: Developing the Time-dependent Distributions of State Probabilities   
 
Although the tasks in this case study are explained based on the Stress Corrosion Cracking 
mechanism (SCC), which is a dominant mechanism associated with LOCA in NPPs, the Spatio-
Temporal Probabilistic methodology can be applied for any other failure mechanisms (e.g., wear, 
creep) and for other industry applications than NPPs (e.g., oil and gas).    
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5.1 TASK #1: DEFINING MARKOV STATES OF DEGRADATION IN THE CASE STUDY 
As explained in Section 4.1.1., the first task in the Markov modeling approach is to 
define a set of discrete states to depict the states of degradation.  A four state Markov model 
(presented in the left side of Figure 5.2) has been selected for modeling a component exposed to 
SCC.  The four states are New, Flaw, Leak, and Rupture, listed in order of increasing 
degradation.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Integration of the Markov Modeling Technique with Probabilistic Physics of Failure Models in the 
Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic Methodology for Location-Specific LOCA Frequency Estimations 
 
5.1.1 DEFINING RUPTURE STATES FOR ALLOY 690 & STAINLESS STEEL 
 The primary concern for this case study is to estimate the probability that a component 
will burst, and enable enough coolant to escape from the RCS to cause a LOCA to occur.  
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Therefore, the final state of the Markov model is defined as the Rupture state.  The characteristic 
threshold of the Rupture state is the occurrence of the burst phenomenon.  The burst 
phenomenon occurs when the internal pressure of the primary coolant exceeds the capability of 
the component to withstand the coolant pressure.  The pressure at which the component cannot 
withstand the internal coolant pressure is the burst pressure.  As a component is degraded by a 
failure mechanism such as SCC, the burst pressure decreases.  There are models for quantifying 
burst pressures available in literature.  For the alloy 690 steam generator tubes, two models for 
axial crack growth were selected.  This research focuses exclusively on axial crack growth and 
does not cover the potential for circumferential crack growth.  The American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) has developed equations for the burst pressure of tubes as a 
function of axial crack sizes in steam generator tube walls, as shown in Equation (5.1)[4]. 
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  (5.1) 
where: p is the pressure differential across the tube, R is the tube radius, t is the tube thickness, 
SF is the safety factor (taken to be equal to 1 in this analysis), a is the depth of corrosion of the 
largest corrosion defect in the component, Sm is the flow stress defined by Equation (5.2), and m1 
is defined by Equation (5.3).  
  
1
2
m y uS S S    (5.2) 
where: Sy is the yield strength of the component and Su is the ultimate tensile stress of the 
component.   
 
2
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4
L
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Rt
    (5.3) 
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where: R is the tube radius, t is the component thickness, and L is the length of the corrosion 
defect.  Another analytical model for burst pressure of steam generator tubes that contain a single 
dominant crack was provided in NUREG-6575[5], as shown by Equations (5.4)-(5.7) 
 1b m
t
P S Log
R
 
  
 
  (5.4) 
where: Pb is the failure pressure for defect-free straight tubing, Sm is the flow stress as defined in 
Equation (5.2), t is the thickness of the component, and R is the radius of the component. 
 
2
b
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where: Pcr is the pressure necessary to cause unstable ductile failure of tubing with a through-wall 
axial crack and m2 is defined by Equation (5.6). 
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where: c is the half of the axial crack length, t is the thickness of the component, and Rm the 
mean radius of the tube, defined by Equation (5.7). 
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where: R is the radius of the component and t is the thickness of the component.  A conservative 
assumption was made to use both rupture pressure models as characteristic thresholds for the 
Rupture state of the alloy 690 steam generator tube.  Therefore, if the pressure inside the 
component exceeded the burst pressure of either model, the component was considered to have 
experienced a burst phenomenon and to have moved into the Rupture state. 
 
170 
 
In the Markov model developed by Vinod[6], two burst pressure models were selected 
from the oil and gas piping industry: the Modified B31G[7], as shown in Equations (5.8)-(5.11) 
and the Shell-92 model[8], as shown in Equations (5.12) and (5.13).   
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  (5.8) 
where: PfB31G is the maximum pressure a component can hold before rupturing using the B31G 
model, Sy is the yield strength of the component, t is the thickness of the component, a is the 
depth of the corrosion defect, D is the outside diameter of the component as defined in Equation 
(5.9), and M is defined in Equation (5.10). 
 2*( )D R t    (5.9) 
where: D is the outside diameter of the component, R is the inner diameter of the component, and 
t is the thickness of the component.   
 
2If G  50: M 1 0.6275G 0.003375
If G  50: M 0.032G 3.3
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  (5.10) 
where: G is defined by Equation (5.11). 
 
4c
G
Dt
   (5.11) 
where: c is half of the axial crack length, D is the outside diameter of the pipe as defined in 
Equation (5.9), and t is the thickness of the component. 
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where: Pf92 is the maximum pressure a component can withhold before rupturing using the Shell-
92 model, Sy is the ultimate tensile strength of the material, t is the thickness of the material, D is 
the outside diameter of the material as defined in Equation (5.9), a is the depth of the corrosion 
defect, and M is defined in Equation (5.13). 
 
2
1 0.805
L
M
Dt
    (5.13) 
where: L is the axial length of the corrosion defect, D is the outside diameter of the material as 
defined in Equation (5.10), and t is the thickness of the material.  Vinod’s two burst pressure 
models were adopted in this research for modeling the stainless steel (SS) component burst 
pressures.  Again, a conservative approach was applied for modeling the burst pressure for SS 
components by utilizing both burst models simultaneously.  Therefore, if the operating pressure 
inside the SS component exceeded the burst pressure calculated by either the B31G or Shell-92 
model, the component was considered to have experienced a burst phenomenon and to have 
moved into the Rupture state. 
 
5.1.2 DEFINING LEAK STATES FOR ALLOY 690 & STAINLESS STEEL 
 
The Leak state is the second most-degraded state in the Markov model.  A component is 
defined as belonging in the Leak state when it has a corrosion defect with a depth equal to the 
thickness of the component, which may be referred to as a 100% through-wall crack.  This 
means that the coolant flowing inside the component has an unimpeded path to escape from the 
component.  Therefore, any component that has a 100% through-wall crack, but has not 
experienced a burst phenomenon is defined as being in the Leak state.   
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For alloy 690 components, the Leak state can be reached when a corrosion crack depth in 
the component propagates 100% through the thickness of the component wall.  Additionally, 
when the internal pressure of the coolant exceeds the capability of a small “ligament” of 
remaining component material, a ligament burst phenomenon occurs.  A “ligament” of 
component material occurs when a partially-through (not 100% through-wall) crack causes only 
a small portion of the material to remain.  This small “ligament” of material has a reduced 
capability to withstand the pressure of the internal coolant.  Once the internal pressure of the 
coolant exceeds the capability of the ligament to hold the coolant, the ligament will rapidly fail, 
forming a 100% through-wall crack.  The pressure at which this rapid failure of the ligament will 
occur is called the ligament pressure.  This research selected a model for ligament pressure 
provided in NUREG-6575, as shown in Equation (5.14)[5].   
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  (5.14) 
where: Psc the pressure required to fail the remaining ligament of a component that has a part-
way through wall axial crack, Pb is the failure pressure for defect-free tubing, a is the depth of 
the corrosion defect, t is the component thickness, and m2 is defined by Equation (5.6).  If the 
internal coolant pressure exceeds the remaining ligament pressure of a component, but does not 
exceed the burst pressure of the component, the ligament section will fail rapidly without the 
component bursting.  Therefore, the component will move into the Leak state.  A ligament 
pressure model was not selected for SS components, because the SCC model development for SS 
in NUREG-6986[9] did not indicate that such behavior also occurred in SS materials.  Therefore, 
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SS components only transition into the Leak state when the crack depth propagates 100% 
through-wall.   
 
5.1.3 DEFINING FLAW STATES FOR ALLOY 690 & STAINLESS STEEL 
 
The Flaw state is the second least-degraded state in the four state Markov model 
developed for this case study.  As explained in Section 4.1.1, Markov states should be defined in 
a way to be aligned with the associated mechanisms acting on the component.  SCC does not 
begin propagating in a material immediately upon the birth of a defect.  SCC begins propagation 
in a component once an initial crack is formed from a defect in the component.  There are many 
ways that a defect can form in a material such as construction deficiencies, external damage, or 
failure mechanisms.  Pitting is often the precursor to SCC due to its combination of local stress 
concentration and solution chemistry[10, 11].  When pitting is the precursor to SCC, the 
fundamental steps in the overall process of crack development include: pit initiation, pit growth, 
transition from pit to crack, and then crack growth[12].  This research adopts the criterion 
developed by Kondo[13], which says that a pit transitions to crack once the SCC growth rate 
exceeds the pit growth rate, representing a threshold driving force.  Therefore, the threshold 
criteria for the Flaw state are dependent on the selection of both SCC propagation models and pit 
growth rate models.  Details on SCC propagation and pit growth models will be further explored 
in Section 5.2.3. 
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5.1.4 DEFINING NEW STATES FOR ALLOY 690 & STAINLESS STEEL 
 
The least degraded state in the Markov model developed for this case study is the New 
state.  A component is defined to be in the New state if it does not have any defects that satisfy 
the threshold criteria to enter the Flaw state.  A component may not be in perfect condition (i.e., 
may have pits or defects), but if none of the pits or defects have become cracks, SCC will not 
propagate, and the component will be in the New state.  A summary of all the parameters in the 
models of the criteria used for the development of the Markov states of degradation for the case 
study can be found in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Model Parameters Used to Define the States in the Markov Model of the Case Study 
Δp pressure differential across the tube 
R tube inner radius 
t tube thickness 
SF safety factor 
a depth of corrosion 
Sm flow stress 
Sy yield strength of component 
Su ultimate tensile stress of component 
L axial length of corrosion defect 
Pb failure pressure for defect-free straight tubing 
Pcr pressure necessary to cause unstable ductile failure of tubing with a through-wall axial crack 
c half of the axial crack length 
Rm mean radius of the tube 
Psc pressure required to fail the remaining ligament of a component that has a part-way through wall axial crack 
PfB31G maximum pressure a component can hold before rupturing using the B31G model 
D outside diameter of a component 
Pf92 maximum pressure a component can withstand before rupturing using the Shell-92 model 
 
5.2 TASK #2: MODELING AND QUANTIFICATION OF TRANSITION RATES OF 
DEGRADATION FOR ALLOY 690 & STAINLESS STEEL 
 
The transition rates of a Markov model represent the possible pathways by which a 
component can move from one state to another.  These pathways are dictated by the underlying 
mechanisms acting on the component.  Numerically, the transition rates represent the rate of 
change in the probability that a component occupies a Markov state at a given time.  As 
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explained in Section 4.1.2 in Chapter 4, the transition rates of degradation are the explicit 
pathway for incorporation of the underlying physical failure mechanisms into the Markov model. 
This section explains the development of transition rates of degradation for the case study, i.e., , 
λ, ρ, and  , which represent the pathways of transition from the “New” state to the “Flaw state, 
“Flaw” to “Leak”, “Leak” to “Rupture”, and “Flaw” to “Rupture”, respectively in the Markov 
model in Figure 5.2.  
 
In Section 4.1.2 in Chapter 4, the following sub-tasks are listed for modeling and quantifying 
transition rates of degradation in the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology:  
 
o TASK #2.1: Developing and quantifying physics of failure causal models based on the 
identified failure mechanisms to find the “transition time between two states” as a function 
of underlying physical causal factor.  
o TASK #2.2: Propagating uncertainties in the physics of failure causal models to make the 
Probabilistic Physic of Failure (PPoF) models and to develop a probabilistic estimation of 
“transition time between two states”.  
o TASK #2.3: Calculating transition rates of degradation based on the output of PPoF models, 
i.e., the estimated probabilistic “transition time between two states”.  
o TASK #2.4: Bayesian integration of the estimated transition rate from PPoF (from step 3) 
and the transition rate from solely data-oriented approaches (e.g., Fleming [14-17]) to 
combine different sources of information, i.e., information from historical data and from 
physics-based simulations. This step is out of the scope of this research and will be 
elaborated in future research.     
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Section 5.2.1 relates to Task 2.1 and the quantification of SCC physics of failure model 
for Alloy 690 and Stainless Steel.  Section 5.2.2 relates to implementation of Task 2.2 and Task 
2.3 for estimation of  for the cases of Alloy 690 and Stainless Steel. Section 5.2.3 relates to 
implementation of Task 2.2 and Task 2.3 for estimations of λ, ρ, and  for the cases of Alloy 690 
and Stainless Steel.  
 
5.2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF STRESS CORROSION CRACKING PROPAGATION 
EQUATIONS FOR ALLOY 690 & STAINLESS STEEL 
 
As a part of Task #2.1 of the methodology explained in Chapter 4, the Data-Theoretic 
approach is proposed to manage the quantification of multi-level causal model (e.g., the one 
presented in Figure 5.2.) and to reduce the scope of the casual network in a scientific way 
without missing the critical risk factors.  However, in this case study, the scope of the causal 
model is reduced (from the beginning) in a way that only the first level of the causal model in 
Figure 5.2 (i.e., the blue casual factors in Figure 5.2) is covered. Therefore, this research mainly 
focuses on implementation of step 1 of the Data-theoretic approach that includes the 
development and quantification of SCC physics of failure casual model for Alloy 690 and SS. In 
this research, a two-stage process SCC model proposed by Wu [3] is utilized to develop physics 
of failure casual model and is quantified by Bayesian regression analysis.  Wu’s model is 
developed for alloy 600 and, therefore, the parameters of the model need to be updated for Alloy 
690 and SS.   
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WinBUGS[18], a statistical software that uses Bayesian regression analysis techniques 
with Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling methods, is used to numerically develop a joint 
posterior distribution of the parameters[19]. The posterior distribution for the SCC model 
parameters of the model developed by Wu [3], is as follows: 
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where: π(θ|E) is the posterior distribution given the data point E, L(E|θ) is the likelihood function 
for regression, and π0 is the prior distribution for the model parameters, where: 
  , , , ,C n m b s    (5.16) 
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 Bayesian regression analysis assumes that the likelihood function is used to describe the 
distribution of model error.  Model error is the difference between the data, or evidence, and the 
best fitted model.  Model error is a random variable that can be described by the likelihood 
function.  Wu utilizes an additive error model[20], meaning the difference between each of the 
values calculated by the best fitted model and the data, or evidence, is assumed to be normally 
distributed with a mean value of zero.  The normally distributed likelihood function used by Wu 
is defined by: 
 
exp
2[ ] [ , ]1
2
1
1
( | )
2
calcCPR i CPR iN
s
i
L E e
s



 
   
 

   (5.18) 
where: N is the total number of data points, s is the standard deviation of the error, CPRexp[i] is 
the i-th experimental data value for crack propagation rate, and CPRcalc[i,θ] is the i-th calculated 
value for crack propagation rate given the parameter set θ.  The posterior joint distribution was 
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then integrated to find the marginal distributions for each empirical model parameter.  The 
marginal distributions for each empirical model parameter capture the uncertainty associated 
with the true value of each empirical model parameter. 
 
For running the case study of this thesis, General Electric Global Research experimental 
data[21] is used for SCC growth rates in alloy 690 specimens to update the SCC propagation 
model developed by Wu.  After examination of the data, two important changes were made to 
the SCC model for alloy 690.  The first change was to condense the two-stage model into a one 
stage model.  Wu wanted to fit a three stage SCC propagation curve to available experimental 
data.  However, Wu realized that the third stage happens very rapidly, so he did not model the 
third stage.  The two-stage model developed by Wu represents the first two stages of the SCC 
propagation curve.  For the first stage, Wu shows that a power law model without a dependency 
on pH is a sufficient fit to the data.  This means that for the first stage of the model, Wu 
determines that the chemical effects are negligible.  However, for the second stage of Wu’s 
model, all the parameters were required to fit the model to the data, including pH.  When fitting 
the base SCC model, developed by Wu, to the General Electric Global Research experimental 
data, it was determined that all dependencies, including chemical dependencies, needed to be 
incorporated.  This determination was made because no transition in the experimental data could 
be seen such as the one identified by Wu, where the chemical effects transition from being 
negligible to necessary.  The alloy 690 crack propagation data for CPR vs. SIF has been plotted 
in Figure 5.3 to demonstrate the clustered nature of the data.  It is from this plot that it was 
decided to condense Wu’s two-stage model into a one-stage model for this research. 
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Figure 5.3 Alloy 690 Crack Propagation Data (CPR vs. SIF) 
 
The second important change to Wu’s model was to replace the pH dependency with a 
Hydrogen content (H2, cc/kg) dependency.  This change was made because quantifying pH at 
higher temperatures is challenging since true chemical elements are not known at those 
temperatures.  This means that hydrogen concentrations cannot be easily quantified.  Therefore, 
hydrogen concentrations were directly included into the model.  The resulting alloy 690 SCC 
propagation model is shown in Equation (5.19).  One important parameter in the CPR690 model is 
Kth690, which represents necessary stress concentration required for SCC to begin propagating in 
a component fabricated from alloy 690 material.  Kth600 was developed by Scott[22] for SCC 
propagation in steam generators made of alloy 600 material.  Scott determined the required stress 
intensity factor for SCC to be 9MPa m to propagate in alloy 600 material.  After analyzing the 
available experimental SCC data for alloy 690, it was determined that the data did not provide 
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sufficient evidence to choose a different value for Kth690.  Therefore, 690 9thK MPa m was 
selected. 
    690 690 690690 690 690 2
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  (5.19) 
 
For the SS SCC propagation model, SS SCC CPR experimental data developed by 
Terachi et al.[23] was used to update the model developed by Wu.  Again, after examination of 
the experimental data, two important changes were made to the SCC propagation model 
developed by Wu.  The first change was to condense the two-stage model down to one stage, as 
there was no indication from the experimental data that a two-stage model was appropriate for 
SCC propagation in SS.  This time, the Stage I model from Wu’s work was selected, because no 
pH dependency could be derived from the available experimental data.  The resulting SS SCC 
propagation model can be found in Equation (5.20).  Like the case for the CPR690 model, a value 
for KthSS needed to be determined and KthSS=10MPa m was selected, which was determined from 
analysis of the experimental data from Terachi et al.[23].  It is likely that the reason for this 
determination stems from the experimental procedure implemented by Terachi et al., where each 
specimen was pre-cracked until the stress intensity factor reached 10MPa m .  Therefore, it is 
recommended that further research be performed to explore the true value of the threshold stress 
intensity factor for SCC propagation in stainless steel materials. 
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  (5.20) 
 
The empirical model parameters in the alloy 690 and SS SCC propagation models, C690, 
m690, n690, 690, CSS, mSS, and nSS, were quantified with Bayesian regression analysis, using 
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OpenBUGS[24], an open source version of the Bayesian inference Using Gibbs Sampling 
(BUGS) package.  Non-informative uniform prior distributions were used for the model 
parameters in the Bayesian regression analysis to ensure the posterior distribution was developed 
from the experimental data with very little contribution from the prior distributions.  These prior 
distributions can be found in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 Non-informative Uniform Prior Distributions 
Parameter Lower Bound Upper Bound 
C690 0 5.00E-10 
m690 0 10 
n690 0 10 
b690 0 10 
CSS 0 5.00E-10 
mSS 0 10 
nSS 0 10 
 
The lower bounds for all parameters was defined as zero because increases in stress, yield 
strength, and hydrogen content all showed an increase in the SCC propagation rate.  The upper 
bounds were determined to be sufficiently large, so as not to introduce any information into the 
calculations.  The Bayesian regression analysis was performed in OpenBUGS for 100,000 trials.  
The trace capability of the program allowed for the mean value of each parameter to be traced as 
a function of the number of trials.  Once the simulation reach roughly 50,000 trials, the 
distributions remained essentially flat.  Therefore, it was deemed that 100,000 trials were 
sufficient for convergence of the results.  The resulting posterior joint distributions are 
represented by marginal distributions for each of the model parameters in the SCC propagation 
model.  These marginal distributions can be found in Table 5.3.  As one can see from Table 5.3, 
none of the output distributions are truncated at the selected upper bounds, which supports the 
theory that our upper bounds were sufficiently large. 
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Table 5.3 SCC Propagation Empirical Model Parameters 
Parameter Mean Std. Dev. 2.50% Median 97.50% 
C690 3.8E-13 1.0E-10 9.2E-18 9.7E-15 3.0E-12 
m690 0.2151 0.00999 0.00517 0.1423 0.8419 
n690 3.22 0.02817 2.054 3.212 4.381 
690 0.8252 0.5977 0.03553 0.7103 2.092 
CSS 9.5E-18 1.0E-10 1.1E-21 2.9E-19 5.5E-17 
mSS 2.547 0.4411 1.756 2.532 3.43 
nSS 1.052 0.4335 0.3383 0.9984 1.989 
 
5.2.2 ESTIMATION OF  FOR ALLOY 690 & STAINLESS STEEL 
 
This section relates to the implementation of Task # 2.2 and Task #2.3 of the Spatio-
Temporal probabilistic methodology to estimate the transition rates between New and Flaw 
states for the cases of Alloy 690 and Stainless Steel (SS).  For this case study, when a component 
is in the New state, it is assumed that the only mechanism acting upon the component is the 
mechanism of pitting.  As discussed in Section 5.1.4, pitting is often a precursor to SCC.  This 
research adopts the pit-to-crack transition criteria developed by Kondo[13], which says that a pit 
will transition into a crack when the SCC propagation rate is greater than or equivalent to the pit 
growth rate.  Therefore, to quantify the transition rate, ϕ, a pit growth model developed by 
Gorman et al.[25] and utilized by Turnbull et al.,[10] which has the form shown in Equation 
(5.21) was selected. 
 
11
1dx
x
dt

 
 
    (5.21) 
where: dx/dt- pit growth rate, x- pit size,  and - empirical pit growth model parameters.  
Turnbull et al. fit the pit growth rate model to experimental data for three environments: de-
aerated pure water, aerated pure water, and aerated 1.5 ppm chloride.  The  parameter of the pit 
growth model was assumed to be a constant while the  parameter was assumed to be normally 
distributed with a mean value of zero.  Turnbull et al. truncated the normal distribution for 
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negative  values, because negative values would be physically unrealistic.  Selecting the mean 
value as zero implies that some  values will be very small, corresponding to pit growth rates 
very close to zero.  This seems reasonable as pit growth can be very slow.  The resulting 
empirical pit growth model parameters, fit to the experimental data, can be found in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Pit Growth Rate Model Parameters Derived from Experimental Data by Turnbull et al.[10] 
Environment  Std. Dev. of  
De-aerated pure water 0.36 0.16 
Aerated pure water 0.35 0.42 
Aerated 1.5 ppm chloride 0.37 0.70 
De-aerated pure water 0.5 0.01 
Aerated pure water 0.5 0.04 
Aerated 1.5 ppm chloride 0.5 0.08 
 
Through analyzing the data provided by Turnbull et al., it was discovered that the 
physical units of the  were unclear, as the resulting pit propagation rates did not appear to 
coincide with the pit growth rates provided in the paper.  Therefore, =0.5 was set as a fixed 
value and the range of possible  values based on the pit growth rates provided in the paper was 
calculated.  These calculations provided a new distribution for .  The  parameter was replaced 
by a uniform distribution, U(9.5917E-09, 2.8249E-07).  With the pit growth model, an initial pit 
size model was required for the calculation of .  Therefore, as suggested by the authors, a 
Weibull distribution was fit to the experimental data collected for pit growth in de-aerated pure 
water for 15,402 hours by Turnbull et al.  This provided a surrogate initial pit size distribution to 
be utilized in simulations for pit-to-crack transitions.  For this case study, the surrogate initial pit 
size distribution represents the natural imperfections that are associated with all materials.  There 
are many reasons for which a material can have defects or imperfections.  Therefore, the 
surrogate initial pit size distribution is meant to capture these random defects. The resulting a1 
and a2 parameters for the fitted Weibull distribution can be found in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 Weibull Distribution Parameters for Initial Pit Size Surrogate Distribution 
Parameter Value Unit 
a1 8.274E+10 1/m 
a2 2.7294 dimensionless 
 
Using the developed models for SCC propagation and pit growth, as well as the initial pit 
distribution, a simulation technique was developed that would sample from the uncertainty 
distributions and determine the amount of time required for initial pits to transition into cracks.  
The pit growth simulation for determining the time of transition from New to Flaw states is 
depicted as a flow chart in Figure 5.4 and the full MATLAB code can be found in Appendix D. 
 
Start
i=0, numcracks=0
i=i+1, j=0
Sample from U9.5917E09,
2.8249E07
Sample CPR model parameters 
from marginal distributions 
(Table 4)
j=j+1
Sample initial pit size from 
Weibull distribution (Table 6)
Calculate SIF, pit growth rate 
(dx/dt), and SCC propagation 
rate (da/dt)
da/dt   dx/dt?
Yes
Growth time=0, pit size=initial 
pit size
No
Calculate SIF, pit growth rate 
(dx/dt), and SCC propagation 
rate (da/dt)
Pit growth =dx/dt * timestep
Pit size=pit size + pit growth
Growth time = growth time + 
timestep
da/dt   dx/dt?
No
Growth time   max timeNo
TTF(i,j)=growth time
Numcracks=numcracks+1
Yes
j=maxj?
No
i=maxi?
No
Yes
Yes
Finish
Yes
TTF(i,j)=NaN
 
Figure 5.4 Flow Chart of Pit Growth Simulation for Modeling New to Flaw Transition with Monte Carlo Sampling 
Techniques 
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The pit growth simulation procedure has the following main steps: 
1. Sample the model parameters from the SCC model marginal distributions provided in 
Table 5.3, and sample an  value for the pit growth model from U(9.5917E-09, 
2.8249E-07). 
2. Sample an initial pit size from the Weibull distribution provided in Table 5.5. 
3. Check to see if the initial pit size sample is in the New state.  If the calculated SCC 
propagation rate initially exceeds the pit growth rate, the sample is rejected because 
this means that the sample is already in the Flaw state.  Therefore, the sample would 
not be physically consistent with the simulation process.  In other words, we 
truncated the initial pit size distribution to remove any possible samples that had 
already moved into the Flaw state, since the purpose of this simulation is to find the 
probability of a sample, which starts in the New state, moving to the Flaw state.  If a 
sample is rejected, a new sample is selected and Step 3 is repeated.   
4. Iteratively integrate the pit growth until the SCC propagation rate, calculated from the 
models developed in Section 5.2.1 exceeds the pit growth rate.  Once the SCC 
propagation rate exceeds the pit growth rate, the sample is considered to transition to 
the Flaw state.  The growth time for transition from New to Flaw is stored as the 
time-to-Flaw.  If the sample does not transition from the New state to the Flaw state 
within 60 years (the extended lifetime of a NPP), the sample is terminated.   
 
To determine the probability that a pit in the New state will transition to the Flaw state, 
the number of samples that transition from the New state to the Flaw state is divided by the total 
number of samples.  Using the frequentist definition of probability, this fraction will provide the 
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probability as the number of samples approaches infinity. The transition rates for a Markov 
model, however, are rates of probability transition.  This means the rate at which the probability 
that a component is in each state is changing or “flowing” into another state.  Therefore, to 
incorporate the rate at which the samples transition from the New state to the Flaw state, the 
mean time-to-Flaw (MTTF) is calculated. Therefore, the probability of transition from the New 
state to the Flaw state is multiplied by the inverse of the MTTF to find the transition rate of 
probability from the New to the Flaw state.  This relationship is represented in Equation (5.22).   
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MTTF
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   
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  (5.22) 
 
Other research has been performed on multi-state physics models for the aging of passive 
components.  Unwin et al. developed a multi-state physics model for SCC growth and crack 
propagation[26].  However, Unwin’s work uses a stochastic Weibull model to calculate the crack 
initiation transition rate as a function of time.  The time is reset after each repair.  Therefore, the 
inhomogeneous nature of time in Unwin’s work makes the model non-Markov.  The work 
presented in this thesis uses failure mechanism models to simulate the behavior of crack 
initiation and progression for SCC.  The transition rates are then calculated based on the 
simulation results.  Also, this research sets the transition rates as constants and does not reset the 
time after each repair to the system; therefore, this research maintains the use of the Markov 
model. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the pit growth simulation consisted of two sampling loops.  
The outer loop sampled model parameters for the SCC propagation rate and the pit growth rate.  
The inner loop sampled initial pit sizes.  Monte Carlo sampling technique is initially selected for 
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the simulation of the New state to Flaw state transition phenomenon.  With Monte Carlo 
simulation, the analyst needs to select the number of random samples while balancing 
computational cost with accuracy of the sampling-based estimations.  For the New to Flaw 
transition, the sampling-based estimations of concern were the MTTF and the fraction of samples 
that transition from the New state to the Flaw state.  A sufficient sample size for each of the 
performance measures is roughly estimated using Equation (5.23) from Law et al.[27]: 
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where: n*r- approximate number of samples required to obtain a relative error of , ti-1,1-/2 
represents the t-distribution value with significance level  and i-1 degrees of freedom, and S2(n) 
represents the estimated sample variance.  Setting ==0.05, it was determined that an 
approximately sufficient sample size would require millions of samples and very long 
computational time.  Therefore, a Latin Hypercube Sampling technique is implemented to 
sample from the uncertainty distributions.  One of the benefits to using the Latin Hypercube 
Sampling technique is that it more efficiently samples from distributions than the Monte Carlo 
sampling method, by ensuring that samples are taken from all portions of the distribution[28-31]. 
 
With the Latin Hypercube Sampling approach, the pit growth simulations are run for 
100,000, 200,000, and 400,000 samples for both alloy 690 and stainless steel using the Illinois 
Campus Cluster computing capabilities[32].1  These simulations are replicated 10 times for alloy 
690 and 20 times for stainless steel.  The resulting mean of the sample means are presented along 
                                                 
1 The Illinois Campus Cluster was run with help from undergraduate research intern, Ethan Graven 
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with the standard error of the mean (SEM) for each case in Table 5.6, which shows that the means 
do not show significant variation with increasing the number of simulations.  Figure 5.5 shows 
how the SEM plateaus as the number of replications of the simulations increases.  This indicates 
that the results have reached a convergence level.  The resulting calculations for ф are presented 
in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.6 Mean of Means and Standard Error of Mean vs. Number of Samples 
Alloy 690 (10 replications) 
 100,000 samples 200,000 samples 400,000 samples 
 Mean TTF 
(hours) 
Transitions 
(%) 
Mean TTF 
(hours) 
Transitions 
(%) 
Mean TTF 
(hours) 
Transitions 
(%) 
Mean of means 11466.17 99.00 11555.15 99.01 11508.02 99.01 
Standard Error 
of Mean (SEM) 
29.17 0.012 23.12 0.007 16.39 0.005 
Stainless Steel (20 replications) 
 100,000 samples 200,000 samples 400,000 samples 
 Mean TTF 
(hours) 
Transitions 
(%) 
Mean TTF 
(hours) 
Transitions 
(%) 
Mean TTF 
(hours) 
Transitions 
(%) 
Mean of means 51824.74 74.25 51797.84 74.22 51910.14 74.25 
Standard Error 
of Mean (SEM) 
87.62 0.023 44.96 0.017 40.89 0.012 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Plateau of the Standard Error of Mean vs. Number of Simulations Demonstrating Convergence 
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Table 5.7 Calculation of ф from Simulation Results of New to Flaw Transitions for Alloy 690 and SS 
ф Alloy 690 Stainless Steel 
# Samples 400,000 400,000 
Fraction of Transitions/Samples 0.99 0.74 
MTTT(hours) 11,508 51,910 
ф(1/hour) 8.60E-05 1.43E-05 
 
5.2.3 ESTIMATION OF λ, , and ρ FOR ALLOY 690 & STAINLESS STEEL 
 
This section relates to implementation of Task # 2.2 and Task # 2.3 of the Spatio-
temporal Probabilistic methodology for estimations of λ, ρ, and  for the cases of Alloy 690 and 
Stainless Steel.  Once a component enters the Flaw state, SCC propagation occurs.  The 
transition rates λ (Flaw to Leak),  (Flaw to Rupture), and ρ (Leak to Flaw) represent the 
potential pathways by which a component can transition between Markov states.  Quantification 
of these transition rates provides the explicit pathway for incorporation of the PoF of the SCC 
phenomena.  For this work, the SCC propagation models are used to quantify the transition rates 
λ, , and ρ using a probabilistic physics-of-failure approach like the one used for the 
quantification of ϕ in Section 5.2.2.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, the SCC models developed by 
Wu[3] ( Equations 4.1 to 4.5) , are used in this research.  
 
An initial Flaw distribution is required for the quantification of the transition rates λ, , 
and ρ.  One could use a crack transition size distribution developed from the pit growth 
simulation used for the quantification of ϕ.  However, it was decided to use a distribution of Flaw 
sizes from NPP service data to reduce the uncertainty accumulated in the development of the pit 
growth simulation for calculating .  This research adopted a gamma distribution of crack 
lengths, which was formulated from 1994 inspection data from a Ringhals Unit 4 steam 
generator[33].  The parameters for the Gamma distribution are [=3.393, =1.395].   
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The SCC propagation simulation developed for the quantification of the transition rates λ, 
, and ρ require the consideration of both length and depth of cracks.  Therefore, this research 
adopts the methodology utilized by Wu[3] and developed by Shin et al.[34], in which an aspect 
ratio of a crack penetration in steam generator tubes was determined to be a random variable. 
The uncertainty in the crack penetration aspect ratio is modeled by a uniform distribution 
between 0.24 and 0.35.  The crack penetration aspect ratio is defined as: a/c, where a is the depth 
of the crack and c is half the length of the crack.  To apply this aspect ratio, the SCC propagation 
simulation selects an initial crack length.  The crack length is then divided by 2 to obtain the 
half-length, c.  The aspect ratio is then randomly sampled from U(0.24, 0.35).  The sampled 
aspect ratio is then multiplied by c, which provides the initial crack depth value, a.  The SCC 
propagation equations shown in Equations (4.1) to (4.5) provide the rate of growth for the crack 
depth.  Therefore, to determine the crack length growth at each time step, the aspect ratio is re-
sampled.  The da/dt value is then divided by the newly sampled aspect ratio to provide the dc/dt 
value. 
 
Using the SCC propagation models and the initial Flaw length distribution, a simulation 
to sample from the uncertainty distributions associated with the model parameters and quantify 
the transition rates λ, , and ρ was developed.  The structure of SCC propagation simulation is 
depicted in Figure 5.6 and the full MATLAB code can be found in Appendix D.  As mentioned 
in Chapter 4, the SCC propagation simulation procedure has the following main steps: 
1. Sample from the SCC model parameter uncertainty distributions (Table 5.3). 
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2. Sample from the initial crack length distribution, sample from the aspect ratio 
uncertainty distribution, and calculate the initial crack depth.   
3. Check initial conditions against threshold criteria for the Flaw, Leak, and Rupture 
states as explained in Section 5.1.  If the sample is found to be in the New, Leak, or 
Rupture states, reject the sample and repeat the second step.  This step serves as a 
method of truncating the initial crack distribution to only allow samples that are 
initially in the Flaw state, as transitions of components that were initially in the Flaw 
state are the concern of the simulation.   
4. Iteratively integrate the crack length and crack depth until one of three possible 
outcomes occurs: transition into the Leak state, transition into the Rupture state, or 
maximum time limit is reached.  The maximum time limit for the simulation is set as 
60 years, which represents an extended lifetime for an NPP. 
5. If the sample transitions into the Rupture state, the time of transition from the Flaw to 
the Rupture state is recorded and the next sample is simulated.  If the sample 
transitions from the Flaw state to the Leak state, the time of transition is also 
recorded.  However, the simulation continues from the Leak state with a new time 
counter to simulate when the sample transitions from the Leak to the Rupture state.  
The SCC propagation model is still used along with the aspect ratio to propagate the 
crack length, but the crack depth is held constant once the Leak state has been 
reached.  Crack depth is held constant since once a SCC crack propagates 100% 
through the thickness of the component, the depth cannot continue to increase.  If the 
sample transitions from the Leak to the Rupture state, the time of the transition from 
entering the Leak state until transitioning into the Rupture state is recorded.   
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Figure 5.6 Flow Chart of SCC Propagation Simulation for Modeling with Monte Carlo Sampling 
 
Figure 5.7 shows a figure of the simulated crack depth vs. time for 100 samples.  The 
intercepts on the vertical axis represent the uncertainty in the initial crack depth distribution.  
Additionally, the plot demonstrates how the uncertainty in the input parameters of the SCC 
propagation simulation affects the crack growth.  This ultimately results in a large variation in 
the time required for each sample to reach a leak or rupture state.  Figure 5.8 shows a plot of the 
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SCC propagation rate as a function of the SIF for 100 alloy 690 samples.  This plot demonstrates 
the uncertainty associated with the SCC propagation model parameters.   
 
 
Figure 5.7 SCC Crack Depth vs. Time for 100 Alloy 690 Samples of the SCC Propagation Simulation 
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Figure 5.8 SCC Crack Propagation Rate vs. SIF for 100 Alloy 690 Samples of the SCC Propagation Simulation at 
T=598K, [H2]=26cc/kg, and ys=337MPa 
 
To calculate the transition rates λ,, and ρ, Equations (4.7) to (4.9) are used.  Once again, 
the Latin Hypercube Sampling approach is chosen instead of the Monte Carlo sampling approach 
due the high computational cost required by Monte Carlo sampling.  The results for the 
simulations for 400,000 samples have been shown in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8 Calculation of λ, , and ρ from Simulation Results of Flaw to Leak, Flaw to Rupture, and Leak to Rupture 
Transitions for Alloy 690 and SS 
λ Alloy 690  Stainless Steel 
# Samples 400,000 400,000 
Fraction of Leaks/Samples 0.507 0.621 
MTFL(hours) 31,895 193,439 
λ(1/hour) 1.59E-05 3.21E-06 
 Alloy 690  Stainless Steel 
# Samples 400,000 400,000 
Fraction of Ruptures/Samples 0.457 0.1 
MTFR(hours) 31,895 193,439 
(1/hour) 1.43E-05 5.17E-07 
ρ Alloy 690  Stainless Steel 
# Leaks 400,000 400,000 
Fraction of Ruptures/Leaks 0.841 0.975 
MTLR(hours) 268,886 19,471 
ρ(1/hour) 3.13E-06 5.01E-05 
 
5.3 MODELING AND QUANTIFICATION OF THE TRANSITION RATES OF REPAIR IN 
THE CASE STUDY  
 
Once a component is degraded enough to enter the Flaw or Leak states, there is a 
possibility that the degradation will be detected and repaired.  These possible repairs would bring 
a component back into a less-degraded state.  The possible repair paths are represented by ω and 
. For this case study, the Markov model does not have any repair transition rates from the 
Rupture state, because it is assumed that once a component ruptures, it cannot be repaired.  To 
fix the rupture, the component must be replaced, which would then require the use of a new 
Markov model for the new component.  Additionally, the repair rates from the Flaw and Leak 
states only transition to the New state, because it is assumed for this case study that all repairs 
are perfect.  For this case study, ω (Flaw to New transition) and  (Leak to New transition) are 
quantified using a solely data-informed approach, as was implemented by both Vinod[6] and 
Fleming[14].  For quantification of ω, the model described by Equation (5.25) is used.  For 
quantification of , the model described by Equation (5.26) was used. 
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where: PIF - probability that the component will be inspected within an inspection interval (10 
years for most NPPs).  This term can be 0 if a component is outside of the inspection programs 
or 1 if the component is inside the inspection programs.  For this case study, a value of 0.25 was 
selected. PFD- probability that the component, in the Flaw state and having degradation, will be 
detected.  This value is assumed to be equal to 0.9 for this case study.  TFI- inspection interval for 
flaws, assumed to be 10 years.  TR- time to repair a component once it is identified to be in a 
degraded state.  This value has been assumed to be 200 hours.  PIL- probability that the 
component will be inspected for leaks, assumed to be equal to 0.9.  PLD- probability that the 
component will be detected to be in the Leak state, assumed to be equal to 0.9.  TLI- inspection 
interval for leaks, assumed to be 10 years.  The values for these repair models were selected to 
maintain consistency with the repair models for the Markov models developed by Vinod and 
Fleming and were kept the same for both alloy 690 and stainless steel.  A summary of all the 
values for the transition rates of the Markov models developed for this case study can found in 
Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 Summary of Values for Transition Rates Used for Quantification of the Markov Model 
Transition 
Rate 
690 Value 
(1/hour) 
SS Value 
(1/hour) 
 8.60E-05 1.43E-05 
λ 1.59E-05 3.21E-06 
 1.43E-05 5.17E-07 
ρ 3.13E-06 5.01E-05 
ω 2.56E-06 2.56E-06 
 9.23E-06 9.23E-06 
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5.4 DEVELOPING THE TIME-DEPENDENT DISTRIBUTIONS OF STATE PROBABILITIES 
IN THE CASE STUDY  
 
As explained in Section 4.1.4, a differential equation can be established for each Markov 
state of degradation, which represents the rate in the probability that a component is in each state 
at a given time.  The differential equations established for the Markov model of this case study 
can be found in Section 4.1.4 in Chapter 4.  To simplify the solution to the coupled differential 
equations, it is assumed that the transition rates are constant over the lifetime of the component.  
The solution requires initial values for the four Markov states of degradation.  For this case 
study, it is assumed that a component will begin in the New state with certainty (probability =1).  
Therefore, the probability that the component will begin in the Flaw, Leak, or Rupture state is 
zero.  This initial condition is shown in Equation (5.27). 
 
( 0) 1
( 0) ( 0) ( 0) 0
New t
Flaw t Leak t Rupture t
 
     
  (5.27) 
 
There is no transition rate of repair leaving the Rupture state.  This is due to the 
assumption that once a component reaches the Rupture state, it can no longer be repaired.  The 
component must then be replaced.  Therefore, the Rupture state acts as a probability sink.  This 
means that if time increases for long enough, the probability that the component will be in the 
Rupture state will go to 1.  Naturally, this means that the probability in the New, Flaw, and Leaks 
states will be zero as time increases to infinity.  This steady state condition is shown in Equation 
(5.28).  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
( ) 1
New t Flaw t Leak t
Rupture t
     
 
  (5.28) 
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The coupled differential equations were solved analytically and applied the initial 
conditions shown in Equation (2.27).  Then transition rate values from Table 5.9 were input to 
the solution.  The resulting solution provided a time-dependent state probability distribution that 
showed what the probability would be that a component was in each state at a given time.  In 
Table 5.10, the results of the state probability distributions over a 60-year period of reactor 
operation are given.  A graphical representation for each state can be found in Figure 5.9 and 
Figure 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10 Summary of Time-Dependent State Probability Distribution for Alloy 690 and Stainless Steel 
Material 
Time 
(years) 
0 1 5 10 20 25 40 60 
Alloy 690 
N(t) 1.000 0.476 0.057 0.037 0.024 0.018 0.009 0.003 
F(t) 0.000 0.453 0.392 0.176 0.078 0.059 0.027 0.010 
L(t) 0.000 0.036 0.248 0.281 0.185 0.144 0.067 0.024 
R(t) 0.000 0.034 0.303 0.506 0.713 0.778 0.897 0.963 
Stainless 
Steel 
N(t) 1.000 0.884 0.558 0.347 0.185 0.152 0.100 0.063 
F(t) 0.000 0.115 0.406 0.547 0.548 0.507 0.374 0.241 
L(t) 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.027 0.030 0.028 0.021 0.014 
R(t) 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.080 0.236 0.313 0.505 0.683 
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Figure 5.9 State Probability Distributions for Alloy 690 for 60 Years of Reactor Life 
 
 
Figure 5.10 State Probability Distributions for Stainless Steel for 60 Years of Reactor Life 
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A few interesting comparisons can be made from the results shown in Table 5.10.  The 
most important result is that the probability that a component made of stainless steel enters the 
Rupture state increases much more slowly than the probability that a component made of alloy 
690 enters the Rupture state which is consistent with what was observed from the experimental 
data.  Additionally, Figure 5.11 was created by isolating only the rupture state probability 
distributions and the ratio of the alloy 690 rupture state probability to the SS rupture state 
probability is presented in Table 5.11.  The rupture state probability for alloy 690 increases much 
more rapidly than the rupture state distribution for stainless steel.  Figure 5.12 shows the rate at 
which the probability that a component exists in the Rupture state changes as a function of 
reactor age.  This figure shows that the alloy 690 component Rupture probability increases very 
rapidly and then decreases rapidly within the first 10 years of the reactors lifetime.  The stainless 
steel rate increases very slowly, but does not peak until just before 20 years of reactor life.  This 
is the result that was expected from the simulations, because stainless steel is more resistant to 
SCC than alloy 690.  Additionally, it may appear incorrect to some readers that the Flaw state 
and Leak state probabilities decrease as the reactor age increases.  However, this is correct.  The 
reasoning is that as the component ages, the probability that the component undergoes a rupture 
event continuously increases.  This research assumes that a component cannot be repaired once it 
has moved to the rupture state.  Therefore, the rupture state acts as a probability sink.  Therefore, 
as the reactor age increases, all the probability will eventually move into the rupture state while 
the probabilities of every other state will eventually decline to 0.  This assumption is not perfect 
because a plant could just replace the ruptured component with a new component.  However, this 
action is outside the scope of this research. 
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The corrosion resistance of each material was captured in the simulation process through 
the SCC propagation model parameters.  These parameters have quite a large effect on the final 
time-dependent state probability distribution.  Per the results of this case study, after 5 years, an 
alloy 690 fabricated expansion-transition region of a steam generator tube has over a 30% chance 
to experience a rupture phenomenon.  Whereas, for a stainless steel fabricated expansion-
transition region of a steam generator, the chance is only 2%.  Then after 60 years, the extended 
lifetime of a NPP, there is a 96% chance of an alloy 690 component experiencing a rupture, but 
only a 68% chance of a SS component experiencing such a phenomenon.  This indicates a very 
significant effect from material selection for the primary reactor coolant system loop.  Pipe 
ruptures in NPPs are an infrequent event.  Therefore, the probabilities of rupture output from this 
research are larger than expected.  These probabilities will be improved as the accuracy of the 
physical crack propagation models are improved.  However, the ability of the research  
 
Figure 5.11 Rupture State Probability Distribution for Alloy 690 and Stainless Steel for 60 Reactor-years 
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Figure 5.12 Rate of Probability Increase for Rupture State as a Function of Reactor Age 
 
Table 5.11 State Probability Ratios for Alloy 690 and Stainless Steel 
Material 
Time 
(years) 
1 5 10 20 25 40 60 
Alloy 690: Stainless Steel 
N(t) 0.539 0.102 0.107 0.129 0.122 0.086 0.049 
F(t) 3.958 0.966 0.322 0.142 0.117 0.073 0.041 
L(t) 25.785 15.944 10.409 6.141 5.091 3.173 1.769 
R(t) 70.530 15.041 6.341 3.014 2.487 1.776 1.411 
 
It is recognized that there are many improvements that can be made to this study.  First, 
the authors only selected one failure mechanism to demonstrate the application of the spatio-
temporal methodology.  Before application in a real-world setting, research needs to be 
conducted to include all the possible failure mechanisms that can act on a component.  This 
addition is not as simple as adding the contributions from many spatio-temporal models 
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
R
at
e 
o
f 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 C
h
an
ge
Reactor Age
Time-dependent Rate of Rupture Probability Increase 
SS dR{t}/dt
690 dR{t}/dt
203 
 
developed for each individual failure mechanism.  Failure mechanisms can interact with each 
other, thus causing the degradation rate to increase more quickly than suggested by a model that 
focuses exclusively on one failure mechanism.   
 
Further improvement can be made for this research through repair causal models which 
are necessary to capture the true nature of the repair phenomena.  In this model, very simple 
point estimates are utilized.  These point estimates fail to capture the complex nature of repair 
phenomena.  This complex nature of repair phenomena also makes the incorporation of 
associated uncertainties critical for the accuracy of the results.  In addition, the current case study 
uses a Markov modeling technique as an approximation for the generalized renewal process.  
However, the author believes that the use of the generalized renewal process will allow for the 
probabilistic PoF to be included into the model more completely.  Finally, the author believes 
that it is important for future work to perform sensitivity analyses on the outputs of the spatio-
temporal methodology so that the most important factors can be identified.  This identification of 
the critical factors will allow for the most efficient resource allocation for both improvement of 
accuracy of the model, as well as improvement of the overall system safety. 
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The roadmap of this research is presented in Figure 6.1.  The premise of the risk-informed 
resolution of GSI-191 is that location-specific LOCA frequencies drive the risk of GSI-191 related 
failure.  Step #1 of the roadmap began with the most recent NRC-sponsored estimations of LOCA 
frequencies.  These estimations are only implicit functions of underlying physics, space, and time.  
Fleming and Lydell first incorporated spatial variation into the estimations of LOCA 
frequencies[1].  Step #2 of this research performed a critical review and quantitative verification 
of the location-specific estimation of LOCA frequencies, developed by Fleming and Lydell for the 
STPNOC risk-informed resolution of GSI-191.  The author’s contributions to the improvement of 
the Fleming & Lydell report are detailed in Chapter 2 and the methodological gaps are identified 
and cover the (a) lack of inclusion of non-piping RCS components, (b) lack of explicit 
incorporation of underlying physics of failure that lead to the occurrence of a LOCA.   
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Figure 6.1 Roadmap of the Research 
 
Step #3 of this research analyzes the criticality of one of the gaps, which is the lack of 
inclusion of non-piping RCS components. This research examined an evidence-seeking procedure 
and expert elicitation process [2] to determine the significance of the contributions of non-piping 
reactor coolant system (RCS) components to the estimation of LOCA frequencies.  The 
investigative procedure performed in this research spanned over 500 academic, regulatory, 
national laboratory, and industry documents.  The 24 subcomponent categories identified by this 
investigative process indicates that estimations of LOCA frequencies for risk-informed decision-
making applications such as GSI-191 should not focus exclusively on the RCS piping components, 
because there is a potential for impact from the non-piping components.  However, the 
investigative procedure could not determine “how significant” the exclusion of non-piping 
components could be on the results of risk-informed analyses. 
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A quantitative methodology is needed to determine the “level of impact” of the 
inclusion/exclusion of non-piping components on the estimations of LOCA frequencies for risk-
informed applications.  Therefore, Step #4 of this research focuses on the development of a 
quantitative methodology and on addressing the other gap in Fleming & Lydell’s approach by 
developing the spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology [3, 4] which explicitly incorporates 
underlying physical failure mechanisms into the estimation of location-specific LOCA 
frequencies.  In this methodology, the Markov modeling technique, which is based on the renewal 
process theory, is integrated with Probabilistic Physics of Failure (PPoF) models to estimate RCS 
LOCA frequencies as a function of location and age and with considerations of periodic 
degradation and repair phenomena. 
 
In most of Markov models developed in this area of research, e.g., Fleming [5-8], the 
“transition rates” among the states are developed using solely data-driven approaches and utilizing 
service data . For example, Fleming develops a Markov model for piping system reliability that 
incorporates statistical estimates for the transition rates from Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) studies performed for thermal fatigue[9] and water hammer events[10]. Other multi-state 
physics-based models have been also developed in recent years for applications, such as the 
exploration of aging degradation of passive components[11, 12], to predict long-term failure rates 
of passive components[13-15], passive component degradation for the RELAP 7 reactor 
simulation environment[16], and SCC of dissimilar metal in RELAP 7[17]. These multi-state 
physics-based models have implemented a data-driven approach by fitting uncertainty 
distributions to available data to quantify the probability of transitions between states.  While these 
approaches try to explicitly incorporate the progression of damage through the Markov model 
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development, the transition rates themselves are developed through a solely data-driven approach. 
The main problems with the Markov models with the solely data-driven transition rates are (1) 
inaccuracy due to insufficient data and (2) the lack of “explicit” connections with location-specific 
physics of failure mechanisms associated with transition rates.   
 
The rate of change in degradation of a component varies at each location.  For example, 
some locations in the RCS may not be inspected as frequently as other locations.  Therefore, the 
probability that the maintenance program will identify the component degradation and repair the 
component is much lower for an infrequently inspected location than it would be for a more 
frequently inspected location.  Additionally, some failure mechanisms may degrade a component 
very quickly at one location due to the operating conditions such as temperature or humidity.  
However, that same failure mechanism may have a much lower rate of degradation at another 
location due to a change in operating conditions or material properties.  Some locations may not 
experience that same failure mechanism at all because of the component being made from a 
different material.  Therefore, to explicitly incorporate this spatial variation of the effects of the 
underlying failure mechanisms into LOCA frequency estimations, it is necessary to integrate the 
transition rates in the Markov modeling technique with the associated location-specific physics of 
failure mechanisms.  
 
Vinod et al. [18] combine the Markov modeling technique with a stress-strength model of 
erosion corrosion (E-C) for the piping components of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR), 
using an analytical model to estimate corrosion rates.  Although Vinod et al.’s approach utilizes a 
physical failure mechanism model for erosion-corrosion to depict the underlying physical failure 
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mechanism of transition rates in the Markov model more explicitly than solely data-driven 
approaches, due to some unrealistic assumptions, their approach does not adequately provide 
explicit incorporation of physical factors associated with locations.  For example, the progression 
of erosion-corrosion damage propagation, like stress corrosion cracking, changes with the size of 
the crack.  As the damage progresses, the damage rate of the mechanism changes.  Vinod et al.’s 
approach lumps the failure rate into a distribution and treats the failure mechanism the same 
through each stage of crack progression.  Therefore, the variations in the failure probability, based 
on the underlying spatio-temporal physics, are masked by the average rate distribution.   
 
In order to develop more explicit connection between the Markov model and the spatio-
temporal physical failure mechanisms, this research proposes the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic 
methodology which is the first that integrates the Markov modeling technique with Probabilistic 
Physic of Failure (PPoF) models.  This methodology has four key tasks including:   
 
 Task #1:  Defining Markov States of Degradation 
 Task #2:  Modeling and Quantification of the Transition Rates of Degradation 
o Task # 2.1: Developing and quantifying physics of failure causal models based 
on the identified failure mechanisms to find the “transition time between two 
states” as a function of underlying physical causal factor. This research proposes 
a Data-Theoretic approach [19] to overcome the challenges of quantification of 
these casual models.  
o Task #2.2: Propagating uncertainties in the physics of failure causal models to 
make the Probabilistic Physic of Failure (PPoF) models and to develop a 
probabilistic estimation of “transition time between two states 
o Task #2.3: Calculating transition rates of degradation based on the output of 
PPoF models, i.e., the estimated probabilistic “transition time between two 
states” 
o Task # 2.4: Bayesian integration of the estimated transition rate from PPoF 
models (from step 3) and the ones from solely data-oriented approaches (e.g., 
Fleming [5-8])  
 Task #3: Modeling and Quantification of the Transition Rates of Repair  
 Task #4: Developing the Time-dependent Distributions of State Probabilities   
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To overcome the quantification difficulties of PPoF models, this research proposes the 
Data-Theoretic approach as a part of Task #2.1 in the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic methodology. 
The underlying theory supports the completeness of contextual factors and the accuracy of their 
causal relationships.  It also helps avoid the potential for being misled by results from a solely 
data-informed analysis.  The proposed Data-Theoretic methodology (in the context of PoF and 
PRA research) is originally published in [19] and is also under development in a parallel research 
[20], for the context of socio-technical risk analysis, sponsored by the National Science 
Foundation.  The proposed Data-Theoretic methodology (in the context of physics of failure and 
PRA research) is broken down into four steps: 
a. Determine causal factors and relationships and develop physics of failure causal 
models of underlying damage mechanisms 
b. Extract historical data and update the generic causal model  
c. Scientifically reduce physical factors in the network 
d. Quantify and validate important factors and causal paths 
 
Step #5 of the roadmap of this research (Figure 6.1) focuses on a case study for the 
implementation of the spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology to examine the effects of stress 
corrosion cracking (SCC) on the rupture probability of steam generator tubes.  This case study 
demonstrates the comparative capabilities of the methodology by showing the variation in rupture 
probability based on the selection of Stainless Steel and Alloy 690 materials for the fabrication of 
the expansion-transition region of the steam generator tubes.   
 
The spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology enables the effects of operating conditions, 
maintenance programs, and material selection to be compared with respect to their contributions 
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to LOCA frequencies. This methodology will assist with the generation of a more efficient 
prevention strategy by identifying the most risk-significant causal factors.  Improved prevention 
strategies will lead to more efficient maintenance programs allowing for a more efficient allocation 
of resources for improving safety and increasing system performance.  These advancements will 
enable a more accurate estimation of LOCA frequencies, which will lead to a more accurate 
estimation of risk for nuclear power plants.  The spatio-temporal probabilistic methodology 
enables ranking of the contributions to risk from each causal factor.  This ranking will help advance 
prevention of risk by helping plants to determine the most efficient method for risk reduction. 
 
Possible future research includes:  
 
I. In Task #1, considering uncertainties in the thresholds of the Markov states can bring another 
layer of uncertainty analysis to the Spatio-temporal Probabilistic methodology. In some 
cases, the choice of the characteristic threshold for defining a Markov state may be 
accompanied with uncertainty.  For example, the modeler may want to find the probability 
that a component will rupture within a given mission time.  However, the modeler may not 
be certain as to what value to use as the characteristic threshold of the “rupture” state.  In this 
case, the suggestion is to quantify the Markov model using the range of possible 
characteristic threshold values.  The resulting distribution of output values would represent 
the model uncertainty for the characteristic threshold.  Investigating the model uncertainty 
enables the modeler to see the significance of assuming a specific characteristic value. 
 
215 
 
II. In Task # 2.1. of this methodology, Data-Theoretic approach is introduced. The four steps 
(a, b, c, and d) of the Data-Theoretic methodology helps manage the quantification of multi-
level causal model (e.g., the one presented on the right side of Figure 4.2.) and to reduce the 
scope of the casual network in a scientific way without missing the critical risk factors.  
However, in this thesis, the scope of the causal model is reduced (from the beginning) in a 
way that only the first level of the causal model in Figure 4.2 (i.e., the blue casual factors in 
Figure 4.2) is covered. Therefore, this research mainly focuses on step “a” of the Data-
theoretic approach explained above. Other steps are the focus of future research.  
III. In Task #2.1, this research only model single failure mechanisms. Mohaghegh et al.  [21] 
proposed combination of causal modeling techniques (e.g., Bayesian Belief Network) and 
Finite Element methods for quantification of PPoF models, more specifically, where two 
failure mechanisms interact. Future work can expand the Spatio-Temporal Probabilistic 
methodology to include the interactions of two failure mechanisms. 
IV. Task #2.4 has not been operationalized in this research and relates to future work.  
V. For Task #3, this research only utilizes empirical estimation of transition rate of repair. Future 
work can be dedicated to integration of maintenance casual models. The maintenance or 
repair mechanisms that can be incorporated in the “degree” of repair are broad and wide 
ranging, but can have a significant effect on the overall quality of repair.  Performance 
shaping factors such as fatigue, quality of training, workplace conditions, workplace culture, 
or weather can all play a major part in the quality of repair[20].  Incorporating these factors 
into the models can result in better-informed decision-makers, enabling them to more 
accurately make decisions to optimize costs and develop maintenance strategies. This will 
help decision-makers determine, not only how frequently repairs will be needed to optimize 
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performance (and costs), but also in what ways the system can most effectively be repaired.  
Explicit incorporation of underlying mechanisms into GRP modeling is a long-term goal of 
this research.   
VI. Although the tasks are explained mainly based on the Stress Corrosion Cracking mechanism 
(SCC), which is a dominant mechanisms associated with LOCA in NPPs, the Spatio-
Temporal Probabilistic methodology can be applied for any other failure mechanisms (e.g., 
wear, creep) and for other industry applications than NPPs (e.g., oil and gas) .   
VII. Integration of the Spatio-Temporal methodology with the Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) framework is a valuable research area to be considered. The Spatio-temporal 
Probabilistic methodology is beneficial, not only for estimation of location-specific LOCA 
frequencies, but also for incorporation of spatio-temporal physics of failure into PRA; 
therefore, it helps advance risk estimation and risk prevention.  
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APPENDIX A: COMMENT RESOLUTION ON LOCATION-SPECIFIC ESTIMATION 
OF LOCA FREQUENCIES DEVELOPED BY FLEMING AND LYDELL 
 
Table A.1 Communication and Comment Resolution Regarding Failure Rate Development in Fleming and Lydell’s 
Report 
UIUC Question/Issue Karl Fleming Response 
[UIUC] The failures in Table 3-3 are not specified by 
component case, therefore, the number of failures for the 
Bayesian updating cannot be determined for every case. 
[KNFCS] That was not the purpose of this table.  They 
were sorted into the correct cases in the excel 
spreadsheets.  The excel spread sheets were not designed 
to be applied by non-experts.  That would be a good 
research project for UCIC [sic] but not included in our 
SOW. 
[UIUC] One of the goals of our current research project 
is to recreate the numbers throughout the report.  This 
has largely been accomplished for most of the tables in 
the report.  However, without a further breakdown of the 
failures in Table 3-3 or access to the Excel files for 
categories other than the Hot Leg, it is impossible to 
recreate every calculation case for Table 3-12.  We 
would appreciate it if you could provide us with a 
breakdown of these failures into each calculation case 
category, or provide us access to the Excel files for the 
rest of the calculation cases, so we could move forward 
with the recreation of the report. 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
Pressurizer Cases (5A-5G in Table 3-12): 
[UIUC] Table 3-3 does not specify if failures listed are 
for B-F or B-J welds, so it is unclear in which cases 
these failures should be included, which is necessary in 
order to perform Bayesian updating 
[KNFCS] See above comment.  That was not the 
purpose of this table.  We did not design the report so 
that all the calcs could be recreated by non-experts.  We 
did not have sufficient budget for that.  That was to be 
done as part of a Phase 2 project which STP decided not 
to fund. 
[UIUC] Please see above comment under first bullet of 
the section titled Chapter 3 (Step 1) Failure Rate 
Development. 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 3-11 lists B-J welds have PWSCC DM 
susceptibility equal to one, but Table 3-12 does not list 
PWSCC as a susceptible DM.  Should PWSCC be 
included in the calculations for failure rate development? 
[KNFCS] Table 3-12 uses the general label SC because 
we only have one prior for all the SC damage 
mechanisms.  We did not want to suggest we have 
different priors for each flavor. 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] The Pressurizer B-J welds in Table 3-11 list 
damage susceptibility fractions for IGSCC, but Table 3-
12 does not list SC as an applicable damage mechanism 
for Pressurizer B-J weld categories.  Should SC be 
included in the calculations for the Pressurizer B-J weld 
categories in Table 3-12? 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
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Table A.1 (Cont.) 
[UIUC] Tables 3-11 and 3-12 do not list VF as an 
applicable DM for pressurizers, but Table 3-3 shows a 
failure by VF.  Should VF be included?  If not, why is 
this data from Table 3-3 excluded? 
[KNFCS] The V-F failures in Table 3-3 were included in 
the failure rates for small bore pipes 
[UIUC] The eighth row of Table 3-3 lists a V-F failure 
for system case 5, PZR-SPRAY, as a leak of a pipe 
between 4” and 10”.  If this failure was included in the 
failure rate calculation for small bore pipes, why was it 
not included in the Pressurizer category instead?  Our 
understanding is that this VF failure was not included in 
the calculations for the Pressurizer cases.  Please 
confirm whether or not our understanding is correct. 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] How does a weld overlay affect DM 
susceptibility fractions or prior distributions? 
[KNFCS] Weld overlays eliminate the potential for 
PWSCC induced failures so only D&C is included for 
such welds. 
This issue was resolved. 
Small Bore Cases (Table 3-12): 
[UIUC] Tables 3-11 and 3-12 do not show TF as 
applicable DM, but Table 3-3 shows 3 failures by TF.  
Should TF be included in the calculations?  If not, why 
not? 
[KNFCS] TF should probably be added but we did not 
develop conditional failure rates given susceptibility to 
TF for any small bore pipes.  Small bore pipes were 
evaluated as unconditional because they were not 
included in the scope of the previous RI-ISI program 
[UIUC] Tables 3-11 and 3-12 list IGSCC, or SC, as 
applicable damage mechanisms, but not TF.  While, 
Table 5-5 includes TF, but not SC.  Table 3-3 includes 
failure data for both.  Please explain which Table 
represents the damage mechanisms that contribute to the 
calculations performed for this category? 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 3-11 lists DM fractions for IGSCC, but 
not for PWSCC, yet Table 3-3 lists failures for SC and 
PWSCC separately.  Should the PWSCC failures be 
added to the SC case, or are they already included in the 
SC number (SC -20, PWSCC -6) 
[KNFCS] In Table 3-3 the SC failures include both 
IGSCC and TGSCC but in the way the failure rates were 
calculated all SC DMs were treated the same way.  The 
primary reason for breaking out PWSCC is to deal with 
the B-F weld overlay issue otherwise it does not make 
any difference. 
[UIUC] Please clarify when the SC prior distribution 
was Bayesian updated, were there 20 or 26 failures used 
in the updating? 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
SIR Cases (Table 3-12): 
[UIUC] The report does not distinguish failures between 
cases.  Should the failures be included in the Excl 
accumulator or in accumulator cases? 
[KNFCS] We did not intend for these table to be 
sufficient to recreate all the numbers.  We worked this 
out in the preparation of the excel sheets. 
This issue was not resolved. 
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[UIUC] For Cases 7E-7L and 7O, should the B-J, BC 
weld type be treated as if it were just a B-J weld type?  
The motivation of this question is that BC is not listed in 
Table 3-11 for DM susceptibility fractions, unless it is 
listed as C-F-1, which I am not sure what C-F-1 
represents and it has not description. 
[KNFCS] The failure rate method does not really 
distinguish between B-J, B-C, C-F-1.  We used these 
terms to be consistent with the ASME classifications. 
[UIUC] If the method does not distinguish between B-J, 
B-C, C-F-1, please explain what causes the difference 
between the failure rates listed in Table 3-12 cases 4B 
and 4C? 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] SIR w/ accumulator lines lists SC as an 
applicable DM, but Table 3-11 doesn’t have a DM 
susceptibility fraction listed.  Should SC be included in 
this case?  Should the same DM fraction as SIR w/out 
accumulator lines be used? 
[KNFCS] STP has no Category 7M welds. 
[UIUC] It would be beneficial to clarify what SC 
damage mechanism susceptibilities were used to 
calculate the failure rate listed in Table 3-12? 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
 
Table A.2 Re-calculation of 40-year LOCA Frequency Distributions from NUREG-1829 Experts 
Updated Table 4-3 NUREG-1829 Expert Distributions for Hot Leg LOCA Frequencies 
Exper
t ID 
LOCA 
Categor
y 
LOCA Frequency for System[1]                             
(Per Reactor-Calendar Year) 
40-Yr Multiplier[1] 
40-Yr LOCA 
Frequency[1] (Per 
Reactor-
Calendar Year) 
LB Mid UB 
RF95=UB/Mid
[2] 
LB Mid UB 
RF95=UB/Mid
[2] 
Mid[3
] 
RF95[4] 
A 
1 (> 
100) 
5.33E
-08 
1.60E
-07 
4.80E
-07 
3.00E+00 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+00 
1.60E
-07 
3.00E+0
0 
2 (> 
1,500) 
5.33E
-08 
1.60E
-07 
4.80E
-07 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
02 
3.00E-
01 
5.85E-
01 
1.95E+00 
4.80E
-08 
3.62E+0
0 
3 (> 
5,000) 
5.33E
-08 
1.60E
-07 
4.80E
-07 
3.00E+00 
5.00E-
03 
1.00E-
01 
1.95E-
01 
1.95E+00 
1.60E
-08 
3.62E+0
0 
4 (> 
25,000) 
5.33E
-08 
1.60E
-07 
4.80E
-07 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
03 
3.00E-
02 
5.85E-
02 
1.95E+00 
4.80E
-09 
3.62E+0
0 
5 (> 
100,000) 
5.33E
-08 
1.60E
-07 
4.80E
-07 
3.00E+00 
5.00E-
04 
1.00E-
02 
1.95E-
02 
1.95E+00 
1.60E
-09 
3.62E+0
0 
6 (> 
500,000) 
5.33E
-08 
1.60E
-07 
4.80E
-07 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
04 
3.00E-
03 
5.85E-
03 
1.95E+00 
4.80E
-10 
3.62E+0
0 
B 
1 (> 
100) 
3.00E
-07 
3.00E
-07 
3.00E
-07 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
10 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
3.00E
-07 
1.00E+0
1 
2 (> 
1,500) 
1.20E
-07 
1.20E
-07 
1.20E
-07 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
10 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
1.20E
-07 
1.00E+0
1 
3 (> 
5,000) 
4.80E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
10 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
4.80E
-08 
1.00E+0
1 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.92E
-08 
1.92E
-08 
1.92E
-08 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
10 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
1.92E
-08 
1.00E+0
1 
5 (> 
100,000) 
7.68E
-09 
7.68E
-09 
7.68E
-09 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
10 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
7.68E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
6 (> 
500,000) 
3.07E
-09 
3.07E
-09 
3.07E
-09 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
10 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
3.07E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
C 
1 (> 
100) 
6.00E
-07 
6.00E
-07 
6.00E
-07 
1.00E+00 
3.00E-
02 
1.00E+0
0 
3.00E+0
1 
3.00E+01 
6.00E
-07 
3.00E+0
1 
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2 (> 
1,500) 
5.00E-
08 
5.00E-
08 
5.00E-
08 
1.00E+00 3.00E-02 1.00E+00 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 
5.00E-
08 
3.00E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
2.00E-
08 
2.00E-
08 
2.00E-
08 
1.00E+00 3.00E-02 1.00E+00 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 
2.00E-
08 
3.00E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
3.00E-
09 
3.00E-
09 
3.00E-
09 
1.00E+00 5.00E-02 1.67E+00 1.67E+02 1.00E+02 
5.01E-
09 
1.00E+02 
5 (> 
100,000) 
1.00E-
09 
1.00E-
09 
1.00E-
09 
1.00E+00 6.00E-02 2.00E+00 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E+03 
6 (> 
500,000) 
2.00E-
10 
2.00E-
10 
2.00E-
10 
1.00E+00 6.00E-02 2.00E+00 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 
4.00E-
10 
1.00E+03 
E 
1 (> 
100) 
3.07E-
07 
9.22E-
07 
2.77E-
06 
3.00E+00 3.33E-04 2.83E-02 3.33E-01 1.18E+01 
2.61E-
08 
1.49E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
3.07E-
07 
9.22E-
07 
2.77E-
06 
3.00E+00 3.33E-04 2.83E-02 3.33E-01 1.18E+01 
2.61E-
08 
1.49E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
3.07E-
07 
9.22E-
07 
2.77E-
06 
3.00E+00 3.33E-04 2.83E-02 3.33E-01 1.18E+01 
2.61E-
08 
1.49E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
3.67E-
09 
1.10E-
08 
3.30E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-03 1.00E-01 1.50E+00 1.50E+01 
1.10E-
09 
1.86E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
1.27E-
09 
3.80E-
09 
1.14E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-04 5.00E-02 1.00E+00 2.00E+01 
1.90E-
10 
2.43E+01 
6 (> 
500,000) 
4.33E-
10 
1.30E-
09 
3.90E-
09 
3.00E+00 1.00E-04 3.00E-02 3.00E+00 1.00E+02 
3.90E-
11 
1.14E+02 
G 
1 (> 
100) 
5.13E-
08 
1.54E-
07 
4.62E-
07 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.14E+00 1.00E+01 8.77E+00 
1.76E-
07 
1.14E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
7.50E-
09 
2.25E-
08 
6.75E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.14E+00 1.00E+01 8.77E+00 
2.57E-
08 
1.14E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
2.78E-
09 
8.33E-
09 
2.50E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.14E+00 1.00E+01 8.77E+00 
9.50E-
09 
1.14E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
9.50E-
10 
2.85E-
09 
8.55E-
09 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.14E+00 1.00E+01 8.77E+00 
3.25E-
09 
1.14E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
1.71E-
10 
8.53E-
10 
4.27E-
09 
5.01E+00 1.00E-01 1.14E+00 1.00E+01 8.77E+00 
9.72E-
10 
1.49E+01 
6 (> 
500,000) 
1.58E-
11 
1.58E-
10 
1.58E-
09 
1.00E+01 1.00E-01 1.14E+00 1.00E+01 8.77E+00 
1.80E-
10 
2.37E+01 
H 
1 (> 
100) 
1.48E-
07 
4.45E-
07 
1.34E-
06 
3.01E+00 2.50E+00 2.50E+01 2.50E+02 1.00E+01 
1.11E-
05 
1.28E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
2.03E-
08 
6.10E-
08 
1.83E-
07 
3.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+01 
6.10E-
07 
1.28E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
7.33E-
09 
2.20E-
08 
6.60E-
08 
3.00E+00 5.00E-01 5.00E+00 5.00E+01 1.00E+01 
1.10E-
07 
1.28E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
2.60E-
09 
7.80E-
09 
2.34E-
08 
3.00E+00 5.00E-01 5.00E+00 5.00E+01 1.00E+01 
3.90E-
08 
1.28E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
8.83E-
10 
2.65E-
09 
7.95E-
09 
3.00E+00 5.00E-01 5.00E+00 5.00E+01 1.00E+01 
1.33E-
08 
1.28E+01 
6 (> 
500,000) 
2.93E-
10 
8.80E-
10 
2.64E-
09 
3.00E+00 5.00E-01 5.00E+00 5.00E+01 1.00E+01 
4.40E-
09 
1.28E+01 
I 
1 (> 
100) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
6 (> 
500,000) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
J 
1 (> 
100) 
9.25E-
12 
9.80E-
11 
2.88E-
09 
2.94E+01 3.19E+01 3.19E+01 3.19E+01 1.00E+00 
3.13E-
09 
2.94E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
5.78E-
13 
1.03E-
11 
7.61E-
10 
7.39E+01 5.24E+01 5.24E+01 5.24E+01 1.00E+00 
5.40E-
10 
7.39E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.40E-
13 
3.21E-
12 
3.38E-
10 
1.05E+02 6.04E+01 6.04E+01 6.04E+01 1.00E+00 
1.94E-
10 
1.05E+02 
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4 (> 25,000) 
1.53E
-14 
4.82E
-13 
9.75E
-11 
2.02E+02 
7.50E+0
1 
7.50E+0
1 
7.50E+0
1 
1.00E+00 
3.62E
-11 
2.02E+0
2 
5 (> 
100,000) 
2.42E
-15 
6.99E
-14 
1.93E
-11 
2.76E+02 
9.81E+0
1 
9.81E+0
1 
9.81E+0
1 
1.00E+00 
6.86E
-12 
2.76E+0
2 
6 (> 
500,000) 
1.44E
-17 
6.28E
-16 
7.56E
-13 
1.20E+03 
1.14E+0
2 
1.14E+0
2 
1.14E+0
2 
1.00E+00 
7.16E
-14 
1.20E+0
3 
L 
1 (> 100) 
2.62E
-06 
9.60E
-06 
3.52E
-05 
3.67E+00 
1.27E-
01 
1.27E-
01 
1.27E-
01 
1.00E+00 
1.22E
-06 
3.67E+0
0 
2 (> 1,500) 
1.58E
-06 
6.34E
-06 
2.53E
-05 
3.99E+00 
1.27E-
01 
1.27E-
01 
1.27E-
01 
1.00E+00 
8.05E
-07 
3.99E+0
0 
3 (> 5,000) 
3.84E
-07 
1.92E
-06 
9.60E
-06 
5.00E+00 
4.19E-
01 
4.19E-
01 
4.19E-
01 
1.00E+00 
8.04E
-07 
5.00E+0
0 
4 (> 25,000) 
1.54E
-07 
7.68E
-07 
3.84E
-06 
5.00E+00 1.01+00 
1.01E+0
0 
1.01E+0
0 
1.00E+00 
7.76E
-07 
5.00E+0
0 
5 (> 
100,000) 
6.40E
-08 
3.20E
-07 
1.60E
-06 
5.00E+00 
2.41E+0
0 
2.41E+0
0 
2.41E+0
0 
1.00E+00 
7.71E
-07 
5.00E+0
0 
6 (> 
500,000) 
3.20E
-11 
3.20E
-10 
3.20E
-09 
1.00E+01 
2.61E+0
0 
2.61E+0
0 
2.61E+0
0 
1.00E+00 
8.35E
-10 
1.00E+0
1 
Notes:                       
[1] Data shaded in yellow are taken from NUREG-1829 expert questionnaires in Reference [14]. Data shaded in blue were calculated in this 
study per Notes [2] through [4]. 
[2] RF = Range Factor of a lognormal distribution defined by the Mid value as the median and by the UB value as the 95%tile. 
[3] Median of a lognormal distribution for the 40-year LOCA frequency created by the product of two lognormal distributions: the medians of the 
lognormal distributions for LOCA frequency for system and the 40-year multiplier (see Equation [4.1]) 
[4] Range Factor of the 40-year LOCA frequency lognormal distribution (see Equation [4.2]). 
Cold Leg 
Exper
t ID 
LOCA 
Categor
y 
LOCA Frequency for System[1]                             
(Per Reactor-Calendar Year) 
40-Yr Multiplier[1] 
40-Yr LOCA 
Frequency[1] (Per 
Reactor-
Calendar Year) 
LB Mid UB 
RF95=UB/Mid
[2] 
LB Mid UB 
RF95=UB/Mid
[2] 
Mid[3
] 
RF95[4] 
A 
1 (> 
100) 
1.37E
-08 
4.10E
-08 
1.23E
-07 
3.00E+00 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+00 
4.10E
-08 
3.00E+0
0 
2 (> 
1,500) 
1.37E
-08 
4.10E
-08 
1.23E
-07 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
02 
3.00E-
01 
5.85E-
01 
1.95E+00 
1.23E
-08 
3.62E+0
0 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.37E
-08 
4.10E
-08 
1.23E
-07 
3.00E+00 
5.00E-
03 
1.00E-
01 
1.95E-
01 
1.95E+00 
4.10E
-09 
3.62E+0
0 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.37E
-08 
4.10E
-08 
1.23E
-07 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
03 
3.00E-
02 
5.85E-
02 
1.95E+00 
1.23E
-09 
3.62E+0
0 
5 (> 
100,000) 
1.37E
-08 
4.10E
-08 
1.23E
-07 
3.00E+00 
5.00E-
04 
1.00E-
02 
1.95E-
02 
1.95E+00 
4.10E
-10 
3.62E+0
0 
6 (> 
500,000) 
1.37E
-08 
4.10E
-08 
1.23E
-07 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
04 
3.00E-
03 
5.85E-
03 
1.95E+00 
1.23E
-10 
3.62E+0
0 
B 
1 (> 
100) 
3.00E
-07 
3.00E
-07 
3.00E
-07 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
6.00E
-08 
1.00E+0
1 
2 (> 
1,500) 
1.20E
-07 
1.20E
-07 
1.20E
-07 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
2.40E
-08 
1.00E+0
1 
3 (> 
5,000) 
4.80E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
9.60E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.92E
-08 
1.92E
-08 
1.92E
-08 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
3.84E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
5 (> 
100,000) 
7.68E
-09 
7.68E
-09 
7.68E
-09 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
1.54E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
6 (> 
500,000) 
3.07E
-09 
3.07E
-09 
3.07E
-09 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
6.14E
-10 
1.00E+0
1 
C 
1 (> 
100) 
2.00E
-07 
2.00E
-07 
2.00E
-07 
1.00E+00 
3.00E-
02 
1.00E+0
0 
3.00E+0
1 
3.00E+01 
2.00E
-07 
3.00E+0
1 
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2 (> 
1,500) 
2.00E-
08 
2.00E-
08 
2.00E-
08 
1.00E+00 3.00E-02 1.00E+00 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 
2.00E-
08 
3.00E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
7.00E-
09 
7.00E-
09 
7.00E-
09 
1.00E+00 3.00E-02 1.00E+00 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 
7.00E-
09 
3.00E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.00E-
09 
1.00E-
09 
1.00E-
09 
1.00E+00 6.00E-02 2.00E+00 2.00E+02 1.00E+02 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E+02 
5 (> 
100,000) 
3.00E-
10 
3.00E-
10 
3.00E-
10 
1.00E+00 7.00E-02 2.33E+00 2.33E+03 1.00E+03 
6.99E-
10 
1.00E+03 
6 (> 
500,000) 
7.00E-
11 
7.00E-
11 
7.00E-
11 
1.00E+00 8.57E-02 2.86E+00 2.86E+03 1.00E+03 
2.00E-
10 
1.00E+03 
E 
1 (> 
100) 
3.07E-
07 
9.22E-
07 
2.77E-
06 
3.00E+00 3.33E-04 2.83E-02 3.33E-01 1.18E+01 
2.61E-
08 
1.49E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
3.07E-
07 
9.22E-
07 
2.77E-
06 
3.00E+00 3.33E-04 2.83E-02 3.33E-01 1.18E+01 
2.61E-
08 
1.49E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
3.07E-
07 
9.22E-
07 
2.77E-
06 
3.00E+00 3.33E-04 2.83E-02 3.33E-01 1.18E+01 
2.61E-
08 
1.49E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
3.67E-
09 
1.10E-
08 
3.30E-
08 
3.00E+00 3.33E-04 3.33E-02 5.00E-01 1.50E+01 
3.66E-
10 
1.86E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
1.27E-
09 
3.80E-
09 
1.14E-
08 
3.00E+00 3.33E-05 1.67E-02 3.33E-01 1.99E+01 
6.35E-
11 
2.42E+01 
6 (> 
500,000) 
4.33E-
10 
1.30E-
09 
3.90E-
09 
3.00E+00 3.33E-05 1.00E-02 1.00E+00 1.00E+02 
1.30E-
11 
1.14E+02 
G 
1 (> 
100) 
5.13E-
08 
1.54E-
07 
4.62E-
07 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 9.14E-01 1.00E+01 1.09E+01 
1.41E-
07 
1.39E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
7.50E-
09 
2.25E-
08 
6.75E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 9.14E-01 1.00E+01 1.09E+01 
2.06E-
08 
1.39E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
2.78E-
09 
8.33E-
09 
2.50E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 9.14E-01 1.00E+01 1.09E+01 
7.61E-
09 
1.39E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
9.50E-
10 
2.85E-
09 
8.55E-
09 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 9.14E-01 1.00E+01 1.09E+01 
2.60E-
09 
1.39E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
1.71E-
10 
8.53E-
10 
4.27E-
09 
5.01E+00 1.00E-01 9.14E-01 1.00E+01 1.09E+01 
7.80E-
10 
1.79E+01 
6 (> 
500,000) 
1.58E-
11 
1.58E-
10 
1.58E-
09 
1.00E+01 1.00E-01 9.14E-01 1.00E+01 1.09E+01 
1.44E-
10 
2.77E+01 
H 
1 (> 
100) 
1.48E-
07 
4.45E-
07 
1.34E-
06 
3.01E+00 1.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+01 
4.45E-
07 
1.28E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
2.03E-
08 
6.10E-
08 
1.83E-
07 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+01 
6.10E-
08 
1.28E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
7.33E-
09 
2.20E-
08 
6.60E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-02 1.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 
2.20E-
09 
1.28E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
2.60E-
09 
7.80E-
09 
2.34E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-02 1.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 
7.80E-
10 
1.28E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
8.83E-
10 
2.65E-
09 
7.95E-
09 
3.00E+00 1.00E-02 1.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 
2.65E-
10 
1.28E+01 
6 (> 
500,000) 
2.93E-
10 
8.80E-
10 
2.64E-
09 
3.00E+00 1.00E-02 1.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 
8.80E-
11 
1.28E+01 
I 
1 (> 
100) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
6 (> 
500,000) 
4.00E-
11 
2.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
5.00E+01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 
1.00E-
09 
5.00E+01 
J 
1 (> 
100) 
9.32E-
12 
7.58E-
11 
2.04E-
09 
2.69E+01 3.41E+01 3.41E+01 3.41E+01 1.00E+00 
2.58E-
09 
2.69E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
5.19E-
13 
9.05E-
12 
5.69E-
10 
6.29E+01 5.33E+01 5.33E+01 5.33E+01 1.00E+00 
4.82E-
10 
6.29E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.19E-
13 
2.87E-
12 
2.69E-
10 
9.37E+01 6.05E+01 6.05E+01 6.05E+01 1.00E+00 
1.74E-
10 
9.37E+01 
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4 (> 
25,000) 
1.28E
-14 
4.51E
-13 
8.00E
-11 
1.77E+02 
7.29E+0
1 
7.29E+0
1 
7.29E+0
1 
1.00E+00 
3.29E
-11 
1.77E+0
2 
5 (> 
100,000) 
2.03E
-15 
6.50E
-14 
1.82E
-11 
2.80E+02 
9.40E+0
1 
9.40E+0
1 
9.40E+0
1 
1.00E+00 
6.11E
-12 
2.80E+0
2 
6 (> 
500,000) 
2.61E
-17 
1.16E
-15 
1.58E
-12 
1.36E+03 
1.12E+0
2 
1.12E+0
2 
1.12E+0
2 
1.00E+00 
1.30E
-13 
1.36E+0
3 
L 
1 (> 
100) 
2.62E
-06 
9.60E
-06 
3.52E
-05 
3.67E+00 
2.54E-
02 
2.54E-
02 
2.54E-
02 
1.00E+00 
2.44E
-07 
3.67E+0
0 
2 (> 
1,500) 
1.58E
-06 
6.34E
-06 
2.53E
-05 
3.99E+00 
2.54E-
02 
2.54E-
02 
2.54E-
02 
1.00E+00 
1.61E
-07 
3.99E+0
0 
3 (> 
5,000) 
3.84E
-07 
1.92E
-06 
9.60E
-06 
5.00E+00 
8.37E-
02 
8.37E-
02 
8.37E-
02 
1.00E+00 
1.61E
-07 
5.00E+0
0 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.54E
-07 
7.68E
-07 
3.84E
-06 
5.00E+00 
2.02E-
01 
2.02E-
01 
2.02E-
01 
1.00E+00 
1.55E
-07 
5.00E+0
0 
5 (> 
100,000) 
6.40E
-08 
3.20E
-07 
1.60E
-06 
5.00E+00 
4.82E-
01 
4.82E-
01 
4.82E-
01 
1.00E+00 
1.54E
-07 
5.00E+0
0 
6 (> 
500,000) 
3.20E
-11 
3.20E
-10 
3.20E
-09 
1.00E+01 
5.22E-
01 
5.22E-
01 
5.22E-
01 
1.00E+00 
1.67E
-10 
1.00E+0
1 
Notes:                       
[1] Data shaded in yellow are taken from NUREG-1829 expert questionnaires in Reference [14]. Data shaded in blue were calculated in this 
study per Notes [2] through [4]. 
[2] RF = Range Factor of a lognormal distribution defined by the Mid value as the median and by the UB value as the 95%tile. 
[3] Median of a lognormal distribution for the 40-year LOCA frequency created by the product of two lognormal distributions: the medians of the 
lognormal distributions for LOCA frequency for system and the 40-year multiplier (see Equation [4.1]) 
[4] Range Factor of the 40-year LOCA frequency lognormal distribution (see Equation [4.2]). 
Surge Line 
Exper
t ID 
LOCA 
Categor
y 
LOCA Frequency for System[1]                             
(Per Reactor-Calendar Year) 
40-Yr Multiplier[1] 
40-Yr LOCA 
Frequency[1] (Per 
Reactor-
Calendar Year) 
LB Mid UB 
RF95=UB/Mid
[2] 
LB Mid UB 
RF95=UB/Mid
[2] 
Mid[3
] 
RF95[4] 
A 
1 (> 
100) 
5.33E
-09 
1.60E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
3.00E+00 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+00 
1.60E
-08 
3.00E+0
0 
2 (> 
1,500) 
5.33E
-09 
1.60E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
02 
3.00E-
01 
5.85E-
01 
1.95E+00 
4.80E
-09 
3.62E+0
0 
3 (> 
5,000) 
5.33E
-09 
1.60E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
3.00E+00 
5.00E-
03 
1.00E-
01 
1.95E-
01 
1.95E+00 
1.60E
-09 
3.62E+0
0 
4 (> 
25,000) 
5.33E
-09 
1.60E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
03 
3.00E-
02 
5.85E-
02 
1.95E+00 
4.80E
-10 
3.62E+0
0 
5 (> 
100,000) 
5.33E
-09 
1.60E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
3.00E+00 
5.00E-
04 
1.00E-
02 
1.95E-
02 
1.95E+00 
1.60E
-10 
3.62E+0
0 
6 (> 
500,000)  
B 
1 (> 
100) 
1.50E
-07 
1.50E
-07 
1.50E
-07 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
01 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
1.50E
-07 
1.00E+0
1 
2 (> 
1,500) 
5.10E
-08 
5.10E
-08 
5.10E
-08 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
01 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
5.10E
-08 
1.00E+0
1 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.73E
-08 
1.73E
-08 
1.73E
-08 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
01 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
1.73E
-08 
1.00E+0
1 
4 (> 
25,000) 
5.90E
-09 
5.90E
-09 
5.90E
-09 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
01 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
5.90E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
5 (> 
100,000) 
2.00E
-09 
2.00E
-09 
2.00E
-09 
1.00E+00 
1.00E-
01 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
1 
1.00E+01 
2.00E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
6 (> 
500,000)  
C 
1 (> 
100) 
6.00E
-05 
6.00E
-05 
6.00E
-05 
1.00E+00 
3.00E-
02 
1.00E+0
0 
3.00E+0
1 
3.00E+01 
6.00E
-05 
3.00E+0
1 
2 (> 
1,500) 
5.00E
-06 
5.00E
-06 
5.00E
-06 
1.00E+00 
3.00E-
02 
1.00E+0
0 
3.00E+0
1 
3.00E+01 
5.00E
-06 
3.00E+0
1 
3 (> 
5,000) 
2.00E
-06 
2.00E
-06 
2.00E
-06 
1.00E+00 
3.00E-
02 
1.00E+0
0 
3.00E+0
1 
3.00E+01 
2.00E
-06 
3.00E+0
1 
227 
 
Table A.2 (Cont.) 
 
4 (> 
25,000) 
3.00E-
07 
3.00E-
07 
3.00E-
07 
1.00E+00 5.00E-02 1.67E+00 1.67E+02 1.00E+02 
5.01E-
07 
1.00E+02 
5 (> 
100,000)           
6 (> 
500,000)  
E 
1 (> 
100) 
7.73E-
07 
2.32E-
06 
6.96E-
06 
3.00E+00 5.00E-03 1.25E-01 5.00E-01 4.00E+00 
2.90E-
07 
5.86E+00 
2 (> 
1,500) 
7.73E-
07 
2.32E-
06 
6.96E-
06 
3.00E+00 5.00E-03 1.25E-01 5.00E-01 4.00E+00 
2.90E-
07 
5.86E+00 
3 (> 
5,000) 
3.07E-
07 
9.22E-
07 
2.77E-
06 
3.00E+00 1.00E-03 8.50E-02 1.00E+00 1.18E+01 
7.84E-
08 
1.49E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
3.67E-
09 
1.10E-
08 
3.30E-
08 
3.00E+00 3.33E-04 3.33E-02 5.00E-01 1.50E+01 
3.66E-
10 
1.86E+01 
5 (> 
100,000)           
6 (> 
500,000)  
G 
1 (> 
100) 
3.03E-
09 
9.08E-
09 
2.72E-
08 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.16E+00 1.00E+01 8.62E+00 
1.05E-
08 
1.12E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
4.77E-
10 
1.43E-
09 
4.29E-
09 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.16E+00 1.00E+01 8.62E+00 
1.66E-
09 
1.12E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.67E-
10 
5.00E-
10 
1.50E-
09 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.16E+00 1.00E+01 8.62E+00 
5.80E-
10 
1.12E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
4.70E-
11 
1.41E-
10 
4.23E-
10 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.16E+00 1.00E+01 8.62E+00 
1.64E-
10 
1.12E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
4.54E-
12 
2.27E-
11 
1.14E-
10 
5.02E+00 1.00E-01 1.16E+00 1.00E+01 8.62E+00 
2.63E-
11 
1.48E+01 
6 (> 
500,000)  
H 
1 (> 
100) 
2.42E-
08 
7.25E-
08 
2.18E-
07 
3.01E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+01 
7.25E-
07 
1.28E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
3.25E-
09 
9.75E-
09 
2.93E-
08 
3.01E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+01 
9.75E-
08 
1.28E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.15E-
09 
3.45E-
09 
1.04E-
08 
3.01E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+01 
3.45E-
08 
1.28E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
3.42E-
10 
1.03E-
09 
3.08E-
09 
2.99E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+01 
1.03E-
08 
1.28E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
9.08E-
11 
2.73E-
10 
8.18E-
10 
3.00E+00 2.00E+00 2.00E+01 2.00E+02 1.00E+01 
5.46E-
09 
1.28E+01 
6 (> 
500,000)  
I 
1 (> 
100) 
2.70E-
06 
8.10E-
06 
2.43E-
05 
3.00E+00 1.96E-03 1.96E-02 1.96E-01 1.00E+01 
1.59E-
07 
1.28E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
2.70E-
06 
8.10E-
06 
2.43E-
05 
3.00E+00 1.96E-03 1.96E-02 1.96E-01 1.00E+01 
1.59E-
07 
1.28E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.77E-
08 
5.30E-
08 
1.59E-
07 
3.00E+00 3.00E-01 3.00E+00 3.00E+01 1.00E+01 
1.59E-
07 
1.28E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.77E-
08 
5.30E-
08 
1.59E-
07 
3.00E+00 3.00E-01 3.00E+00 3.00E+01 1.00E+01 
1.59E-
07 
1.28E+01 
5 (> 
100,000) 
2.50E-
10 
5.00E-
09 
1.00E-
07 
2.00E+01 3.33E-01 3.33E-01 3.33E-01 1.00E+00 
1.67E-
09 
2.00E+01 
6 (> 
500,000)  
J 
1 (> 
100) 
6.84E-
12 
6.07E-
11 
1.82E-
09 
3.00E+01 3.82E+01 3.82E+01 3.82E+01 1.00E+00 
2.32E-
09 
3.00E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
5.07E-
13 
6.14E-
12 
5.90E-
10 
9.61E+01 7.09E+01 7.09E+01 7.09E+01 1.00E+00 
4.35E-
10 
9.61E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.20E-
13 
2.04E-
12 
2.67E-
10 
1.31E+02 8.42E+01 8.42E+01 8.42E+01 1.00E+00 
1.72E-
10 
1.31E+02 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.63E-
14 
4.45E-
13 
1.00E-
10 
2.25E+02 1.01E+02 1.01E+02 1.01E+02 1.00E+00 
4.49E-
11 
2.25E+02 
5 (> 
100,000) 
2.58E-
15 
8.52E-
14 
3.04E-
11 
3.57E+02 1.15E+02 1.15E+02 1.15E+02 1.00E+00 
9.80E-
12 
3.57E+02 
 
228 
 
Table A.2 (Cont.) 
 
6 (> 
500,000)  
L 
1 (> 
100) 
2.62E
-06 
9.60E
-06 
3.52E
-05 
3.67E+00 
1.27E-
02 
1.27E-
02 
1.27E-
02 
1.00E+00 
1.22E
-07 
3.67E+0
0 
2 (> 
1,500) 
1.58E
-06 
6.34E
-06 
2.53E
-05 
3.99E+00 
1.27E-
02 
1.27E-
02 
1.27E-
02 
1.00E+00 
8.05E
-08 
3.99E+0
0 
3 (> 
5,000) 
3.84E
-07 
1.92E
-06 
9.60E
-06 
5.00E+00 
4.19E-
02 
4.19E-
02 
4.19E-
02 
1.00E+00 
8.04E
-08 
5.00E+0
0 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.54E
-07 
7.68E
-07 
3.84E
-06 
5.00E+00 
1.01E-
01 
1.01E-
01 
1.01E-
01 
1.00E+00 
7.76E
-08 
5.00E+0
0 
5 (> 
100,000) 
6.40E
-08 
3.20E
-07 
1.60E
-06 
5.00E+00 
2.41E-
01 
2.41E-
01 
2.41E-
01 
1.00E+00 
7.71E
-08 
5.00E+0
0 
6 (> 
500,000)  
Notes:                       
[1] Data shaded in yellow are taken from NUREG-1829 expert questionnaires in Reference [14]. Data shaded in blue were calculated in this 
study per Notes [2] through [4]. 
[2] RF = Range Factor of a lognormal distribution defined by the Mid value as the median and by the UB value as the 95%tile. 
[3] Median of a lognormal distribution for the 40-year LOCA frequency created by the product of two lognormal distributions: the medians of the 
lognormal distributions for LOCA frequency for system and the 40-year multiplier (see Equation [4.1]) 
[4] Range Factor of the 40-year LOCA frequency lognormal distribution (see Equation [4.2]). 
HPI Line 
Exper
t ID 
LOCA 
Categor
y 
LOCA Frequency for System[1]                             
(Per Reactor-Calendar Year) 
40-Yr Multiplier[1] 
40-Yr LOCA 
Frequency[1] (Per 
Reactor-
Calendar Year) 
LB Mid UB 
RF95=UB/Mid
[2] 
LB Mid UB 
RF95=UB/Mid
[2] 
Mid[3
] 
RF95[4] 
A 
1 (> 
100) 
8.33E
-07 
2.50E
-06 
7.50E
-06 
3.00E+00 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+0
0 
1.00E+00 
2.50E
-06 
3.00E+0
0 
2 (> 
1,500) 
8.33E
-07 
2.50E
-06 
7.50E
-06 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
02 
3.00E-
01 
5.85E-
01 
1.95E+00 
7.50E
-07 
3.62E+0
0 
3 (> 
5,000) 
8.33E
-07 
2.50E
-06 
7.50E
-06 
3.00E+00 
5.00E-
03 
1.00E-
01 
1.95E-
01 
1.95E+00 
2.50E
-07 
3.62E+0
0 
4 (> 
25,000) 
8.33E
-07 
2.50E
-06 
7.50E
-06 
3.00E+00 
1.50E-
03 
3.00E-
02 
5.85E-
02 
1.95E+00 
7.50E
-08 
3.62E+0
0 
5 (> 
100,000) 
8.33E
-07 
2.50E
-06 
7.50E
-06 
3.00E+00 
5.00E-
04 
1.00E-
02 
1.95E-
02 
1.95E+00 
2.50E
-08 
3.62E+0
0 
6 (> 
500,000)  
B 
1 (> 
100) 
3.00E
-07 
3.00E
-07 
3.00E
-07 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
6.00E
-08 
1.00E+0
1 
2 (> 
1,500) 
1.20E
-07 
1.20E
-07 
1.20E
-07 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
2.40E
-08 
1.00E+0
1 
3 (> 
5,000) 
4.80E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
4.80E
-08 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
9.60E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.92E
-08 
1.92E
-08 
1.92E
-08 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
3.84E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
5 (> 
100,000) 
7.68E
-09 
7.68E
-09 
7.68E
-09 
1.00E+00 
2.00E-
02 
2.00E-
01 
2.00E+0
0 
1.00E+01 
1.54E
-09 
1.00E+0
1 
6 (> 
500,000)  
C 
1 (> 
100) 
1.00E
-04 
1.00E
-04 
1.00E
-04 
1.00E+00 
1.20E-
01 
4.00E+0
0 
1.20E+0
2 
3.00E+01 
4.00E
-04 
3.00E+0
1 
2 (> 
1,500) 
1.00E
-04 
1.00E
-04 
1.00E
-04 
1.00E+00 
1.20E-
01 
4.00E+0
0 
1.20E+0
2 
3.00E+01 
4.00E
-04 
3.00E+0
1 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.00E
-05 
1.00E
-05 
1.00E
-05 
1.00E+00 
1.20E-
01 
4.00E+0
0 
1.20E+0
2 
3.00E+01 
4.00E
-05 
3.00E+0
1 
4 (> 
25,000)           
5 (> 
100,000)           
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6 (> 
500,000)  
E 
1 (> 
100) 
5.33E-
06 
1.60E-
05 
4.80E-
05 
3.00E+00 7.00E-02 3.30E-01 7.00E-01 2.12E+00 
5.28E-
06 
3.79E+00 
2 (> 
1,500) 
7.73E-
07 
2.32E-
06 
6.96E-
06 
3.00E+00 1.00E-02 2.50E-01 1.00E+00 4.00E+00 
5.80E-
07 
5.86E+00 
3 (> 
5,000) 
3.07E-
07 
9.22E-
07 
2.77E-
06 
3.00E+00 2.00E-03 1.70E-01 2.00E+00 1.18E+01 
1.57E-
07 
1.49E+01 
4 (> 
25,000)           
5 (> 
100,000)           
6 (> 
500,000)  
G 
1 (> 
100) 
2.29E-
06 
6.87E-
06 
2.06E-
05 
3.00E+00 3.00E-01 5.78E-01 3.00E+00 5.19E+00 
3.97E-
06 
7.24E+00 
2 (> 
1,500) 
3.83E-
07 
1.15E-
06 
3.45E-
06 
3.00E+00 3.00E-01 5.78E-01 3.00E+00 5.19E+00 
6.65E-
07 
7.24E+00 
3 (> 
5,000) 
7.13E-
08 
2.14E-
07 
6.42E-
07 
3.00E+00 3.00E-01 5.78E-01 3.00E+00 5.19E+00 
1.24E-
07 
7.24E+00 
4 (> 
25,000)           
5 (> 
100,000)           
6 (> 
500,000)  
H 
1 (> 
100) 
2.42E-
08 
7.25E-
08 
2.18E-
07 
3.01E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+01 
7.25E-
07 
1.28E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
3.25E-
09 
9.75E-
09 
2.93E-
08 
3.01E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+01 
9.75E-
08 
1.28E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.15E-
09 
3.45E-
09 
1.04E-
08 
3.01E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+01 
3.45E-
08 
1.28E+01 
4 (> 
25,000)           
5 (> 
100,000)           
6 (> 
500,000)  
I 
1 (> 
100) 
2.70E-
06 
8.10E-
06 
2.43E-
05 
3.00E+00 1.39E+00 2.09E+01 1.25E+02 5.98E+00 
1.69E-
04 
8.16E+00 
2 (> 
1,500) 
2.70E-
06 
8.10E-
06 
2.43E-
05 
3.00E+00 1.39E+00 2.09E+01 1.25E+02 5.98E+00 
1.69E-
04 
8.16E+00 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.77E-
08 
5.30E-
08 
1.59E-
07 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+01 
5.30E-
08 
1.28E+01 
4 (> 
25,000) 
1.77E-
08 
5.30E-
08 
1.59E-
07 
3.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+01 
5.30E-
08 
1.28E+01 
5 (> 
100,000)           
6 (> 
500,000)  
J 
1 (> 
100) 
1.46E-
08 
2.72E-
07 
6.82E-
06 
2.51E+01 2.31E+01 2.31E+01 2.31E+01 1.00E+00 
6.28E-
06 
2.51E+01 
2 (> 
1,500) 
4.65E-
10 
1.41E-
08 
1.39E-
06 
9.86E+01 4.02E+01 4.02E+01 4.02E+01 1.00E+00 
5.67E-
07 
9.86E+01 
3 (> 
5,000) 
1.10E-
10 
4.60E-
09 
7.06E-
07 
1.53E+02 4.29E+01 4.29E+01 4.29E+01 1.00E+00 
1.97E-
07 
1.53E+02 
4 (> 
25,000) 
9.72E-
12 
6.77E-
10 
1.81E-
07 
2.67E+02 4.68E+01 4.68E+01 4.68E+01 1.00E+00 
3.17E-
08 
2.67E+02 
5 (> 
100,000)           
6 (> 
500,000)  
L 
1 (> 
100) 
2.62E-
06 
9.60E-
06 
3.52E-
05 
3.67E+00 4.58E-01 4.58E-01 4.58E-01 1.00E+00 
4.40E-
06 
3.67E+00 
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2 (> 
1,500) 
1.58E-
06 
6.34E-
06 
2.53E-
05 
3.99E+00 4.58E-01 4.58E-01 4.58E-01 1.00E+00 
2.90E-
06 
3.99E+00 
3 (> 
5,000) 
3.84E-
07 
1.92E-
06 
9.60E-
06 
5.00E+00 5.25E-01 5.25E-01 5.25E-01 1.00E+00 
1.01E-
06 
5.00E+00 
4 (> 
25,000)           
5 (> 
100,000)           
6 (> 
500,000)  
Notes:                       
[1] Data shaded in yellow are taken from NUREG-1829 expert questionnaires in Reference [14]. Data shaded in blue were calculated in this 
study per Notes [2] through [4]. 
[2] RF = Range Factor of a lognormal distribution defined by the Mid value as the median and by the UB value as the 95%tile. 
[3] Median of a lognormal distribution for the 40-year LOCA frequency created by the product of two lognormal distributions: the medians of the 
lognormal distributions for LOCA frequency for system and the 40-year multiplier (see Equation [4.1]) 
[4] Range Factor of the 40-year LOCA frequency lognormal distribution (see Equation [4.2]). 
 
Table A.3 Status of Communication with Fleming and Lydell for Critical Review of CRP Development for 
Location-specific Estimation of LOCA Frequencies Methodology 
UIUC Question/Issue Karl Fleming Response 
[UIUC] Can you clarify what is meant by selecting 
option 4 over option 3, “… as it exhibits a larger degree 
of epistemic uncertainty …” in paragraph 4 of section 
4.9? 
 
[KNFCS] This simply means that we selected the option 
that was a better reflection of the state of knowledge 
about the frequency of significant pipe ruptures, in our 
opinion.  The CRP model is effectively a way to 
extrapolate data and any type of extrapolation involves 
uncertainty. In addition the further out you extrapolate, 
and in this case that means that we are extrapolating into 
areas of very low frequency, the uncertainty increases.  
We use actual data to calculate the failure rates but they 
are all small leaks and cracks so any attempt to predict 
frequency of large pipe ruptures must entail a large 
degree of uncertainty.  When quantifying uncertainties, 
understating their ranges is non-conservative.  So we 
picked the option that did a better job, in our opinion of 
expressing the correct degree of uncertainty. 
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[UIUC] The NUREG-1829 elicitation accounts for the 
entire fleet of US PWR plants and therefore, is 
applicable to the VEGP study.  However, it is unclear to 
us what including the base case analysis for a specific 
PWR design with a specific number of coolant loops, 
pipe sizes, and weld counts adds to the formulation of 
the “target” LOCA frequencies that is not captured in the 
expert elicitation.  Also, it is not clear to us that the 
inclusion of the analysis for a specific PWR design is 
valid for the analysis of all PWRs, some of which have a 
different number coolant loops and welds?   
[KNFCS] Your response is only addressing one aspect 
of the difference between Option 3 and Option 4 namely 
specific plant vs. fleet of plants.  In our view the most 
important difference is the fact that Appendix D and the 
expert elicitation came up with LOCA frequencies using 
two fundamentally different methods:  Appendix D used 
a failure rate/ CRP model that is very similar to the 
approach used for our report where the failure rates are 
estimated using the same Bayes’ update procedure, 
service data and estimates of weld exposures, etc.  The 
most important element that we wanted to use from 
Appendix D was a different CRP model than was 
implicit in the expert elicitation. The expert elicitation 
was just that.  In addition, the plant specific example 
used in Appendix D was a Westinghouse PWR.  Finally, 
keep in mind that the only part of the expert data that we 
used was for four systems:  hot leg, cold leg, surge line, 
and HPI line.  When we divided out the LOCA initiating 
event frequencies in converting target LOCA 
frequencies to CRPs, the question of different number of 
loops gets cancelled out.  We firmly believe that using 
Method 4 was a better reflection of the state of 
knowledge than Method 3.  Our independent reviewer 
Dr. Mosleh agreed. 
[UIUC] We think that including a summary of your 
explanation to our questions concerning this issue, in 
addition to the sensitivity analysis for the selection of 
option 4 instead of option 3, would help the reader 
understand the motivation of this choice.  The responses 
have resolved our concerns and we have no further 
comments.  
  
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] Why is such a heavy weight given to the Lydell 
base case analysis from Appendix D of NUREG-1829? 
[KNFCS] We do not think it is such heavy weight.  We 
gave the NUREGs-1829 input and Appendix D input 
equal weight because they come from two completely 
different approaches to estimating LOCA frequency and 
they also represent different scope of plants.  The former 
is strictly expert opinion and the latter is the result of a 
LOCA frequency model quantified using data and some 
individual expert judgment. Also the former are for a 
fleet of PWR plants and the latter is for one specific 
PWR design.  If you look at Bengt Lydell’s input to the 
elicitation you will see it is not the same as Appendix D 
because of the scope of plants and systems. 
This issue was resolved. 
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[UIUC] Section 4.12 investigates the inclusion of the 
Lydell base case analysis in the target LOCA frequency 
development. Is there any statistical evidence to show 
that the variations of the mean values are not significant 
in comparison with the CRP uncertainties? If a 15% shift 
in the mean of the CRP values is insignificant, what does 
this shift do to the rest of the distribution? Are the 
changes to the rest of the distribution also insignificant? 
How much would the mean of the data have to change 
for there to be a significant variation in the CRP 
distributions? 
[KNFCS] The results for all the key percentiles of the 
cases with and without Lydell are shown in Table 4-11 
so you can see this directly in the report.  The conclusion 
was not just based on the change in the mean. 
[UIUC] Excluding the Lydell’s result from the GM 
results in a larger RF, and therefore a broader 
uncertainty distribution for almost every case in Table 4-
11.  Therefore, if an increased uncertainty better reflects 
the state of knowledge about the frequency of significant 
pipe ruptures, it seems beneficial to exclude the Lydell 
results from the GM.  However, we also believe that 
resulting numbers should not drive the process, so there 
is no need to exclude the Lydell data from the GM.   
[KNFCS] As a final remark, the main reason for 
including Lydell results in the first place was that he was 
providing his input for a broader question than he was 
providing in Appendix D, the LOCA frequencies for a 
fleet of PWRs and for the entire reactor coolant system 
pressure boundary rather than for specific components 
for a specific design in Appendix D. 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] Why was the data for Table 4-4 LOCA case 5 of 
the HPI line manipulated?  It appears that the RF was 
increased from 6.0 to 18.8, but this adjustment was not 
made for the surge line, where the case 5 RF is lower 
than the case 4 RF.  
[KNFCS] Do not understand what you mean by 
manipulated? 
[UIUC] In Table 4-4, why was the RF for LOCA Cat. 5 
of the Surge Line not increased (from 15.8 to 17.3) in 
order to match the RF from LOCA Cat. 4 of the Surge 
Line?  The Table shows RF of HPI Line Cat. 5 is 
increased to match HPI Line Cat. 4 as a means to 
prevent an illogical trend in RF vs. decreasing 
frequency. 
  
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] What is the justification for increasing the range 
factor of the data in Table 4-9.  My understanding is that 
the RF is increased so that larger breaks, which are less 
frequent, do not have decreasing uncertainties.  
However, is there any justification for the numbers that 
the RFs were increased to, or are they just an expert 
opinion adjustment?  
[KNFCS] They were adjusted to be the same as the RF 
for the maximum RF for the previous breaks sizes 
calculated.  The justification is to prevent the range 
factors determined from the mixture distribution to have 
an illogical trend in RF vs. decreasing frequency – based 
on what we believe is a reasonable engineering 
judgment. 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] What is the justification for using the HPI priors 
to update CVCS, SIR, Pressurizer, and Small Bore lines?  
[KNFCS] The piping designs are essentially the same – 
same materials and similar pipe schedules and design 
codes. 
This issue was resolved. 
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[UIUC] The R-DAT output for Hot Leg at SG Inlet for 
case 5 gives values that are 5% larger for the mean, 5%, 
median, and 95%, than those reported.  What is the 
reason for this?  Were the numbers intentionally 
adjusted?  If so, why?  
[KNFCS] Needs further study.  There was not 
manipulation intended. 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] The R-DAT output for the Small Bore differs 
significantly from the values in Table 4-10.  
Additionally, the small bore values appear to be 
manipulated as the 5% listed is larger than the median 
values listed.  What manipulation was performed to this 
data?  Why?  
[KNFCS] Needs further study.  There was not 
manipulation intended. 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] Some of the range factors for the cold leg (cases 
1,3), hot leg (cases 2,5,6), surge line (case 1) appear to 
be varied.  This could be intentional manipulation or 
simply a failure to replicate the data analysis.  Are there 
Excel files available for cases other than the hot leg that 
the recreation results can be benchmarked against?  
[KNFCS] Needs further study.  There was not any 
manipulation intended.   
This issue was not resolved. 
 
Table A.4 Status of Communication with Fleming and Lydell for Critical Review of Final LOCA Frequency 
Distributions for Location-specific Estimation of LOCA Frequencies Methodology 
UIUC Question/Issue Karl Fleming Response 
[UIUC] Hot Leg case 1A, failure model of 2.0 label was skipped in 
the table and all of the values were shifted downward, ultimately 
not giving a value for failure mode of 41.0  
[KNFCS] You are correct this is a typo which is corrected in the attached 
file.  The values in Table 5-1 which was used for input to Casagrande are 
correct. 
[UIUC] In the updated report, the value listed in Table 5-1 for case 
1A, break size 41.01 is 1.53E-09, which does not match the mean 
value shown in Table 5-5 of 1.32E-09.  We were able to 
successfully recreate the value listed in Table 5-1.  However, the 
distribution (mean, 5%, median, 95%) values for the updated case 
in Table 5-5 are 15% lower than the values we were able to 
recreate.  Please explain this difference. 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] The failure rates for cases 4A, 4B(&4D), and 4C do not 
match those from Table 3-12.  It appears that the failure rates for 
4B and 4C were switched, but also adjusted 
[KNFCS] Yes they do not match because Table 3-12 shows the results of 
the monte carlo mixture distributions for the total failure rate.  As 
explained in Section 5 near these tables we calculated the unconditional 
LOCA frequencies using two methods, one via Monte Carlo propagation 
of the Monte Carlo derived failure rates and the CRP distributions and the 
other using formulas for combining the product of two lognormal 
distributions which are used as the official results.  For that step it was 
necessary to fit the MC failure rate distributions to Lognormal.  This was 
done by fitting the median to the GM of the 5th and 95th percentiles and 
using the RF calculated using these same percentiles.  You and I have 
discussed this earlier on several occaisions.  That is why the failure rate 
distributions in these tables are generally not the same as those in Table 3-
12. In only a few cases where the RF is small did these come out the same. 
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[UIUC] We apologize for not making the question clearer.  For every 
calculation case in Table 5-5, except for cases 4A, 4B(&4D), and 4C, 
the 5% and 95% values are exactly the same as those listed in Table 3-
12.  From these values, we were able to successfully recreate the 
failure rates listed in Table 5-5 with a very small amount of variation, 
using the method that we have discussed.  However, the 5% and 95% 
values listed in Table 5-5 for the cases 4A, 4B(&4D), and 4C are 
different from the values listed in Table 3-12.  Please clarify why 
these values are not the same as those listed in Table 3-12. 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] For case 4B, all of the 95% values were shifted.  This is clear 
from the mean, 5%, median, and RF for each failure mode matching 
the report data very well, while only the 95% column is drastically 
different (>125% for each failure mode)  
[KNFCS] Yes the data for the 95%values in Table 5-4 were copied 
wrong and in fact they repeat values from the 5% column.  I have 
corrected that in the revised report.. 
[UIUC] Using the 5% and 95% failure rate values listed in Table 5-5 
of the updated version of the report, we were able to recreate the 
updated values for case 4B from the updated version of the report.  
Thank you, we have no further comment. 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 3-12 gives 5E its own failure rate, but Table 5-5 clumps 
5E in with 5C, 5D, & 5H.  Should the cases be separate or combined?  
How is the failure rate and conditional probability chosen to calculate 
the LOCA distributions (from which Table 3-12 cases and why?)?  
[KNFCS] In tracking this down I found some weld case labeling 
problems in Table 3-12 and 5-5.  The weld case labels in Table 3-2 and 
Tables 5-1 through 5-4 are correct but in the revised report I have 
corrected the mentioned label issues for Table 5-5 and 3-12.  If you 
look at note [1] in Table 5-5 it is explained that when weld cases only 
vary by pipe size (i.e. have the same weld type and DM combinations) 
they are combined in this table because the only difference is which 
break size they are cut off at.  I have modified this note to explain that 
the appropriate break size cutoffs are shown in Tables 5-1 through 5-4. 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 3-12 separates cases 7D and 7M, but in Table 5-5 they 
are clumped together.  They have the same failure rate in Table 3-12, 
but it is justifiable to clump them together since they are technically in 
different cases?  
[KNFCS] The only different is the pipe size so the one with the smaller 
pipe size has a different DEGB size that is the only difference.  This is 
taken care of in Tables 5-1 through 5-5.  This is explained in note [1] 
for Table 5-5 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 3-12 separates 8F from 8C&8D, but they are clumped 
together in Table 5-5.  8C&8D are affected by Vibrational fatigue, but 
8F is not.  Is this justifiable?  
[KNFCS] Yes because we do not make the failure rates conditional on 
VF as a damage mechanism because VF is not evaluated in the EPRI 
RI-ISI.  VF is only listed because some of the failures identified in the 
failure query involve VF.   
[UIUC] The failure rate for category 8C&8D is larger than the failure 
rate for the 8F category.  This is due to the contribution to VF that the 
8F category does not include.  Inclusion of the 8F weld into the 
8C&8D category would increase the contributions to the total 
frequency of VF, by applying its failure contribution to a weld that is 
not affected by it.  Is this done to increase the conservatism of the 
report? 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 5-1 calculation cases 3B, 3D for break size of 43.80 use 
the data from Table 5-5 break size of 44.5.  Should the break size in 
Table 5-1 be 44.5 or should there be another value calculated for 43.8? 
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[UIUC] It appears that the numbers used in Table 5-1 for the mean 
values for the break sizes of 43.8 for cases 3B and 3D simply use the 
values from the Table 5-5 break sizes of 44.5.  After recalculating 
these values for a break size of 43.8, the results give values of 3.21E-
10 (for 3B) and 1.94E-12 (for 3D), corresponding to 2.5% and 2.8% 
increases over the values published in Table 5-1.  Is the motivation for 
using the values calculated for break sizes of 44.5 that these 
differences are considered insignificant? 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 5-5 lists case 5F as its own case, but the values for case 
5F in Table 5-2 correspond with case J in Table 5-5.  Which is correct?   
[KNFCS] See above – this is a labeling problem which I fixed in the 
revised report 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 5-5 lists case 5G as its own case, but the values for case 
5G in Table 5-2 correspond with case 5-F in Table 5-5.  Which is 
correct?  
[KNFCS] See above – this is a labeling problem which I fixed in the 
revised report 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 5-5 lists case 5H with cases 5C, 5D, and 5E, but the 
values for case 5H in Table 5-2 correspond with case 5G in Table 5-5.  
Which is correct?  
[KNFCS] See above – this is a labeling problem which I fixed in the 
revised report 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 5-5 lists calculation case 5I with cases 5A and 5B, but 
the values in Table 5-2 would place 5I with cases 5C, 5D, 5E, and 5H.  
Which one is correct?  
[KNFCS] See above – this is a labeling problem which I fixed in the 
revised report 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] Table 5-5 lists calculation case 5J as its own case, but the 
values in Table 5-2 would place 5J with cases 5A, 5B, and 5I.  Which 
one is correct?  
[KNFCS] See above – this is a labeling problem which I fixed in the 
revised report 
This issue was resolved. 
[UIUC] The numbers for case 7N in Table 5-5 do not match the 
numbers for case 7N in Table 5-4, which numbers are correct?  
[KNFCS] Do not understand comment.  I just checked and the 
numbers in these two tables are identical 
[UIUC] It appears this is a labeling/copying issue with the report.  The 
numbers beginning with a break size of 5.66 do not match the values 
calculated in Table 5-5.  Since Table 5-4 skips some of the break sizes 
calculated in Table 5-5, extra values are copied to Table 5-4.  Ex. 
Table 5-4, BS of 5.66 is listed as 7.09E-10, but is listed as 6.19E-10 in 
Table 5-5.  Another example can be seen for BS of 16.97, where 5-4 
lists 7.56E-11 and 5-5 lists 3.11E-08.  This same labeling/copying 
issue appears to have occurred for case 7O as well. 
 
This issue was not resolved. 
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[UIUC] There were many values that I could not replicate using 
strictly the data available from the report.  Would you please offer 
any explanation or potential reasoning as to why my calculations do 
not replicate your own?  In the attached Excel file (“STP KF ch5 
LOCA Frequencies for STP GSI-191 Application (Step 3)”), under 
the table labeled “Table 5-5” the values that do not match the results 
from the report are highlighted so that they can be easily seen.   
[KNFCS] As we discussed a while back when we were looking at the 
hot leg weld calcs the STP  values were developed using randomized 
seeds for the monte carlo trials so even on the same computer one would 
get some random behavior.  Then even if you are fixing the seed you 
may get different results on different computers depending on all kinds 
of things such as 32bit vs.64 bit versions of excel (I use 32bit).  When 
you look at the standard error in the mean for the cases we ran you 
typically see errors in  the mean due to sampling of plus or minus 5 to 
10%.  Given the relatively low frequency of exceeding this error 
magnitude in your table I would say overall your numbers are in pretty 
good agreement.  Your thorough checking has greatly helped identify 
some errors in transcribing data from excel to word which I appreciate.  
Fortunately none identified here impact the numbers fed into 
CASAGRANDE but will help to clearnup the report. Your results for 
6A and 6B indicated something other that MC noise so could you please 
send me your excel sheets for these so I can see what the source of the 
difference is.   
[UIUC] Our discussion a while back concerning random sampling 
apparently does not apply for the quantification of Table 5-5 (and 
Tables 5-1 – 5-4), because the data from Table 5-5, as it is stated in 
section 5.2 of the report, is calculated using formulas for combining 
the product of two lognormal distributions.  The input data to these 
calculations was taken directly from the published values in Tables 3-
12 and 4-10.  Therefore, there is no effect from sampling, as there 
was no sampling performed in these calculations.  The recreation of 
the report values has been with a 64-bit version of Excel, so it is 
likely that this accounts for some of the small variations in the 
numbers of the report.  However, it is not likely that this would result 
in standard errors of 5-10%.  Also, there are calculation cases, such 
as a BS of 4.24 in the Pressurizer categories, which are significantly 
different from the reported values, despite all or most of the other 
break sizes in those categories being recreated with a high degree of 
accuracy.  All of the data recreation was performed using the values 
of Tables 3-12, 4-10, and the lognormal equations.  Therefore, all of 
the work done in Excel is contained in the file included with the 
questions.  
 
This issue was not resolved. 
[UIUC] For the first bullet point in Section 5.4, what is the statistical 
validation for claiming that the results are in good agreement? Table 
5-6 displays the mean values, but mean values can be very 
misleading. What are the associated range factors? 
[KNFCS] There is no statistical validation for the statement but we do 
not think one should be necessary.  This is just a statement from 
reviewing the numbers and should be self explanatory.   
This issue was resolved. 
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APPENDIX B: COMPLETE EVIDENCE TABLES FOR INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INCLUSION OF NON-PIPING COMPONENTS INTO THE ESTIMATIONS OF LOCA 
FREQUENCIES 
 
PRESSURIZER 
Component Highlight Author GSI-191 Evidence Expert Comments 
Thermal/heater 
sleeve 
Table 15.2 Summary 
of degradation 
processes for 
pressurizers [1] 
 
1989 – 20 leaking 
sleeves at Calvert 
Cliffs 2.  1994 – 
Calvert cliffs 1 2 
leaking sleeves.  
1997 – St. Lucie 1 – 
1 leaking sleeve. 
2000- ANO-2 12 
leaking sleeves [2]  
 
Calvert cliffs 2008, 
Palo Verde Unit 3 in 
2004 [3] 
 
“In May 1989, 
approximately 20 of 
120 heater sleeves 
were found to be 
leaking in the Calvert 
Cliffs Unit 2 
pressurizer.” [4] 
Idaho National Lab 
[1] (1989) 
 
VTT technical 
research center of 
Finland [2] (2006) 
 
US NRC [3] (2012) 
 
Babcock & Wilcox 
[9] (1992) 
 
Dominion 
Engineering [4] 
(1992) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corporation [5] 
(2001) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[6] (1990) 
 
Brookhaven National 
Lab [7]  (2008) 
 
“There is no reverse flow in the 
spray line that would allow a broken 
thermal sleeve to be carried into the 
RCS cold leg, but it is possible that a 
broken surge line thermal sleeve 
could be swept into the hot leg 
during an outsurge, depending on 
the design.”  
“It is not likely that these thermal 
sleeves could become loose parts in 
the RCS or pressurizer.”  
“An indication of a crack was 
discovered in a thermal sleeve of a 
Westinghouse pressurizer surge 
nozzle.” 
“Failure of heater sleeve welds has 
the potential of becoming a serious 
problem because it is possible that 
these sleeves could blow out and 
result in an unisolable small-break 
LOCA.” [1] 
 
“The staff therefore concludes that 
PWSCC is an applicable aging 
effect for the pressurizer surge and 
spray nozzle thermal sleeves. 
The sleeves are pretty 
small, but they could 
be a SBLOCA concern. 
 
Not included in GSI-
191 
 
The thermal/ heater 
sleeves are welded in 
some reactor designs, 
but not in other 
designs.  We do not 
believe that the 
thermal/ heater sleeves 
have been included in 
STP LOCA 
development. 
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Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review 
Results; “Loss of 
Material” [5] 
“Operating 
transients, thermal 
shocks, stratified 
flows, 
and flow-induced 
vibrations cause 
fatigue damage to 
surge and spray lines, 
nozzles, and thermal 
sleeves” [6] 
 
PWSCC cracking 
occurred: Millstone 
2, 2/19/2002 
Arkansas Nuclear 2, 
7/30/2000 
Palo Verde 2, 
10/4/2000 
Waterford 3, 
10/17/2000  
Braidwood Unit 1, 
spring 2006 
“ Since the late 
1980's, 
approximately 50 
Alloy 600 pressurizer 
heater sleeves at  
Combustion 
Engineering-
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [10] 
(2003) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[8](2008) 
 
However, neither of these sleeves 
are welded to the nozzles. Therefore, 
growth of a PWSCC-induced sleeve 
crack into the nozzles will not be of 
concern for the pressurizer surge or 
spray nozzles…is not an aging effect 
that needs to be managed during the 
extended periods of operation for the 
St. Lucie units.“[10] 
 
Table 7.10, “Additionally, in PWR 
plants, steam generator tubes and 
pressurizer heater sleeves are 
important contributors.”, “For 
LOCA Category 1, the large non-
piping contribution is provided by 
steam generator tubes, CRDM 
penetrations, and pressurizer heater 
sleeves (Section 6.3.1).” 
“It was almost universally expressed 
that the contribution to the overall 
LOCA frequencies is greater for the 
non-piping components than for 
piping for the smaller category 
LOCAs in PWR plants. Specifically, 
steam generator tube, CRDM, and 
pressurizer heater sleeve failures are 
expected to be the most important 
Category 1 and 2 total LOCA 
frequency contributors.”[11] 
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designed (CE-
designed) facilities in 
the United States 
have shown evidence 
of RCPB leakage 
which has been 
attributed to 
PWSCC.” [7] 
 
Table B.1.13, 
“Heater sleeves fail 
due to PWSCC, but 
as a result of their 
size, multiple failures 
are required in order 
to result in a 
LOCA.”, 
Table H.2 Summary 
of Non-Pipe 
Database by Plant 
Type and Piece Part 
[8]  
 
 
Manway 
bolts/studs 
“… the only 
degradation effects 
that are potentially 
significant to 
pressurizer 
subcomponents 
during an extended 
period of operation 
are: fatigue of …, the 
Westinghouse 
Electric Company 
LLC [14] (2000) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[1] (1989) 
 
“Pressurizer manway bolts can be 
and have been damaged by leaking 
primary coolant, which causes stress 
corrosion cracking. Leakage of 
borated coolant can also cause 
corrosion”[1] 
 
Like the steam 
generators, these 
manways could cause a 
lot of damage if they 
fail. 
 
Not included in GSI-
191 
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manway bolts 
…”[14] 
 
Structural steel bolt 
loosened from 
vibration at Three 
Mile Island 1 
2/1/2001 [7] 
“The upper head of 
the pressurizer has 
several potential 
leakage points. These 
include the four 
nozzle-to-safe end 
welds (Alloy 600 
welds) and several 
bolted connections 
consisting of the 
pressurizer manway 
and the two sets of 
bolted connections 
for each pressurizer 
safety valve. The 
insulation is removed 
from the manway 
cover every refueling 
outage for the 
inspection of the 
manway bolts. “ [15] 
 
Table B.1.13, 
“Manway failures 
would result by 
Duke Energy 
Corporation [5] 
(2001) 
 
Brookhaven National 
Lab [7] (2008) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Company 
[15] (2002) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[8](2008) 
 
 
Table 3.1-1 Aging Management 
Review Results “Loss of Material” 
[5] 
 
“Also, bolting failures are only 
expected to lead to a LOCA if 
multiple bolts fail due to common 
causes, such as improper installation 
and inspection, or the emergence of 
degradation mechanisms such as 
steam cutting or boric acid corrosion 
which affect multiple bolts.” 
“The major PWR non-piping 
contributors are 
nozzles and component bodies for 
LOCA Categories 3 and 4; the 
manways and component bodies for 
Category 5; and the component 
bodies for Category 6.”[11] 
Only a potential issue 
given multiple bolt 
failure 
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multiple bolt 
failures.”[8] 
 
 
Instrument 
nozzles 
Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review 
Results; “Loss of 
Material” [5] 
 
“The team prepared a 
summary of industry 
experience for each 
of the main types of 
applications where 
PWSCC has 
occurred. These are 
reactor vessel head 
CRDM/CEDM 
nozzles (to be 
reported elsewhere), 
small diameter 
instrument/ vent 
nozzles” 
Table 1-1 
Chronology of Key 
Events Relating to 
PWSCC of Alloy 600 
Type Materials in 
Non-Steam 
Generator Tubing 
PWR Plant 
Applications: 
Duke Energy 
Corporation  [5] 
(2001) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute  
[12](2003) 
 
Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science 
and Technology [13] 
(2010) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[8](2008) 
 
“Nozzle failures are a concern 
because system and transient 
stresses can be highest at these 
locations. 
Additionally, past degradation has 
been experienced in these 
locations.” 
“The major PWR non-piping 
contributors are 
nozzles and component bodies for 
LOCA Categories 3 and 4; the 
manways and component bodies for 
Category 5; and the component 
bodies for Category 6.”[11] 
 
 
We have replaced 
CRDM and reactor 
vessel head with Alloy 
690. We have also 
reduced the head 
temperature to reduce 
failure likelihoods. 
Also, there have been 
many CRDM leaks and 
J-Weld failures without 
any major problems. 
 
Instrument nozzles 
addressed in bottom-up 
approach. PWSCC 
susceptibility exists 
only for B&W and CE 
plants. Current fleet has 
implemented 
mitigation. 
 
 
Extremely low 
likelihood of debris 
formation 
Instrument nozzles 
addressed in bottom-up 
approach. PWSCC 
susceptibility exists 
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1986 – leak at San 
Onofre Unit 3 
1989 – leaks in two 
EDF plants (Nogent 
1 and Cattenom 2) 
and circumferential 
cracks in Belleville 1 
and Flamanville 2 
1993- crack at St. 
Lucie 2  
Stress relieved 
pressurizer 
instrument nozzle at 
ANO-1 in 1990 [12] 
Table H.2 Summary 
of Non-Pipe 
Database by Plant 
Type and Piece Part 
[8] 
only for B&W and CE 
plants. Current fleet has 
implemented 
mitigation. 
 
 
Extremely low 
likelihood of debris 
formation 
 
Walls/ vessel shell Table 15.2 Summary 
of degradation 
processes for 
pressurizers, 
“The key fatigue 
degradation sites are 
calculated to have 
high usage factors 
and include the 
pressurizer walls near 
the usual steamwater 
interface … 
susceptible to 
Idaho National Lab 
[1] (1989) 
 
Nuclear Management 
Company [16] (2007) 
 
Brookhaven National 
Lab [7] (2008) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corporation [5] 
(2001) 
 
“The Pressurizer shell and the 
outside of the support skirt is 
insulated with Mineral Wool 
aluminum jacketing and wire 
mesh.”[16] 
Similar to comment 
above, this is 
interesting for GSI-
191… 
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thermal aging 
(embrittlement) and 
erosion.”[1] 
 
PWSCC crack 
11/4/2003 Three 
Mile Island 1 [7] 
 
Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review 
Results, “Loss of 
Material” [5] 
 
Table B.1.13, 
“The shell failure 
envisioned would 
most likely occur by 
boric acid wastage 
from the outer 
diameter of the 
B-33shell.” [8] 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[8](2008) 
 
Valve bonnet 
bolts 
Table H.2 Summary 
of Non-Pipe 
Database by Plant 
Type and Piece Part 
[8] 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[8](2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(2008) 
 
 
“Also, bolting failures are only 
expected to lead to a LOCA if 
multiple bolts fail due to common 
causes, such as improper installation 
and inspection, or the emergence of 
degradation mechanisms such as 
steam cutting or boric acid corrosion 
which affect multiple bolts.”[11] 
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Bolted relief valve Table B.1.13 [8] U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[8](2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(2008) 
 
 
“Bolted relief valves could fail due 
to steam cutting or localized bolt 
corrosion resulting from boric acid 
leaks.”[8] 
 
“Also, bolting failures are only 
expected to lead to a LOCA if 
multiple bolts fail due to common 
causes, such as improper installation 
and inspection, or the emergence of 
degradation mechanisms such as 
steam cutting or boric acid corrosion 
which affect multiple bolts.”[11] 
 
 
Spray head Table 15.1 Key PWR 
components for 
residual life 
assessment [17] 
 
Table 15.2 Summary 
of degradation 
processes for 
pressurizers, 
“The key fatigue 
degradation sites are 
calculated to have 
high usage factors 
and include the 
pressurizer walls near 
the usual steamwater 
interface, the spray 
head, and the spray 
and surge line 
Idaho National Lab 
[17] (1987) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[1] (1989) 
 
 
Erosion, embrittlement, or fatigue.  
Direct contact with coolant. 
 
This is interesting 
because it is talking 
about the vessel walls. 
We should look into 
this and find out what 
the exposure may be. 
The pressurizer has a 
large volume of liquid 
in it and there would be 
a very large break 
potential (much bigger 
than a pipe) 
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nozzles. The cast 
stainless steel spray 
heads are also 
susceptible to 
thermal aging 
(embrittlement) and 
erosion.”[1] 
Support skirt and 
immediately 
surrounding 
insulation 
 “… the only 
degradation effects 
that are potentially 
significant to 
pressurizer 
subcomponents 
during an extended 
period of operation 
are: fatigue of …, 
and the support skirt 
…”[14] 
 
Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review 
Results “loss of 
material” [5] 
Westinghouse 
Electric Company 
LLC [14] (2000) 
 
Nuclear Management 
Company [16] (2007) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corporation [5] 
(2001) 
Coolant flows through support skirt, 
so failure could lead to debris 
entering coolant, or accumulating on 
containment floor. 
 
“The Pressurizer shell and the 
outside of the support skirt is 
insulated with Mineral Wool 
aluminum jacketing and wire 
mesh.”[16]  
Not sure about this. I 
didn’t think the support 
skirt had flow through 
it. 
 
Not included in GSI-
191 – not a pressure 
boundary component 
Seismic lugs Table 15.1 Key PWR 
components for 
residual life 
assessment [17] 
 
Table 3.3 shows 
seismic lug usage 
factor of 0.947 [1] 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[17] (1987) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[1] (1989) 
 
U.S. NRC [18] 
(2000) 
 
“The seismic lug welds are 
inaccessible due to seismic lug 
restraints and the configuration of 
the Pressurizer coffin.”[18] 
I am not sure if seismic 
lugs are included in the 
KF analysis, although I 
believe that it is not.  
 
Correct – not included 
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“… the only 
degradation effects 
that are potentially 
significant to 
pressurizer 
subcomponents … 
seismic support 
lugs…” [14] 
 
Westinghouse 
Electric Company 
LLC [14] (2000) 
Power-operated 
relief valve 
(PORV) 
“…a stuck-open 
PORV has the 
potential to 
overwhelm the PRT 
[pressure relief tank], 
causing burst disk 
rupture, debris 
generation, and pool 
formation in the 
containment.” [19] 
“The thermal-
hydraulic transient of 
a PWR during the 
pressurizer power-
operated relief valve 
(PORV) stuck-open 
accident is 
characterized by the 
lowest break flow 
rate due to the 
highest break 
locations as 
compared to the other 
small break LOCA 
Los Alamos National 
Laboratory [19] 
(2002) 
 
Institute of Nuclear 
Energy Research [20] 
(1998) 
 
Japan Atomic Energy 
Research Institute 
[24] (1990) 
 
Lockheed Martin 
Idaho Technologies 
Company [21] (1998) 
 
Brookhaven National 
Lab [7] (2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [22] 
(1995) 
 
“…a stuck-open PORV has the 
potential to overwhelm the PRT 
[pressure relief tank], causing burst 
disk rupture, debris generation, and 
pool formation in the containment.” 
[19] 
This isn’t a concern for 
GSI-191 (at least at 
STP) because the water 
goes to the PRT and it 
doesn’t have insulation 
around it. 
 
As a historical note, a 
key driver for the GSI-
191 issue was the July 
1991 SRV rupture disc 
failure at the Swedish 
Barseback unit – see 
the NRC KM report for 
details 
 
If the contributions 
from active failures 
were to be considered, 
a stuck-open PORV 
would need to be 
included.  Without 
active failure inclusion, 
we do not believe that 
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(Kukita et al., 
1990a).” [20]  
Table 3-1 Frequency 
estimates of 
functional impact 
categories: mean, 
percentiles, and 
trends, Pressurizer 
PORV stuck open  
1.0E-3 (mean 
frequency per critical 
year) [21] 
“Palisades in 1993 
where leakage was 
observed and 
attributed to a 
circumferentially-
oriented PWSCC 
flaw in a line leading 
to the unit’s power 
operated relief 
valves.” [7] 
“On September 11, 
1995, the Limerick 
Unit 1 plant was 
being operated at  
100 percent power 
when control room 
personnel observed 
alarms and other 
indications that one 
SRV ("M") was 
open.  Emergency 
Idaho National 
Laboratory  [23] 
(2007) 
the PORV can 
contribute in a 
significant way to the 
GSI-191 issue. 
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procedures were 
implemented.  
Attempts to close the 
valve were 
unsuccessful and 
within  
2 minutes a manual 
reactor scram was 
initiated.” [22] 
Power-Operated 
Relief Valve Fail to 
Close, 5 failures in 
5054 hours/demands 
[23] 
 
Spray line nozzle Table 15.1 Key PWR 
components for 
residual life 
assessment [17] 
Table 15.2 Summary 
of degradation 
processes for 
pressurizers, 
“The spray line head, 
nozzle, and thermal 
sleeve are susceptible 
to fatigue damage 
caused by the 
subcooled spray 
actuations associated 
with power 
changes.”[1] 
Idaho National Lab 
[17] (1987) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[1] (1989) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[6] (1990) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corporation [5] 
(2001) 
 
American Society of 
Mechanical 
Engineers [25] 
(2007) 
 
Welded nozzle [25]  
 
“Nozzle failures are a concern 
because system and transient 
stresses can be highest at these 
locations. 
Additionally, past degradation has 
been experienced in these 
locations.”[11] 
 
The spray line might 
have issues. The other 
stuff (except the 
nozzle) is pretty much 
in the pressurizer. 
 
Covered in STP 
analysis, so no 
additional  contribution 
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“Operating 
transients, thermal 
shocks, stratified 
flows, 
and flow-induced 
vibrations cause 
fatigue damage to 
surge and spray lines, 
nozzles, and thermal 
sleeves” [6] 
Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review 
Results; “Loss of 
Material” [5] 
 
Table B.1.13, 
Table H.2 Summary 
of Non-Pipe 
Database by Plant 
Type and Piece Part 
[8] 
 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[8](2008) 
 
Surge line nozzle Table 15.1 Key PWR 
components for 
residual life 
assessment [17] 
Table 15.2 Summary 
of degradation 
processes for 
pressurizers, 
“The key fatigue 
degradation sites are 
Idaho National Lab 
[17] (1987) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[1] (1989) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[6] (1990) 
 
Welded nozzle [25]  
 
“Nozzle failures are a concern 
because system and transient 
stresses can be highest at these 
locations. 
Additionally, past degradation has 
been experienced in these 
locations.”[11] 
 
Again, the spray line is 
an issue, but the spray 
head, thermal sleeve, 
etc, are inside. 
 
Covered in STP 
analysis, so no 
additional  contribution 
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calculated to have 
high usage factors 
and include the 
pressurizer walls near 
the usual steamwater 
interface, the spray 
head, and the spray 
and surge line 
nozzles. The cast 
stainless steel spray 
heads are also 
susceptible to 
thermal aging 
(embrittlernent) and 
erosion.”[1] 
 
“Operating 
transients, thermal 
shocks, stratified 
flows, 
and flow-induced 
vibrations cause 
fatigue damage to 
surge and spray lines, 
nozzles, and thermal 
sleeves”[6] 
  
Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review 
Results; “Loss of 
Material” [5] 
 
Table B.1.13, 
Duke Energy 
Corporation [5] 
(2001) 
 
American Society of 
Mechanical 
Engineers [25] 
(2007) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[8](2008) 
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Table H.2 Summary 
of Non-Pipe 
Database by Plant 
Type and Piece Part 
[8] 
 
Surge line Table 15.3 Summary 
of degradation 
processes for 
pressurizer surge and 
spray lines and 
nozzles, 
“The potential failure 
mode (for both the 
surge line and spray 
lines) is a through-
wall crack leading to 
leakage of the 
coolant.” 
“A break in a surge 
or spray line would 
be an unisolatable 
breach of the primary 
coolant pressure 
boundary and could 
create a severe 
thermal-hydraulic 
transient.” [1] 
“In the US, Trojan 
plant reported 
unexpectedly large 
piping displacements 
due to thermal 
Idaho National Lab 
[1] (1989) 
 
Korea Institute of 
Nuclear Safety [26] 
(2011) 
 
Budapest University 
of Technology and 
Economics [28] 
(2008) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[6] (1990) 
 
Korea Institute of 
Nuclear Safety [29] 
(2007) 
 
Burns and Roe Inc. 
[30] (1981) 
 
Pacific Northwest 
National Lab [27] 
(1997) 
 
“There have been no PWR 
pressurizer surge or spray line 
failures to date.” 
“ There have been no known failures 
or cracks in the 
pressurizer surge and spray line 
piping or nozzles in any 
PWR. However, stratified flows and 
thermal striping have caused 
through-wall thermal fatigue cracks 
in the welds and stainless steel base 
metal of the safety injection and 
residual heat removal piping. In 
safety injection piping, the cracks 
were between the safety injection 
nozzle and the first check valve. 13, 
18.19 In residual heat removal 
piping, the cracks were in the 
horizontal pipe section upstream of 
the first isolation valve.” 
[1] 
“The maximum equivalent stress 
and deflection for insurge case are 
almost the same as those for out-
surge case, and the fatigue usage 
factors due to thermal stratification 
are relatively very low.” [26] 
This is related to the 
spray line which can 
cause debris. 
 
Covered in STP 
analysis, so no 
additional  contribution 
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stratification, which 
resulted in crushed 
insulation”[26] 
“Operating 
transients, thermal 
shocks, stratified 
flows, 
and flow-induced 
vibrations cause 
fatigue damage to 
surge and spray lines, 
nozzles, and thermal 
sleeves”[6] 
 
Table 3.1 – CDF 
median of 6.38E-09 
[27] 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [8] 
(2008) 
“In the US, Trojan plant reported 
unexpectedly large piping 
displacements due to thermal 
stratification, which resulted in 
crushed insulation”[26] 
“The potential for large amounts of 
insulation debris reaching the sump 
from inside the shield wall exist. 
Two partial floors exist within the 
shield wall at El. 605'-4" and El. 
609'-1". Although these floors will 
capture much of the insulation, some 
could pass through the gap between 
the two floors to reach the sump. 
Any insulation below the floor at El. 
606'-0" and  
El. 605'-4" will reach the basement 
floor. In the region surrounding the 
sump, there exists several pipes 
above the sump. The largest of these 
pipes is a 10 inch residual heat 
removal pipe. A pipe break could 
dislodge the insulation from these 
pipes and the insulation could land 
on the sump. “ [30] 
 
Table D.B.4 PWR-2 – Pressurizer 
Surge Line, 
“Relative to PWRs of Westinghouse 
design, the pipe failure database 
includes no records on through-wall 
flaws in large-diameter pressurizer 
surge line welds.”[8] 
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STEAM GENERATOR 
Component Highlight Author GSI-191 Evidence Expert Comments 
Tubes “Worldwide, 19 of 34 
reactors in operation at the 
end of 1971 had experienced 
tube failures…” [1] 
 
Started in 1978 by 1993 12% 
of tubes failed to pitting and 
by ’90 7% of tubes failed by 
PWSCC [2] 
 
“SONGS unit 3 experienced 
a leak on Jan. 31, 2012 from 
tube wear at retainer bars, 74 
tubes had indications of 
potential failure” [3] 
 
“There have been 10 SGTRs 
(or significant leaks) in U.S. 
PWRs from 1975 to 2000.” 
[4] 
 
“2062 cracked tubes out of 
3388 tubes for French SG 
most affected by this 
degradation” [5] 
 
Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review Results 
– Reactor Coolant System 
“Loss of Material”   [6] 
 
Bettis Labs [1] 
(1975) 
 
Korean Atomic 
Energy Research 
Institute  [2] (2007) 
 
Tohoku University 
[28] (2008) 
 
U.S. NRC [3] 
(2014) 
 
U.S. NRC [4] 
(2011) 
 
EDF [5] (1992) 
 
Argonne National 
Lab [29] (2007) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corporation [6] 
(2001) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[7] (1998) 
 
Argonne National 
Lab[8] (1999) 
 
Pitting penetrates through 
wall leading to loss of 
primary coolant water [2] 
 
“Unless there is extensive 
circumferential cracking, SG 
tubes retain their integrity 
even if a few are locked to 
the TSPs by crevice deposits 
or corrosion products” [29] 
 
“In a corrosive environment, 
the erosion process may first 
remove a protective film 
from the tube, thus making 
the tube susceptible to more 
corrosion and then more 
erosion. In both cases, wall 
metal loss occurs, either 
directly or by accelerated 
corrosion of the tube 
surface.” "Although the 
damaged tubes on the tube 
bundle periphery were 
plugged as a result of eddy-
current inspection 
indications and/or small 
leaks, the debris, in 
conjunction with the 
hydraulic and pressure 
loadings, continued to 
Tube failures are primary-
to-secondary leaks and 
don’t result in GSI-191 
concerns. That is, the water 
that comes out goes in the 
secondary side of the steam 
generators. 
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Table 3-1. Frequency 
estimates of functional 
impact categories: mean, 
percentiles, and trends. - 
7.0E-3 mean frequency, 
“This study identified three 
steam generator tube rupture 
(SGTR) events. The SGTR 
frequency estimate based on 
the three SGTR events is 
7.0E-3 per critical year. 
Based on the current PWR 
population, this frequency 
correlates to about one event 
every two calendar years. 
The last SGTR identified in 
the 1987–1995 experience 
occurred at Palo Verde 2 in 
1993.”  
a 74-gpm steam generator 
tube leak from a tube plug at 
North Anna Unit 1 (LER 
338/89-005) led to very small 
LOCA/Leak  [7] 
 
“As indicated above, SCC on 
both the primary and 
secondary sides of steam 
generator tubes has become 
the principal degradation 
mode leading to tube 
plugging in the USA and 
worldwide. Stress corrosion 
Idaho National Lab 
[9](1996) 
 
Chalk River 
Nuclear 
Laboratories [10] 
(1975) 
 
Chalk River 
Nuclear 
Laboratories [11] 
(1986) 
 
Politecnico de 
Torino [30](2011) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[12] (1995) 
 
Siemens [13] 
(1993) 
 
University of 
Maryland College 
Park [14] (2011) 
 
International 
Atomic Energy 
Agency [15](1997) 
 
damage the plugged tubes 
and eventually caused the 
tubes to collapse and in 
some cases to become 
completely severed near the 
top of the tubesheet."[9] 
 
“From 1990 to 2002 there 
were 15 reports of steam 
generator tube leaks.  There 
is a total of 929 reactor 
calendar years represented in 
this period, so the mean leak 
frequency over this period is 
1.6x10-3 per calendar year.” 
“Therefore, the frequency of 
steam generator tube 
Category 1 ruptures (with 
resultant leak rates greater 
than 100 gpm [380 lpm]) 
was 4/1,133 calendar years, 
or 3.5x 103 per calendar 
year. NUREG/CR-5750 [4. 
1] conducted a similar 
assessment of SGTRs, and 
estimated a frequency of 7x 
10-3 per calendar year.” 
“It was almost universally 
expressed that the 
contribution to the overall 
LOCA frequencies is greater 
for the non-piping 
components than for piping 
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cracking can occur at 
numerous locations on both 
sides of steam generator 
tubes and can take on various 
forms and configurations.” 
“One hundred and five steam 
generators in 37 PWRs 
around the world had been 
replaced by the end of 1996 
because of serious tubing 
degradation, including 44 
steam generators at 15 plants 
in the USA.”[8] 
 
Table 18. U.S. PWR IPE 
results, 
“In a corrosive environment, 
the erosion process may first 
remove a protective film 
from the tube, thus making 
the tube susceptible to more 
corrosion and then more 
erosion. In both cases, wall 
metal loss occurs, either 
directly or by accelerated 
corrosion of the tube 
surface.” [9] 
 
Table 1 – Summary of 1974 
Steam Generator Tube 
Failures [10] 
 
International 
Atomic Energy 
Agency [16] (1997) 
 
Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory 
[17] (2007) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
[18](2004) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [19] 
(1987) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [20] 
(1989) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [21] 
(2005) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [22] 
(2010) 
 
for the smaller category 
LOCAs in PWR plants. 
Specifically, steam generator 
tube, CRDM, and 
pressurizer heater sleeve 
failures are expected to be 
the most important Category 
1 and 2 total LOCA 
frequency contributors.” 
“In addition, steam generator 
tubes, which were generally 
cited as a major small break 
LOCA contributor in PWRs, 
are susceptible to a variety 
of unique degradation 
mechanisms, including 
fretting and wear and 
denting from secondary side 
contamination.” 
“The PWR plants operate at 
higher temperatures and 
several non-piping 
components (e.g. 
pressurizer, 
steam generator) have 
experienced service 
degradation due to PWSCC 
or actual rupture (e.g. steam 
generator tubes).”[25] 
 
“Steam generator tube 
rupture (Table B.1.16) can 
occur from a variety of 
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Table 1A Experience During 
1983, 
Table 1B Experience During 
1984[11] 
 
Table 1. Units Reporting 
steam generator problems 
worldwide 
“The flow-induced vibration 
(FIV) may result in structural 
damage and may 
compromise the integrity of 
the tube, due to fretting and 
wear and due to tube 
fatigue.” 
 [12] 
 
Figure 2. Plant Status 
Summary of SIEMENS 
Steam Generators (SG) as 
per 31.12.1992 [13] 
 
“…there were ten SGTR 
occurrences in the United 
States between 1975 and 
2000. For example, on July 
15, 1987, an SGTR event 
occurred at the North Anna 
Unit 1 PWR, shortly after the 
unit reached 100% power. 
The cause of the tube rupture 
was determined to be high-
cycle fatigue.” [14] 
Brookhaven 
National Lab [23] 
(2002) 
 
Brookhaven 
National Lab [24] 
(2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [25] 
(2008) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[26] (1997) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [27] 
(2008) 
different mechanisms 
including thermal fatigue, 
mechanical fatigue, SCC, 
and general corrosion. The 
tubes can also be degraded 
by mechanical deformation 
(MECDEF), or denting, 
during installation, 
inspection, or cleaning. 
Steam generator tubes are 
too small to lead to a LOCA 
due to a single tube 
failure.”[27] 
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Table V. Units Reporting 
Steam Generator Problems, 
Table VI Summary of PWR 
Recirculating Steam 
Generator Tube Degradation 
Processes 
Table IX Summary of the 
leak rate, degradation 
mechanism, rupture size, 
rupture location, and stressor 
information associated with 
ten steam generator tube 
ruptures  [15] 
 
Summary of CERT data for 
steam generator tube 
materials, 
Contributions from 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Germany, India, Japan, 
USSR [16] 
 
“For PWR plants, the 
estimated frequency for 
steam generator tube rupture 
was about a factor of 10 
greater, at 7 × 10-3.” 
“The integrity of steam 
generator tubes has been a 
significant aging issue given 
the various degradation 
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mechanisms that have been 
active at PWR plants.”  [17] 
 
“Circumferential cracks can 
occur at locations of high 
axial stress (e.g., small-radius 
U-bends and the tubesheet 
expansion region).”[18] 
 
Table 2.1 Key PWR 
components for residual life 
assessment – degradation 
sites: inside tube surfaces at 
U-bends and tube sheet” [19] 
 
“The primary side of some 
PWR steam generator tubing 
is susceptible to primary 
water stress corrosion 
cracking (PWSCC); 
Combustion Engineering and 
Babcock & Wilcox units are 
much more tolerant than 
most Westinghouse units.” 
Table 8.2 Summary of 
degradation processes for 
steam generator tubes [20] 
 
Table 3.1-1 Summary of 
Aging Management 
Programs for Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reavtor 
Coolant System Evaluated in 
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Chapter IV of the GALL 
Report[21] 
 
Table IV D1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor 
Coolant System Steam 
Generator (Recirculating) 
[22] 
 
“At Shearon Harris, tube 
wear was detected on several 
tubes in row49 just above the 
B plate, on the cold leg side 
of one Model D4 SG.”[23] 
 
Table 3-2 Degradation 
Occurrence Records [24] 
 
“Because tube ruptures have 
occurred with enough 
regularity to be represented 
in the passive-system failure 
database, historical rupture 
frequencies can be estimated 
…” 
“The LER non-piping 
database was used to conduct 
this study as explained more 
fully in Section 3.5.2.2. 
From 1990 to 2002 there 
were 15 reports of steam 
generator tube leaks. There is 
a total of 929 reactor 
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calendar years represented in 
this period, so the mean leak 
frequency over this period is 
16x10-3 per calendar year.” 
“Steam generator tube failure 
is 
also an expected dominant 
contributor based on the 
historically high failure rates 
and the decreased 
degradation tolerance 
associated with these 
components since the design 
safety factors for these tubes 
are less than for small bore 
piping.”, 
Table 7.18 PWR Steam 
Generator Tube Rupture 
Frequencies, 
Table 6.1 Major Piping and 
Non-Piping Contributors to 
the Various Size LOCA 
Categories [25] 
 
Table 2-1, Table 2-2, Figure 
5-1 [26] 
 
“These 4 ruptures occurred at 
North Anna in 1987, 
McGuire in 1989, Palo Verde 
in 1993, and Indian Point in 
2000.”[25] 
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Table H.2 Summary of Non-
Pipe Database by Plant Type 
and Piece Part [27] 
Primary 
manway cover, 
bolts, studs 
“5 of 20 studs failed during 
the March 1982 from steam 
generator number 2 at the 
Maine Yankee Atomic 
Power Plant”[20] 
 
“The steam generator 
manway closure was selected 
because stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC) was 
observed in studs removed 
from these manways in two 
plants.”[31] 
 
Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review Results 
– Reactor Coolant System 
“Loss of Material”  [6] 
“The most likely reason to 
inspect a steam generator 
while at power would be in 
the event of a suspect 
manway leak or handhole 
inspection port leak.” [32] 
 
“Some examples include 
common cause bolting 
failures resulting from 
maintenance that could lead 
to vessel head, pump or valve 
Idaho National Lab 
[20]  (1989) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[31] (1988) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corporation [6] 
(2001) 
 
Prince’s textbook 
[32] (2012) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [25] 
(2008) 
 
Technical Research 
Center of Finland 
[33] (1985) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [34] 
(1990) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
“Also, bolting failures are 
only expected to lead to a 
LOCA if multiple bolts fail 
due to common causes, such 
as improper installation and 
inspection, or the emergence 
of degradation mechanisms 
such as steam cutting or 
boric acid corrosion which 
affect multiple bolts.” 
“The major PWR non-piping 
contributors are nozzles and 
component bodies for LOCA 
Categories 3 and 4; the 
manways and component 
bodies for Category 5; and 
the component bodies for 
Category 6.”[25] 
This manway problem 
could be a GSI-191 concern 
because if the manway 
cover fails, primary water 
would come out at high 
pressure, possibly causing a 
lot of insulation 
destruction. 
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bonnet, or steam generator 
manway failures.” [25] 
 
"The cracking has also 
occurred in steam generator 
manway studs, which were 
exposed to leaking borated 
water…" [33] 
 
Table 1-1 Summary of 
Degraded Threaded-Fastener 
Incidents Involving Reactor 
Coolant Pressure Boundary 
(RCPB) – 8 reported 
incidents (1977-1982) 
“The closures in which 
bolting degradation has been 
observed include primary 
side manway covers of steam 
generators” [31] 
 
“A common factor in six 
SCC events involving steam 
generator primary manway 
closure studs, which pose a 
potential for a LOCA, was 
the use of MoS2 
lubricant.”[34] 
 
“On March 10, 1982, the 
NRC was notified by Maine 
Yankee Atomic Power 
Company and Combustion 
Commission 
[35](1982) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [25] 
(2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [27] 
(2008) 
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Engineering (C-E) that 
during routine disassembly 
of a steam generator primary 
manway at Maine Yankee, 6 
of the 20 manway closure 
studs, failed and another 5 
were found, by ultrasonic 
examination using 
specialized techniques, to be 
cracked.”[35] 
 
“The second difference is 
that some of the non-piping 
failure modes considered 
were distinct from important 
piping failure modes and did 
not lend themselves to 
classical modeling 
approaches. Some examples 
include common cause 
bolting failures resulting 
from maintenance that could 
lead to vessel head, pump or 
valve bonnet, or steam 
generator manway failures. It 
is for these types of failure 
modes that elicitation is most 
valuable.”[25] 
 
“Steam generator failure can 
also occur at the manway 
(specifically bolt failure), the 
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steam generator shell, or the 
nozzles.”[27] 
 
Table H.2 Summary of Non-
Pipe Database by Plant Type 
and Piece Part [27] 
Steam 
generator 
nozzles 
Table 6.1 Major Piping and 
Non-Piping Contributors to 
the Various Size LOCA 
Categories, 
“The nozzle and component 
body references in Table 6.1 
refer to all nozzles (RPV, 
steam generator, and 
pressurizer nozzles) and/or 
all component bodies (RPV, 
steam generator, pressurizer, 
pumps, and valve 
bodies).”[25] 
 
“Steam generator failure can 
also occur at the manway 
(specifically bolt failure), the 
steam generator shell, or the 
nozzles.” 
Table H.2 Summary of Non-
Pipe Database by Plant Type 
and Piece Part [27] 
 
“Tensile stresses (caused by 
a combination of weld 
residual stresses  and service 
loads) along the inner  
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [25] 
(2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [27] 
(2008) 
 
Engineering 
Mechanics 
Corporation of 
Columbus [36] 
(2010) 
 
Sunchon National 
University [37] 
(2009) 
 
Kansai Electric 
Power Co. [38] 
(2009) 
“Nozzle failures are a 
concern because system and 
transient stresses can be 
highest at these locations. 
Additionally, past 
degradation has been 
experienced in these 
locations.” 
“The major PWR non-piping 
contributors are nozzles and 
component bodies for LOCA 
Categories 3 and 4; the 
manways and component 
bodies for Category 5; and 
the component bodies for 
Category 6.”[25] 
The nozzle connecting the 
hot leg to the steam 
generator is covered in 
KF’s report.  However, it is 
unclear if the nozzle 
connecting the cold leg to 
the steam generator is 
included as well.   
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surface of the nozzle weld 
can lead to a type of 
corrosion termed primary-
water stress corrosion 
cracking (PWSCC) in 
pressurized water reactors 
(PWR’s), especially in the 
Alloy 82/182 material.”[36] 
 
“Recently, it is reported that 
axial and circumferential 
PWSCCs occurred on the 
dissimilar welds of steam 
generator drain nozzle on 
PWR operating in South 
Korea.”[37] 
 
Table 1 [38] 
Tubesheet Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review Results 
– Reactor Coolant System 
“Loss of Material”  [6] 
 
Table 2 Location on 1974 
Tube Failures [10] 
 
Table 1A, 1B Experience 
During 1983, 1984 [11] 
 
Table VI Summary of PWR 
Recirculating Steam 
Generator Tube Degradation 
Processes [15] 
Duke Energy 
Corporation 
[6](2001) 
 
Chalk River 
Nuclear 
Laboratories 
[10](1975) 
 
Chalk River 
Nuclear 
Laboratories [11] 
(1986) 
 
"Although the damaged 
tubes on the tube bundle 
periphery were plugged as a 
result of eddy-current 
inspection indications and/or 
small leaks, the debris, in 
conjunction with the 
hydraulic and pressure 
loadings, continued to 
damage the plugged tubes 
and eventually caused the 
tubes to collapse and in 
some cases to become 
completely severed near the 
top of the tubesheet."[9] 
The tubesheet failure is 
similar to the tube ruptures 
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“Circumferential cracks can 
occur at locations of high 
axial stress (e.g., small-radius 
U-bends and the tubesheet 
expansion region).”[18] 
 
Table 2.1 Key PWR 
components for residual life 
assessment – degradation 
sites: inside tube surfaces at 
U-bends and tube sheet” [19] 
 
Table 3.1-1 Summary of 
Aging Management 
Programs for Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reavtor 
Coolant System Evaluated in 
Chapter IV of the GALL 
Report [21] 
 
“During the SG inspection in 
May 1997, IP2 reported the 
following 
active degradation 
mechanisms in the SGs: wear 
at the anti-vibration 
bars (AVBs); outside-
diameter stress corrosion 
cracking (ODSCC) and 
pitting in the sludge-pile 
region (i.e., the area above 
the top of the 
International 
Atomic Energy 
Agency [15] (1997) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [18] 
(2004) 
 
Idaho National Lab 
[9] (1996) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [19] 
(1987) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [21] 
(2005) 
 
Brookhaven 
National Lab [23] 
(2002) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [27] 
(2008) 
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tubesheet and below the first 
TSP); ODSCC and 
intergranular attack 
(IGA) in the crevice between 
the tubes and the tubesheet; 
and primary water stress 
corrosion cracking (PWSCC) 
at the tubesheet roll 
transitions and in a low row 
U-bend.”[23] 
 
Table B.1.16 Steam 
Generator/Steam System 
Failure Scenarios [27] 
 
Support bolts, 
embedded 
anchor studs 
Table 1-2 Summary of 
Degraded Threaded-Fastener 
Incidents Involving 
Components Supports – 6 
reported incidents 1974-
1980, 2 reported incidents 
1970, 1973, 
“The high-strength steam 
generator support bolting 
material, in combination with 
high preloads, is susceptible 
to stress corrosion cracking 
because of its relatively low 
stress corrosion cracking 
(kISCC) resistance.”   [31] 
 
“Significant problems with 
anchor bolts for supports at 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[31] (1988) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Company 
[39] (1985) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [40] 
(1991) 
 
U.S Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [25] 
(2008) 
“Also, bolting failures are 
only expected to lead to a 
LOCA if multiple bolts fail 
due to common causes, such 
as improper installation and 
inspection, or the emergence 
of degradation mechanisms 
such as steam cutting or 
boric acid corrosion which 
affect multiple bolts.”[25] 
 
Steam generator supports 
failures could result in 
greater load on the 
connected piping. So this is 
something to consider. 
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Ginna in 1970, Haddam 
Neck in 1973 and Surry in 
1974 prompted the inclusion 
of consideration of support 
bolts in Task Action Plan A-
12, "Fracture Toughness of 
Steam Generator and Reactor 
Coolant Supports."[39] 
 
“Thirteen incidents related to 
component support 
structures, such as the 
column support or embedded 
anchor bolts or studs of 
steam generators … were 
reported.” [40] 
 
Primary divider 
plate 
Table 3.1-1 Aging 
Management Review Results 
– Reactor Coolant System 
“Loss of Material”  [6] 
 
When the primary header 
divider design is the 
‘segmented’, or ‘lap joint’ 
designed (plate segments 
bolted to each other), leakage 
may occur [30] 
 
Table 3.1-1 Summary of 
Aging Management 
Programs for Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reavtor 
Duke Energy 
Corporation[6] 
(2001) 
 
Politecnico de 
Torino [30] (2011) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [21] 
(2005) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [22] 
(2010) 
“The degradation of primary 
header divider plates doesn’t 
lead to major safety impacts, 
but can lead to loss of 
thermal efficiency. 
Degradation permits hot 
reactor outlet header fluid to 
by-pass the tube bundle. An 
increase in reactor inlet 
header temperature has been 
observed.” [30] 
 
“The results of the 
conservative crack and 
fatigue life estimate analysis, 
using the geometry from the 
This is not a GSI-191 
concern because it is 
internal to the primary 
system. 
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Coolant System Evaluated in 
Chapter IV of the GALL 
Report [21] 
 
Table IV D1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor 
Coolant System Steam 
Generator (Recirculating) 
[22] 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[41] (2007) 
most limiting steam 
generator model with a 
nominal divider plate 
thickness of 2.00 inches, 
show that the currently 
observed cracks in the 
foreign steam generators are 
not capable of causing the 
divider plate to fail in the 
worst case domestic steam 
generator during accident or 
normal operating 
conditions.” 
“96% (1.92 inches) of the 
divider plate thickness must 
be cracked in order for the 
weld to plastically fail under 
NOP. 93% (1.85 inches) 
must be cracked in order for 
the weld to plastically fail 
during an SLB. “[41] 
Steam 
generator shell 
“Steam generator failure can 
also occur at the manway 
(specifically bolt failure), the 
steam generator shell, or the 
nozzles.”[27] 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [27] 
(2008) 
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REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 
Component Highlight Author GSI-191 Evidence Expert Comments 
Turning Vane Bolts/ 
Cap Screws 
“Sheehan said one of the main 
concerns was having the bolt 
heads damage or stop the 
impeller at the bottom of the 
pump which spins and draws the 
water into the pump in then 
sends it into the reactor vessel. 
Also, Sheehan said, there could 
be the possibility of the 
impeller, moving at such a high 
rate of speed, striking and 
disintegrating a bolt head and 
sending tiny pieces of metal 
circulating throughout the 
cooling system and possibly 
causing damage.” [1] 
 
“On September 2, 1993, the 
licensee for Millstone Unit 3 
was inspecting the reactor lower 
core support plate before 
reloading fuel.  The licensee 
discovered pieces of a locking 
cup for the Westinghouse model 
93A-1 reactor coolant pump 
turning vane cap screws.  The 
cap screws connect the flanged 
interfaces of the turning vane 
and thermal barrier.”[2] 
 
South Jersey Times 
[1] (2014) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [2] 
(1994) 
 
Westinghouse 
Electric Company 
[3] (2014) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[4] (1988) 
 
Nuclear Street News 
Team [5] (2014) 
“Inspections during a 
refueling outage at unit 2 
of PSEG's Salem nuclear 
plant revealed bolt 
fragments at the bottom 
of the reactor pressure 
vessel.  Quoting 
spokesmen from the 
plant and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 
the South Jersey Times 
reported that as many as 
17 bolt heads have been 
found beneath fuel 
assemblies and at the 
bottom of a reactor 
coolant pump. The bolts 
came from RCP turning 
vanes and may have 
been affected by stress 
corrosion cracking.” [5] 
 
“The licensee 
subsequently removed 
four turning vane cap 
screws for inspection.  
A visual and liquid 
penetrant inspection at 
the juncture of the head 
and body of the cap 
screws revealed cracks 
Not an issue for the 
GSI-191, because 
the bolt fragments 
are too heavy.  If the 
flow through the 
reactor pressure 
vessel isn’t strong 
enough to push the 
fragments out, then 
in the case of a 
LOCA, the flow on 
the containment 
floor will not push 
the fragments to help 
clog the sump 
strainer. 
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“Other model 93A RCPs and 
model 93A-1 RCPs have larger 
turning vane bolts of 1.5 inch 
diameter, and the bolted 
assembly uses 23 or 24 bolts. 
Westinghouse evaluated the 
RCPs with these bolts and 
determined that a failure could 
not result in a substantial safety 
hazard, even if left uncorrected. 
The basis for this is the 
inspection data which shows a 
very low incidence of bolt 
failure, likely due to the reduced 
bolt stress associated with the 
fastener size and load 
distribution.”[3] (Therefore, 
only some plants have this 
issue) 
 
Surry 2 1981, incident with 
service water pump internals – 
impeller capscrew [4] 
in two cap screws.  One 
cap screw had no cracks.  
The head of the fourth 
cap screw was almost 
completely severed.  The 
cap screws are made of 
alloy A286 stainless 
steel, designated by the 
American Society for 
Testing and Materials as 
A453 grade 660.  The 
cap screw or cap screw 
head may deform, 
loosen, fracture, or fail 
the locking cup 
restraints. Cap screw 
failures could present a 
safety hazard because 
failed parts could enter 
the reactor coolant 
system and cause 
damage to vital 
components.”[2] 
 
“Westinghouse 
determined in its 
evaluation that the only 
scenario that could 
potentially result in a 
substantial safety hazard 
would be if more than 
one RCP rotor 
simultaneously "looked" 
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as a result of 
simultaneous failures of 
turning vane bolts, and 
the turning vanes 
contacting the impellers. 
However, the possibility 
of multiple simultaneous 
locked rotors occurring 
is extremely unlikely. 
Since Westinghouse 
could not establish with 
certainty that a multiple 
looked rotor event could 
not occur, Westinghouse 
concluded that this 
deviation could 
potentially result in a 
substantial safety hazard 
if left uncorrected.”[3] 
Pump Shaft Fig. 7 Inspections of pump 
shafts [6] 
 
Table 2-4 KSB PWR Main 
Coolant Pumps [7] 
 
Table 3 Summary of 
degradation processes for LWR 
coolant pumps [8] 
 
"Within the last few years, 
several plants have found cracks 
in the reactor coolant pump 
Siemens AG-UB 
KWU [6] (1989) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[7] (1992) 
 
Idaho National 
Engineering 
Laboratory [8] 
(1990) 
 
REM Technologies 
[9] (1990) 
"Failure of pump 
internals, for example, 
shafts and bearings, will 
not compromise the 
integrity of the pressure 
boundary, but the broken 
pieces may be carried 
over to the reactor vessel 
and damage the vessel 
internals, fuel rods, and 
other core components." 
[10] 
Failure can lead to 
seal package 
damage, which can 
cause a lot of water 
to come out. 
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shaft near the thermal barrier." 
[9] 
 
"A coolant pump shaft at Crystal 
River 3 completely failed in 
1986. The cause of failure was 
determined to be a 
circumferential crack attributed 
to fatigue." [10] 
 
Idaho National 
Engineering 
Laboratory [10] 
(1989) 
Pump Closure  
 
(Studs, Bolts, Main 
Flange, and Nuts) 
"Visual inspection of closure 
studs at other PWR plants has 
revealed that the studs in all 
pump designs are susceptible to 
boric acid corrosion." 
"Leakage of borated water 
across LWR primary coolant 
pump case-to-cover gaskets can 
cause corrosion of the pump 
closure studs and corrosion of 
carbon steel pump body base 
metal." [10] 
 
"Boric acid corrosion in one 
PWR plant reduced seven 
reactor coolant pump studs from 
a nominal diameter of 90 mm 
(3.5 in.) to between 25 and 37 
mm (1.0 and 1.5 in.)."  [8] 
 
Table 1 Summary of Degraded 
Threaded Fasteners in Reactor 
Coolant Pressure Boundary [11] 
 
Idaho National 
Engineering 
Laboratory  [10] 
(1989) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(1982) 
 
Idaho National 
Engineering 
Laboratory [8] 
(1990) 
 
International Atomic 
Energy Agency [12] 
(2003) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[4] (1988) 
 
"After complete removal 
of the nonmetallic 
insulation, further visual 
observations revealed 
three studs located side-
by-side on one pump and 
three studs similarly 
located on the other 
pump had significant 
corrosion wastage in the 
shank area next to the 
lower thread section in 
the pump casing flange." 
[13] 
(If the coolant leakage 
corrodes the bolting, 
debris generation can 
flow with the coolant to 
the containment floor 
causing a GSI-191 issue) 
 
“The RC pump main 
flange showed the 
greatest capacity for 
Potential for large 
LOCA here.  
Probably most 
important issue for 
reactor coolant pump 
(because seal 
package failure has 
been experienced). 
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"PWR pump closure studs are 
susceptible to corrosion wastage 
caused by primary coolant 
leakage across the pump body-
to-cover gaskets." [12] 
 
Table 1-1 Summary of 
Degraded Threaded-Fastener 
Incidents Involving Reactor 
Coolant Pressure Boundary 
(RCPB) 
Waterford 1981 incident with 
Reactor Coolant Pump Support 
Bolts (Table 1-2) 
Table 1-6 Incidents of Borated-
Water Corrosion of Threaded 
Fasteners 
“The reactor coolant pump main 
closure was selected because 
corrosion wastage was observed 
in pump studs in several plants.” 
“The closures in which bolting 
degradation has been observed 
include primary side manway 
covers of steam generators and 
pressurizers, coolant pump main 
flanges, and some primary valve 
flanges.”[4] 
 
"On May 17, 1980, the NRC 
staff was informed by Omaha 
Public Power District (OPPD) 
that severe corrosion damage 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [13] 
(1980) 
 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [14] 
(1988) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc.[15] 
(2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[16] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [17] 
(2005) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [18] 
(2003) 
 
Carolina Power & 
Light Co.[19] (2006) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc. 
[20] (2003) 
producing large leak 
rates owing to the large 
diameter of the sealing 
surface and smaller 
number of studs per arc 
length.”[4] 
 
"Leakage of reactor 
coolant across the pump 
casing-to-cover gasket 
may wet the insulation, 
allowing chlorides in the 
insulation to contaminate 
the coolant." [8] 
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was found on a number of 
closure studs in two of the four 
Byron Jackson reactor coolant 
pumps at Fort Calhoun Unit 1 
(PWR)." [13] 
 
"At Fort Calhoun, the diameter 
of a reactor coolant pump 
closure bolt was reduced from 
3.5 inches to 1.1 inches by boric 
acid corrosion." 
"In June 1981, the Institute for 
Nuclear Power Operations 
issued a report discussing the 
effect of low level leakage from 
the gasket of a reactor coolant 
pump and concluded that 
significant corrosion of the 
pump studs could occur during 
all modes of operation." [14] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Coolant - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[15] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Coolant - 
Aging Management Evaluation  
[16] 
 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [21] 
(2000) 
 
Brookhaven 
National Laboratory 
[22] (2008) 
 
Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory 
[23] (1995) 
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Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System - Primary Coolant 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation 
[17] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Class 1 Piping, 
Valves, and Reactor Coolant 
Pumps [18] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation - 
Reactor Coolant Pump and 
Motor [19] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
Systems, Reactor Coolant 
System and Connected Lines – 
Summary of Aging 
Management Review [20] 
 
"Mechanical closure bolting 
associated with the reactor 
coolant pump components is 
made of low alloy steel bolting 
material and is subject to 
aggressive chemical attack." 
[21] 
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“Boric acid wastage of reactor 
coolant pump closure flange 
studs” [22] 
 
Table 4.5 Aging degradation 
concerns and mechanisms for 
reactor coolant pumps [23] 
 Pump Body/Casing Table 3 Summary of 
degradation processes for LWR 
coolant pumps [8] 
 
"The most likely failure mode 
for a pump casting would be 
through wall leakage of primary 
coolant water." [10] 
Table 3.1-1 Aging Management 
Review Results – Reactor 
Coolant System [24] 
 
Table 2.1. Key PWR 
components for residual life 
assessment [25] 
 
Table 3.4-1 Applicable Aging 
Effects for Reactor Coolant 
System Components & Class 1 
Component Supports [26] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Aging Effects 
Requiring Aging Management 
for Reactor Coolant System 
Components [27] 
 
Idaho National 
Engineering 
Laboratory [8] 
(1990) 
 
Idaho National 
Engineering 
Laboratory [10] 
(1989) 
 
Duke Energy 
Carolinas, LLC [24] 
(2001) 
 
Idaho National 
Engineering 
Laboratory [25] 
(1987) 
 
Duke Energy Corp. 
[26] (1998) 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [27] (2000) 
 
"About about 150 liters 
[40 gallons] of oil was 
collected by the oil 
collection system, and 
150 liters [40 gallons] 
leaked onto the 
insulation and the 
containment floor." [31] 
(If oil can reach the 
containment floor, then 
whatever failed to 
release the oil can 
generate debris that can 
ultimately reach the 
containment floor and 
become a GSI-191 
concern.) 
 
“While there is some 
documented evidence of 
degradation of such 
components, (e.g., 
[D.10]) the frequency of 
a through-wall defect in 
valve bodies and pump 
casings is viewed as 
If casing failed it 
would be a problem.   
 
Oil leakage isn’t an 
issue, because the 
amount of oil would 
be much less than 
the amount of 
coolant water, so it 
would be in a small 
concentration.  Also, 
the oil floats.  The 
oil does have the 
potential to cause a 
fire.  If fire occurs, it 
is unlikely that it 
would increase the 
chance for a LOCA, 
because the plant 
would be shutdown 
first. 
 
In regards to 
reference [31], if oil 
is reactive with the 
insulation, then that 
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Table 3.1.2-3 Class 1 Piping, 
Valves, and Reactor Coolant 
Pumps [28] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Class 1 Piping, 
Valves, and Reactor Coolant 
Pumps [18] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
Systems, Reactor Coolant 
System and Connected Lines – 
Summary of Aging 
Management Review [20] 
 
"The Reactor Coolant Pump 
casings and the SG Channel 
Heads are insulated with a 
stainless steel reflective 
insulation." [29] 
 
Table B.1.17 Pump Failure 
Scenarios [30] 
Table 4.5 Aging degradation 
concerns and mechanisms for 
reactor coolant pumps [23] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [28] (2003) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [18] 
(2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc. 
[20] (2003) 
 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear 
Power Plant, LLC 
[29] (2002) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [31] 
(1994) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [30] 
(2008) 
 
Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory 
[23] (1995) 
being considerably lower 
than for welds in Class 1 
systems.” 
“Non-nuclear experience 
therefore provides 
additional justification 
for very low failure 
frequencies for 
components such as 
pump bodies, tube 
sheets, manways, etc. 
that imply large 
extrapolations from the 
limited years of nuclear 
plant operation.”[30] 
could be evidence of 
how insulation could 
break off of the 
RCP.  Is there any 
evidence that oil can 
break off the 
insulation?   
Also, does oil pose 
any problems for the 
GSI-191 issue?  
Perhaps it will 
chemically react and 
form some 
precipitates that can 
help clog the sump 
strainer? 
Flange  
 
(Bolts, Studs, 
Fasteners) 
Table 3.1-1 Aging Management 
Review Results – Reactor 
Coolant System [24] 
 
Duke Energy 
Carolinas, LLC [24] 
(2001) 
 
"During the visual 
inspection, saturated and 
dripping insulation was 
observed at one of the 
Byron Jackson reactor 
Main flange is a 
pressure boundary, 
so could be an issue.  
However, this is 
already included in 
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Table 3-11 Reactor Coolant 
Pumps Flange and Seal Bolts at 
Risk [4] 
 
“Corrosion of flanges for 
primary coolant pump 
component cooling water 
connections due to external 
boric acid leakage” 
 “Boric acid wastage of primary 
coolant pump studs” [22]  
 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Class 1 Piping, 
Valves, and Reactor Coolant 
Pumps [18] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
Systems, Reactor Coolant 
System and Connected Lines – 
Summary of Aging 
Management Review [20] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Aging Effects 
Requiring Aging Management 
for Reactor Coolant System 
Components [27] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Class 1 Piping, 
Valves, and Reactor Coolant 
Pumps [28] 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[4] (1988) 
 
Brookhaven 
National Laboratory 
[22] (2008) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [33] 
(1980) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [17] 
(2005) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [18] 
(2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc. 
[20] (2003) 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [27] (2000) 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [28] (2003) 
 
Duke Energy Corp. 
[26] (1998) 
coolant pump flange 
regions." [33] 
 
"A review of plant 
specific operating 
experience related to the 
Boric Acid Corrosion 
Program and aging 
revealed that the 
following issues had  
been addressed: 
Corrosion of flanges for 
primary coolant pump 
component cooling water 
connections due to 
external boric acid 
leakage" [17] 
 
the pump closure 
category. 
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Table 3.4-1 Applicable Aging 
Effects for Reactor Coolant 
System Components & Class 1 
Component Supports [26] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System - Aging Management 
Programs Evaluated in NUREG-
1801 that are Relied on for 
License Renewal 
Table 3.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Component Types 
Subject to Aging Management 
not Evaluated in NUREG-1801  
[29] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System - Class 1 
Piping/Components System - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [32] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System [21] 
 
"An example of the first type is 
the corrosion of fasteners in the 
reactor coolant pressure 
boundary, for example, in 
reactor coolant pumps." [14] 
 
"However, except for the reactor 
coolant pump stud wastage, 
 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear 
Power Plant, LLC 
[29] (2002) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[32] (2004) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [21] 
(2000) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [14] 
(1988) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(1982) 
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most failures have occurred in 
fastener sizes 2 inches and 
smaller."[11] 
Flywheel 
 
"The aging effect of concern is 
fatigue crack initiation in the 
flywheel bore key way from 
stresses due to starting the 
motor." [24] 
 
"The aging effect of concern for 
the reactor coolant pump 
flywheel is fatigue crack 
initiation in the flywheel bore 
keyway." [34] 
 
“The only unique mode 
considers an incipient failure of 
a pump flywheel which could 
initiate collateral damage in 
other components or in other 
piping systems.”  
Table B.1.17 Pump Failure 
Scenarios [30] 
Duke Energy 
Carolinas, LLC [24] 
(2001) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [17] 
(2005) 
 
STP Nuclear 
Operating Co. [34] 
(2010) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [30] 
(2008) 
"A reactor coolant pump 
flywheel could 
theoretically burst 
because of centrifugal 
stresses, which could 
produce missiles inside 
containment and could 
also damage pump seals 
or other pressure 
boundary components." 
[17] 
 
“There was no 
appropriate passive 
pump failure data that 
was identified by the 
group.”[30] 
This could be a 
problem.  If one 
were to occur, it may 
bend the pump over, 
or possibly open a 
big hole in the seal 
package. 
 
There have not been 
many (or any?) 
flywheel issues.  
However, if one 
were to occur, the 
damage to the 
nearby components 
would be a major 
GSI-191 issue, 
potentially causing a 
LOCA as well as 
generating debris. 
Framing and Support 
(Leg-Support Anchor 
Bolts, Embedded 
Anchor Studs, Driver 
Mounts) 
"Failures of ASTM A 490 high-
strength RCP leg-support anchor 
bolts due to stress corrosion 
cracking; other factors 
contributing to the failures were 
improper heat-treatment and 
excessive preload during 
original installation;" [29] 
 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear 
Power Plant, LLC 
[29] (2002) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[4] (1988) 
 
Omaha Public Power 
District [35] (2002) 
“Field experience has 
shown that steam 
generator supports and 
their anchor bolting, and 
the anchor bolting of 
reactor coolant pumps 
and of reactor pressure 
vessels support skirts 
have suffered from 
Support failure can 
increase the 
probability of failure 
due to excessive 
bending loads and 
shear as well, if 
support was being 
relaxed.  Also, 
snubbers may have 
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Table 4-1 Summary of 
Structural Support Bolting 
Failures [4] 
 
Table 3.1-3 Components in 
Reactor Vessel, Internals, and 
Reactor Coolant System not 
Evaluated in NUREG-1801 that 
rely on Ageing Management 
Programs in NUREG-1801 for 
FCS License Renewal [35] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Class 1 Piping, 
Valves, and Reactor Coolant 
Pumps [28] 
 
Table 3.5.2-1 Containment 
Buildings Structural 
Components and Commodities 
Summary of Aging 
Management Review [36] 
 
Table 3.5.2-24 Structures and 
Component Supports - NSSS 
Equipment Supports - Aging 
Management Evaluation [15] 
 
Table 3.5.2-35 Structures and 
Component Supports - NSSS 
Equipment Supports - Aging 
Management Evaluation [16] 
 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [28] (2003) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [36] 
(2007) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc.[15] 
(2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[16] (2004) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [18] 
(2003) 
 
Carolina Power & 
Light Co. [19] 
(2006) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [37] 
(2001) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [38] 
(2001) 
 
degradation by SCC.” 
[4] 
 
an effect for seismic 
events.  
 
Degradation and loss 
of material from the 
framing and support 
would lead to debris 
falling down onto 
the containment 
floor, thus causing a 
GSI-191 issue. 
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Table 3.5.2-1 Containment 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [18] 
Table 3.5.2-1 Containments, 
Structures, and Component 
Support - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation - 
Containment Building [19] 
 
Table 3.5.9-1 NSSS Equipment 
Supports [37] 
 
Table 3.5.9-1 NSSS Equipment 
Supports [38] 
Thermal Barrier  
 
(Heat Exchanger, 
Assembly, and 
Housing) 
Table 3.1.2-3 Class 1 Piping, 
Valves, and Reactor Coolant 
Pumps [18] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
Systems, Reactor Coolant 
System and Connected Lines – 
Summary of Aging 
Management Review [20] 
 
"The integral thermal barrier 
heat exchangers are exposed to 
an internal environment of 
treated water and treated water 
primary, and an external 
environment of containment air 
and potential borated water 
leaks (see Tables 3.0-1 and 3.0-
2)." [21] 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [18] 
(2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc. 
[20] (2003) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [21] 
(2000) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [39] 
(1997) 
 
"The safety concerns 
were identified and 
evaluated with regard to 
the potential 
consequences of (1) the 
formation of loose parts, 
generated by the thermal 
barrier housing, which 
could damage the pump 
seals…” [39] 
Consists of pretty 
small pipes, so small 
concern. 
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Table 3.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Component Types 
Subject to Aging Management 
not Evaluated in NUREG-1801 
[29] 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear 
Power Plant, LLC 
[29] (2002) 
Seals "The reactor coolant pump seal 
LOCA frequency of 2.5E-3 per 
critical year was calculated in 
this study, based on 2 
catastrophic seal failures with 
leak rates greater than 300 gpm 
in the total U.S. operating 
experience (1969–1997)." [40] 
 
Table 3-11 Reactor Coolant 
Pumps Flange and Seal Bolts at 
Risk [4] 
 
Table A.3-1 Examples of 
Generic Safety Issues that 
Should/Should Not Be 
Specifically Addressed for 
License Renewal and Basis for 
Disposition [41] 
 
"The staff determined that RCP 
seal leakage could exceed 25 
gpm and lead to core uncovery 
during an SBO in any of the 
PWRs and in any of the four 
BWRs (Millstone Unit 1, Oyster 
Idaho National 
Laboratory [40] 
(1998) 
 
Electric Power 
Research Institute 
[4] (1988) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [41] 
(2010) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [42] 
(1991) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [43] 
(1990) 
 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
"The staff has 
determined that the 
accident sequences 
involving pump seal 
failures are potentially 
risk-significant for only 
a handful of plants. 
Therefore, this matter no 
longer qualifies as a 
GSI." [47] 
 
"The normal operational 
seal failure rate has since 
been significantly 
reduced through 
improvements in design 
and operation of RCP 
seals." [48] 
 
"This issue relates to 
reactor coolant pump 
seal failures, which 
challenge the makeup 
capacity of the 
emergency core cooling 
system in PWRs." [41] 
 
Based on experience, 
no GSI-191 
concerns.  Primary 
coolant can squirt up 
and hit pump motor.  
This may lead to a 
small LOCA, but no 
debris. 
 
Also, considered by 
NUREG-1829 as an 
active failure, and 
thus not included in 
that analysis. 
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Creek, Nine Mile Point Unit 1" 
[42] 
 
"The inability of the reactor 
coolant pump seals to survive 
loss of cooling and injection 
without developing significant 
leakage dominates the core 
damage frequency." [43] 
 
"On May 24, 1992, the licensee 
commenced a reactor shutdown 
from 100 percent power because 
of excessive leakage from the 
1A2 Reactor Coolant Pump seal. 
The maximum leakage was 
approximately 23 liters per 
minute [6 gpm]." [44] 
“At Indian Point Unit 2 Nuclear 
Station (IP2) there have been a 
number of primary reactor 
coolant pump (RCP) shaft seal 
failures which have led to loss 
of reactor primary coolant.”[45] 
 
Table 4.5 Aging degradation 
concerns and mechanisms for 
reactor coolant pumps [23] 
 
Table 1 Calculations Used to 
Estimate Frequency that Sump 
will be Required [46] 
Commission [47] 
(1999) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [48] 
(2000) 
 
Los Alamos 
National Laboratory 
[46] (2000) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [44] 
(1993) 
 
Brookhaven 
National Laboratory 
[45] (1987) 
 
Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory 
[23] (1995) 
 
STP Nuclear 
Operating Co. [34] 
(2010) 
"Borated water solution 
traveled to the shanks of 
all the seal housing bolts, 
which were constructed 
of low alloy steel. All of 
the bolts experienced 
some degradation, with 
15 of the 16 failing VT-1 
inspection for continued 
service." [34] 
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Suction Deflector 
Bolting/ Diffuser 
Bolting 
"Of the three bolts inspected to 
date, two had cracks of 40 
percent and 100 percent of the 
circumference and the third bolt 
head sheared during removal" 
[49] 
(This shows evidence of 
degradation which leads to 
debris generation) 
Calvert Cliffs 
Nuclear Power Plant 
Inc. [50] (1998) 
 
Northeast Utilities 
[49] (1993) 
"The 1988 and 1996 
failures of the RCP 
suction deflector 
bolting... A portion of 
the failed bolt was not 
recovered at the pump in 
each case... bolt 
fragments were 
recovered during the 
1989 refueling outage." 
[50] 
Not a problem for 
GSI-191. 
 
 
Motor Exterior 
 
Table 3.4-1 Applicable Aging 
Effects for Reactor Coolant 
System Components & Class 1 
Component Supports -  
Lateral support assemblies loss 
of material from boric acid 
wastage [26] 
 
"There were a number of small 
oil leaks on each pump motor 
although there was more leakage 
from the `A' pump motor. The 
inspector observed that various 
equipment around the `A' 
reactor coolant pump was coated 
with a film of oil and he 
estimated that several gallons of 
oil had collected in various areas 
outside the oil collection 
system." [31] 
 
Duke Energy Corp. 
[26] (1998) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [31] 
(1994) 
 
Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. [51] 
(2009) 
 
 Not much of a 
concern for GSI-191. 
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"Reactor coolant pump (RCP) 
motor feeder cables experienced 
cracking and one failed a 
polarization index test." [51] 
Oil Collection System 
Tank ** 
Table 3.3.2-31: Auxiliary 
Systems - Unit 2 Fire Protection 
- Aging Management Evaluation 
[15] 
 
Table 3.3.2-36: Auxiliary 
Systems - Unit 2 Fire Protection 
- Aging Management Evaluation 
[16] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation - 
Reactor Coolant Pump and 
Motor [19] 
 
Table 3.3.2-19 : Auxiliary 
Systems, Liquid Waste and 
Drains – Summary of Aging 
Management [20] 
 
Table 3.4-14 Fire Protection 
[21] 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc.[15] 
(2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[16] (2004) 
 
Carolina Power & 
Light Co. [19] 
(2006) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc. 
[20] (2003) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [21] 
(2000) 
 
 Not much of a 
concern for GSI-191. 
 
A lot of external rust 
can form, and the 
tank can overfill and 
spill oil on the 
containment floor. 
Motor Stator Coolers 
 
Table 3.1.2-3: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Coolant - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[16] (2004) 
 
 Not much of a 
concern for GSI-191. 
 
No interface with the 
reactor coolant, this 
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– Loss of material due to 
borated water leakage [16] 
 
Table 3.1.1-1 Reactor Coolant 
System – borated water leakage 
causing loss of material [37] 
 
Table 3.1.1-1 Reactor Coolant 
System – borated water leakage 
loss of material  [38] 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [37] 
(2001) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [38] 
(2001) 
 
still could be an 
external debris 
source if not 
properly coated. 
Heat Exchanger 
components 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Coolant System [51] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation - 
Reactor Coolant Pump and 
Motor [19] 
 
Table 3.3.2-8 : Auxiliary 
Systems, Chemical and Volume 
Control System – Summary of 
Aging Management Review 
[20] 
 
Table 3.3.1-1 Primary Process 
Systems — Chemical and 
Volume Control [37] 
 
Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. [51] 
(2009) 
 
Carolina Power & 
Light Co. [19] 
(2006) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc. 
[20] (2003) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [37] 
(2001) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [38] 
(2001) 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [27] (2000) 
Tables show loss of 
material from borated 
water exposure 
Not much of a 
concern for GSI-191. 
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Table 3.3.1-1 Primary Process 
Systems — Chemical And 
Volume Control [38] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Aging Effects 
Requiring Aging Management 
for Reactor Coolant System 
Components [27] 
Motor Lower/Upper 
Lube Oil Coolers** 
Table 3.1.2-3: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Coolant - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[16] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Coolant - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[15] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System [21] 
 
Table 3.1.1-1 Reactor Coolant 
System [37] 
 
Table 3.1.1-1 Reactor Coolant 
System [38] 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[16] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc.[15] 
(2004) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [21] 
(2000) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [37] 
(2001) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [38] 
(2001) 
 
Loss of material from 
borated water leakage or 
containment air 
Not much of a 
concern for GSI-191. 
 
No interface with the 
reactor coolant, this 
still could be an 
external debris 
source if not 
properly coated 
Valves** Table 3.3.2-19 : Auxiliary 
Systems, Liquid Waste and 
Drains – Summary of Aging 
Management [20] 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc. 
[20] (2003) 
 
Loss of material from 
borated water leakage 
Valves are generally 
packed to not leak 
and capped.  Boric 
acid could be a 
problem. 
 297 
 
Table 3.3.9-2 Fire Protection 
and Supporting Systems — 
Reactor Coolant [37] 
 
Table 3.4-14 Fire Protection 
[21] 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [37] 
(2001) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co.[21] (2000) 
 
Non-regenerative and 
regenerative heat 
exchanger 
   Had a problem in 
Japan where it was 
blown apart due to 
cyclic fatigue due to 
thermal cycling of 
coolant water. 
 
Could cause a leak 
outside of 
containment.  
Unsure if it is 
isolatable or not. 
* Plant specific whether welded or non-welded 
** Component in Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection Sub-System 
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REACTOR VESSEL 
Component Highlight Author GSI-191 Evidence Expert Comments 
Reactor Vessel 
(Bolting, Studs, Nuts 
and Washers) 
"The Inservice Inspection 
Program manages cracking of 
the… reactor vessel bolting, and 
supplements the Boric Acid 
Corrosion Prevention Program 
with regard to detecting loss of 
material at external surfaces of 
the reactor vessel and control 
element drive mechanism 
(CEDM) pressure boundary." 
[1] 
 
Table 3.4-1 Applicable Aging 
Effects for Reactor Coolant 
System Components & Class 1 
Component Supports [2] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [1] (2003) 
Duke Energy Corp. 
[2] (1998) 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
 Excessive flange 
failures could result in 
debris generation 
Instrument Tubes "On the other hand, a break at 
the reactor vessel bottom by 
such as instrument-tube break 
allows no gas discharge until 
the whole vessel becomes 
empty of coolant."  
[4] 
 
 
Thermohydraulic 
Safety Engineering 
Laboratory [4] 
(2012) 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
 Instrument tube 
penetrations could result 
in bebris generation 
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"At Turkey Point Unit 4, 
leakage of reactor coolant from 
the lower instrument tube seal 
on one of the incore instrument 
tubes resulted in corrosion of 
various components on the 
reactor vessel head including 
three reactor vessel bolts. The 
maximum depth of corrosion 
was 0.25 inches." [5] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
Commission  [5] 
(1988)  
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
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Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
Instrumentation Tube 
Penetrations (Bottom 
Head) 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Bottom mounted 
instrumentation weld 
failures could result in 
debris generation 
Instrumentation Tube 
Penetrations (Top Head) 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Top mounted (RV head) 
instrumentation weld 
failures could result in 
debris generation 
Control Rod Drive 
Mechanism Nozzles 
"Circumferential cracking in 
CRDM nozzles were identified 
at Oconee 2 and 3, and axial 
cracking in the J-groove weld in 
CRDM nozzles were identified 
at Oconee 1 and ANO 1 (i.e., 
B&W plants)." [10] 
 
"In 2002, the discovery of 
thinning of the vessel head wall 
at the Davis Besse nuclear 
power plant reactor indicated 
the possibility of an SBLOCA 
in the upper head of the reactor 
vessel as a result of 
FirstEnergy [10] 
(2002) 
 
Universidad 
Politécnica de 
Madrid [11] (2011) 
 
Brookhaven 
National Laboratory 
[12] (2002) 
"Two CRDMs had 
minor boron film 
running down from 
the above 
insulation. The 
insulation around 
the two CRDM 
nozzles and along 
nearby insulation 
seams had a heavier 
film of boron." [14] 
CRDM nozzle weld 
failures could result in 
debris generation. The 
motor connections are 
not likely to result in 
significant jets due to 
the nature of the 
connection (threaded) 
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circumferential cracking of a 
control rod drive mechanism 
penetration nozzle…" [11] 
 
"Primary water stress corrosion 
cracking (PWSCC) in the axial 
direction of control rod drive 
mechanism (CRDM) nozzles 
has previously been observed." 
[12] 
 
"In the updated histogram, 
Surry Unit 1 and North Anna 
Unit 1 remained in the most 
susceptible category, while 
Surry Unit 2 and North Anna 
Unit 2 remained in the 
intermediate category." [13] 
 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [14] 
(2008) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
Control rod drive 
penetration nozzles 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System[8] 
 
Control Rod Drive 
Nozzle 
 
Table 3.1-1 Summary of Aging 
Management Program for 
Reactor Vessel, Internals, and 
Reactor Coolant System 
Evaluated in NUREG-1801 that 
are Relied on for FCS License 
Renewal [15] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System - Aging Management 
Programs Evaluated in 
NUREG-1801 that are Relied 
on for License Renewal [16] 
 
Omaha Public Power 
District [15] (2002) 
 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear 
Power Plant, LLC 
[16] (2002) 
 
 Same as CRD 
penetration nozzle 
(Above) 
CRDM nozzle weld 
failures could result in 
debris generation (as 
opposed to motor 
connections) 
Control Rod Drive 
Housing 
 
Table 3.1-1 Summary of Aging 
Management Program for 
Reactor Vessel, Internals, and 
Reactor Coolant System 
Evaluated in NUREG-1801 that 
are Relied on for FCS License 
Renewal [15] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Coolant System [3] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System - Aging Management 
Programs Evaluated in 
Omaha Public Power 
District [15] (2002) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear 
Power Plant, LLC 
[16] (2002) 
 
 CRDM housing 
failures, especially the 
drive shaft housing 
could result in debris 
generation 
308 
 
NUREG-1801 that are Relied 
on for License Renewal [16] 
 
CRDM Housings Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 CRDM housing 
failures, especially the 
drive shaft housing 
could result in debris 
generation 
Control Rod Drive 
Service Structure 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 CRDM housing 
failures, especially the 
drive shaft housing 
could result in debris 
generation (not clear on 
what the service 
structure is) 
CRDM Support Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals 
[17] 
 
STP Nuclear 
Operating Co. [17] 
(2010) 
 
 CRDM housing 
failures, especially the 
drive shaft housing 
could result in debris 
generation 
CRDM Housing Tubes Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 CRDM housing 
failures, especially the 
drive shaft housing 
could result in debris 
generation 
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CRDM Housing Tubes 
(Head Adapters) 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 CRDM housing 
failures, especially the 
drive shaft housing 
could result in debris 
generation 
Reactor Vessel Head O-
rings 
"The procedure identifies the 
following areas as principal 
locations for possible leaks: ... 
Reactor Vessel Head O-rings" 
[10] 
 
FirstEnergy [10] 
(2002) 
 
 
 Failures at the RV head 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
Reactor Vessel Head 
Bolts 
"At Turkey Point Unit 4, 
leakage of reactor coolant from 
the lower instrument tube seal 
on one of the incore instrument 
tubes resulted in corrosion of 
various components on the 
reactor vessel head including 
three reactor vessel bolts. The 
maximum depth of corrosion 
was 0.25 inches." [5] 
 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [5] 
(1988) 
 
 
 Failures at the RV head 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
Valve Packing Follower 
Plate (Bolts) 
"At San Onofre Unit 2, boric 
acid solution corroded nearly 
through the bolts holding the 
valve packing follow plate in 
the shutdown cooling system 
isolation valve. During an 
attempt to operate the valve, the 
bolts failed and the valve 
packing follow plate became 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [5] 
(1988) 
 
 
 Not sure what this valve 
is but it doesn't seem 
like it would be 
pressurized at power 
(plus, it looks like the 
experiment has been 
completed and it didn't 
block recirculation!). 
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dislodged causing leakage of 
approximately 18,000 gallons 
of reactor coolant into the 
containment." [5] 
 
 
Reactor Vessel Head  “Corrosion by boric acid 
crystals was observed in Turkey 
Point Unit 4 where more than 
500 pounds of boric acid 
crystals were found on the 
reactor vessel head." [5] 
 
"Recent industry events 
regarding reactor vessel head 
degradation required 
assessments at each site to 
ensure boric acid corrosion 
prevention programs are 
adequate and functioning 
effectively." [1] 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [5] 
(1988) 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [1] (2003) 
 
 Failures of the RV head 
could result in debris 
generation 
Thimble Tubes "… identified flow-induced 
vibration as a cause for wear 
(i.e., thinning) of the thimble 
tubes…" [12]  
 
 
"Flux thimble tubes are subject 
to loss of material at certain 
locations in the reactor vessel 
where flow-induced fretting 
causes wear at discontinuities in 
the path from the reactor vessel 
Brookhaven 
National Laboratory 
[12] (2002) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [18] 
(2007) 
 
 Failure of thimble tube 
penetrations could result 
in debris generation 
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instrument nozzle to the fuel 
assembly instrument guide 
tube." [18] 
 
 
 
Core Support Lugs “…are not adequate for 
managing cracking of the core 
support lugs." [12] 
 
 
Brookhaven 
National Laboratory 
[12] (2002) 
 
 Core support lugs 
would not cause debris 
generation (although 
they may result in a 
failure during seismic 
event). 
Beltline Region * 
(Shell, Nozzles, and 
Welds) 
"Another issue that is 
considered important for the 
reactor vessel is the loss of 
fracture toughness in the 
beltline region material due to 
both high neutron flux and high 
temperature conditions." [12] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Coolant System [3] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Brookhaven 
National Laboratory 
[12] (2002) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 RV Failures could result 
in debris generation 
 
Welded 
 
Center portion of the 
vessel directly adjacent 
to the fuel  
 
Highest embrittlement 
from neutrons 
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Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
"Based upon the materials and 
projected fluence levels, the 
only items expected to be 
susceptible to neutron 
embrittlement are the reactor 
vessel shell components in the 
beltline region immediately 
surrounding the core." [8] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System - Aging Management 
Programs Evaluated in 
NUREG-1801 that are Relied 
on for License Renewal [16] 
 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear 
Power Plant, LLC 
[16] (2002) 
 
Reactor Vessel Annulus  FNC Technology 
Co. Ltd [19] (2011) 
 
 
Table 4 Volume 
Capture Type and 
Capture Fraction 
[19] 
 
The RV annulus is 
internal to the vessel 
and would not result in 
debris generation. 
 
Cold water down comer 
around the fuel 
RV Cooling Shroud 
 
Table 3.2-1 Potential and 
Plausible ARDMS for the FHE 
and HLHC System [20] 
Calvert Cliffs 
Nuclear Power Plant 
Inc. [20] (1998) 
 The RV cooling shroud 
is not pressurized and 
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 would not result in 
debris generation 
Flow Skirt Table 3.1-2 FCS Reactor 
Vessel, Internals, and Reactor 
Coolant System Component 
Types Subject to Aging 
Management not Evaluated in 
NUREG-1801 [15] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Omaha Public Power 
District [15] (2002) 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 The flow skirt is not 
pressurized and would 
not result in debris 
generation 
Thermal Shield 
(Positioning Pin & Bolt) 
Table 3.1-3 Components in 
Reactor Vessel, Internals, and 
Reactor Coolant System not 
Evaluated in NUREG-1801 that 
rely on Aging Management 
Programs in NUREG-1801 for 
FCS License Renewal [15] 
 
 
Omaha Public Power 
District [15] (2002) 
 
 
 
 RV internals would 
result in debris 
generation 
Reactor Vessel 
Cladding 
Table 3.1-3 Components in 
Reactor Vessel, Internals, and 
Reactor Coolant System not 
Evaluated in NUREG-1801 that 
Omaha Public Power 
District [15] (2002) 
 
 RV cladding would no 
result in debris 
generation (although 
failure could result in 
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rely on Aging Management 
Programs in NUREG-1801 for 
FCS License Renewal [15] 
 
 
 early failure due to 
boric acid corrosion) 
Reactor Vessel Closure 
(Studs, Stud Assembly, 
Nuts, Bolts, and 
Washers) 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.4-1 Applicable Aging 
Effects for Reactor Coolant 
System Components & Class 1 
Component Supports [2] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Duke Energy Corp. 
[2] (1998) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 Failures at the RV head 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
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Reactor Head Closure 
Studs 
"Minor nicks, scratches, 
gouges, and thread damage 
have occurred due to 
maintenance activities during 
refueling outages." [22] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [22] 
(2008) 
 
 Failures at the RV head 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
Reactor Vessel Nozzles 
Safe Ends (and Welds) 
Table 3.1-1 Summary of Aging 
Management Program for 
Reactor Vessel, Internals, and 
Reactor Coolant System 
Evaluated in NUREG-1801 that 
are Relied on for FCS License 
Renewal [15] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Omaha Public Power 
District [15] (2002) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 Failures of nozzles 
could result in debris 
generation 
316 
 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
Table 3.2-1 Reactor Coolant 
System - Aging Management 
Programs Evaluated in 
NUREG-1801 that are Relied 
on for License Renewal [16] 
 
 
R.E. Ginna Nuclear 
Power Plant, LLC 
[16] (2002) 
 
Primary Nozzle Safe 
Ends 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 Failures of the RV 
nozzles  could result in 
debris generation 
RV Vent Nozzle 
 
Table 3.1-3 Components in 
Reactor Vessel, Internals, and 
Reactor Coolant System not 
Evaluated in NUREG-1801 that 
rely on Aging Management 
Programs in NUREG-1801 for 
FCS License Renewal [15] 
 
 
Omaha Public Power 
District [15] (2002) 
 
 Failures at RV nozzles 
could result in debris 
generation 
Reactor Vessel Support 
Framing 
Table 3.5.2-1 : Containment 
Buildings Structural 
Components and Commodities 
Summary of Aging 
Management Review [24] 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [24] 
(2007) 
 
 The external brackets 
are not pressurized and 
would not result in 
debris generation 
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Table 3.5.2-1: Containment and 
Containment Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
External Support 
Brackets 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 The external support 
brackets are not 
pressurized and would 
not result in debris 
generation 
Reactor Vessel Column 
Support 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
 The RV column 
supports are not 
pressurized and would 
not result in debris 
generation 
Reactor Vessel Support 
Skirt 
Table 3.4-1 Applicable Aging 
Effects for Reactor Coolant 
System Components & Class 1 
Component Supports [2] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
Duke Energy Corp. 
[2] (1998) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 The RV column 
supports are not 
pressurized and would 
not result in debris 
generation 
Support Flange Table 3.4-1 Applicable Aging 
Effects for Reactor Coolant 
System Components & Class 1 
Component Supports [2] 
Duke Energy Corp. 
[2] (1998) 
 
 The RV support flange 
is not pressurized and 
318 
 
 would not result in 
debris generation 
Closure head lifting 
lugs 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
 Failures of the RV 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
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Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
Core stabilizing lugs Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Core components are 
internal to the vessel 
and would not cause 
debris generation 
Core Stop Lugs Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Core components are 
internal to the vessel 
and would not cause 
debris generation 
Grayloc clamp studs 
and nuts 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Grayloc clamps are to 
seal failed CRDM 
motor seal weld failures 
and are not expected to 
create debris 
Reactor Vessel Support 
Pads 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
 RV support pads are not 
expected to create 
debris 
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Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Core Support Pads Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation  [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 Core components are 
internal to the vessel 
and would not cause 
debris generation 
Nozzle Support Pads Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 Support pads are not 
expected to create 
debris 
Shear Keys Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Shear keys would not 
create debi. 
321 
 
Shear Lugs Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Shear lugs would not 
create debris. 
Bottom head (torus, 
dome, and cladding) 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
 Failure of the bottom 
head would cause debris 
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Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
Upper shell (and 
cladding)  (and Flange) 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 RV internals would not 
create debris. 
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Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
Reactor Vessel Upper 
Shell Flange 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
 Failures of the RV 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
Reactor Vessel Closure 
Head (Including Studs, 
Nuts, & Washers) 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
“…manages cracking due to 
primary water stress corrosion 
cracking (PWSCC) and loss of 
material due to boric acid 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [26] 
(2009) 
 Failures of the RV 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
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wastage in nickel-alloy pressure 
vessel head penetration nozzles 
and includes the reactor vessel 
closure head…” [26] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
"The Upper Head Nickel Alloy 
AMP provides for the 
management of cracking due to 
PWSCC in nickel-alloy vessel 
head penetration nozzles and 
includes the reactor vessel 
closure head, upper vessel head 
penetration nozzles and 
associated welds." [14] 
 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [14] 
(2008) 
 
Closure Head Bolts Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Failures of the RV 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
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Closure head dome 
(torus, dome, and 
cladding) 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 Failures of the RV 
headsw could result in 
debris generation 
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Closure Head Stud 
Assembly 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 Failures of the RV 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
Closure head flange 
(and Cladding) 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 Failures of the RV 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
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Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
Intermediate shell (and 
cladding) 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Failures of the RV 
could result in debris 
generation 
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System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
Lower shell (and 
cladding) 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 Failures of the RV 
heads could result in 
debris generation 
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Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
Shell Bottom Head Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Failures of the RV head 
could result in debris 
generation 
Primary inlet/outlet 
nozzles (and Cladding) 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 Failures of RV nozzless 
could result in debris 
generation 
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System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
Reactor Vessel Primary 
Coolant Nozzles 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
 Failures of RV nozzless 
could result in debris 
generation 
Vessel Flange Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
 Failures of the RV 
flange could result in 
debris generation 
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Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation  [9] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
Threaded fasteners, 
reactor vessel support 
connections 
Table 3.5.2-1: Containment and 
Containment Internals [21] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
 Failures of the RV 
flange could result in 
debris generation. Other 
external supports and so 
forth would cause 
debris generation 
Core Support Ledge 
(and cladding) 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[23] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Aging Management Evaluation 
[25] 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[23] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[25] (2004) 
 
 This is internal to the 
vessel and would not 
cause debris 
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Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
Reactor Vessel Seal 
Ledge Ring 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [3] 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. [3] 
(2005) 
 
 Not familiar but is 
probably referring to the 
flange seal which could 
cause debris generation 
RPV Refueling Seal 
Ledge 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 Would not generate 
dbris 
RVLIS Penetration Pipe 
Nozzle 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Failures could result in 
debris generation 
 
Reactor Vessel Level 
Instrument System 
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Safety Injection Nozzles Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 Pressurized RCS-
connected systems may 
result in debris 
generation 
RCCA guide tube 
assemblies 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 The RCCA guide tube 
is internal to the vessel 
and would not cause 
debris generation 
 
Rod Control Cluster 
Assembly 
RCCA Guide Tube 
Bolts 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 The RCCA guide tube 
is internal to the vessel 
and would not cause 
debris generation 
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Upper internals 
assembly 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System  
[8] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 The upper internals are 
internal to the vessel 
and would not cause 
debris generation 
 
Lower internal 
assembly 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 The lower internals are 
internal to the vessel 
and would not cause 
debris generation 
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and Reactor Coolant System  
[8] 
 
CEA shroud assemblies Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 The CEA shroud would 
not cause debris 
generation 
Core shroud assembly Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 Internal to vessel, would 
not cause debris 
generation 
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Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
 
Core support shield 
assembly 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Internal, would not 
cause debris 
Core barrel assembly Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Internal, would not 
cause debris 
Core Support Barrel 
Assembly 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Internal, would not 
cause debris 
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Core Support Barrel 
Snubber Assembly 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Internal, would not 
cause debris 
Lower Support 
Structure Assembly 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Internal, would not 
cause debris 
Lower grid assembly Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Internal, would not 
cause debris 
Flow distributor 
assembly 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Internal, would not 
cause debris 
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Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
Reactor vessel upper 
head (penetration?)  
nozzles 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 Failures of RV head 
nozzles would cause 
debris generation 
Head vent pipe (top 
head) 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [6] 
 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations in 
Chapter IV of NUREG-1801 
for Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [7] 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Failures of RV head 
nozzles would cause 
debris generation 
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Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
Head Vent Penetration Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 Failures of RV head 
nozzles would cause 
debris generation 
Vent Penetration Pipe 
Nozzle 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 
 Failures of RV head 
nozzles would cause 
debris generation 
Surveillance capsule 
holders (and Tubes) 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
"The integrated reactor vessel 
material surveillance program 
was designed when the 
surveillance capsule holder 
tubes in a number of B&W 
reactors were damaged and 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [14] 
(2008) 
 
 Internal to vessel and 
would not cause debris 
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could not be repaired without a 
complex and expensive repair 
program and considerable 
radiation exposure to 
personnel." [14] 
 
CEDM motor housing Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Motor housing is 
unlikely to cause debris 
absent a catastrophic 
failure 
RV CEDM Housing 
(Lower and Upper) 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 Housings may cause 
debris 
CEDM upper pressure 
housing 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Housings may cause 
debris 
Pressure housings Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 Housings may cause 
debris 
CEDM ball seal 
housing 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Housings may cause 
debris 
CEDM upper pressure 
housing upper fitting 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Housings may cause 
debris 
CEDM motor housing 
upper and lower end 
fittings 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Housings may cause 
debris 
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CEDM upper pressure 
housing lower fitting 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Housings may cause 
debris 
CEDM nozzle Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Nozzle failures could 
cause debris generation 
ICI nozzle tubes Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Nozzle failures could 
cause debris generation 
ICI Nozzle Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Nozzle failures could 
cause debris generation 
CEDM steel ball Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Failures could cause 
debris generation 
ICI flange adapter/ seal 
plate 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 The seal table should be 
outside the containment 
building 
Reactor Vessel Vent 
Pipe 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
 Nozzle failures could 
cause debris generation 
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Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
Reactor Vessel Vent 
Pipe Flange 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Nozzle failures could 
cause debris generation 
Grayloc clamp 
 
Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Not likely to result in 
debris generation 
ICI drive nuts Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Not likely to result in 
debris generation 
ICI spacer sleeves Table 3.1.2-1: Reactor Vessel 
and CEDM Pressure Boundary 
[21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Not likely to result in 
debris generation 
CEA instrument tube Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Internal components 
would not cause debris 
generation 
CEA shroud adapter Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Internal components 
would not cause debris 
generation 
 
CEA shroud support  Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
Ventilation Shroud 
Support Ring 
Table 3.1.2-4 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Northern States 
Power Co. [7] (2008) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
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System - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [7] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessels 
[13] 
 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
 
Virginia Electric & 
Power Co. [13] 
(2001) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 
Positioning plate Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
 
CEA shroud extension 
shaft guides, cylinders, 
and bases 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
 
CEA shroud base Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
 
CEA shroud flow 
channel 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
 
CEA shroud flow 
channel cap 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
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CEA shroud shaft 
retention pin 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
 
CEA shroud retention 
block 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
 
External spanner nut Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 Would not cause debris 
generation 
 
Internal spanner nut Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CEA shroud fasteners Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CEA shroud flow 
channel extension 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CEA shroud tube Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Core Shroud Plates Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Plates Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
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Ribs Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Intermediate Plates Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Core Shroud Guide 
Lugs 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CSB Alignment Keys Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CSB assembly dowel 
pin 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CSB lifting bolt insert Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CSB lower flange Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CSB lug Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CSB nozzle Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CSB cylinder Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
CSB upper flange Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
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ICI Guide tubes Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 May cause debris 
generation 
Bottom Mounted 
Instrument Guide Tubes 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 May cause debris 
generation 
Bottom Mounted 
Instrumentation Column 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
 May cause debris 
generation 
ICI thimble support 
plate assembly 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
ICI Support Structures Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
  
ICI support plate, grid, 
lifting support, lifting 
plate, column, plates, 
funnel 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
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ICI Pad, ring, nipple, 
hex bolt, spacer 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
ICI Threaded rod, hex 
jam nut, thimble support 
nut, cap screws 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
UGS CEA Shroud 
Assembly 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
  
UGS Holddown Ring Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
  
UGS Support Barrel 
Assembly 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals [6] 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
  
Lower Internals 
Assembly Bottom plate 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Lower Internals 
Assembly Bottom plate 
manhole cover 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Lower Internals 
Assembly Cylinder 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
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Lower Internals 
Assembly Core support 
column 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Lower Internals 
Assembly Core support 
plate 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Lower Internals 
Assembly Insert pins 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Lower Internals 
Assembly Support beam 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Lower Internals 
Assembly Support beam 
flange 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly FAP plate 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly FAP guide 
lug inserts 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly Holddown 
ring 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly Upper guide 
structure (UGS) support 
plate 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly UGS cylinder 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly UGS grid 
plate 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
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Upper Internals 
Assembly UGS flange 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly UGS sleeve 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly UGS lifting 
bolt insert 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly UGS 
alignment keys 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Upper Internals 
Assembly UGS dowel 
pins 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Internals [21] 
Entergy Operations, 
Inc. [21] (2003) 
  
Flow Venturi Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Valve Body Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Control rod guide tube 
assembly 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
CRGT pipe and flange Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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CRGT rod guide sectors Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
CRGT rod guide tubes Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
CRGT spacer casting Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
CRGT spacer screws Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Flange-to-upper grid 
screws 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Baffle/former assembly Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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Baffle and Former 
Plates 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Core Barrel Assembly Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Baffle/former bolts and 
screws 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Core barrel cylinder 
(top and bottom flange) 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Core barrel-to-thermal 
shield bolts 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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Lower Internals 
assembly-to-core barrel 
bolts 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Core support shield 
assembly 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Core support shield 
cylinder (top and 
bottom flange) 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Core support shield-to-
core barrel bolts 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Outlet and vent valve 
nozzles 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Vent valve assembly 
locking device 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Vent valve body Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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Vent valve retaining 
ring 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Clamping ring Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Flow distributor 
assembly 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Flow distributor head 
and flange 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Incore guide support 
plate 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Shell forging-to-flow 
distributor bolts 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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Lower grid assembly Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Fuel assembly support 
pads 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Guide blocks Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Guide blocks bolts Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Incore guide tube spider 
castings 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Lower grid and shell 
forgings 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Lower grid flow 
distributor plate 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
  
355 
 
 
Lower grid rib section Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Lower grid rib-to-shell 
forging screws 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Lower internals 
assembly-to-thermal 
shield bolts 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Orifice plugs Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Shock pads Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Shock Pads Bolts Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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Support post pipes Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Plenum cover and 
plenum cylinder 
Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Bottom flange-to-upper 
grid screws 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Plenum cover assembly Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Plenum cylinder Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Reinforcing plates Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Rib Pads Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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Top flange-to-cover 
bolts 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Incore Guide Tube 
Gussets 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Incore Guide Tube Nuts Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Incore Guide Tube 
Spiders 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Incore Guide Tubes Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Thermal Shield Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
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Upper grid assembly Table 3.1.1 Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluations for 
the Reactor Vessel, Internals, 
and Reactor Coolant System [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Rib-to-ring screws Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Upper grid rib section Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Upper grid ring forging Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Instrumentation support 
structures 
Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Vessel 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [8] 
 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
  
Control Rod Drive 
Flange 
"During the Fall 2005 refueling 
outage, minor boric acid 
deposits were visible during the 
video inspection at three CRD 
flanges." [14] 
AmerGen Energy 
Company, LLC [14] 
(2008) 
  
CRDM Flanges Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
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Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
 
Seal Table Fittings Table 3.1.2-2 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel - 
Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Clevis Insert Bolt 
Locking Mechanisms 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Clevis Insert Bolts Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Clevis Inserts Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Core Barrel - Plates Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
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Core Barrel Flange – 
ring forging, Core 
Barrel (guide key) 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Core Barrel Outlet 
Nozzle - Nozzle 
forgings 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
RCCA Flexures Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
GT Support pin (split 
pin) 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Flux Thimbles Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals 
[17] 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
STP Nuclear 
Operating Co. [17] 
(2010) 
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Head and Vessel 
Alignment Pins 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Holddown Spring Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Lower Core Plate Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Lower Core Plate Fuel 
Alignment Pins 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Lower Support 
Columns, Sleeves 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
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Lower Support Forging Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Lower Support Plate 
Column Bolts/Nuts 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Radial Support Keys Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
RCCA Guide Tubes, 
Inserts, and Flow 
Downcomers 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Secondary Core Support 
- base plate, energy 
absorber, Diffuser Plate 
(Flow Mixer Plate) 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Secondary Core Support 
Assembly - guide post, 
housing 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
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(Head-Cooling) Spray 
nozzle bodies, and 
nozzle tips 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Thermal shield - plate 
material, flexures, 
Dowel Pin 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Upper Core Plate Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Upper Core Plate 
Alignment Pin 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Upper Core Plate Fuel 
Alignment Pin 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Upper Instrumentation 
Column, Conduit 
(tubing and supports), 
Spacers/Clamps 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
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Upper Support Column 
and Bottom Nozzles 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Upper Support Column- 
instr. Fittings- for 
installation of 
instrumentation 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Upper Support Column- 
USC Base castings 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Upper Support Column 
Bolts 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Upper Support Plate, 
deep beam weldment, 
top plate, ribs, hollow 
rounds 
Table 3.1.2-3 Reactor Coolant 
System - Reactor Vessel 
Internals - Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation [9] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Point Beach, LLC 
[9] (2004) 
 
  
Refueling Missile 
Shield 
Table 3.1.2-1 Reactor Vessel, 
Internals, and Reactor Coolant 
System – Summary of Aging 
Management Evaluation – 
Reactor Vessel and Internals 
[17] 
STP Nuclear 
Operating Co. [17] 
(2010) 
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 * Contains welds 
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 
Component Highlight Author GSI-191 Evidence Expert Comments 
CSS Heat 
exchanger (shell) 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS Heat 
Exchanger (Shell) – Carbon Steel – Air 
(External) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Heat Exchanger Shell - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water – Loss of 
Material and Cracking) [2] 
 
TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 
(Containment Spray Pump Seal Water Heat 
Exchanger Shells – Cast Iron – Treated 
Water – Borated – Loss of Material) 
[3] 
 
TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 
(Containment Spray Pump Seal Water Heat 
Exchanger Covers - Cast Iron – Treated 
Water – Borated – Loss of Material) [3] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(RHR Heat Exchanger (Shell) – Carbon 
Steel – Inside – Loss of Material – Borated 
Water Leakage Assessment and Evaluation 
Program) [4] 
 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
(2003) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [3] 
(2000) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 In some plants, the 
CSS does not use a 
heat exchanger for 
the pumped water. In 
this case, there is no 
effect. In plants 
where the CSS is 
pumped through the 
heat exchanger, 
plugging by debris 
needs to be checked. 
 
I think CSS HX is 
not part of Class 1 
piping system 
pressure boundary. 
Additionally, if a 
leak/breach occurs, it 
would be an isolable 
LOCA without a 
significant 
contribution to the 
debris-clogging 
issue. 
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Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review ( RHR Heat Exchanger (Shells) 
Carbon Steel – Air – Indoor (Exterior) 
(Borated Water Leakage) – Loss of Material 
(Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program) ) 
[5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger (Shell) – 
Carbon Steel – Loss of Material (Boric Acid 
Corrosion Prevention) ) [6] 
Tanks Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Tank – Carbon Steel with Stainless 
Cladding - Treated Borated Water (Internal) 
– Loss of Material) [1]  
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Tank – Carbon Steel with 
Stainless Steel Cladding – Treated Water 
(Borated) (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
[6] 
 
Table : V ENGINEERED SAFETY 
FEATURES D1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System (PWR) [7] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS Tank 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [7] 
(2010) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
Exelon Generation 
Co., LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 The RWST is need to 
inject borated water 
required for 
reactivity control 
during cool down. 
However, tank 
failure is not directly 
related to GSI-191 
concerns 
 
I agree. 
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- Stainless Steel – Treated Borated Water 
(Internal) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-1 Core Flooding System 
Summary of Aging Management Evaluation 
[8] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (CFS Tank – Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (High Pressure Injection System 
Tank – Stainless Steel – Borated Water – 
Loss of Material and Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (Low Pressure Injection System 
Tank – Carbon Steel (Lined) – Borated 
Water – Loss of Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(Refueling Water Storage Tank - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – loss of Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 
371 
 
Review (Eductors – RWST Mixing – 
Stainless Steel Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Tank – Boron Injection Tank (Unit 
1 only) – Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Tank Liners (& internals) – RWST 
Liners – Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Tanks – SI Accumulator Tanks – 
Carbon Steel (with Stainless Steel Cladding) 
– Borated Water (Interior) – Loss of 
Material) [5] 
 
Bolting and 
Bearings 
Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Bolting – Carbon Steel - Air (External) – 
Loss of Material – Boric Acid Corrosion 
Prevention) [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-1 Core Flooding System 
Summary of Aging Management Evaluation 
(CFS Bolting – Carbon and Low Alloy Steel 
Bolting – Air with Borated Water Leakage 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Exelon Generation 
Co., LLC [8] 
(2008) 
 
 Typically, CSS 
pumps are low 
pressure and not 
connected to the RCS 
(high pressure) 
system. Failure of the 
CSS due to boron 
corrosion is not 
directly related to 
GSI-191 concerns. 
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(External) – Loss of Material - Boric Acid 
Corrosion) [8] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Bolting – Carbon Steel – Air 
(External) – Loss of material (Boric Acid 
Corrosion Prevention) and Loss of 
mechanical Closure Integrity (Boric Acid 
Corrosion Prevention) ) [6] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(Closure Bolting – Alloy Steel and Carbon 
Steel – Inside and Outside – Loss of 
Material (Borated Water Leakage 
Assessment and Evaluation Program) ) [4] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Closure Bolting – Carbon Steel – 
Air (Exterior) (Borated Water Leakage) – 
Loss of Material (Boric Acid Corrosion 
Control Program) ) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Bearing Housing – Cast Iron – Air 
(External) – Loss of Material – Boric Acid 
Corrosion Prevention) [1] 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [9] 
(1982) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [3] 
(2000) 
Other pumpsoperate 
at higher pressures 
but would not create 
debris (they are not 
located where 
insulation could be 
released to the sump) 
 
I think 
bolting/bearing might 
not be an issue itself; 
however leakage due 
to bolting/bearing 
might be a non-
isolable LOCA issue. 
Please note my point 
is about Class 1 
piping system 
pressure boundary. 
However, Class 1 
SIS is between two 
valves off the RCS. 
This makes LOCA 
extremely unlikely. 
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"Tests conducted by Durametallic on their 
safety back-up bushing show that the 
leakage rates under normal conditions for a 3 
inch diameter bushing are about 80 gph at 60 
psig for a ¼ inch long bushing and 47 gph 
for a 3/4 inch long bushing." [9] 
 
"Leakage tests on safety bushings typical of 
those used in RHR and CS pumps show that 
leakage rates are less than 100 gph." [9] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS 
Bolting – Carbon Steel Air (External) – Loss 
of Material (Boric Acid Corrosion 
Prevention) and Loss of Mechanical Closure 
Integrity (Boric Acid Corrosion Prevention) 
) 
[1] 
 
TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 
(Containment Spray Bolting(mechanical 
closures)  – Carbon Steel – Borated Water 
Leaks – Loss of Mechanical Closure 
Integrity)  [3] 
Valves and Valve 
Bodies 
Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Valve - Stainless Steel – Treated Borated 
Water (Internal) – Loss of Material)  [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
 Valve failures in 
RCS-connected 
systems can result in 
debris generation. 
The component 
would have to be in 
the first pressurized 
piping section 
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(Valve Bodies - Stainless Steel – Borated 
Water – Cracking and Loss of Material) 
[4] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Valve – Carbon Steel – Air 
(Internal and External) and Treated Water 
(Borated) (Internal) – Loss of Material)  [6] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review [5] 
 
"The crack resulted from high-cycle thermal 
fatigue that was caused by relatively cold 
water leaking through a closed globe valve 
at a pressure sufficient to open the check 
valve. The leaking globe valve is in the 
bypass pipe around the boron injection tank 
(BIT) as shown in Figure 2." [10] 
 
"At Tihange 1, the through-wall crack was in 
the base metal of the elbow. Other cracks at 
Tihange 1 were found in the pipe spool 
connected to one side of the elbow and in the 
body of the check valve connected to the 
other side." [11] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS 
Valve - Stainless Steel – Treated Borated 
Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) [1] 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 
Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [10] 
(1988) 
 
Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [11] 
(1988) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [3] 
(2000) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [12] 
(1998) 
connected to the 
RCS. 
 
Is leak before break 
true for valves too? 
On the other hand 
valves in a piping 
system are designed 
based on the 
redundancy. This 
might mitigate 
LOCA probability 
extremely 
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TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 
(Containment Spray Valves, Piping/fittings 
and Tubing/fittings – Stainless Steel – 
Treated Water – Borated – Loss of Material) 
[3] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (CFS Valve Bodies - Stainless Steel 
– Borated Water – Loss of Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Valve Bodies - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – Loss of Material 
and Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems ( LPIS Valve Bodies - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – Loss of Material 
and Cracking) [2] 
 
"In LER 96-007, the licensee for Diablo 
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, 
reported a radiograph inspection finding that 
openings in the Diablo Canyon plant's 3.81-
cm (1-1/2 in.) centrifugal-charging pump 
run-out-protection manual throttle valves 
and in the 5.08-cm (2 in.) safety-injection 
(SI) to cold-leg manual throttle valves were 
less than the 0.673-cm (0.265 in.) diagonal 
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opening in the containment recirculation 
sump debris screen." [12] 
 
"After reviewing an Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations (INPO) operational 
experience report on this event, the licensee 
for Millstone Nuclear Station, Unit 2, 
determined that eight throttle valves in the 
high pressure safety injection (HPSI) system 
injection lines were susceptible to the failure 
mechanism described in Diablo Canyon 
Nuclear Power Plant LER 96-007." [12] 
Tubing Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Tubing – Stainless Steel – Treated Borated 
Water (Internal) – Loss of Material)  [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Tubing – Stainless steel – 
Treated Water (Borated) (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS 
Tubing - Stainless Steel – Treated Borated 
Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY [3] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (CFS Tubing - Stainless Steel – 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [3] 
(2000) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 
 Tubing failures are 
small enough that 
they can be mitigated 
without recirculation. 
Some small tubing 
failures can be 
repaired at power 
 
This part of piping is 
off the RCS and 
between the first and 
second valves. 
Therefore, LOCA 
might be highly 
small. 
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Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Tubing - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (LPIS Tubing - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Seal Water Coolers (RHR Pumps 
Tubes) – Carbon Steel – Air – Indoor 
(Exterior) (Borated Water Leakage) – Loss 
of Material (Boric Acid Corrosion Control 
Program) ) [5] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (LPIS Annular Tube - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – Loss of Material 
and Cracking) [2] 
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Strainers, 
Suction, Grating, 
and Sump 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation ( Strainer Housing - Stainless 
Steel – Treated Water (Borated) (Internal) – 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
“Problems have also been found with the 
material condition of sumps and suction 
strainers. These problems, potentially 
impairing the operation of the ECCS or 
safety-related CSS, include deformed 
suction strainers and unintentional flow 
paths created by missing grout.” [12] 
 
"1.Operator found debris in the sump." [12] 
 
"2.Five 208 L (55-gallon) drums of sludge 
removed from ECCS sump. Also, plastic 
sheeting, nuts, and bolts, tie wraps, and 
pencils." [12] 
 
"1.Construction debris discovered in 
containment recirculation spray system 
(RSS) containment sump and in RSS suction 
lines" [12] 
 
"Other concerns related to debris generated 
during postulated accidents are beyond the 
scope of the GSI-191 study and the 
parametric analyses presented in this report. 
Examples of such concerns include...(b) 
structural failure of sump screens as a result 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [12] 
(1998) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [13] 
(2002) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [14] 
(2003) 
 
 If the ECCS suction 
strainers are 
weakened by 
corrosion or have 
additional buildup of 
corrosion prior to the 
need for 
recirculation, they 
could fail 
mechanically 
(allowing excess 
debris bypass to the 
core) or collapse and 
prevent pumping. 
 
I think these parts are 
key components in 
ECCS. Any 
deterioration in their 
performance could 
have a substantiate 
effect on GSI-191 
issue. 
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of l6ads from debris or direct jet 
impingement." [13] 
 
"Sump failure is likely to occur for sumps in 
this configuration because of cavitation 
within the pump housing when head loss 
caused by debris accumulation exceeds the 
NPSHMagn." - Fully Submerged Sump 
Screens [13] 
 
"Failure can occur for sumps in this 
configuration in one of two ways: by pump 
cavitation as explained above or when head 
loss caused by debris buildup prevents 
sufficient water from entering the sump." - 
Partially Submerged Sump Screens [13] 
 
"structural failure of the sump screens as a 
result of loads from debris or direct jet 
impingement." [14] 
 
"4.Bolts and clips missing from the vortex 
suppression grating." [12] 
Seals "In the event of increased leakage of the 
shaft seals due to wear, the seal safety 
bushings limit leakage to less than 0.1% of 
pump flow rates." [9] 
 
"In pumps with mechanical shaft seals, 
debris could cause clogging or excessive 
wear, leading to increased seal leakage. 
However, catastrophic failure of a shaft seal 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [9] 
(1982) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [14] 
(2003) 
 
 ECCS equipment 
requiring seals would 
not result in debris 
generation that 
would cause sump 
blockage  
 
if you consider that 
SIS piping system is 
located between two 
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as a result of debris ingestion was considered 
unlikely." [14] 
 
"Durametallic Corp. [42] has also conducted 
tests of their seals for nuclear power plant 
auxiliary and cooldown pumps. They report 
that seal life is shortened due to high 
temperatures, pressures and the presence of 
boric acid." [9] 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [9] 
(1982) 
valves, you would 
not evaluate seal 
failure LOCA’s a 
significant issue 
Nozzles Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Nozzle – Inconel – Treated Borated Water 
(Internal) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS 
Nozzle - Stainless Steel – Treated Borated 
Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems ( HPIS Flow Nozzle - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – Loss of Material 
and Cracking) [2] 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 Containment spray 
nozzles should not be 
affected by GSI-191 
concerns because of 
the hole size 
compared to the 
ECCS screen hole 
size 
 
The same as seals. 
 
Orifices Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Orifice – Stainless Steel – Treated Borated 
Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Orifice – Stainless Steel – 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
 Orifices are large 
diameter and should 
not be affected by 
debris. The flow 
measuring orifices 
may indicate 
properly if debris 
collects around ports 
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Treated Water (Borated) (Internal) – Loss of 
Material/Erosion) [6] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS 
Orifice - Stainless Steel – Treated Borated 
Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 
(Containment Spray Orifices – Stainless 
Steel – Treated Water – Borated – Loss of 
Material) [3] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Orifice - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (LPIS Orifice - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(Charging/SI Pump Mini-Flow Orifices – 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water – Loss of 
Material) [4] 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [3] 
(2000) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [7] 
(2010) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
one point that should 
be explained is if 
these components are 
studied for debris 
generation by itself 
or how do these parts 
perform in a pressure 
boundary break?  
 
If there is no LOCA 
in pressure boundary, 
it would be hard to 
assign any number to 
these subcomponent 
other than a 
minimum. However, 
if there is a LOCA in 
pressure boundary, 
any issue in ECCS 
might be important. 
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Table : V ENGINEERED SAFETY 
FEATURES D1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System (PWR) [7] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(Flow Orifice/Element - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water – Cracking and Loss of 
Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Flow Orifice/Element - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – Loss of 
Material) [5] 
Thermowell Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Thermowell - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water >270 °F (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation ( Thermowell – Stainless Steel – 
Treated Water (Borated) >270°F (Internal) – 
Cracking/Fatigue, Cracking, and Loss of 
Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS 
Thermowell - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
 Pressurized, RCS-
conneted thermowell 
failure has the 
potential for creating 
debris 
 
as I said in my 
previous comment, 
does this mean there 
is no breach in 
pressure boundary? 
In other words, is 
debris generated 
concurrently with 
debris generation in 
pressure boundary? I 
am not sure 
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Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
[1] 
thermowell has any 
potential for debris 
generation 
Filters Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS Filter 
Housing – Stainless Steel – Treated Borated 
Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Filter Housing – Carbon Steel – 
Air (External) – Loss of Material (Boric 
Acid Corrosion Prevention) )  [6] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Filter Housings – Carbon Steel – 
Air (Ecterior0 (Borated Water Leakage) – 
Loss of Material (Boric Acid Corrosion 
Control Program) ) [5] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Filter - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 ECCS filter failures 
would not create 
debris (although they 
could become 
clogged) 
 
I agree. 
Heater Housing Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heater Housing – Stainless Steel 
– Treated Water (Borated) (Internal) – Loss 
of Material) [6] 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 Heaters would not 
cause GSI-191-
related issues or 
debris 
 
I agree. 
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Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Electric Heater Housings – 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS 
Heater Housing - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
[1] 
 
 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Oil Cooler Shell 
and Channel 
Head 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(Oil Cooler (Shell) (for High Head Safety 
Injection Pump) – Inside – Loss of Material 
(Borated Water Leakage Assessment and 
Evaluation Program) ) [4] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(Oil Cooler (Channel Head) (for High Head 
Safety Injection Pump) – Inside – Loss of 
Material (Borated Water Leakage 
Assessment and Evaluation Program) )[4] 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
 Oil cooler failure 
would not result in 
debris generation 
Spray System "Most of the coating in the torus is 
unqualified, which could affect the 
operability of the low-pressure coolant 
injection and core spray systems." [12] 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [12] 
(1998) 
 Coatings failures are 
a concern related to 
ECCS screen head 
loss.  
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"1.Construction debris discovered in 
containment recirculation spray system 
(RSS) containment sump and in RSS suction 
lines" [12] 
I am not sure this is a 
category for us. 
Torus is a 
subcomponent in 
BWR’s. 
 
Flex Hose Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation  (Flex Hose – Stainless Steel – 
Treated Water (Borated) (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Flex Hose - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 Flex hose is related 
to any GSI-191 
concerns 
 
I agree. 
High Pressure 
Injection System 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Demineralizer - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – Loss of Material 
and Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Flow Meter - Stainless Steel 
– Borated Water – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Mechanical Expansion Joint 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
 Pressurized RCS-
connected ECCS 
componenets have 
the potential to creat 
debris 
 
I agree. 
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- Stainless Steel – Borated Water – Loss of 
Material and Cracking) [2] 
Structural and 
Coating 
"Seven unscreened holes found in masonry 
grout below screen assembly of ECCS sump. 
Could potentially degrade both trains of 
HPSI and containment spray. Had 
previously inspected sump because of IN 89-
77; did not discover problem. NRC estimate 
of incremental increase in core damage: 3 
X10-04." [12] 
 
"There have been no changes made 
specifically to address particular aging-
related or coating-related problems or 
failures." [16] 
 
"Most of the coating in the torus is 
unqualified, which could affect the 
operability of the low-pressure coolant 
injection and core spray systems." [12] 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [12] 
(1998) 
 
Calvert Cliffs 
Nuclear Power 
Plant Inc. [16] 
(1998) 
 
Northern States 
Power Co. – 
Minnesota [17] 
(2008) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [3] 
(2000) 
 
"The issue is based 
on containment 
sump strainer 
design and on the 
identification of 
new potential 
sources of debris, 
including failed 
containment 
coatings that have 
the potential to 
block the sump 
strainers." [17] 
 
"Coatings 
qualified for use in 
the Turkey Point 
Units 3 and 4 
Containments are 
adequate to resist 
exposures due to 
both normal 
operating and 
design basis 
accident 
conditions. These 
exposures include 
ionizing radiation, 
high temperature 
and pressure, 
impingement from 
Coatings failures are 
a concern related to 
ECCS screen head 
loss. 
 
I think this category 
is related to BWR’s 
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jets or sprays, and 
abrasion due to 
traffic." [3] 
Pump Casings Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Pump Casing – Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material)[1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Pump Casing – Carbon Steel 
with Stainless Steel Cladding – Treated 
Water (Borated) (Internal) – Cracking and 
Loss of Material)  [6] 
 
Table : V ENGINEERED SAFETY 
FEATURES D1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System (PWR) [7] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management ( CSS 
Pump Casing – Cast Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Pump Casing - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – Loss of Material 
and Cracking) [2] 
 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [7] 
(2010) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [18] 
(2008) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 
 ECCS pump casings 
would not cause 
debris (in 
recirculation) 
 
My understanding is 
that pump casing 
should be important 
and in fact would 
cause debris. Unless 
they are sitting in an 
isolated place. 
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"In May 1997, at Oconee Nuclear Station 
Unit 3, hydrogen ingestion during plant 
cooldown damaged and rendered 
nonfunctional two high-pressure injection 
(HPI) pumps."  
"In February 2005, an HPI pump at Indian 
Point Energy Center Unit 2 was found 
inoperable because the pump casing was 
filled with gas."[18] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (LPIS Pump Casing - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – Loss of Material 
and Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(High Head and RHR Pump Casings – 
Carbon Steel/Stainless Steel Clad – Borated 
Water – Loss of Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Pump Casing (Centrifugal 
Charging Pumps) - Stainless Steel – Borated 
Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Pump Casing (RHR Pumps) - 
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Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Pump Casing (Safety Injection 
Pumps) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Pump Casing (Sludge Mixing 
Pumps) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [5] 
Pumps "At Surry Units 1 and 2, some of the debris 
was large enough to cause pump damage or 
flow degradation." [12] 
 
"In addition, extended operation at low flow 
or severe cavitation may cause mechanical 
damage to the pump which can lead to pump 
failure during the long-term recirculation 
phase." [9] 
 
"Test data on the mechanical wear of pumps 
indicate that the estimated quantity of debris 
expected in the recirculating fluid is too 
small to seriously impair long-term pump 
operation as a result of material erosion." [9] 
 
"The principal concerns are interrelated. 
They involve those factors which have the 
potential to affect the short or long term 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [12] 
(1998) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [9] 
(1982) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [3] 
(2000) 
 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission [19] 
(1986) 
 
 ECCS pump casings 
would not cause 
debris (in 
recirculation) 
 
Please see previous 
comment. Also, 
should “pump 
casing” read “pump” 
above. 
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ability of the pumps to provide adequate 
cooling to the core and containment. These 
factors have been identified as:...mechanical 
erosion or failure of the pumps caused by 
debris." [9] 
 
TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 
(Containment Spray Pump – Stainless Steel 
– Treated Water – Borated – Loss of 
Material) [3] 
 
"September 18, 1992: During Technical 
Specification inservice inspection testing of 
the A containment spray pump the pump 
was declared inoperable. A foam rubber plug 
was blocking pump suction. Plug removed 
and pump tested satisfactorily. One train of 
Unit 2 residual heat removal, safety 
injection, and containment spray systems 
inoperable for entire operating cycle. Plug 
was part of a cleanliness barrier." [12] 
 
"Containment spray and HPSI pumps 
declared inoperable." [12] 
 
"Experimental data and pump and seal 
manufacturers' experience agree that for the 
types and quantities of debris present, 
hydraulic performance degradation of RHR 
and CS pumps should be negligible." [9] 
 
"Experimental data and pump and seal 
manufacturers' experience agree that for the 
Calvert Cliffs 
Nuclear Power 
Plant Inc. [20] 
(1998) 
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types and quantities of debris present, 
hydraulic performance degradation of RHR 
and CS pumps should be negligible." [9] 
 
"The malfunction of the pumps was 
apparently caused by boric acid 
crystallization blocking pump suction and by 
possible gas binding of the pumps." [19] 
"In that event, two of the three SI pumps 
were rendered inoperable as a result of boric 
acid crystallization." [19] 
 
Table F.2-2 SUMMARY OF CCNPP 
SAMAs  
CDF Improvement of 2.7% 
[20] 
Heat Exchanger 
(Channel Heads 
and Coils 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems(HPIS Heat Exchanger Coil - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water - Cracking) 
[2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (LPIS Heat Exchanger Channel 
Heads - Stainless Steel – Borated Water – 
Loss of Material and Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(RHR Heat Exchanger (Channel Head) - 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 ECCS heat 
exchangers  would 
not cause debris (in 
recirculation) due to 
their location 
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Stainless Steel – Borated Water – Loss of 
Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (RHR Hat Exchanger (Channel 
Head) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material)  [5] 
Heat Exchanger 
(Tubes and 
Tubesheets/Tube 
Shields) 
Table 3.2.2-1 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
(Heat Exchanger (Tubes) – Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Emergency Core Cooling 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation ( Heat Exchanger (Tubes) - 
Stainless Steel – Treated Water (Borated) 
>270 °F (Internal) – Cracking/Fatigue, 
Cracking, and Loss of Material) 
 [6] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Containment Spray System 
Summary of Aging Management (CSS Heat 
Exchanger (Tubes) – Ferritic Stainless Steel 
– Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Heat Exchanger Tubes - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water – Loss of 
Material and Cracking) [2] 
Entergy 
Operations, Inc. 
[1] (2003) 
 
Indiana Michigan 
Power Co. [6] 
(2003) 
 
Duke Energy 
Corp. [2] (1998) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [3] 
(2000) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [4] (2003) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., 
Inc. [5] (2007) 
 
 ECCS heat 
exchanger failures  
would not cause 
debris (in 
recirculation) due to 
their location 
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Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (LPIS Heat Exchanger Tubes - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water – Loss of 
Material and Cracking) [2] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (LPIS Heat Exchanger Tubesheet - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water – Loss of 
Material and Cracking) [2] 
 
TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 
(Containment Spray Pump Seal Water Heat 
Exchanger Tube Shields - Brass – Treated 
Water – Borated – Loss of Material) 
[3] 
 
TABLE 3.3-2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 
(Containment Spray Pump Seal Water Heat 
Exchanger Tubes (inside diameter) – 
Stainless Steel - Treated Water – Borated – 
Loss of Material and Fouling) [3] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(RHR Heat Exchanger (Tube sheet) – 
Carbon Steel/ Stainless Steel (clad on tube 
side only) – Borated Water – Cracking and 
Loss of Material) [4] 
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Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (RHR Heat Exchanger (Tubesheets) 
– Carbon Steel (with Stainless Steel 
Cladding) – Borated Water (Interior) – Loss 
of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, 
Emergency Core Cooling System – 
Summary of Aging Management Review 
(RHR Heat Exchanger (Tubes) - Stainless 
Steel – Borated Water – Loss of Material) 
[4] 
 
Table 3.2.2-2 Emergency Core Cooling 
System: Summary of Aging Management 
Review (RHR Heat Exchanger (Tubes) - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material)  [5] 
 
Table 3.5-3 Applicable Aging Effects for 
Components of Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems (HPIS Heat Exchange Tubesheet - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water – Loss of 
Material and Cracking) [2] 
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CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM 
Component Highlight Author GSI-191 Evidence Expert Comments 
Valve and Bodies Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Valve Bodies - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Valve Body – CASS – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
 [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-7 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation - Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Valve - 
Stainless Steel – Reactor Coolant (Int) – Loss 
of Material) [3] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Valves - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Water Borated – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Valve Body – CASS – Treated 
Borated Water (Int) – Loss of Material) 
 [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-5 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Wolf Creek 
Nuclear Operating 
Corp. [3] (2008) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [5] 
(2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[9] (2004) 
 Some CVCS 
equipment and 
piping is 
connected to RCS 
pressurized 
systems. This 
equipment could 
create debris. 
 
CVCS is another 
system located 
out of RCS 
pressure 
boundary 
between the first 
and second 
valves. The 
potential for 
debris generation 
could be an issue, 
but they are 
isolable-LOCA.   
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Evaluation (Valve - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Cracking and Loss 
of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Valve - 
Stainless Steel - Reactor Coolant (Int) - 
Cracking and Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Valves - Carbon Steel -  Borated 
Water Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric 
Acid Corrosion) [9] 
Housings TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Suction Stabilizers Housings - 
Stainless Steel – Treated Water Borated – 
Loss of Material and Cracking) [7] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Pulsation Dampers Housings - 
Stainless Steel – Treated Water Borated – 
Loss of Material and Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Pulsation Dampener Housing - 
Stainless Steel – Treated Borated Water (Int) 
– Loss of Material) [4] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Purification Filters Housings - 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 Some CVCS 
equipment and 
piping is 
connected to RCS 
pressurized 
systems. This 
equipment could 
create debris. 
 
Please note that 
LOCA might 
happen in 
primary path with 
no effect on 
CVCS 
subcomponents. 
If a component of 
CVCS fails it 
 399 
  
Stainless Steel – Treated Water Borated – 
Loss of Material and Cracking) [7] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Ion Exchangers Housings - 
Stainless Steel – Treated Water Borated – 
Loss of Material and Cracking) [7] 
might not even 
actuate ECCS. 
 
Thermowell Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Thermowell - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [2] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Thermowells - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Water Borated – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Thermowell - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Int) – Loss of 
Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-5 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Thermowell - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water >270 270°F (Internal) 
– Cracking-fatigue and Loss of Material) [5] 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [5] 
(2003) 
 Some CVCS 
equipment and 
piping is 
connected to RCS 
pressurized 
systems. This 
equipment could 
create debris. 
 
extremely 
unlikely to 
generate debris 
with a significant 
contribution to 
clogging issue of 
strainer. 
 
Gauges and 
Indicators 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Flow Indicator - 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 Some CVCS 
equipment and 
piping is 
connected to RCS 
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Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Sight Gauge - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (CS Manifolds (Level Indicators - 
Carbon Steel -  Borated Water Leakage - Loss 
of Material - Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[9] (2004) 
pressurized 
systems. This 
equipment could 
create debris. 
 
as above. 
 
Vessels, 
Accumulators, and 
Reservoirs 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Demineralizer 
Vessels – Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Demineralizer - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (CS Manifolds (Lube Oil 
Reservoirs - Carbon Steel -  Borated Water 
Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric Acid 
Corrosion) [9] 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[9] (2004) 
 
 Some CVCS 
equipment and 
piping is 
connected to RCS 
pressurized 
systems. This 
equipment could 
create debris. 
 
please see 
previous notes. 
All these 
reservoirs are 
isolated from 
pressure 
boundary. 
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Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Accumulator - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Pumps and Cases "Cracking of stainless steel pump casings in 
the CVCS system" [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Pump Casing - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-7 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation - Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Pump – Carbon 
Steel – Plant Indoor Air (Ext) – Loss of 
Material) [3] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Pump Casing - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Int) – Loss of 
Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-5 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Pump Casing - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Cracking-
fatigue and Loss of Material-wear) 
 [5] 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Wolf Creek 
Nuclear Operating 
Corp. [3] (2008) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [5] 
(2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 The CVCS 
pumps are not 
susceptible to 
failure that would 
cause debris 
 
I agree 
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Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Pump - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Cracking and Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Pump Casings – 
Boric Acid Transfer Pumps - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) 
[1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Pump Casings – 
CVCS Recycle Feed Pumps - Stainless Steel 
– Borated Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) 
[1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Pump Casings – 
Normal Charging Pumps - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) 
[1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Pump Casing (High Head 
Centrifugal Pump) - Stainless Steel – Treated 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[8] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[9] (2004) 
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Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
[2] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Boric Acid Makeup Pumps - 
Stainless Steel – Treated Water Borated – 
Loss of Material) [7] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Charging Pumps - Stainless 
Steel – Treated Water Borated – Loss of 
Material and Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Pumps (Charging Pump Lube 
Oil) – Carbon Steel - Borated Water Leakage 
– Loss of Material – Boric Acid Corrosion) 
[8] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Charging Pump Lube Oil Coolers 
(Channel Head) - Carbon Steel - - Borated 
Water Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric 
Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Charging Pump Lube Oil Coolers 
(Shell) - Carbon Steel - Borated Water 
Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric Acid 
Corrosion) [9] 
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Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (CS Manifolds (Pumps) -  Carbon 
Steel -  Borated Water Leakage - Loss of 
Material - Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Lube Oil Reservoirs (Charging 
Pump) –Carbon Steel - Borated Water 
Leakage – Loss of Material – Boric Acid 
Corrosion) [8] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (CS Manifolds (Charging Pump 
LO) - Carbon Steel - Borated Water Leakage 
- Loss of Material - Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Motor Coolers – 
Normal Charging Pumps (Shells) – Carbon 
Steel – Air Indoor (Exterior) – Loss of 
Material – Borated Water Leakage) [1] 
Bolting and 
Fasteners 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Closure Bolting 
– Carbon Steel – Air Indoor (Exterior) – Loss 
of Material – Borated Water Leakage) [1] 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
Wolf Creek 
Nuclear Operating 
Corp. [3] (2008) 
 Some CVCS 
equipment and 
piping is 
connected to RCS 
pressurized 
systems. This 
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"NUREG-1800 item 3.3.2.2.4 (4) relates to 
cracking of high strength closure bolting for 
chemical and volume control system bolting 
exposed to steam or water leakage." [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-7 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation - Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Closure Bolting 
– Carbon Steel – Plant Indoor Air (Ext) – 
Loss of Material) [3] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Closure Bolting 
- Carbon Steel - Borated Water Leakage (Ext) 
- Loss of Preload (Bolting Integrity) and Loss 
of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Bolting – Steel – Air With 
Borated Water Leakage (Exterior) – Loss of 
Material) [2] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Bolting (Mechanical Closures) – 
Carbon Steel – Borated Water Leaks – Loss 
of Mechanical Closure Integrity) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Bolting – Carbon Steel – Air Indoor 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [5] 
(2003) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[8] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[9] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
[10] (2004) 
equipment could 
create debris. 
 
any leakage due 
to bolting and 
fasteners should 
be quickly 
recognized and 
isolated. 
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(Ext) – Loss of Material – Boric Acid 
Corrosion Prevention) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-5 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Bolting Carbon Steel – Air 
(External) – Loss of Material – Boric Acid 
Corrosion Prevention) [5] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Bolting – Low-Alloy Steel – 
Borated Water Leakage – Loss of Material – 
Boric Acid Corrosion) [8] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Bolting - Low-Alloy Steel - 
Borated Water Leakage - Loss of Material - 
Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-1 Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control System - Summary of 
Aging Management Evaluation (Fasteners - 
Stainless Steel - Containment Air (Ext) - Loss 
of Preload - Bolting Integrity Program) [10] 
Filters and 
Strainers 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Filter Housings 
– Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 CVCS filters and 
strainers are 
generally not 
connected to 
pressurized RCS 
piping. They 
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Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Filter Housing – Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-7 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation - Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Filter – Carbon 
Steel – Plant Indoor Air (Ext) – Loss of 
Material) [3] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Filter Housing – Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Int) – Loss of 
Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Filter - Stainless 
Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - Loss of 
Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Filter/Strainers (Housing – 
Charging Pump Lube Oil) – Carbon Steel - 
Borated Water Leakage – Loss of Material – 
Boric Acid Corrosion) [8] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Strainer Elements - Stainless 
 
Wolf Creek 
Nuclear Operating 
Corp. [3] (2008) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[8] (2004) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
should not cause 
debris generation 
 
I agree. 
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Steel – Treated Water Borated – Loss of 
Material) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Strainer - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Charging Pump Strainers 
Housings - Stainless Steel – Treated Water 
Borated – Loss of Material and Cracking) [7] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Let Down Strainers Housings - 
Stainless Steel – Treated Water Borated – 
Loss of Material and Cracking) [7] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Boric Acid Suction Strainers 
Housings - Stainless Steel – Treated Water 
Borated – Loss of Material and Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Strainer Housing - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Int) – Loss of 
Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Piping 
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Components – Pipe Spools for Startup 
Strainers - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
Tanks Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Tank - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
[2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-7 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation - Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Tank – Carbon 
Steel – Plant Indoor Air (Ext) – Loss of 
Material) [3] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Tank - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Int) – Loss of Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-5 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Tank - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Cracking and Loss 
of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Tank - Stainless 
Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - Loss of 
Material) [6] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Wolf Creek 
Nuclear Operating 
Corp. [3] (2008) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [5] 
(2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 
 
 CVCS tanks are 
not directly 
connected to RCS 
piping and should 
not cause debris 
generation 
 
please see 
previous notes 
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Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Tanks – Boric 
Acid Batching Tanks - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) 
[1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Tanks – Boric 
Acid Storage Tanks - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) 
[1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Tanks – Boron 
Meter Tanks - Stainless Steel – Borated 
Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Tanks – 
Chemical Mixing Tanks - Stainless Steel – 
Borated Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) 
[1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Tanks – Recycle 
Holdup Tanks - Stainless Steel – Borated 
Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
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Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review [1] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Voluem control Tanks - 
Stainless Steel – Treated Water Borated – 
Loss of Material and Cracking) [7] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Boric Acid Makeup Tanks – 
Stainless Steel – Treated Water Borated – 
Loss of Material) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Tank Liner - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
Orifices and 
Elements 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Flow 
Orifice/Elements - Stainless Steel – Borated 
Water (Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Flow Element - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Int) – Loss of 
Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
 CVCS orifices 
and other 
instrumentation 
would not cause 
debris generation 
 
I agree. 
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and Volume Control System (Flow Element - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Orifice - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
[2] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Orifices - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Water Borated – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Orifice - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Letdown 
Orifices - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Instrumentation Element – 
Copper Alloy >15% Zn – Air With Borated 
Water Leakage (External) – Loss of Material) 
[2] 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
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Piping, Hoses, and 
Fittings 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Piping And Fittings – Steel – Air 
With Borated Water Leakage (External) – 
Loss of Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-7 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation - Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Class 1 Piping 
<= 4in – Stainless Steel – Reactor Coolant 
(Int) – Loss of Material) [3] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Piping/Fittings - Stainless Steel 
– Treated Water Borated – Loss of Material 
and Cracking)  [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Piping – Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Int) – Loss of Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-5 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Piping – Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Cracking and Loss 
of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Piping - 
Stainless Steel - Reactor Coolant (Int) - 
Cracking and Loss of Material) [6] 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Wolf Creek 
Nuclear Operating 
Corp. [3] (2008) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [5] 
(2003) 
 
Arizona Public 
Service Co. [6] 
(2009) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[9] (2004) 
 
 Some CVCS 
piping is 
connected to 
pressurized RCS 
systems. If not 
isolated, they 
may could 
contribute to 
debris generation 
 
It would be good 
to investigate if 
there is any 
piping in CVCS 
that is not 
isolable. 
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Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (CS Manifolds (Pipe - Carbon 
Steel -  Borated Water Leakage - Loss of 
Material - Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Tubing/Fittings - Stainless Steel 
– Treated Water Borated – Loss of Material 
and Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Tubing - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Int) – Loss of Material) 
 [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-5 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Tubing - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Cracking and Loss 
of Material) [5] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation – Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Tubing - 
Stainless Steel - Treated Borated Water (Int) - 
Loss of Material) [6] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Flexible Hose – Nickel Alley – 
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Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [2] 
Heat Exchanger 
(Channel Heads 
and Covers) 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchangers Components 
(CS E-2 Channel Head) - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Excess Letdown HXs (Channel 
Heads) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Letdown Chillers (Channel 
Heads) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Letdown HXs (Channel Heads) 
- Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [1] 
 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[9] (2004) 
 
 The CVCS heat 
exchangers are 
generally 
operated at lower 
pressures (shell 
side) and located 
where they 
should not cause 
debris generation 
 
I agree. Also, in 
industry HX is a 
system usually 
isolated. 
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TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Letdown Heat Exchanger 
Channel Heads and Covers - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Water Borated – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Letdown Reheat HXs (Channel 
Heads) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Moderating HXs (Channel 
Heads) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Regenerative HXs (Channel 
Heads) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Seal Water HXs (Channel 
Heads) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
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Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger Components 
(CS-P-128 Fluid Drive Cooler Channel Head) 
– Air With Borated Water Leakage (External) 
– Loss of Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger Components 
(CS-P-128 Pump Oil Cooler Channel Head) – 
Gray Cast Iron – Air With Borated Water 
Leakage (External) – Loss of Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Thermal Regeneration Chiller 
Compressor Oil Cooler (Channel Head) - 
Carbon Steel -  Borated Water Leakage - Loss 
of Material - Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Thermal Regeneration Chiller 
Condenser (Channel Head) - Carbon Steel -  
Borated Water Leakage - Loss of Material - 
Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
Heat Exchanger 
(Shell) 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger Components 
(CS-E-2 Shell) - Stainless Steel – Treated 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
 The CVCS heat 
exchangers are 
generally 
operated at lower 
pressures (shell 
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Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
[2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-7 Auxiliary Systems – Summary 
of Aging Management Evaluation - Chemical 
and Volume Control System (Heat Exchanger 
Shell Side (HX #41,42,43) – Carbon Steel – 
Plant Indoor Air (Ext) – Loss of Material) [3] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Excess Letdown HXs (Shells) – 
Air Indoor (Exterior) – Loss of Material – 
Borated Water Leakage) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger 
(Shell) - Carbon Steel -  Borated Water 
Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric Acid 
Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Letdown Chiller (Shells) – Air 
Indoor (Exterior) – Loss of Material – 
Borated Water Leakage) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Wolf Creek 
Nuclear Operating 
Corp. [3] (2008) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[9] (2004) 
 
Dominion Nuclear 
Connecticut, Inc. 
[8] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
[10] (2004) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [5] 
(2003) 
 
side) and located 
where they 
should not cause 
debris generation 
 
I agree. 
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Exchangers – Letdown HXs (Shells) – Air 
Indoor (Exterior) – Loss of Material – 
Borated Water Leakage) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Letdown Heat Exchanger (Shell) 
– Carbon Steel - Borated Water Leakage – 
Loss of Material – Boric Acid Corrosion) [8] 
 
Table 3.3.2-1 Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control System - Summary of 
Aging Management Evaluation (Letdown 
Heat Exchanger Shell - Carbon Steel - 
Containment Air (Ext) - Loss of Material - 
Boric Acid Corrosion Program) [10] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Letdown Reheat HXs (Shells) - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Moderating HXs (Shells) - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
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Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Regenerative HXs (Shells) - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Seal Water HXs (Shells) – 
Carbon Steel – Air Indoor (Exterior) – Loss 
of Material – Borated Water Leakage) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger Components 
(CS-p-128 Fluid Drive Cooler Shell) – Steel – 
Air With Borated Water Leakage (External) – 
Loss of Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger Components 
(CS-P-128 Pump Oil Cooler Shell – Copper 
Alloy >15% Zn – Air With Borated Water 
Leakage (External) – Loss of Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-5 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger (Shell) Stainless 
Steel – Treated Borated Water >270 °F 
(Internal) – Cracking, Cracking-Fatigue, and 
Loss of Material) [5] 
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Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (CS Manifolds (Letdown Chiller 
Heat Exchanger (Shell) - Carbon Steel -  
Borated Water Leakage - Loss of Material - 
Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (CS Manifolds (Letdown Heat 
Exchanger (Shell) - Carbon Steel -  Borated 
Water Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric 
Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (CS Manifolds (Seal Water Heat 
Exchanger (Shell) - Carbon Steel -  Borated 
Water Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric 
Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Thermal Regeneration Chiller 
Compressor Oil Cooler (Shell) - Carbon Steel 
-  Borated Water Leakage - Loss of Material - 
Boric Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Thermal Regeneration Chiller 
Condenser (Shell) - Carbon Steel -  Borated 
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Water Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric 
Acid Corrosion) [9] 
 
Table 3.3.2-15: Auxiliary Systems - Chemical 
and Volume Control - Aging Management 
Evaluation (Thermal Regeneration Chiller 
Evaporator (Shell) - Carbon Steel -  Borated 
Water Leakage - Loss of Material - Boric 
Acid Corrosion) [9] 
Heat Exchanger 
(Tubes and 
Tubesheets) 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger Components 
(CS-E-2 Tubes) - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of Material) 
[2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-6-IP2 Chemical and Volume 
Control Summary of Aging Management 
Review (Heat Exchanger (Tubes) Stainless 
Steel – Treated Borated Water > 140 °F (Int) 
– Loss of Material) [4] 
 
Table 3.3.2-3 Chemical and Volume Control 
System Summary of Aging Management 
Evaluation (Heat Exchanger Components 
(CS-E-2 Tube Sheet) - Stainless Steel – 
Treated Borated Water (Internal) – Loss of 
Material) [2] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Excess Letdown HXs (Tubes & 
NextEra Energy 
Seabrook, LLC [2] 
(2010) 
 
Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc [4] 
(2007) 
 
Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. [1] 
(2007) 
 
Florida Power & 
Light Co. [7] 
(2001) 
 
 
 The CVCS heat 
exchangers are 
generally 
operated at lower 
pressures (shell 
side) and located 
where they 
should not cause 
debris generation 
 
please see 
previous notes. 
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Tubesheets) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Letdown Chillers (Tubes) - 
Stainless Steel – Borated Water (Interior) – 
Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Letdown HXs (Tubes & 
Tubesheets) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Letdown Heat Exchanger Tubes 
and Tubesheets - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Water Borated – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) 
 [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Letdown Reheat HXs (Tubes & 
Tubesheets) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
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Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Moderating HXs (Tubes & 
Tubesheets) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Regenerative HXs (Tubes & 
Tubesheets) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
 
TABLE 3.3-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME 
CONTROL (Regenerative Heat Exchangers 
(Including Tubes) - Stainless Steel – Treated 
Water Borated – Loss of Material and 
Cracking) [7] 
 
Table 3.3.2-10 Chemical and Volume Control 
and Boron Recycle Systems: Summary of 
Aging Management Review (Heat 
Exchangers – Seal Water HXs (Tubes & 
Tubesheets) - Stainless Steel – Borated Water 
(Interior) – Loss of Material) [1] 
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APPENDIX C:  OVERVIEW OF RENEWAL PROCESS THEORY 
C.1. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding and modeling system or component availability is a critical part of 
reliability and risk analysis for high consequence industries such as the nuclear power generation 
industry.  One common approach taken by analysts is to model the failure mechanisms that lead 
to unavailability of an item (i.e., component or system).  However, for complex engineering 
systems, failure mechanisms only tell part of the story.  Complex engineering systems have 
maintenance programs that are designed, to the most possible extent, to optimize system 
performance and prevent failure.  To develop accurate item unavailability estimations, it is critical 
to incorporate the effects of maintenance mechanisms. 
 
As failure mechanisms work to degrade a component or system, maintenance mechanisms 
work to reduce the effects of the failure mechanisms, or to return the item to a less degraded state.  
Perfect repair mechanisms would return the component or system to an “as good as new” state. 
Perfect repair is modeled by the renewal process (RP).  RP theory considers successive failure 
times that are independently and identically distributed random variables.  At the moment of each 
failure, the system is immediately restored to the “as good as new” condition [1, 2].   
 
The perfect repair assumption is not realistic.  This is because it is not reasonable to expect 
to have a perfect repair for every repair in an entire system.  Therefore, the minimal repair 
assumption is implemented to return the system to an “as bad as old” condition.  The “as bad as 
old” condition assumes that the failed item is replaced with an identical item and the system is 
returned to the state it was in immediately before failure occurred.  This concept of minimal repair 
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was modeled in [3, 4] in order to find the optimal time between preventive maintenance for cost 
optimization.  This concept has been advanced to consider optimal repair times using the Non-
Homogenous Poisson Process (NHPP) [1, 2, 5-11]. 
 
Perfect repair and minimal repair assumptions are insufficient for modeling many systems, 
as many repairs fall somewhere in-between (or exceed) these two conditions.  In order to capture 
a combination of both assumptions[12], a bivariate method, where perfect repair has a probability 
of p and imperfect repair (minimal repair) has a probability of q=1-p, is developed.  The authors 
also introduced the concept of effective age.  The effective age is the time elapsed since the 
component was perfectly repaired.  The bivariate p and q concept was extended by [13] to include 
time dependency. 
 
The authors of [14] consider a multivariate imperfect repair concept, where p represents 
the probability that a repair is unsuccessful and the item is scrapped (replaced), and q=1-p 
represents the probability that a minimal repair will occur.  This research considers the case when 
only one component at a time can fail and then generalizes the model for multiple simultaneous 
component failures.   
 
 In [15], the authors establish the concept of a degree of repair, An.  This concept will be 
elaborated in detail in next section of this appendix, when the generalized renewal process (GRP) 
is explained.  However, it is mentioned here to set the framework for the literature that builds off 
that fundamental concept, but does not utilize the GRP. 
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The bivariate concept of repair was expanded upon, and sometimes referenced as a 
geometric process by multiple papers including [16], which examines the problem from the angle 
of both working age (residual age) and failure numbers.  This concept is accompanied by [17] 
which investigates an optimization of replacement policy implementing both analytical and 
numerical solutions.  The concept is then extended for a multistate degenerative system in [18].    
 
The concept of imperfect maintenance was implemented in a cumulative damage shock 
model by [19] for optimization of preventive maintenance periods that minimized the expected 
cost rate.  In this paper, the imperfect repair reduces the damage to the system by 100(1-b) %, 
where b is the degree of effectiveness of the maintenance action.  The authors expand upon the 
model to include minimal repairs at the point where the system fails due to the cumulative damage 
accrued from periodic (according to a Poisson process) shocks to the system in [20]. 
 
All the renewal models discussed until now have assumed repair or maintenance actions to 
be point processes with a negligible time.  This assumption is relaxed by [21], who develops 
unavailability steady state fractions.   
 
C.2. GENERALIZED RENEWAL PROCESS THEORY  
The classical renewal theory focuses on associated counting processes, N(t).  [22] focuses 
on the renewal function (g-renewal function), H(t)=E[N(t)], and the renewal density function (g-
renewal density), h(t)=(d/dt)H(t).  The theory defines intervals between failures as a Markov 
process in discrete times of non-negative real numbers which is temporally and spatially 
homogenous.   
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The concept of a virtual age is introduced in [23], a paper that considers periodic system 
replacement as well as failure replacement.  Then, in [15], the general repair models for 
repairable systems using the concept of virtual age are established.  This is the paper that lays the 
foundation for the modern GRP literature.   
 
Until [15], the stochastic behavior of repairable systems assumed either perfect or 
minimal repair.  The new GRP utilizes the concept of virtual age.  If the virtual age of the system 
is Vn-1=y immediately after the (n-1)
th repair, then the nth failure time Xn is distributed as: 
 1
( ) ( )
| ]   
1 ( )
Pr[ n n
F x y F y
x V y
F y
X 
 
  

  (C.1) 
Here F(x) is the failure time distribution of a system with virtual age V0=0, or a “new” system.  
The authors define An as the “degree” (or quality) of the nth repair.  Two possible models are 
developed by the authors and, in recent publications, remain relevant.   
 
The first model, which will be referred to as KIJIMA I, assumes that the nth repair cannot 
remove the damage (age) incurred before the (n-1)th repair.  The additional age added to the 
virtual age of the system is reduced from Xn to An* Xn.  Therefore, the virtual age after the nth 
repair is: 
 1n n n nXV V A    (C.2) 
 
The second model, which will be referred to as KIJIMA II, assumes that the nth repair 
can remove the damage (age) that has been accumulated before the (n-1)th repair.  The second 
model shows a virtual age after the nth repair as: 
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  1  n n n nA XV V     (C.3) 
 
In both KIJIMA models, An is a random variable with values of the range [0,1].  If An=0, 
then the models represent the special case of perfect repair.  If An=1, the models represent the 
special case of minimal repair.   
 
The development of the generalized renewal theory set the groundwork for the expansion 
from renewal models that considered two repair types (perfect or minimal repair), which resulted 
in two post-repair conditions (“as good as new” and “as bad as old”) to renewal models that 
considered five post-repair conditions: “as good as new”, “as bad as old”, “better than old, but 
worse than new”, “worse than old”, and “better than new”.   
 
The "better than old, but worse than new” post-repair condition is a result of a repair that 
has a degree, An, somewhere between (0,1).  This means that the repair was better than minimal 
repair, but not as effective as perfect repair.  This is intuitively a very common post-repair 
condition, as there are many cases where it is unrealistic for actions applied to a complex system 
to repair the entire system perfectly, but where the repair actions still do improve the condition of 
the system more than the minimal repair assumption indicates.  The “worse than old” post-repair 
condition is a result of a repair that has a degree An>1.  This means that the “repair” damaged or 
aged the system further instead bringing it to a “newer” or less-degraded state.  Such an event 
can occur when a maintenance worker is improperly trained and causes damage to the system 
instead of rejuvenating the system.  Finally, the “better than new” post-repair condition is a result 
of a repair that has a degree, An<0.  This can occur when the resulting repair action brings the 
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system to a state that is less aged or degraded than when the system originated.  Such an action 
could potentially include a situation where a repair mitigates some underlying failure mechanism 
of the system; thus, producing a slower rate of degradation and a reduced likelihood of failure for 
the system. 
 
The expected number of failures from the time when the system is put in operation (t=0) 
until an arbitrary time, T, is given by the solution of the G-renewal equation: 
  
0 0
| 0 ( ) ( | )H(t)=
T T
g h x g x x dx d  
 
  
 
 
    (C.4) 
where: 
  
 
 
g |
1
f t qx
t x
F qx



  (C.5) 
represents the conditional probability density function; q is the parameter or rejuvenation or 
quality of repair[23].  The closed form solution of Equation (C.4) is not available for an 
underlying Weibull distribution.  A Monte Carlo simulation numerical approach is discussed in 
[24].  This Monte Carlo approach to estimation is applied for warranty data analysis for data 
collected over 18 months and used to estimate the parameters of the Weibull distribution to be 
used in the GRP modeling. 
 
C.3. GENERALIZED RENEWAL PROCESS APPLICATIONS 
Having been introduced approximately 25 years ago, the GRP is still very young.  A 
large part of the literature regarding the GRP is focused on the development of the process itself 
and the assumptions that surround the process and the different techniques used to find solutions 
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(analytical or numerical) for the GRP.  This section discusses some of the areas where the GRP 
has been applied.   
 
A replacement model with general repair is used to develop an optimal replacement 
policy for the expected average cost per unit time in [25].  The benefit that can be derived from 
an item as a function of its virtual age is explored in [26].  The paper considers an item than can 
only be repaired N times and which continuously yields a benefit at a rate which is a function 
only of its virtual age.  The model takes into consideration costs for maintenance and explores 
the total benefit of the item. 
 
Most applications of the GRP utilized a maximum likelihood estimation of the 
parameters for the model.  However, [27] demonstrated that even when there is a relatively small 
amount of data, a Bayesian approach can be sufficient for estimation of the parameters and the 
model can still accurately describe the failure data. 
 
The behavior of the KIJIMA I and KIJIMA II models with underlying Weibull time-to-
failure distributions is explored in [28].  This paper explores the sensitivity of the GRP models 
for the degree of repair as well as the shape and scale parameters of the underlying Weibull 
distributions.  The decision between performing preventive replacement or renewal maintenance 
is explored in [29].  The various decision variables are taken into consideration including the 
time between preventive replacements.  The model utilizes the KIJIMA II type general or 
imperfect repair, as well as random failure times to decide the optimal method for renewal. 
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Time dependent scale transformation of the underlying distribution function is explored 
and compared to the virtual age processes proposed by Kijima in [30].  Both KIJIMA I and 
KIJIMA II models are used to compute a mean cost function in order to determine optimal 
preventive maintenance schedules in [31].  The authors found that KIJIMA I models required 
optimal preventive maintenance periods to be more uniformly spread out over the life of the 
system, whereas in the KIJIMA II models the required optimal preventive maintenance periods 
between required actions quickly decreased.  One important observation that the authors make at 
the end of this paper is that maintenance not only reduces the occurrence of failures, but also 
increases the efficiency of the system.  Therefore, cost optimization methods should account for 
this increase in efficiency in future lifetime cost optimization work. 
 
A point process model, known as the geometric process, models the “better than new” 
post-repair condition using the maximum likelihood estimation of the model for the case of the 
Exponential and Weibull underlying distributions in [32].  The Monte Carlo simulation 
approach, combined with a semi-Markov chain theory, allowed for an accurate estimation for an 
underlying failure distribution function of Weibull in [33].   
 
The authors of [34] discuss systems whose state cannot be known without inspection of 
the system.  Such inspections have an associated cost that is incorporated into the optimization 
maintenance strategy using an iterative algorithm to minimize the mean long-run cost rate.  The 
author of [35] points out that the cost-centric optimization methods ignore “the value dimension” 
of maintenance.  This paper explores general repair optimization incorporating semi-Markov 
decision methods, discounted cash flow techniques, and dynamic programming. 
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Three of the most popular maintenance policies are studied in [36].  For a Weibull failure 
time distribution function for the g-renewal Kijima models, the authors developed two efficient 
solutions: an approximate solution previously developed in [37] and a Monte Carlo simulation 
method.  The authors examine the sensitivity of each model with respect to the restoration factor 
(degree of repair) to benchmark other approximate methods for solving g-renewal equations. 
 
The GRP literature largely focuses on cost optimization work for maintenance.  The most 
common decision variable explored is the length of time between preventive maintenance 
activities.  The models are built based on point estimates developed from maximum likelihood 
approaches.  GRP literature generally focuses on single failure modes for system optimization 
analysis.  As is pointed out in [38], some models are considered “black box” models where the 
main goal is simply to fit the model to data.  Therefore, it becomes difficult to consider multiple 
failure modes.  However, to most accurately represent a system and optimize it for cost or 
availability, it is important to consider all the possible failure modes.  
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APPENDIX D: MATLAB CODES FOR CRACK PROPAGATION SIMULATION OF 
ALLOY 690 AND STAINLESS STEEL 
 
D.1 PITTING TO CRACK TRANSITION CODE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TO FLAW 
TRANSITION RATE FOR ALLOY 690 
 
% LHS SCC Pit Growth Propagation Code for Alloy 690 
% Developer: Nick O'Shea 
% Date: 7.6.16 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 1: Initialization 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
%Simulation Conditions 
p = parpool('local', 2); 
numsamp = 50; 
deltagrowthtime = 1;                     %step-time in [s] (3600s = 1hr) 
Maxruntimeinyears = 60;                  %max run time for the code in years 
% myCluster=parcluster('local'); 
% myCluster.NumWorkers = 20; 
% saveProfile(myCluster); 
% parpool(myCluster, 20); 
%parpool('size'); 
%Variable initialization 
minpit = 2.5E-5;                        %min pit size 
alphamin = 9.59166E-09; 
alphamax = 2.82489E-07; 
beta = 0.5;                             %initialize beta parameter for sample growth size of pits 
CW=2;                                   %[percent] CW by Rolling for exp trans region 
sigma_ys = (CW*20.283)+296.61;          %[MPa] calculate yield strength 
sigma_app = 430;                        %[MPa] total effective stress (applied+residual) exp trans 
region 
%SCC Constants 
SIFthreshold = 9;                       %[MPasqrt(m)] SIF when SCC crack propagation begins 
Tref = 598.15;                          %[Kelvin] Normalize to 325C 
Q = 120;                                %kJ/mol for Alloy 690 
R = 0.008314;                           %[kJ/mol-K] Boltzmann constant 
H2 = 26;                                %[cc/kg] Hydrogen concentration of primary water environment 
temp = 598.15;                          %[K] temperature of primary water 325 
C690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
n690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
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m690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
B690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
alpha690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
beta690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
prefail690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
toosmall690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
numcrack690pittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
TTCtable = nan(numsamp,1);              %data matrix for TTF tracking 
initpittable = nan(numsamp,1);          %data matrix for initial pit size 
cracktranstable = nan(numsamp,1);       %data matrix for tracking transition size of flaw/crack 
initpitvaluetable = nan(numsamp,1); 
Maximumruntime = Maxruntimeinyears*365.25*24*60*60;   
%years*days*hours*minutes*seconds 
%Fitting Weibull distribution to Turnbull Data at 15,402 hours 
numbin = [5,16,33,22,19,10,3,2,2,1]; 
binbounds = [20,40,60,80,100,120,140,160,180,200,220];      %microns 
totalinitpits = sum(numbin); 
initpitdatatable = nan(max(size(numbin)),max(numbin)); 
for pout = 1:max(size(numbin)) 
    for pin = 1:numbin(pout) 
        initpitdatatable(pout,pin) = (binbounds(pout)+(rand*(binbounds((pout+1))-
binbounds(pout))))*(1E-6); 
    end 
end 
initpitdatatablecolumn = initpitdatatable(:); 
initpitdatatablecolumn(isnan(initpitdatatablecolumn)) = []; 
pdW=fitdist(initpitdatatablecolumn,'Weibull'); 
WeibullA = 1/((pdW.A)^(pdW.B)); 
WeibullB = pdW.B; 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 2: Generate Samples 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
%Crack model parameters 
load('Alloy690params.mat');     %#,C,m,n,B,s 
[datalength, ~] = size(Alloy690params); 
alphadist = makedist('Uniform','lower',alphamin,'upper',alphamax); 
randalphadist = random(alphadist,datalength,1); 
Alloy690params = [Alloy690params randalphadist]; 
randpitdist = random(pdW,datalength,1); 
Alloy690params = [Alloy690params randpitdist]; 
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[datalength, numvar] = size(Alloy690params); 
rng shuffle; 
randnummatrix = rand(numsamp,numvar); 
samplematrix = zeros(numsamp,numvar); 
for j = 1:numvar 
    idx = randperm(numsamp)'; 
    Pmatrix = ((idx-randnummatrix(:,j))/numsamp).*100; 
    samplematrix(:,j) = prctile(Alloy690params(:,j),Pmatrix); %#,C,m,n,Beta(CPR),s,alpha,initpit 
end 
parfor samp = 1:numsamp 
    remainder = rem(samp,10); 
    if remainder == 0 
        fprintf('Sample: %d\n',samp) 
    end 
    dt = deltagrowthtime; 
    prefail = 0;               %reset too large sample counter 
    toosmall = 0; 
    numcrack = 0; 
    growthtime = 0;             %reset growth time for each sample 
    checker = 0; 
    cracksize = nan; 
    alpha = samplematrix(samp,7); 
    C690 = samplematrix(samp,2); 
    m690 = samplematrix(samp,3); 
    n690 = samplematrix(samp,4); 
    B690 = samplematrix(samp,5);     
    %record model parameter selection 
    C690pittable(samp) = C690; 
    n690pittable(samp) = n690; 
    m690pittable(samp) = m690; 
    B690pittable(samp) = B690; 
    alpha690pittable(samp) = alpha; 
    beta690pittable(samp) = beta; 
    pitsize = samplematrix(samp,8); 
    initpitvaluetable(samp,1) = pitsize; 
    SIF = sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*pitsize); 
    pitgrowthrate = (beta*(alpha^(1/beta))*(pitsize^(1-(1/beta)))); %[m/s] 
    dadt690 = (C690*exp(-(Q/R)*((1/temp)-(1/Tref)))*(sigma_ys^m690)*((SIF-
SIFthreshold)^n690)*(H2^B690)); %calc dadt [m/s] 
    %Check for Initial Pit Out of Acceptable Range 
    if ((abs(real(dadt690)) >= pitgrowthrate) && (SIF >= SIFthreshold)) 
        %if ((dadt690 >= pitgrowthrate) && (SIF >= SIFthreshold)) 
        prefail = prefail+1; 
    end 
    %pit propagation loop 
    if prefail == 0 
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        while (growthtime < Maximumruntime) 
            pitgrowth = pitgrowthrate*dt; 
            pitsize = pitsize+pitgrowth; 
            growthtime = growthtime+dt; 
            if (growthtime>=1*3600) && (growthtime<(1*3600+3600)) 
                dt = 1800; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=240*3600) && (growthtime<(240*3600+10800)) 
                dt = 5400; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=720*3600) && (growthtime<(720*3600+21600)) 
                dt = 10800; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=4320*3600) && (growthtime<(4320*3600+43200)) 
                dt = 21600; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=8640*3600) && (growthtime<(8640*3600+86400)) 
                dt = 43200; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            end             
            pitgrowthrate = (beta*(alpha^(1/beta))*(pitsize^(1-(1/beta)))); 
            SIF = sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*pitsize); 
            dadt690 = (C690*exp(-(Q/R)*((1/temp)-(1/Tref)))*(sigma_ys^m690)*((SIF-
SIFthreshold)^n690)*(H2^B690)); %calc dadt [m/s] 
            if (SIF >= SIFthreshold) 
                if (dadt690 >= pitgrowthrate) 
                    TTCtable(samp) = growthtime/3600;         %convert to hours 
                    numcrack = numcrack+1; 
                    cracksize = pitsize; 
                    cracktranstable(samp)=cracksize; 
                    break 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
    prefail690pittable(samp) = prefail; 
    % toosmall690pittable(samp) = toosmall; 
    numcrack690pittable(samp) = numcrack; 
end 
%Fraction of pits that propagate to cracks 
totalprefails = sum(prefail690pittable); 
fprintf('Number of Prefails = %d\n',totalprefails) 
% totaltoosmalls = sum(toosmall690pittable); 
% fprintf('Number of Toosmalls = %d\n',totaltoosmalls) 
totalnumcracks = sum(numcrack690pittable); 
totalnumpits = numsamp-totalprefails; 
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percentage = (totalnumcracks/totalnumpits)*100; 
fprintf('There were %d cracks out of %d pits, which is %6.2f percent of pits\n',totalnumcracks, 
totalnumpits, percentage); 
%TTF distribution of transition from N to F stage 
TTCtablecolumn = TTCtable(:); 
TTCtablecolumn(isnan(TTCtablecolumn)) = []; 
TTCmean = mean(TTCtablecolumn); 
TTCvary = var(TTCtablecolumn); 
%pdf development for 1 set of model parameters 
%pd1=fitdist(TTCtablecolumn,'Normal'); 
%pd1=fitdist(TTCtablecolumn,'Exponential'); 
pd1=fitdist(TTCtablecolumn,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov'); 
%LAMBDAN2F=1/(pd1.mu); 
fprintf('Mean TTC = %f [hours] \n',TTCmean) 
fprintf('TTC Variance = %f [hours] \n',TTCvary) 
%fprintf('Crack Rate from New Stage = %f [1/hours] \n',LAMBDAN2F) 
%fprintf('STD TTC= %f \n',pd1.sigma) 
% addition for mean and variance for convergence check 
alphavalue = 0.05; 
gammavalue = 0.05; 
statt = tinv(1-(alphavalue/2),(numsamp-1)); 
GAMMAFRAC=gammavalue/(1+gammavalue); 
numsamplesreq=TTCvary*(statt^2)/((GAMMAFRAC*TTCmean)^2); 
fprintf('Number of required simulations for time from flaw = %d\n',numsamplesreq); 
delete(gcp('nocreate')); 
 
D.2 PITTING TO CRACK TRANSITION CODE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TO FLAW 
TRANSITION RATE FOR STAINLESS STEEL 
 
% LHS SCC Pit Growth Propagation Code 
% Developer: Nick O'Shea 
% Date: 7.6.16 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 1: Initialization 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
%Simulation Conditions 
%p = parpool('local', 2); 
numsamp = 500; 
deltagrowthtime = 1;                     %step-time in [s] (3600s = 1hr) 
Maxruntimeinyears = 60;                  %max run time for the code in years 
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myCluster=parcluster('local'); 
myCluster.NumWorkers = 2; 
saveProfile(myCluster); 
parpool(myCluster, 2); 
%parpool('size'); 
%Variable initialization 
minpit = 2.5E-5;                        %min pit size 
alphamin = 9.59166E-09; 
alphamax = 2.82489E-07; 
beta = 0.5;                             %initialize beta parameter for sample growth size of pits                                  
%[percent] CW by Rolling for exp trans region 
sigma_ys = 263.75;          %[MPa] calculate yield strength 
sigma_app = 430;                        %[MPa] total effective stress (applied+residual) exp trans 
region 
%SCC Constants 
SIFthreshold = 10;                       %[MPasqrt(m)] SIF when SCC crack propagation begins 
Tref = 598.15;                          %[Kelvin] Normalize to 325C 
Q = 84;                                %kJ/mol for Alloy 690 
R = 0.008314;                           %[kJ/mol-K] Boltzmann constant 
temp = 598.15;                          %[K] temperature of primary water 325 
CSSpittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
nSSpittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
mSSpittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
alphaSSpittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
betaSSpittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
prefailSSpittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
toosmallSSpittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
numcrackSSpittable = nan(numsamp,1); 
TTCtable = nan(numsamp,1);              %data matrix for TTF tracking 
initpittable = nan(numsamp,1);          %data matrix for initial pit size 
cracktranstable = nan(numsamp,1);       %data matrix for tracking transition size of flaw/crack 
initpitvaluetable = nan(numsamp,1); 
Maximumruntime = Maxruntimeinyears*365.25*24*60*60;   
%years*days*hours*minutes*seconds 
%Fitting Weibull distribution to Turnbull Data at 15,402 hours 
numbin = [5,16,33,22,19,10,3,2,2,1]; 
binbounds = [20,40,60,80,100,120,140,160,180,200,220];      %microns 
totalinitpits = sum(numbin); 
initpitdatatable = nan(max(size(numbin)),max(numbin)); 
for pout = 1:max(size(numbin)) 
    for pin = 1:numbin(pout) 
        initpitdatatable(pout,pin) = (binbounds(pout)+(rand*(binbounds((pout+1))-
binbounds(pout))))*(1E-6); 
    end 
end 
initpitdatatablecolumn = initpitdatatable(:); 
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initpitdatatablecolumn(isnan(initpitdatatablecolumn)) = []; 
pdW=fitdist(initpitdatatablecolumn,'Weibull'); 
WeibullA = 1/((pdW.A)^(pdW.B)); 
WeibullB = pdW.B; 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 2: Generate Samples 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
%Crack model parameters 
load('SSparams.mat');     %#,C,m,n,B,s 
[datalength, ~] = size(SSparams); 
alphadist = makedist('Uniform','lower',alphamin,'upper',alphamax); 
randalphadist = random(alphadist,datalength,1); 
SSparams = [SSparams randalphadist]; 
randpitdist = random(pdW,datalength,1); 
SSparams = [SSparams randpitdist]; 
[datalength, numvar] = size(SSparams); 
rng shuffle; 
randnummatrix = rand(numsamp,numvar); 
samplematrix = zeros(numsamp,numvar); 
for j = 1:numvar 
    idx = randperm(numsamp)'; 
    Pmatrix = ((idx-randnummatrix(:,j))/numsamp).*100; 
    samplematrix(:,j) = prctile(SSparams(:,j),Pmatrix); %#,C,m,n,Beta(CPR),s,alpha,initpit 
end 
parfor samp = 1:numsamp 
    remainder = rem(samp,10); 
    if remainder == 0 
        fprintf('Sample: %d\n',samp) 
    end 
    dt = deltagrowthtime; 
    prefail = 0;               %reset too large sample counter 
    toosmall = 0; 
    numcrack = 0; 
    growthtime = 0;             %reset growth time for each sample 
    checker = 0; 
    cracksize = nan; 
    alpha = samplematrix(samp,7); 
    CSS = samplematrix(samp,2); 
    mSS = samplematrix(samp,3); 
    nSS = samplematrix(samp,4); 
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    %record model parameter selection 
    CSSpittable(samp) = CSS; 
    nSSpittable(samp) = nSS; 
    mSSpittable(samp) = mSS; 
    alphaSSpittable(samp) = alpha; 
    betaSSpittable(samp) = beta; 
    pitsize = samplematrix(samp,8); 
    initpitvaluetable(samp,1) = pitsize; 
    SIF = sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*pitsize); 
    pitgrowthrate = (beta*(alpha^(1/beta))*(pitsize^(1-(1/beta)))); %[m/s] 
    dadt_SS = (CSS*exp(-(Q/R)*((1/temp)-(1/Tref)))*(sigma_ys^mSS)*((SIF-
SIFthreshold)^nSS)); %calc dadt [m/s] 
    %Check for Initial Pit Out of Acceptable Range 
    if ((abs(real(dadt_SS)) >= pitgrowthrate) && (SIF >= SIFthreshold)) 
        %if ((dadt690 >= pitgrowthrate) && (SIF >= SIFthreshold)) 
        prefail = prefail+1; 
    end 
    %pit propagation loop 
    if prefail == 0 
        while (growthtime < Maximumruntime) 
            pitgrowth = pitgrowthrate*dt; 
            pitsize = pitsize+pitgrowth; 
            growthtime = growthtime+dt; 
            if (growthtime>=1*3600) && (growthtime<(1*3600+3600)) 
                dt = 3600; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=240*3600) && (growthtime<(240*3600+10800)) 
                dt = 10800; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=720*3600) && (growthtime<(720*3600+21600)) 
                dt = 21600; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=4320*3600) && (growthtime<(4320*3600+43200)) 
                dt = 43200; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=8640*3600) && (growthtime<(8640*3600+86400)) 
                dt = 86400; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            elseif (growthtime>=17280*3600) && (growthtime<(17280*3600+172800)) 
                dt = 172800; 
                %fprintf('dt: %d\n',dt) 
            end             
            pitgrowthrate = (beta*(alpha^(1/beta))*(pitsize^(1-(1/beta)))); 
            SIF = sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*pitsize); 
            dadt_SS = (CSS*exp(-(Q/R)*((1/temp)-(1/Tref)))*(sigma_ys^mSS)*((SIF-
SIFthreshold)^nSS)); %calc dadt [m/s] 
447 
 
            if (SIF >= SIFthreshold) 
                if (dadt_SS >= pitgrowthrate) 
                    TTCtable(samp) = growthtime/3600;         %convert to hours 
                    numcrack = numcrack+1; 
                    cracksize = pitsize; 
                    cracktranstable(samp)=cracksize; 
                    break 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
    prefailSSpittable(samp) = prefail; 
    % toosmall690pittable(samp) = toosmall; 
    numcrackSSpittable(samp) = numcrack; 
end 
%Fraction of pits that propagate to cracks 
totalprefails = sum(prefailSSpittable); 
fprintf('Number of Prefails = %d\n',totalprefails) 
% totaltoosmalls = sum(toosmall690pittable); 
% fprintf('Number of Toosmalls = %d\n',totaltoosmalls) 
totalnumcracks = sum(numcrackSSpittable); 
totalnumpits = numsamp-totalprefails; 
percentage = (totalnumcracks/totalnumpits)*100; 
fprintf('There were %d cracks out of %d pits, which is %6.2f percent of pits\n',totalnumcracks, 
totalnumpits, percentage); 
%TTF distribution of transition from N to F stage 
TTCtablecolumn = TTCtable(:); 
TTCtablecolumn(isnan(TTCtablecolumn)) = []; 
TTCmean = mean(TTCtablecolumn); 
TTCvary = var(TTCtablecolumn); 
%pdf development for 1 set of model parameters 
%pd1=fitdist(TTCtablecolumn,'Normal'); 
%pd1=fitdist(TTCtablecolumn,'Exponential'); 
pd1=fitdist(TTCtablecolumn,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov'); 
%LAMBDAN2F=1/(pd1.mu); 
fprintf('Mean TTC = %f [hours] \n',TTCmean) 
fprintf('TTC Variance = %f [hours] \n',TTCvary) 
%fprintf('Crack Rate from New Stage = %f [1/hours] \n',LAMBDAN2F) 
%fprintf('STD TTC= %f \n',pd1.sigma) 
% addition for mean and variance for convergence check 
alphavalue = 0.05; 
gammavalue = 0.05; 
statt = tinv(1-(alphavalue/2),(numsamp-1)); 
GAMMAFRAC=gammavalue/(1+gammavalue); 
numsamplesreq=TTCvary*(statt^2)/((GAMMAFRAC*TTCmean)^2); 
fprintf('Number of required simulations for time from flaw = %d\n',numsamplesreq); 
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delete(gcp('nocreate')); 
 
D.3 STRESS CORROSION CRACKING PROPAGATION CODE FOR DEVELOPING FLAW 
TO LEAK, FLAW TO RUPTURE, AND LEAK TO RUPTURE TRANSITION RATES FOR 
ALLOY 690 
 
% Crack Propagation MATLAB Code for SCC Alloy 690 using LHS 
% Developer: Nick O'Shea 
% Date: 6.27.16 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 1: Initialization 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% Simulation conditions 
% p = parpool('local', 2); 
numsamp = 100; 
myCluster = parcluster('local'); 
myCluster.NumWorkers = 2; 
saveProfile(myCluster); 
parpool(myCluster, 2);              
timestep = 3600;                                    % seconds to one loop 3600 = 1 hour 
prefailtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
noproptable = nan(numsamp,1); 
NOFAILtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
numF2Ltable = nan(numsamp,1); 
numF2Rtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
numL2Rtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
LNORtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
datamean = nan(numsamp,1); 
difftable = nan(numsamp,1); 
datamean2 = nan(numsamp,1); 
difftable2 = nan(numsamp,1); 
datatable = nan(numsamp,1);      % data matrix for TTF tracking 
L2Rtable = nan(numsamp,1);       % data matric for L2R time storage 
%temp_L2Rtable = zeros(numsamp,1); 
maxtime = 60*365.25*24*60*60;                    % max time set to 60 years 
%Steam Generator Tube Information 
thickness = 0.002;                          %[m] thickness of tube 
Radius = 0.0155/2;                          %[m] tube inside radius for use in failure code 
CW = 2;                                       %[percent] CW by Rolling for exp trans region 
sigma_ys = (CW*20.283)+296.61;              %[MPa] calculate yield strength 
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sigma_uts = 709;                            %[MPa] ultimate tensile stress 
sigma_app = 430;            %[MPa] total effective stress (applied+residual) exp trans region 
%Primary Coolant Information 
H2 = 26;                         %[cc/kg] Hydrogen concentration of primary water environment 
temp = 598.15;                              %[K] temperature of primary water 325 
p_pressure = 17.24;                         %[MPa] primary side pressure 
s_pressure = 5.67;                          %[MPa] secondary side pressure 
d_pressure = p_pressure - s_pressure;       %[MPa] pressure differential 
% SCC Constants 
Kth = 9;                                    %[MPaROOT(m)] threshold SCC intensity factor 
Tref = 598.15;                              %[Kelvin] Normalize to 325C 
Q = 120;                                    %kJ/mol for Alloy 690 
R = 0.008314;                               %[kJ/mol-K] Boltzmann constant 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 2: Generate Samples 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% Load model parameter distributions for Alloy 690 
load('Alloy690params.mat');     %#,C,m,n,B,s,adding crack size 
[datalength, ~] = size(Alloy690params); 
initcrackdist = makedist('Gamma','a',3.393,'b',1.395); 
maxcracklength = 2*(2/0.24);    %mm (2*c=length)(2mm max crack depth)(0.24 max aspect 
ratio(a/c)) 
truncinitcrackdist = truncate(initcrackdist,0,maxcracklength);        %[mm] 
randinitcrackdist = random(truncinitcrackdist,datalength,1); 
randinitcrackdist = randinitcrackdist./1000;    %convert to m 
randinitcrackdist = randinitcrackdist./2;        %convert to half length 
Alloy690params = [Alloy690params randinitcrackdist]; 
[datalength, numvar] = size(Alloy690params); 
rng shuffle; 
randnummatrix = rand(numsamp,numvar); 
samplematrix = zeros(numsamp,numvar); 
for j = 1:numvar 
    idx = randperm(numsamp)'; 
    Pmatrix = ((idx-randnummatrix(:,j))/numsamp).*100; 
    samplematrix(:,j) = prctile(Alloy690params(:,j),Pmatrix); %#,C,m,n,Beta,s, c_initial 
end 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
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% SECTION 3: Building Time-To-100%TW Iteration Loop 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
parfor samp = 1:numsamp 
    remainder = rem(samp,10); 
    if remainder == 0 
        fprintf('Sample: %d\n',samp); 
    end 
    prefail = 0;                % number of flaws that already failed 
    noprop = 0;                 % number of flaws that do not propagate via SCC 
    NOFAIL = 0;                 % number of flaws that propagate but do not fail in 60 years 
    numfail_F2L = 0;               % number of flaws that fail by leak 
    numfail_F2R = 0;               % number of flaws that fail by rupture 
    numfail_L2R = 0;               % number of flaws that fail by leak and then rupture 
    LNOR = 0;                      % number of flaws that fail by leak but not rupture 
    fail_F2L = 0; 
    fail_F2R = 0; 
    fail_L2R = 0; 
    L2Rtime  = 0; 
    C690 = samplematrix(samp,2); 
    m690 = samplematrix(samp,3); 
    n690 = samplematrix(samp,4); 
    B690 = samplematrix(samp,5); 
    c_initial = samplematrix(samp,7); 
    aspectratio=random('unif',0.24,0.35); 
    a_initial=c_initial*aspectratio; 
    fail = checkFail690(a_initial,c_initial,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius); 
    K_initial=(sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*a_initial)); 
    if fail == 1 
        prefail = prefail+1; 
    elseif K_initial<Kth 
        noprop = noprop+1; 
        fail = 1;      %sample does not fail, but done to avoid propagation loop 
    end 
    time = 0; 
    dt = timestep; 
    a = a_initial; 
    c = c_initial; 
    %Crack propagation loop 
    while(fail==0) 
        K=sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*a); 
        dadt_690 = (C690*exp(-(Q/R)*((1/temp)-(1/Tref)))*(sigma_ys^m690)*((K-
Kth)^n690)*(H2^B690)); %calc dadt [m/s] 
        random_ac=random('unif',0.24,0.35); 
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        dcdt=dadt_690/random_ac; 
        da=dadt_690*dt; 
        dc=dcdt*dt; 
        a=a+da; 
        c=c+dc; 
        time=time+dt; 
        if (time>=(10000*3600)) && (time<(10000*3600)+10800) 
            dt = 10800;                  %increase step time to 3 hours 
        elseif (time>=(20000*3600)) && (time<(20000*3600)+21600) 
            dt = 21600;                 %increase step time to 6 hours 
        elseif (time>=(40000*3600)) && (time<(40000*3600)+43200) 
            dt = 43200;                 %increase step time to 12 hours 
        elseif (time>=(80000*3600)) && (time<(80000*3600)+86400) 
            dt = 86400;                 %increase step time to 24 hours 
        elseif (time>=(100000*3600)) && (time<(100000*3600)+172800) 
            dt = 172800;                %increase step time to 48 hours 
        end 
        if (time >= maxtime) 
            NOFAIL=NOFAIL+1; 
            break 
        end 
        [fail_F2L, fail_F2R, 
fail]=checkFailure_690(a,c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius); 
        %Enter the Leak to Rupture Simulation 
        if (fail_F2L == 1) 
            numfail_F2L = numfail_F2L + 1; 
            fail_L2R = 0; 
            time_L2R = 0; 
            dt = timestep; 
            K = sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*a);               %calculate K with a=thickness 
            dadt_690 = (C690*exp(-(Q/R)*((1/temp)-(1/Tref)))*(sigma_ys^m690)*((K-Kth)^n690)); 
%calc dadt [m/s] 
            while (fail_L2R==0) 
                random_ac = random('unif',0.24,0.35); 
                dcdt = dadt_690/random_ac; 
                dc = dcdt*dt; 
                c = c + dc; 
                time_L2R = time_L2R + dt; 
                if (time_L2R>=(10000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(10000*3600)+10800) 
                    dt = 10800;                 %increase step time to 3 hours 
                elseif (time_L2R>=(20000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(20000*3600)+21600) 
                    dt = 21600;                 %increase step time to 6 hours 
                elseif (time_L2R>=(40000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(40000*3600)+43200) 
                    dt = 43200;                 %increase step time to 12 hours 
                elseif (time_L2R>=(80000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(80000*3600)+86400) 
                    dt = 86400;                 %increase step time to 24 hours 
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                elseif (time_L2R>=(100000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(100000*3600)+172800) 
                    dt = 172800;                %increase step time to 48 hours 
                end 
                if time_L2R>(maxtime-time) 
                    LNOR=LNOR + 1; 
                    break 
                end 
                fail_L2R = checkfail_L2R_690(c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius); 
            end 
            if (fail_L2R==1) 
                numfail_L2R = numfail_L2R +1; 
            end 
            L2Rttf = time_L2R/3600; 
            L2Rtable(samp) = L2Rttf; 
        end 
        if (fail_F2R == 1) 
            numfail_F2R = numfail_F2R + 1; 
        end 
    end 
    if (prefail == 1)||(noprop == 1) 
        datatable(samp) = nan; 
    else 
        ttf=(time/3600);                           %convert time to hours 
        datatable(samp)=ttf; 
    end 
    prefailtable(samp)=prefail; 
    noproptable(samp)=noprop; 
    NOFAILtable(samp)=NOFAIL; 
    numF2Ltable(samp)=numfail_F2L; 
    numF2Rtable(samp)=numfail_F2R; 
    numL2Rtable(samp)=numfail_L2R; 
    LNORtable(samp)=LNOR; 
end 
prefailtotal=sum(prefailtable); 
noproptotal=sum(noproptable); 
NOFAILTOTAL=sum(NOFAILtable); 
totalleaks=sum(numF2Ltable); 
totalruptures=sum(numF2Rtable); 
totalL2R=sum(numL2Rtable); 
totalLnotR=sum(LNORtable); 
fprintf('Total Number of Prefails: %d\n',prefailtotal); 
fprintf('Total Number of Noprops: %d\n',noproptotal); 
fprintf('Total Number of Non-failures: %d\n',NOFAILTOTAL); 
fprintf('Total Number of Ruptures: %d\n',totalruptures); 
fprintf('Total Number of Leaks: %d\n',totalleaks); 
fprintf('Total Number of Leaks to Ruptures: %d\n',totalL2R); 
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fprintf('Total Number of Leaks never Rupture: %d\n',totalLnotR); 
datatablecolumn=datatable(:); 
datatablecolumn(isnan(datatablecolumn))=[]; 
totalmean = mean(datatablecolumn); 
% Cumulative/Aggregated PDF 
pd2=fitdist(datatablecolumn,'Exponential'); 
LAMBDA=1/(pd2.mu); 
fprintf('Aggregated Mean TTF = %f [hours] \n',pd2.mu) 
fprintf('Aggregated Failure Rate from Flaw Stage = %f [1/hours] \n',LAMBDA) 
if (totalleaks > 0) 
    %PDF of times for L2R 
    L2Rtablecolumn=L2Rtable(:); 
    L2Rtablecolumn(isnan(L2Rtablecolumn))=[]; 
    L2Rtotalmean = mean(L2Rtablecolumn); 
    pd3=fitdist(L2Rtablecolumn,'Exponential'); 
    LAMBDAL2R=1/(pd3.mu); 
    fprintf('Mean TTR Given Leak State = %f [hours] \n',pd3.mu) 
    fprintf('Rupture Rate from Leak Stage = %f [1/hours] \n',LAMBDAL2R) 
end 
% addition for mean and variance for convergence check 
finalsamp = numsamp-(prefailtotal+noproptotal); 
varianceoutput = var(datatablecolumn); 
varianceoutput2 = var(L2Rtablecolumn); 
fprintf('Mean of TTF data out of F = %f hours\n',totalmean); 
fprintf('Variance of TTF data out of F = %f \n',varianceoutput); 
fprintf('Mean of TTF L2R data out of F = %f hours\n',L2Rtotalmean); 
fprintf('Variance of TTF L2R data out of F = %f \n',varianceoutput2); 
alphavalue = 0.05; 
gammavalue = 0.05; 
statt = tinv(1-(alphavalue/2),(numsamp-1)); 
GAMMAFRAC=gammavalue/(1+gammavalue); 
numsamplesreq=varianceoutput*(statt^2)/((GAMMAFRAC*totalmean)^2); 
fprintf('Number of required simulations for time from flaw = %d\n',numsamplesreq); 
numsamplesreq2=varianceoutput2*(statt^2)/((GAMMAFRAC*L2Rtotalmean)^2); 
fprintf('Number of required simulations for L2R = %d\n',numsamplesreq2); 
delete(gcp('nocreate')); 
 
D.4 STRESS CORROSION CRACKING PROPAGATION CODE FOR DEVELOPING FLAW 
TO LEAK, FLAW TO RUPTURE, AND LEAK TO RUPTURE TRANSITION RATES FOR 
STAINLESS STEEL 
 
% Crack Propagation MATLAB Code for SCC SS using LHS 
% Developer: Nick O'Shea 
% Date: 6.28.16 
% 
===================================================================== 
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% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 1: Initialization 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% Simulation conditions 
% p = parpool('local', 2); 
numsamp = 10; 
myCluster = parcluster('local'); 
myCluster.NumWorkers = 2; 
saveProfile(myCluster); 
parpool(myCluster, 2);              
timestep = 3600;                                    % seconds to one loop 3600 = 1 hour 
prefailtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
noproptable = nan(numsamp,1); 
NOFAILtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
numF2Ltable = nan(numsamp,1); 
numF2Rtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
numL2Rtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
LNORtable = nan(numsamp,1); 
datamean = nan(numsamp,1); 
difftable = nan(numsamp,1); 
datamean2 = nan(numsamp,1); 
difftable2 = nan(numsamp,1); 
datatable = nan(numsamp,1);      % data matrix for TTF tracking 
L2Rtable = nan(numsamp,1);       % data matric for L2R time storage 
maxtime = 60*365.25*24*60*60;                    % max time set to 60 years 
%Steam Generator Tube Information 
thickness = 0.002;                          %[m] thickness of tube 
Radius = 0.0155/2;                          %[m] tube inside radius for use in failure code 
%CW = 2;                                       %[percent] CW by Rolling for exp trans region 
%sigma_ys = (CW*20.283)+296.61;              %[MPa] calculate yield strength 
sigma_ys = 263.75;                          %[MPa] calculate yield strength from Table 3 Terachi paper 
sigma_uts = 709;                            %[MPa] ultimate tensile stress 
sigma_app = 430;            %[MPa] total effective stress (applied+residual) exp trans region 
%Primary Coolant Information 
H2 = 26;                         %[cc/kg] Hydrogen concentration of primary water environment 
temp = 598.15;                              %[K] temperature of primary water 325 
p_pressure = 17.24;                         %[MPa] primary side pressure 
s_pressure = 5.67;                          %[MPa] secondary side pressure 
d_pressure = p_pressure - s_pressure;       %[MPa] pressure differential 
% SCC Constants 
Kth = 10;                                    %[MPaROOT(m)] threshold SCC intensity factor 
Tref = 598.15;                              %[Kelvin] Normalize to 325C 
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Q = 84;                                    %kJ/mol for Alloy 690 
R = 0.008314;                               %[kJ/mol-K] Boltzmann constant 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 2: Generate Samples 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% Load model parameter distributions for Alloy 690 
load('SSparams.mat');     %#,C,m,n,~,s,adding crack size 
[datalength, ~] = size(SSparams); 
initcrackdist = makedist('Gamma','a',3.393,'b',1.395); 
maxcracklength = 2*(2/0.24);    %mm (2*c=length)(2mm max crack depth)(0.24 max aspect 
ratio(a/c)) 
truncinitcrackdist = truncate(initcrackdist,0,maxcracklength);        %[mm] 
randinitcrackdist = random(truncinitcrackdist,datalength,1); 
randinitcrackdist = randinitcrackdist./1000;    %convert to m 
randinitcrackdist = randinitcrackdist./2;        %convert to half length 
SSparams = [SSparams randinitcrackdist]; 
[datalength, numvar] = size(SSparams); 
rng shuffle; 
randnummatrix = rand(numsamp,numvar); 
samplematrix = zeros(numsamp,numvar); 
for j = 1:numvar 
    idx = randperm(numsamp)'; 
    Pmatrix = ((idx-randnummatrix(:,j))/numsamp).*100; 
    samplematrix(:,j) = prctile(SSparams(:,j),Pmatrix); %#,C,m,n,Beta,s, c_initial 
end 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
% SECTION 2: Building Time-To-100%TW Iteration Loop 
% 
===================================================================== 
% 
===================================================================== 
parfor samp = 1:numsamp 
    remainder = rem(samp,10); 
    if remainder == 0 
        fprintf('Sample: %d\n',samp); 
    end 
    prefail = 0;                % number of flaws that already failed 
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    noprop = 0;                 % number of flaws that do not propagate via SCC 
    NOFAIL = 0;                 % number of flaws that propagate but do not fail in 60 years 
    numfail_F2L = 0;               % number of flaws that fail by leak 
    numfail_F2R = 0;               % number of flaws that fail by rupture 
    numfail_L2R = 0;               % number of flaws that fail by leak and then rupture 
    LNOR = 0;                      % number of flaws that fail by leak but not rupture 
    fail_F2L = 0; 
    fail_F2R = 0; 
    fail_L2R = 0; 
    L2Rtime  = 0; 
    CSS = samplematrix(samp,2); 
    mSS = samplematrix(samp,3); 
    nSS = samplematrix(samp,4); 
    c_initial = samplematrix(samp,7); 
    aspectratio=random('unif',0.24,0.35); 
    a_initial=c_initial*aspectratio; 
    fail = checkFailSS(a_initial,c_initial,sigma_ys,thickness,d_pressure,Radius,sigma_uts); 
    K_initial=(sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*a_initial)); 
    if fail == 1 
        prefail = prefail+1; 
    elseif K_initial<Kth 
        noprop = noprop+1; 
        fail = 1;      %sample does not fail, but done to avoid propagation loop 
    end 
    time = 0; 
    dt = timestep; 
    a = a_initial; 
    c = c_initial; 
    %Crack propagation loop 
    while(fail==0) 
        K=sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*a); 
        dadt_SS = (CSS*exp(-(Q/R)*((1/temp)-(1/Tref)))*(sigma_ys^mSS)*((K-Kth)^nSS)); %calc 
dadt [m/s] 
        random_ac=random('unif',0.24,0.35); 
        dcdt=dadt_SS/random_ac; 
        da=dadt_SS*dt; 
        dc=dcdt*dt; 
        a=a+da; 
        c=c+dc; 
        time=time+dt; 
        if (time>=(10000*3600)) && (time<(10000*3600)+10800) 
            dt = 10800;                  %increase step time to 3 hours 
        elseif (time>=(20000*3600)) && (time<(20000*3600)+21600) 
            dt = 21600;                 %increase step time to 6 hours 
        elseif (time>=(40000*3600)) && (time<(40000*3600)+43200) 
            dt = 43200;                 %increase step time to 12 hours 
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        elseif (time>=(80000*3600)) && (time<(80000*3600)+86400) 
            dt = 86400;                 %increase step time to 24 hours 
        elseif (time>=(100000*3600)) && (time<(100000*3600)+172800) 
            dt = 172800;                %increase step time to 48 hours 
        end 
        if (time >= maxtime) 
            NOFAIL=NOFAIL+1; 
            break 
        end 
        [fail_F2L, fail_F2R, 
fail]=checkFailure_SS(a,c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius); 
        %Enter the Leak to Rupture Simulation 
        if (fail_F2L == 1) 
            numfail_F2L = numfail_F2L + 1; 
            fail_L2R = 0; 
            time_L2R = 0; 
            dt = timestep; 
            K = sigma_app*sqrt(pi()*a);               %calculate K with a=thickness 
            dadt_SS = (CSS*exp(-(Q/R)*((1/temp)-(1/Tref)))*(sigma_ys^mSS)*((K-Kth)^nSS)); 
%calc dadt [m/s] 
            while (fail_L2R==0) 
                random_ac = random('unif',0.24,0.35); 
                dcdt = dadt_SS/random_ac; 
                dc = dcdt*dt; 
                c = c + dc; 
                time_L2R = time_L2R + dt; 
                if (time_L2R>=(10000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(10000*3600)+10800) 
                    dt = 10800;                 %increase step time to 3 hours 
                elseif (time_L2R>=(20000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(20000*3600)+21600) 
                    dt = 21600;                 %increase step time to 6 hours 
                elseif (time_L2R>=(40000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(40000*3600)+43200) 
                    dt = 43200;                 %increase step time to 12 hours 
                elseif (time_L2R>=(80000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(80000*3600)+86400) 
                    dt = 86400;                 %increase step time to 24 hours 
                elseif (time_L2R>=(100000*3600)) && (time_L2R<(100000*3600)+172800) 
                    dt = 172800;                %increase step time to 48 hours 
                end 
                if time_L2R>(maxtime-time) 
                    LNOR=LNOR + 1; 
                    break 
                end 
                fail_L2R = checkfail_L2R_SS(a,c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius); 
            end 
            if (fail_L2R==1) 
                numfail_L2R = numfail_L2R +1; 
            end 
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            L2Rttf = time_L2R/3600; 
            L2Rtable(samp) = L2Rttf; 
        end 
        if (fail_F2R == 1) 
            numfail_F2R = numfail_F2R + 1; 
        end 
    end 
    if (prefail == 1)||(noprop == 1) 
        datatable(samp) = nan; 
    else 
        ttf=(time/3600);                           %convert time to hours 
        datatable(samp)=ttf; 
    end 
    prefailtable(samp)=prefail; 
    noproptable(samp)=noprop; 
    NOFAILtable(samp)=NOFAIL; 
    numF2Ltable(samp)=numfail_F2L; 
    numF2Rtable(samp)=numfail_F2R; 
    numL2Rtable(samp)=numfail_L2R; 
    LNORtable(samp)=LNOR; 
end 
prefailtotal=sum(prefailtable); 
noproptotal=sum(noproptable); 
NOFAILTOTAL=sum(NOFAILtable); 
totalleaks=sum(numF2Ltable); 
totalruptures=sum(numF2Rtable); 
totalL2R=sum(numL2Rtable); 
totalLnotR=sum(LNORtable); 
fprintf('Total Number of Prefails: %d\n',prefailtotal); 
fprintf('Total Number of Noprops: %d\n',noproptotal); 
fprintf('Total Number of Non-failures: %d\n',NOFAILTOTAL); 
fprintf('Total Number of Ruptures: %d\n',totalruptures); 
fprintf('Total Number of Leaks: %d\n',totalleaks); 
fprintf('Total Number of Leaks to Ruptures: %d\n',totalL2R); 
fprintf('Total Number of Leaks never Rupture: %d\n',totalLnotR); 
datatablecolumn=datatable(:); 
datatablecolumn(isnan(datatablecolumn))=[]; 
totalmean = mean(datatablecolumn); 
% Cumulative/Aggregated PDF 
pd2=fitdist(datatablecolumn,'Exponential'); 
LAMBDA=1/(pd2.mu); 
fprintf('Aggregated Mean TTF = %f [hours] \n',pd2.mu) 
fprintf('Aggregated Failure Rate from Flaw Stage = %f [1/hours] \n',LAMBDA) 
if (totalleaks > 0) 
    %PDF of times for L2R 
    L2Rtablecolumn=L2Rtable(:); 
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    L2Rtablecolumn(isnan(L2Rtablecolumn))=[]; 
    L2Rtotalmean = mean(L2Rtablecolumn); 
    pd3=fitdist(L2Rtablecolumn,'Exponential'); 
    LAMBDAL2R=1/(pd3.mu); 
    fprintf('Mean TTR Given Leak State = %f [hours] \n',pd3.mu) 
    fprintf('Rupture Rate from Leak Stage = %f [1/hours] \n',LAMBDAL2R) 
end 
% addition for mean and variance for convergence check 
finalsamp = numsamp-(prefailtotal+noproptotal); 
varianceoutput = var(datatablecolumn); 
varianceoutput2 = var(L2Rtablecolumn); 
fprintf('Mean of TTF data out of F = %f hours\n',totalmean); 
fprintf('Variance of TTF data out of F = %f \n',varianceoutput); 
fprintf('Mean of TTF L2R data out of F = %f hours\n',L2Rtotalmean); 
fprintf('Variance of TTF L2R data out of F = %f \n',varianceoutput2); 
alphavalue = 0.05; 
gammavalue = 0.05; 
statt = tinv(1-(alphavalue/2),(numsamp-1)); 
GAMMAFRAC=gammavalue/(1+gammavalue); 
numsamplesreq=varianceoutput*(statt^2)/((GAMMAFRAC*totalmean)^2); 
fprintf('Number of required simulations for time from flaw = %d\n',numsamplesreq); 
numsamplesreq2=varianceoutput2*(statt^2)/((GAMMAFRAC*L2Rtotalmean)^2); 
fprintf('Number of required simulations for L2R = %d\n',numsamplesreq2); 
delete(gcp('nocreate')); 
 
D.5 STRESS CORROSION CRACKING PROPAGATION FAILURE FUNCTIONS FOR 
TESTING SAMPLE TRANSITION BETWEEN FLAW, LEAK, AND RUPTURE STATES 
FOR ALLOY 690 
 
% checkFail() determines if the tube has failed 100%TW 
% 
===================================================================== 
function fail = checkFail690(a,c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius) 
% Steam Generator Assumptions/Constants 
sigma_bar = 0.5*(sigma_uts+sigma_ys); 
Pb = sigma_bar*log(1+(thickness/Radius)); % failure pressure for unflawed tube 
% determine pressure required to fail remaining ligament. does not 
% mean that the tube will burst (fish-mouth) at this pressure 
Rm = Radius+(thickness/2); 
lamda = (1.82*c)/sqrt(Rm*thickness); 
m1 = 0.614 + 0.481*lamda + 0.386*exp(-1.25*lamda); 
alpha = 1 + 0.9*(a/thickness)*(a/thickness)*(1 - 1/m1); 
mp = (1-(alpha*a/(m1*thickness)))/(1-(a/thickness)); 
Pcr = Pb/m1; 
Psc = Pb/mp; 
%ASME Burst (NUREG-6365) 
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m2 = sqrt(1 + 1.61*(c*c)/(Radius*thickness)); 
exp1 = ((thickness/a) - 1)/((thickness/a) - (1/m2)); 
Pb_ASME = (thickness/Radius)*(3*sigma_bar)*exp1; 
if (a > thickness) 
    fail = 1; 
end 
if (a <= thickness) 
    if (Psc < d_pressure) 
        fail = 1; 
    elseif (Pcr < d_pressure) 
        fail = 1; 
    elseif (Pb_ASME < d_pressure) 
        fail = 1; 
    else 
        fail = 0; 
    end 
end 
end 
 
% checkFailure_690 determines if the tube has failed (leak or rupture) for Alloy 690 
% Date: 3/23/16 
% 
===================================================================== 
function [fail_F2L, fail_F2R, fail] = 
checkFailure_690(a,c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius) 
% Steam GeneRadiusator Assumptions/Constants 
sigma_bar = 0.5*(sigma_uts+sigma_ys); 
Pb = sigma_bar*log(1+(thickness/Radius)); % failure pressure for unflawed tube 
% determine pressure required to fail remaining ligament. does not 
% mean that the tube will burst (fish-mouth) at this pressure 
Rm = Radius+(thickness/2); 
lamda = (1.82*c)/sqrt(Rm*thickness); 
m1 = 0.614 + 0.481*lamda + 0.386*exp(-1.25*lamda); 
alpha = 1 + 0.9*(a/thickness)*(a/thickness)*(1 - 1/m1); 
mp = (1-(alpha*a/(m1*thickness)))/(1-(a/thickness)); 
Pcr = Pb/m1; 
Psc = Pb/mp; 
%ASME Burst (NUREG-6365) 
m2 = sqrt(1 + 1.61*(c*c)/(Radius*thickness)); 
exp1 = ((thickness/a) - 1)/((thickness/a) - (1/m2)); 
Pb_ASME = (thickness/Radius)*(3*sigma_bar)*exp1; 
% check for burst to rupture 
if(Pb_ASME < d_pressure) 
    fail_F2R = 1; 
    fail_F2L = 0; 
    fail = 1; 
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elseif (Pb_ASME >= d_pressure) 
    fail_F2R = 0; 
    %check for ligament pressure 
    if(Psc < d_pressure) 
        fail_F2L = 1; 
        fail = 1; 
        if (Pcr < Psc) 
            fail_F2R = 1; 
            fail_F2L = 0; 
        end 
    elseif (Psc >= d_pressure) 
        fail_F2L = 0; 
        fail = 0; 
    end 
end 
end 
 
% checkfail_L2R_690 determines if the tube has failed (leak or rupture) for Alloy 690 
% Date: 3/29/16 
% 
===================================================================== 
function [fail_L2R] = checkfail_L2R_690(c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius) 
 
sigma_bar = 0.5*(sigma_uts+sigma_ys); 
Pb = sigma_bar*log(1+(thickness/Radius)); % failure pressure for unflawed tube 
% determine pressure required to fail remaining ligament. does not 
% mean that the tube will burst (fish-mouth) at this pressure 
Rm = Radius+(thickness/2); 
lamda = (1.82*c)/sqrt(Rm*thickness); 
m1 = 0.614 + 0.481*lamda + 0.386*exp(-1.25*lamda); 
Pcr = Pb/m1; 
 
if(Pcr < d_pressure) 
    fail_L2R = 1; 
elseif (Pcr > d_pressure) 
    fail_L2R = 0; 
end 
 
end 
 
D.6 STRESS CORROSION CRACKING PROPAGATION FAILURE FUNCTIONS FOR 
TESTING SAMPLE TRANSITION BETWEEN FLAW, LEAK, AND RUPTURE STATES 
FOR STAINLESS STEEL 
 
% checkFail() determines if the tube has failed 100%TW 
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% 
===================================================================== 
function fail = checkFailSS(a,c,sigma_ys,thickness,d_pressure,Radius,sigma_uts) 
%Modified B31G Rupture 
DDD = 2.0*(Radius + thickness); 
GGG = (c^4)/(DDD*thickness); 
if( GGG <= 50) 
    MMM = sqrt(1 + 0.6275*GGG - 0.003375*(GGG^2)); 
elseif( GGG > 50) 
    MMM = 0.032*GGG + 3.3; 
end 
PfB31G =  2*(sigma_ys + 68.95)*thickness*((1 - 0.85*a/thickness)/(1 - 
0.85*a/thickness/MMM))/DDD; 
%Shell-92 L2R  
M92=sqrt(1+((0.805*(c^4))/(DDD*thickness))); 
Pf92=((1.8*thickness*sigma_uts)/DDD)*((1-(a/thickness))/(1-(a/(thickness*M92)))); 
%remaining ligament bursts leading to leak 
sigma_bar = 0.5*(sigma_uts+sigma_ys); 
Pb = sigma_bar*log(1+(thickness/Radius)); % failure pressure for unflawed tube 
% determine pressure required to fail remaining ligament. does not 
% mean that the tube will burst (fish-mouth) at this pressure 
Rm = Radius+(thickness/2); 
lamda = (1.82*c)/sqrt(Rm*thickness); 
m1 = 0.614 + 0.481*lamda + 0.386*exp(-1.25*lamda); 
alpha = 1 + 0.9*(a/thickness)*(a/thickness)*(1 - 1/m1); 
mp = (1-(alpha*a/(m1*thickness)))/(1-(a/thickness)); 
Psc = Pb/mp; 
 
if (a > thickness) 
    fail = 1; 
end 
if (a <= thickness) 
    if (PfB31G < d_pressure) 
        fail = 1; 
    elseif (Pf92 < d_pressure) 
        fail = 1; 
    elseif (Psc < d_pressure) 
        fail = 1;         
    else 
        fail = 0; 
    end 
end 
end 
 
% checkFailure_SS determines if the tube has failed (leak or rupture) for Alloy 690 
% Date: 5/25/16 
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% All rupture conditions for SS are modeled the same as 690 (different 
% equations), but F=>L is simply using the a >= thickness condition as per 
% NUREG-6986 
% 
===================================================================== 
function [fail_F2L, fail_F2R, fail] = 
checkFailure_SS(a,c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius) 
%Modified B31G Rupture 
DDD = 2.0*(Radius + thickness); 
GGG = (c^4)/(DDD*thickness); 
if( GGG <= 50) 
    MMM = sqrt(1 + 0.6275*GGG - 0.003375*(GGG^2)); 
elseif( GGG > 50) 
    MMM = 0.032*GGG + 3.3; 
end 
PfB31G =  2*(sigma_ys + 68.95)*thickness*((1 - 0.85*a/thickness)/(1 - 
0.85*a/thickness/MMM))/DDD; 
%Shell-92 L2R  
M92=sqrt(1+((0.805*(c^4))/(DDD*thickness))); 
Pf92=((1.8*thickness*sigma_uts)/DDD)*((1-(a/thickness))/(1-(a/(thickness*M92)))); 
%remaining ligament bursts leading to leak 
%sigma_bar = 0.5*(sigma_uts+sigma_ys); 
%Pb = sigma_bar*log(1+(thickness/Radius)); % failure pressure for unflawed tube 
% determine pressure required to fail remaining ligament. does not 
% mean that the tube will burst (fish-mouth) at this pressure 
%Rm = Radius+(thickness/2); 
%lamda = (1.82*c)/sqrt(Rm*thickness); 
%m1 = 0.614 + 0.481*lamda + 0.386*exp(-1.25*lamda); 
%alpha = 1 + 0.9*(a/thickness)*(a/thickness)*(1 - 1/m1); 
%mp = (1-(alpha*a/(m1*thickness)))/(1-(a/thickness)); 
%Psc = Pb/mp; 
 
if (PfB31G < d_pressure) || (Pf92 < d_pressure) 
    fail_F2R = 1; 
    fail_F2L = 0; 
    fail = 1; 
elseif (PfB31G >= d_pressure) && (Pf92 >= d_pressure) 
    fail_F2R = 0; 
%     if (Psc < d_pressure) 
    if (a >= thickness) 
        fail_F2L = 1; 
        fail = 1; 
    else 
        fail_F2L = 0; 
        fail = 0; 
    end 
464 
 
end 
end 
 
% checkfail_L2R_SS determines if the tube has failed (leak or rupture) for 
% SS 
% Date: 3/29/16 
% 
===================================================================== 
function [fail_L2R] = checkfail_L2R_SS(a,c,sigma_ys,thickness,sigma_uts,d_pressure,Radius) 
 
%Modified B31G Rupture 
DDD = 2.0*(Radius + thickness); 
GGG = (c^4)/(DDD*thickness); 
if( GGG <= 50) 
    MMM = sqrt(1 + 0.6275*GGG - 0.003375*(GGG^2)); 
elseif( GGG > 50) 
    MMM = 0.032*GGG + 3.3; 
end 
PfB31G =  2*(sigma_ys + 68.95)*thickness*((1 - 0.85*a/thickness)/(1 - 
0.85*a/thickness/MMM))/DDD; 
%Shell-92 L2R  
M92=sqrt(1+((0.805*(c^4))/(DDD*thickness))); 
Pf92=((1.8*thickness*sigma_uts)/DDD)*((1-(a/thickness))/(1-(a/(thickness*M92)))); 
 
if (PfB31G < d_pressure) || (Pf92 < d_pressure) 
    fail_L2R = 1; 
else 
    fail_L2R = 0; 
end 
end 
 
 
